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Abstract 
This thesis examines the nature–origin, character, and temporal change–of the 
difference that educated and mostly male white southerners had about history at the level 
of historiography and other texts among themselves and in relation to “modern history” 
mostly in the states of Virginia and South Carolina in the first four decades of the 19th 
century. The study compares and contrasts such postulate with two other areas of cultural 
discussion that included, but was not limited to, history. The first is the locality of New 
England, with some support from the Mid–Atlantic States New York and Pennsylvania. 
By the 1790s, these areas dominated the national intellectual landscape of U.S. culture. 
The individuals resided, grew up, educated or published in these states. The second is the 
change about culture that was initiated in Europe roughly after the 1750s the thesis refers 
to as “modern history”. It transformed history into a major area of interest and cultural 
component. History attained a status it had previously lacked within Western modernity. 
The practical method is mainly a scanning of digitalized online contemporary printed 
sources–mostly leading books about history, leading contemporary journals, letter 
collections, and historical novels mostly produced in the U.S.–for word “history” and a 
variant “histor” that yields for example “historical” and “histories”. In order to reveal the 
southern difference, the findings have then been subjected to the study’s theoretical and 
methodological framework. Instead of being a scientific undertaking, linguistically 
neutral, or grounded in material reality as usually treated in the U.S., written history 
overlaps with other text production and communication such as literary writing, poetics, 
and cultural discourse. The philosophy of modernity and scientific truth history became 
associated with in its modern guise can be read as a metaphysical problem and crisis of 
especial severity in the southern areas. There, modern history entailed an experiential and 
communicative renovation that extended to individuals and their relationship to society. 
Through partly deductive, partly poetic readings, the study charts the course of this change 
that spans from syntax to discourse, philosophy, semiotics and poetics. Some key 
individuals, many rather obscure today, are identified. The concerns help reveal the 
tension of modern association of reality with history that has obscured and forgotten 
competing claims about and experiences of this relationship. 
The New England–led “bloc” departed from European skepticism at first still present 
in modern history as well. Virginia and South Carolina seldom rejected the European 
critical tradition. Modern history became disseminated more only in the 1840s, 
comparatively more in South Carolina. Previously, it was rare to see history as romantic, 
evangelical or scientific like in New England. Especially until the late–1830s, history 
predating modern history was combined with skeptical and ironic views about the history–
reality relationship. Unlike often portrayed, these learned white southerners were rarely 
sentimentalists. Equally rare was to conflate reality and science with history for nationalist 
ends and mold useful (white, male) citizens. Forgotten perspectives and agencies can be 
re–examined by including more recent theories about history and language. 
 
Keywords: U.S. South, Early National Period, Antebellum Period, historiography, 
philosophy of history, narratology, deconstruction 
  
 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Tutkimuksen tarkoitus on selvittää, miten enimmäkseen miespuoliset koulutetut tai 
oppineet henkilöt lähinnä Yhdysvaltain Virginian ja Etelä-Carolinan osavaltioissa erosivat 
historiakäsityksiltään sekä ”modernista historiasta” että keskinäisesti historiankirjoituksen 
ja muiden tekstien tasolla 1800-luvun alun Yhdysvalloissa. Henkilöt asuivat, kasvoivat, 
kouluttautuivat tai julkaisivat näissä osavaltioissa. Tutkimus vertailee tätä alkuoletusta 
kahteen vaikutusvaltaisempaan historian sisältävään kulttuurikeskustelun alueeseen. Näitä 
ovat ensiksi Yhdysvalloissa ensisijaisesti New Englandin alue, toissijaisesti sitä 
kulttuurisesti myötäilleet New Yorkin ja Pennsylvanian osavaltiot. Toinen alue on 
Euroopassa 1750-luvun jälkeen tapahtunut kulttuurikeskustelun muutos. ”Moderni 
historia” ymmärretään tutkimuksessa monitahoisena muutoksena, jossa kiinnostus 
historiaan virisi toden teolla länsimaissa tärkeänä osana yhteiskuntaa että kulttuuria. 
Aineisto koostuu painetuista internetiin digitoiduista aineistoista: tunnetuimmat 
historiantutkimukset ja akateemiset lehdet, joidenkin tunnetuimpien henkilöiden 
kirjekokoelmat ja Yhdysvalloissa tuotetut tunnetut historiaromaanit. Tutkimus tutkii 
aineistoja ensisijaisesti käyttämällä hakusanoja ”history” ja ”histor”. Löydöksiä on 
seuraavaksi käsitelty tutkimuksen viitekehyksen kautta. Yhdysvalloissa historia käsitetään 
usein tieteelliseksi, kielellisesti neutraaliksi ja materiaaliseen todellisuuteen pohjautuvaksi 
ilmiöksi tai tutkimusalaksi. Tutkimus väittää, että historialla on yhtymäkohtia muun kielen 
tuottamisen ja kommunikaation–kirjallisuuden, runouden, kulttuurikeskustelun–kanssa. 
Modernin historian filosofia ja tieteellistys voidaan lukea vakavana maailmankuvallisena 
ongelmana ja kriisinä kyseisissä etelävaltioissa. Moderniin historiaan sisältyi näillä 
alueilla kommunikatiivinen ja kokemuksellinen muutos, joka ulottui yksilöön ja hänen 
suhteeseensa yhteiskuntaan. Tutkimus yrittää kartoittaa tätä muutosta lukemalla tekstejä 
osin yleisiä suuntauksia heijastellen ja osin runollisesti. Samalla tutkimus tunnistaa useita 
nykyisin jo lähes täysin unohdettuja yksilöitä. Nämä kysymykset auttavat näkemään 
moderniin mielleyhtymään historiasta todellisuutena kytkeytyvät jännitteet, joka on 
jättänyt syrjään sen kanssa poikkeavat ja ristiriitaiset kokemukset ja väitteet. 
New Englandin ”blokki” hylkäsi epäilyn historiasta, joka kuului eurooppalaiseen 
historiaperinteeseen ja aluksi moderniin historiaan. Virginiassa ja Etelä-Carolinassa 
perintö harvoin hylättiin. Vasta 1840-luvulta alkaen lähinnä Etelä-Carolinassa ilmeni 
enemmän modernia historiaa historiankirjoituksessa. Romanttiset, evankeliset ja 
tieteelliset ainekset historiasta olivat aiemmin harvinaisia Virginiassa ja Etelä-Carolinassa, 
toisin kuin New Englandissa. Historian ja todellisuuden suhde oli vähintään 1830-luvun 
jälkipuoliskolle hyvin epäilevä ja ironinen. Perinteinen Etelän historiatietoisuuden 
luonnehdinta sentimentaalisena nostalgiana oli lähes tuntematon, samoin historian 
näkeminen tieteenä, jonka tehtävä on nationalistinen ja synnyttää hyödyllisiä (valkoisia, 
miespuolisia) kansalaisia. Unohdettuja näkökulmia ja kulttuuritoimijoita voidaan tutkia 
uudelleen sisällyttämällä uudempaa teoriaa historian ja kielen suhteesta. Tutkimus liittyy 
kiinnostukseen valkoisten etelävaltiolaisten kulttuuriin ennen sisällissotaa. 
 
Asiasanat: USA:n Etelä, USA:n itsenäisyyden alku, USA:n sisällissotaa edeltävä aika, 
historiankirjoitus, historianfilosofia, narratologia, dekonstruktio  
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12 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between the American South and New England 
concerning the writing of history in the early nineteenth century. Within these areas, the 
study pays most attention to the South and within the South, to the states of Virginia and 
South Carolina (especially Charleston), because these locales are traditionally considered 
the most influential areas concerning written culture that includes history.
1
 To the north of 
Virginia, I shall emphasize New England, because the area was in a dominant position 
regarding white U.S. culture in the 1800s. During my examination, I shall constantly refer 
to European theories about history: the 1800s was an exciting time in terms of the change 
in Western history that built on previous Enlightenment ideas. The U.S. was not an 
outsider in the process. I shall focus on philosophy and literature,
2
 because they impact the 
way history is written and what it is. According to my thesis, viewed from these angles, 
Virginia and South Carolina were very critical about the change, irreconciliable to it, or 
both. The research question I shall try to answer is: “What were the philosophical 
differences in historiography between the white southerners of Virginia and South 
Carolina and inhabitants of New England during the early nineteenth century?”  
In order to discuss the relations of philosophy and literature on history, I shall divide 
“history” into three separate but interrelated areas of inquiry following Alun Munslow’s 
typology.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of American 
Literature from the Beginnings to 1920, Volume II (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958), 61. 
Tellingly, Parrington, the interwar intellectual giant on American culture, spends only 125 pages on 
antebellum South out of the nearly 500 in his analysis that covers decades 1800–1860. 
2
 See for just a sampling of work that examines these topics and change, Maurice Mandelbaum, 
History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth–Century Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1971); Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki, eds., The Writing of History: Literary 
Form and Historical Understanding (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Suzanne 
Gearhart, The Open Boundary of History and Fiction: A Critical Approach to the French 
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, 
Heidegger, and the Ground of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984); Hans 
Robert Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics. trans. Michael Shaw, Theory and 
History of Literature series Volume 3, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 
104-9; Philippe Lacoue–Labarthe and Jean–Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of 
Literature in German Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester, Intersections series 
(New York: SUNY, 1988); Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), 176-79; Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: 
Three Narrative Histories of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). 
3
 Alun Munslow, The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 
2006), entry for “Historiography,” 142-43. I have added space to this anatomy, because spatial             
change complemented the temporal one. 
  
 
 
13 
First is the change in Europe that had began in the 1700s brought forth a new time and 
a new space. For my purposes, I shall only make the following summary of this vast topic.  
The new time moved–and thinned out–from cyclic to developing and linear. 
Previously among the ancients and Christians, the present and the future were not valued 
more than the past. Virtue and vice were impervious to time. Now the past became more 
obsolete and a hindrance to progress, and the future a promise to root out–or at least 
decrease at a cost–evil and pestilence from society.The new space synchronized history 
with modern man’s ability to control nature by using his independent, free mind. In other 
words, by the French Revolution, every individual person–at least white bourgeois male–
became a historical participant. The new space was a unity of all men–in practice those 
that were agreeable to the bourgeoisie–within a nation. History, grounded in God, now 
guided men and nations. The old space had divided people into high and low, noble and 
savage. Its history that addressed humans–unlike natural history–was located either in 
poetry, rhetoric, or in events that happened to individuals. The old space never saw man as 
an active shaper of historical events themselves: spatially, history was retroactive 
collecting and compiling, not proactive doing. At the most, individual examples–persons 
categorically above others and hence outside discourse and comparison–could offer moral 
lessons for multitudes. The new space leveled these distinctions. The Yankee response–
arguably, the most rigorous in the world–was to implement the mastery of mind over 
nature by imposing the new space that was grounded in natural science and natural history 
on the old to extract “a rational basis for public policy and reform.”4 In Germany, the new 
space entailed a new, essentially discursive philosophy about man in history that tried 
more ponderously to come to grips with the now–abandoned nature. Following Jean–
Jacques Rousseau, the Germans held that Western man is only able to exist as a synthetic 
being, as someone who has become philosophically conscious of his split from nature. At 
the cost of breaking the security of natural identity, humanity could discourse about 
history in more free and more united space along its timeline.  
Second is the question of history as an academic pursuit, how knowledge about the 
past is had and what it is. This question relates to the status of history as knowledge that 
belongs to the field of philosophy named epistemology. Epistemology is interested in both 
what and how can phenomena and things be known in science. Third is the question of 
historiography, that is, the textual remains of the past, the empirical level of the study. Its 
traditional definition is “the study of and writing about some past facts” dug up by 
academics. Combined, these three changes and levels constitute what the study refers to as 
modern history.  
The more recent definition of historiography, subscribed to by the study, is “meta–
history” or study of how history is written by others.5 However, although I shall deal with 
this relationship—since history was not a specialized field of knowledge at the time—and 
                                                 
4
 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History, 14. While Gillespie only mentions “the 
Anglo–French tradition,” I have singled out New England, because differences within it, France and 
England were notable for my concerns. 
5
 Paul Cartledge, “Introduction,” in Companion to Historiography, ed. Michael Bentley 
(Routledge: London, 1997), 2. 
  
 
 
14 
for reasons of selection and method, I shall not limit my analysis of written history only to 
historians or proper historiographers.  
As for regional grouping, the study will examine 245 written southern sources 
inclusive of Maryland, and 49 sources produced in New England, inclusive of the Mid–
Atlantic. Since the focus is on southern states, they dominate in sources. For the most part, 
the northern regions are represented by those individuals that are considered major or 
leading in research literature. Most often, a source is regionally grouped based on it having 
been written by a person residing or being active in a given state. At times, however, what 
counts is either the place of publication or the individual’s past or present location. This 
second, more phenomenological basis for grouping enables illuminating internal 
comparisons and contrasts in a given context. A common feature of my material is that–
save for a few exceptions that were important in cases that featured white women more 
prominently–it was mostly produced by white males and persons more educated or self–
learned than average. My South is thus composed mostly of such individuals residing in 
the states of Virginia and South Carolina, and their writings.  
As for temporal framing, my time frame is roughly between 1800 and 1844, spanning 
the Early National and Antebellum periods of U.S. history. The rationale to focus on years 
starting from 1800 rather than the 1780s is, first and foremost, discursive and arising from 
the aims and design of the study. In history, the 1800s was the decade when especially in 
Germany, the spatiotemporal changes about history increasingly became applied to the 
more pedantic practice of scientific research.
6
 It was also the decade when, initiated by 
pro–Federalist historian John Marshall, historiography as a medium of transmitting the 
wisdom of the Founders appeared in the U.S. beset with partisan conflict about its 
meaning that was registered by Thomas Jefferson of Virginia.
7
 Also in Virginia, the first 
years of the 19th century saw prominent the first historical investigations into 
revolutionary leaders as well as a reflective look at its society by lawyer and man of letters 
William Wirt that stayed relevant in the South through the next several decades. Equally 
important, it was when New England annexed history to previous antisouthern politics of 
culture.
8
 This aggravated the notion of the South as an anomalous region in the national 
project the first wave of post–Revolution Federalist historians had established. Finally, it 
is my impression that the early–1800s have been less studied historically with a southern 
focus than the times around the Revolution, the American Civil War, or the 
Reconstruction. My end point is 1844, because in my locales of focus after roughly this 
                                                 
6
 The 1800s synthesized “the tradition of text criticism of classical philology; the work with 
sources by the erudites and legal historians; and the concept of the nation as a unique whole in 
which spiritual forces bind things together and each element influences the others. Used with these 
elements was a methodology taken from the diverse currents that helped maintain the autonomy of 
the historical inquiry in relation to all other scholarly inquiries.” Ernst Breisach, Historiography: 
Ancient, Miedieval, and Modern, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 229. 
7
 ibid., 226. 
8
 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 
1776–1820 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 268. As I shall elaborate, 
antisouthernism began around the 1790s in New England. 
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date, several changes occurred at individual and institutional levels that brought 
southerners closer to history as the other places conceived it. This manifested at levels of 
organizations and how history was thought about and communicated. Even though the 
1840s marked the beginnings of southern sectionalism, the study contends that, in senses 
of philosophy and figuration of history, sectionalism ironically brought with it a stronger 
confluence of southern historical consciousness and modern history. As the justly famed 
intellectual historian Michael O’Brien possibly first pointed out, Antebellum South was 
never exceptional, an anti– or pre–modern sanctuary. However, this study contends that in 
the context of modern history, persons in Virginia and South Carolina also had 
philosophy, experience and figurations of older, differing and even conflicting sort. I agree 
with the kernel of O’Brien’s argument, but I would insist that despite certain–and 
growing–inroads of modern history, there was discomfort and even difference in regard to 
it and its premises–in places implicitly acceded to by O’Brien himself–that can be 
perceived when sources are audited from these directions. The study is interested in this 
process from a comparative angle. Lastly, sheer scope of the undertaking renders a further 
foray into the time line impossible. 
Like any academic endeavor, the study is hardly exhaustive of its subject. In the first 
place, it has been constrained by what has been preserved and digitally put online. All the 
writings analyzed were found on the Internet. The databases mainly used were Google 
Books, www.archive.org, and the University of Michigan’s Making of America online 
journal collection. These contained digitalized reprints of books and journals. An online 
newspaper collection and an online manuscript collection were also used, but 
comparatively little. No archival research was conducted. This was the first criterion for 
selection. In the second place, there was a second, more interpretive criterion: it derived 
from research literature that was considered authoritative, with the goal to examine at least 
the figures and journals it considered prominent or influential for history in this time 
frame and locations as to their output in either book or journal format, in some cases aided 
by letter collections. In the third place, there was a third criterion for selection that was a 
scanning of the thusly found sources for the topic of history using computer help from 
beginning to end: entering “histor” into the search option yielded all matches of “history,” 
“historical” or “historian” for example. Simple “history” was also used as a search 
criterion. There are two exceptions to this: 1. with the aim to attain as variegated an 
understanding of history as possible, if the sample was redundant to the contextual 
argument about history and reflected on history very little, the result was, as a rule, left out 
after careful consideration. As a result of this aim, although constrained by the first and 
second criterions, the sample extends from the major figures in research literature to 
include several more obscure personalities. 2. Chapter 5, analyzing a report and lecture 
notes printed as books, combines the results of the scanning with a closer examination of 
some of the sources that were most used in case of the notes. All the books and journals 
that slip outside these three criteria have been left out.  
The results were analyzed through the theoretical and methodological framework of 
the study that claims that “history” was a concept loaded with philosophical and often 
figural value, in other words, that it did not exist in isolation but instead rose from 
surrounding discouse. Google Books was a necessity in locating some of the intertextual 
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relations across historiographical and poetic genres as well as, especially in chapter 5, 
some sources that were used. The study proceeds from the assumption it was not self–
evident that only those trained as historians or aspiring to become such wrote and thought 
about history in public or private. It also was not obvious that history was to be in book 
monograph form or that it excluded the imagination. Thereby, I find it important to 
analyze both amateur and professional historical monographs as well as other printed 
sources such as published letter collections and discussions on the pages of major 
contemporary scholarly journals within the above-set frames. The authors are historians, 
men of letters, intellectuals, educators, theologians, novelists, poets and essayists, and 
even a gazetteer.
9
 
The study thus follows the recent reconceptualization of society through culture, or the 
tendency to combine the intellectual “top–down” level of analysis on how culture was 
thought about with the “bottom–up” level of analysis on how these ideas were put to use 
in practice. However, the study departs from conceiving of cultural practice in a 
material(ist) manner.
10
 Rather, the study thinks of culture’s relationship to modern history 
more as philosophical and societal upheaval
11
 in the South that the practice of modern 
history further disseminated and aggravated in texts. At the extreme, for example those 
areas of southern culture that were still emulating or living Renaissance humanism of the 
1500s about history and culture gradually came under tremendous pressure from modern 
history in the 1800s. Such world–views and practices were ultimately irreconcilable. 
Thereby, the study seeks to continuously interpret culture as a regulative but at the same 
time violent force. This concern extends from general philosophical and aesthetic shifts 
affecting history to their concrete manifestations as texts and functional outlining of 
discourse formation and bourgeois prose industry in the South in the context of history.   
 
Background of the study 
 
The motivation for the study arises especially from my three above definitions of history 
that I shall next elaborate on.  
Firstly, the U.S. culture in general has not been keen to think about history as time and 
experience. Satirist Henry Louis Mencken even once claimed all American thinking is 
                                                 
9
 A newsman or gazetteer preceded both the press and specialized history. In a form of a gazette 
(though the terms became interchangeable) he produced a simple record of everyday events as 
history. Gazettes as histories had generally become obsolete by the late–1600s. Yves Lavoinne, 
“Journalists, History and Historians: The Ups and Downs of a Professional Entity,” trans. David 
Motlow, Réseaux, French Journal of Communication 2 (1994): 205-21. In the U.S., gazettes 
continued to be published in the 1800s. 
10
 Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, “Introduction,” in Beyond the Cultural Turn: New 
Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, Studies on 
the History of Society and Culture series (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 11. 
11
 See especially Eve Tavor Bannet, Postcultural Theory: Critical Theory after the Marxist 
Paradigm (London: Macmillan, 1993). 
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religious, political or economic.
12
 Americans have been “obsessed” with authenticity even 
in historical fiction at least up to the late–1940s.13 Pervasive faith in progress and the 
future in the U.S. have discouraged preoccupied backward glances.  
However, relatively speaking, the strongest exception to the rule may be the U.S. 
South. Though few modern southerners have re–examined American history in detail, the 
more folksy levels of southern practice and experience, as well as theories put forth by 
some southern literary critics, indicate that southern culture is more traumatized in ways 
that resemble Europe.
14
 This notion extends to southern historical thinking and 
experience.
15
  
                                                 
12
 Mencken quoted in Richard Ruland, The Rediscovery of American Literature: Premises of 
Critical Taste, 1900–1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 98. 
13
 Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American 
Culture (New York: Vintage, 1993), 29. 
14
 See, more generally, Elizabeth Fox–Genovese, “The Anxiety of History: The Southern 
Confrontation with Modernity,” Southern Cultures 1 (1993): 68-70; David Goldfield, Still Fighting 
the Civil War: The American South and Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2002); Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War 
(New York: Vintage, 2009), 197. For Tate, Ransom and William Faulkner as modernists see, for 
example, Paul V. Murphy, The Rebuke of History: The Southern Agrarians and American 
Conservative Thought (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 35-36, 87-88; 
Bertram Wyatt–Brown, “William Faulkner: Art, Alienation, and Alcohol,” in Bridging Southern 
Cultures: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. John Lowe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2005), esp. 80-81.  
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Raven: Literary Overdeterminedness in France and the South since Poe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
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Southern Studies series (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2009), ch. 5, esp. 148-150; Daniel 
Joseph Singal, William Faulkner: The Making of a Modernist, The Fred W. Morrison Series in 
Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press, 1997). Faulkner’s historical 
imagination has been compared to post–WWII German authors in Peter Nicolaisen, “Faulkner and 
Southern History: A View from Germany,” Southern Cultures 4 (1998): 31-44.  
15
 For a pioneering diagnosis, see C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, rev. 3rd 
ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008). Philosopher of history F. R. Ankersmit 
used the contemporary U.S. South as an example of rupture at the very core of modern Western 
historical consciousness idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel has diagnosed. In rupture, “a 
civilization discards a former identity while defining its new entity precisely in terms of what has 
been discarded or surrendered.” Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience Cultural Memory 
in the Present series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 13. For a comparative approach 
into such southern trauma, see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, 
Mourning, and Recovery, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Picador, 2004), ch. 1.  
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A strong counter tradition to this–one that is quite similar with the U.S. mainstream–
has cared little for white southern culture apart from utilitarian use value. To this tradition, 
white southern culture matters only as a site or depository for political, economic and 
moral lessons. The original utilitarians on the South were Whigs such as Walter Hines 
Page, John Spencer Bassett, and William Peterfield Trent. From the 1880s, they retained 
an explicitly economic and moralistic framework about southern culture that extended 
even to southern literature.
16
 Their work stayed relevant for roughly a century, because 
they were also the first white southerners to criticize southern slavery. At the same time, 
they wanted to leave behind southern society before the Civil War. Ironically, many 
southerners themselves agree with such a mainstream approach into southern culture.
17
 
Taking liberal progressiveness as an axiomatic truth about the South and converse 
polemics or exclusion of all phenomena that fail to fit has only recently been more 
forcefully exposed as a myth that serves national ends.
18
 In other words, seeing anything 
violent about the idea of America as essentially liberal and progressive has often been 
missed in a southern context. By contrast, this study extends the notion of southern trauma 
about modernity and culture to the period under study. 
Secondly, this study seeks to rethink the spectacle presented by academic southern 
history. In other words, the study is critical of the roots of academic southern history and 
conceives history’s relationship to knowledge differently. At its institutional birth, the 
purpose to study history in the U.S. was either scientific or utilitarian.
19
 The Southern 
History Association was founded in 1896 to branch out from preoccupation with military 
campaigns of the Civil War (1861–1865) to preserve written Confederate records and “to 
win the battle of history as partial compensation for the Lost Cause.” However, the 
association declined to merge with the American Historical Association, ending its 
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 Daniel Joseph Singal, The War Within: From Victorian to Modernist Thought in the South, 
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The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, eds. Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 7-9. 
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19 
publishing activities in 1907. Historians living in the former Confederacy combined were 
fewer than historians living in Massachusetts alone. They had heavy workloads, poor 
salaries and no specialization in history. From 1903, after the American Historical 
Association convened in New Orleans, Louisiana, articles on southern history steadily 
became more accepted in the American Historical Association’s journal The American 
Historical Review, a major organ of United States history, provided they met the approval 
of its editor John Franklin Jameson.
20
  
When a utilitarian approach into southern culture became applied to southern history, 
the result resembled the Whig interpretation of history. In such an interpretation, historical 
research tends to value progress and progressive political philosophy. The amount of 
progressivism is inversely proportionate to the amount of time: the less temporally 
detailed the research, the more “whiggish” the result. What the past is becomes derivative 
from present, often political, issues.
21
   
Historians seldom departed from social scientific or economic analyses that enabled 
them to bridge their scientific and utilitarian concerns. At the birth of academic southern 
history, powerful industrial interests had begun to dominate college boards that affected 
endowments. Popular political mannequins also interfered in academic work and 
advocates of wealth gained increasing prominence. Southern history was censored 
severely as a result.
22
 It was first conducted in accordance with Social Darwinism
23
 of 
German–educated New Englander Herbert Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins. Jameson had 
studied under Adams. Though lamenting the dry language of many histories, he applauded 
history’s novel accuracy, thoroughness and its commonsensical separation from literature. 
Further, for Jameson, history had to be oriented for the future.
24
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 Woodward contends the situation was similar across all American higher education. 
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Jameson thus was receptive to progressive view about history. Progressive history 
spanned from individuals to institutions. It was chauvinistic, inherently in conflict, and 
liberal. It rejected the relevance of history and Europe “on behalf of a better future.” In 
such a future–oriented and context–independent view, American history would guarantee 
“the ever fuller realization of the individual rights of divine or natural law origins, within 
the new republican institutional order.”25 Frederick Jackson Turner was one of the most 
influential perpetuators of the approach. For Turner, the supposedly anti–metaphysical 
geographical frontier was timeless space and the only ground of American history. The 
frontier guaranteed history’s continuity and potentially affirmed the scientific status of 
history. Such scientific history was composed of positivism,
26
 Social Darwinism, and 
economics.
27
 From the 1920s and 1930s, southern history, already immersed in the 
utilitarian side of things, saw the scientific element of history as an impartial antidote 
                                                                                                                                                   
Scholarship in America, Volume I: Selected Essays, eds. Morey Rothberg and Jacqueline Goggin 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1993), 302-15. 
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against sectional prejudices.
28
 As a result, academic southern history largely became a 
social science by 1920.
29
  
Although historian C. Vann Woodward highlighted the dilemma of the South as a 
misfit region and thus opened the relevance of my first category for southern history, 
Woodward also perpetuated the interpretation of the South as an exceptional region with 
exceptional problems grounded in geography.
30
 This is not surprising since Woodward’s 
work was inspired by the interwar progressive social science turn in and on the South.
31
 
The scientific–utilitarian abandonment was so thorough that only in the 1980s have more 
scholars begun to examine this period’s culture in more detail about culture beyond the 
traditional concerns with economics and slavery.
32
 The major exceptions to the rule were 
Wilbur J. Cash and Rollin G. Osterweis in the 1940s.
33
 However, O’Brien has exposed 
their interpretations outdated and intellectually lacking.
34
 It is O’Brien’s work that has 
offered the most sustained treatment yet of this neglected field.
35
 It has marked a 
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significant broadening of horizons especially in context of white southerners. But as a 
whole, O’Brien notes the “master paradigm” of New England has contributed to dealing 
with the South with the lenses of social history, little theory, and few leftist perspectives.
36
 
For me this is problematic since the research agenda of the southern progressive social 
scientists was attached to nominalist
37
 science, or scientism, united by method.
38
 
Ironically, it is only a slightly rehashed view about history laid out by the Yankees more 
than a century earlier. In addition, the study revisits the time period the progressives 
wanted to forget, and I could spot only two southern authors who believed that natural 
science can simply be implemented on history. Therefore, the study holds that it is 
imperative to rethink the relationship between truth and history, something that gets 
seldom done in American history.
39
 The study conceptualizes the relationship between 
knowledge and history in a way that is different from scientific or social scientific 
approaches. 
Thirdly, metahistorical studies about American historiography have been quite rare.
40
 
Text analyses about the time period that would take into account philosophy and 
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semiotics
41
 are even more so. Textually speaking, only Philip F. Gura has paid more 
constant attention to the role that philosophy of language and semiotics have played in 
American cultural and religious history before the Civil War to my knowledge. Dorothy 
Ross is the only one who has cautiously speculated about northern historiography of the 
period as narrative.
42
  
In this scholarship, the American South is not the focus. For southerners, language has 
mainly been a theme for literature, and pressures for progressive utility have further 
discouraged applications of literary theory to history.
43
 Sentimentalism and romance were 
the key literary tropes of southern reunion.
44
 They are still relevant and have dominated 
southern history. However, often unnoticed are the implications of the essential 
commodification of such figuration that was in full swing by 1880. Already in 1873, it had 
pragmatically combined business with peace and reconciliation.
45
 It is problematic in a 
sense that cuts across all my categories, because it lets slip the notion of history as a 
single, non–problematic entity under the radar that is hardly tenable today when history, in 
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all these senses, gets theorized about.
46
 The deceptive mixture of scientific objectivity, 
realism, (religious) pathos and commercialism has obscured issues such theorizing has 
brought up.
47
  
The period under study was when an aesthetic and communicative shift about language 
that paralleled the spatiotemporal one became cemented into a division into literature that 
dealt with the imagination and history that dealt with factual knowledge.
48
 As I shall 
examine, unlike in New England, this was far from an obvious truth in the South. Still, 
scholars who take a linguistic approach into southern history are rare. Though speculations 
from literature to history have been fairly traditional
49
 and language has been a peculiarly 
southern theme as testified by a strong tradition of philology by Jefferson and the 20th 
century emergence of New Criticism,
50
 the issue has not been carried into historiography. 
The exceptions have not paid attention to how philosophy relates to history.
51
 Conversely, 
O’Brien pays attention to cosmopolitan ideas about philosophy and literature for history, 
but departs from treating history as textual practice, something intellectual history can, 
nevertheless, opt for.
52
 Though some acknowledge the South’s modernist53 issues about 
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culture touch upon historiography,
54
 southern historiography has not been examined in 
detail. Further, only fairly recently have such cultural problems been located around the 
period.
55
 Even in southern literature at least to the early–1990s, theories about language 
remained rooted in a division of labor: literary analyses were left for New Criticism, 
positivist Old Historicism that had a theory–free ideal and materialistic focus examined 
history and biography.
56
 Except the more cynical William Faulkner, religion rather than 
irony has offered a place of solace for southern historical consciousness and southern 
aesthetes alike. But critics say it is a weak defense against rational, individualistic society, 
amounts to utopia, and depends on (bourgeois) romance.
57
 My niche, then, is a wholly 
new avenue into southern history where attention is paid to metahistory, textual practice as 
well as philosophy.  
 
Theoretical and methodological framework 
 
According to Forster, current avenues into southern history are four: 1. a literary agrarian 
approach crystallized in Richard M. Weaver, a source of influence for historian Eugene D. 
Genovese, basically modernization
58
 critique via southern culture, 2. an institutional 
approach to religion, the most common area of the four according to Forster, 3. postwar 
reconciliation, 4. racism, pretty much the only issue of interest previously.
59
 This study 
has most in common with the first area but it is more subtle about it. By contrast, Weaver, 
the agrarians and Genovese avoid thinking about southern history in a particularly recent 
European fashion and even O’Brien notes the European theories only in passing. Southern 
historical modernization critique need not exclude Western discussions about modernity 
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and culture done since the Second World War. To the contrary, these insights help address 
and examine: 1. Traditional ignorance of how philosophy and experience bear on history, 
2. Traditional ignorance of the period as culture related to the groups and locales of focus, 
3. The belief that applied natural science can be methodologically adequate about history 
and historiography, 4. Traditional ignorance of language as related to history and 
historiography. These problems are greatly different from the Yankees in regard to history 
as time, thought, and experience, and from most modern white Americans across the board 
in regard to history as knowledge and historiography. 
Consequently, the study shifts the entire previous science–based tradition about its 
object towards a more historical one that, by comparison, is extremely wary of generalities 
as well as conscious of their instrumental and parasitic substance as explanatory, or 
substantially empty, means. Such operations were only enabled by humans existing in a 
historically conscious manner in the first place.
60
 The study questions this bias, because 
the study contends its subject matter cannot be reconciled to these presuppositions. It tries 
to accomplish this in two interconnecting ways. 1. It will re–examine the convention of 
modern history as an academic practice to make no bones about text that is still paramount 
about southern history. 2. Using texts, it will try to map the mutations in historical 
awareness that bear on historical text in terms of semiotics and philosophy. These aims are 
elaborated on below. 
Conventionally, text of history is only window–dressing to an objective and separate 
social sphere that causally determines it.
61
 In the late–1990s, less than 1% of American 
and Canadian historians ranked historiography as close to their top priorities.
62
 However, 
in its desire to dethrone the independent and rational enquirer of history–something 
Victorian liberal historians cherished
63–materialistic social history also prohibited 
philosophy from intervening, via concepts, between consciousness and material reality. 
Concepts are a filter to provide meaning.
64
 Except for Woodward’s opening, this 
philosophically idealist claim is in my research tradition a fairly unknown intermediate 
step. However, concepts and meanings are a very old notion in European history and 
almost a truism for historians today according to Munslow.
65
 Its relevance has increased in 
the past decades of historical theory. The study seeks to further refine this postulate.  
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Specifically, as text, the study shall conceive of historiography as figural in a sense of 
theorist of history Hayden White. On White’s definition, the reality claim of a historical 
text cannot do without establishing relations between contexts, objects, and, lastly, 
descriptions or representations comprised of historical events, actions, structures and 
processes. The end product that emerges is squeezed through specific discursive 
communities in the academy and the audience for approval. These relations, thus, serve 
narrative ends rather than emerge isometrically from nature or possess inherently analytic 
or formal content. Therefore, historian must manipulate the relations across these levels. 
Although often made implicit, historians need to actively establish some relations between 
them. This active establishing means that history, comprised of context, object and 
description–categories that roughly correspond with the historical anatomy of this study–is 
figural. This is because even what is historical, what is at first glance the most obvious 
level of history, is not something given or grounded in nature.  
History is through and through metaphorical. However, as White and a host of others 
have hastened to add, metaphoricity does not impair historical, or even scientific, veracity. 
It only impairs direct access to what is real.
66
 It is not necessarily vicious, but it can be if 
metaphoricity is forgotten and more rational and natural scientific methodology is 
imposed on phenomena instead, particularly if such an imposition distorts said phenomena 
and turns a blind eye to its own presuppositions. Such has been the case in my object of 
study. Since poetic metaphor “is not necessarily connected with poetry, it is possible to 
generalize from [this] suggestion to the idea that producing, responding to and analyzing 
metaphor is a form of active participation in the circulation and criticism of meanings in 
society.”67 This concern has become more acute among historians at least since 1990 when 
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first language and then agency have raised concern over writing of history.
68
 At issue is 
not ridding metaphor from history, nor collapsing history into poetics. Rather, the study 
shall attempt to examine how the metaphoric or figural element of history that produces 
discursive meanings interacts with broader concerns of philosophy, semiotics and 
aesthetics in my object of study.  
The study shall not stop at meaning–the concession that in history, concepts are a 
necessary filter that gets imposed on reality, that function metaphorically, and that are 
steeped in ideology and discourse. The study goes further afield to seek to address the 
more complex question how my first category–philosophy manifest as experience and 
time–shapes historical meaning at levels of semiotics and ontology or, “what is?” In other 
words, the study tries to pay attention to the residue and conflict modern history as a 
philosophical, aesthetic and semiotic force metaphysically enacted on my authors and their 
world. Loosely following philosopher Jacques Derrida and his deconstruction,
69
 the study 
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claims that although discursivity and language is an inescapable condition for humans to 
be,
70
 white southern existence met with a crisis in relation to the philosophical and 
semiotic forces of modern history that effected a transformation on their human ways to 
be. Though lacking in systematic method in principle,
71
 the study aims to present a 
deductive reading of this transformation by paying careful attention to the text–history and 
history–philosophy relations.   
Though white southerners were not exceptional, the study shall attempt to address this 
change, because like Derrida, most of them doubted Platonic philosophy.
72
 A 
reformulation of Plato was the philosophy behind modern history and historical text. This 
reformulation radicalized “the thinking of totality and the Subject” towards infinity and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, being became uniformly deduced from the supersensible 
realm that everyone’s shared feelings accessed and partook in. On the other hand, being 
became an actor in an organicist history that aimed for an ideal resolution among thus 
feeling–sharing–but mutually and internally conflicting–beings.73 Because every–one 
partook in the One as spirit and organism, it no longer was possible to be without the 
spiritual–organicist bond. This change underpinned modern history. It conflicted with the 
South, where vestiges of categorically different organic society of the body politic 
survived that was far more static, hierarchic and communal. By dramatic contrast, New 
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England scholars radicalized organicism. The study attempts to chart these differences and 
shifts that overlap with history’s textual and semiotic dimensions. In this overlap of being, 
text, semiotics and philosophy, Derrida is relevant, because he strategically questions 
idealist iterations of Plato that modern history became grounded in. Such undertaking 
reaches beyond metaphor and metaphysics. According to philosopher Martin Heidegger 
who Derrida follows on the issue, metaphor can only examine production within 
metaphysics
74
 whose connotations are idealist, Platonic and theological.
75
 Limiting 
metaphor and idealist historiography within metaphysics enables alertness, first, to their 
effects as organizers of reality, second, to the changes they exacted on being and thereby 
on culture, and, third, to differences from them. 
Derrida is interested in being that is not only linguistic (written or spoken), scientific 
(known or referred to), thought about in reflection, nor material negative of these ways to 
reality. For clarity, I shall refer to these relations as R[1]. R[1] refers to reality, but it is 
also incumbent upon reality. I shall refer to these incumbent remains as R[2].
76
 Simply 
put, R[2], as being, cannot be exhausted by R[1]. The way to examine the effects R[1] has 
had is for Derrida, as in case of White, a historical and rigorous examination into the 
discursive ways thinking has influenced concepts at levels of context, medium and 
effective limit. The point is to attain a glimpse of R[2]. At issue is not more genuine truth 
inherent in R[2] or its specific grounding, but a critical exposition on how R[1] has dealt 
with R[2]
77
 that is still ethical.
78
 Due to Plato, R[2] became ignored in art and truth: the 
only way to R[1] or nature was via inferior and secondary imitation that put present R[1] 
as primary and superior. R[1] could only be accessed through discourse or secondary, 
posterior imitation. The dynamics to access R[1] depend on re–presentation as relation or 
resemblance that agrees, relates or equalizes with a present unveiled object. Thus, 
imitation aims at either revealing nature–the move from R[2] to R[1]–or imitating R[1] in 
an equal relationship that ideally makes R[1] and its inherent meaning transparent and 
effaces the imitator. Derrida names this the process of truth. Using modernist poet 
Stephane Mallarmé as an example, Derrida claims that syntactically, texts–especially 
those that are undecideable or more self–conscious about their operation on nature–write 
using a figure that is both other and free from the homogenous and homogenising space 
that is R[1]. This writing does not overturn the sacredness of truth, but it wants to escape 
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its pertinence or authority, and maintains a playful relationship to it. In such writing, what 
writes and what is written are both dislocated.
79
  
I claim in their similar suspicion or even liminal difference in regard to metaphysics, 
many southerners were in a dangerous position about idealist philosophy as it manifested 
in truth and meaning
80
 within modern history. It derived from a philosophical dislocation: 
a version of freedom and life that defied the philosophy of modern history. This entails 
alertness about their texts of history and philosophy of modern history.
81
 A strategic 
examining of the discursive metaphysics of history may produce “a force of dislocation 
that spreads itself throughout the entire system”82 when it pays attention to production of 
southern text. Derrida’s approach is comparable to Faulkner’s: both men sorrowfully 
reject all comfort of representations as temporal continuity and language, faith in uniform 
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and linear time and narrative. But in addition, Derrida is a very theological writer as 
well.
83
 Many southerners held similar distrust about the text of history.   
This is, still, an entirely novel approach in the present context–but that’s “the point.”84 
If U.S. historiography and U.S. history have differed from this study in their general lack 
of interest in theory, American Studies acts as a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, 
scholars in the discipline are nowadays sympathetic to postmodern practices of inquiry 
that, after some opposition in the 1990s, include deconstruction.
85
 On the other hand, 
history’s textual and philosophical sides, though also acts of cultural producing after 
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White, have usually been left alone by American Studies.
86
 I know of only one scholar–
Robert F. Berkhofer–who is a historian, Americanist, and interested in deconstruction.87 
Sadly, Berkhofer fails to advance beyond the initial U.S. reception of deconstruction by 
claiming deconstruction has got nothing to do with the real world.This interpretation 
easily obscures more nuanced commitments pertaining to freedom, namely, freedom’s 
originally pre–Socratic interest in being and language as something that is irreducible to 
ideology, science or commodity,
88
 an important consideration about the South in the 
study. David E. Nye, historian, Americanist and interested in White, wrote roughly three 
decades years ago that American Studies has ignored the underlying philosophical issues 
for history.
89
 His observation seems correct even today.     
Chapter 2 covers the stages in southern historical discussion in Virginia from the 
1800s to the 1820s vis–á–vis the mighty New England’s rationalist–religious history–
referred to as “Austere Enlightenment”–that greatly differed from southern ways. 
Subsequent northern importation of German ideas was also little echoed in Virginia. The 
chapter contends that unlike New England that was complicit with the novelties, 
Virginians’–perhaps to an extent other white southerners’–notion of history cannot be 
simply reduced to modern historiography and its presuppositions, because many held on to 
older views. Even the dynamic of southern cultural discourse differed philosophically 
from that found elsewhere in the West. This showed also in biography, a historical genre 
in which lawyer–polymath William Wirt was a local authority, far more progressive about 
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history than most around him, but still not ready for modern history. When German ideas 
entered New England, I conjecture some southerners, on the one hand, developed a 
skeptical reading of history through author Walter Scott. On the other hand, simultaneous 
southern fascination and appreciation of historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr entailed no 
historicist history. Kantian idealist philosophy about history did become introduced 
through him as historism. However, within Idealism, the difference between historism and 
more practically radical and liberal historicism was critical.
90
 The Yankees preferred their 
Christian social science reading of historicism; in great contrast, many southerners 
seemed, similar to Friedrich Nietzsche, to apply historism to augment their more 
language–oriented tradition that included humanistic and very skeptical thinking about 
history. An extreme variant of this direction the study calls historiality was found to exist 
particularly in Virginia. On the one hand, historiality flatly rejected history’s philosophical 
content, emphasizing instead its poetic and rhetoric qualities in an antimodern reversal. On 
the other hand, historiality welcomed enlightened skepticism about historical representing. 
In a preliminary phase to modern history, Western history was philosophically value–
laden and linked with the state roughly from the 1600s to the 1750s. The discrepancy of 
historiality means profound suspicion about the modern project and its philosophical and 
semiotic interpellations in the context of history.   
Chapter 3, covering the years from the late–1820s to 1841, first turns more to 
Charleston, to compare and contrast its learned historical views with state–level 
organizing of historical research begun by and in the North. Though more engaged with 
Germany than Virginia, these theories about history were far more developed and critical 
than Yankee versions. There was not only skepticism about history that was almost 
unknown in New England, semiotics of history differed as well. More recent aesthetic 
discourse was applied to history than in Virginia. This enabled a modernist direction about 
history as an ironic symbol that turned into juxtaposition between admiration of the 
ancients and most self–consciously modern theories. The slight exception here is author 
William Gilmore Simms. Simms’s urban fretting about lack of civilized southern book 
discourse was indicative of a different attitude to prose around him. A different attitude to 
prose from modern history would illuminate the peculiar southern desire to censor 
writings about slavery in books of romance and history. A comparison with Edgar Allan 
Poe, a Jefferson graduate, brings Simms’s difference into relief. The chapter proceeds to 
critically investigate the first professionalized historiographies by Germany–imbibed 
northerners, beginning with George Bancroft. He was metaphysically indebted to 
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historicist Hegel and his conception about history was strengthened by the 
transcendentalists. I shall examine their discrepancies with southerners. However, 
Bancroft also got support in the South, mainly in the person of Maryland novelist–
historian John P. Kennedy. At the same time, the institutional organizing of history took 
place in Virginia. Manned solely by Whigs, it was far more in tune with the national 
project. However, internally, it left out a residue of different thinking and experience about 
history that was perhaps best represented by the Jefferson Republicans. I shall proceed to 
look at the first overall history of Virginia as a gazette, and then examine another 
pioneering northern professional William H. Prescott. Prescott epistemologically 
misunderstood or manipulated what modern history was about in ways that had cultural 
consequences. For Prescott, modern enlightened history meant certain and objective 
historical truth in practice. His approach began to reverberate also within the historical 
organization of Virginia and similar organizations in the South. Notable here is southern 
sensitivity, in the person of Maryland linguist Severn Teackle Wallis, about Yankee 
reinscription of modern history as manipulation in his discursive analysis of history’s use 
and abuse. Wallis was the pioneering public southern commentator on Prescott’s first 
history. Ironically, he still had not examined Prescott’s presuppositions deeply enough.  
Chapter 4 resumes the Virginia historical discussion in the journal Southern Literary 
Messenger around 1840. Here the individuals who stand out are Jane Tayloe Lomax and 
George E. Dabney. Lomax is previously in practice fully forgotten theorist of history and 
letters, and a pioneer of romantic historiography in Virginia. This may be explained, 
however, by her quite cosmopolitan life: she moved away from Virginia in her teens. Her 
changes of view about history can be deduced from her texts and poetics. Here was the 
first unblushingly bourgeois and novel opinion about history in that state. Dabney, in 
contrast, was another Virginia graduate and a representative of a semiotically idiosyncratic 
conception of history that helps reveal southern rhetorical and metaphysical differences to 
modern history still existed, particularly in Virginia. Striking is also Dabney’s departure 
from Victorian moralism that conventionally had women enclosed to the home. Rather, 
Dabney sees the female fluidity of keen perception and existence as a positive resource 
about history that functions like a physician–an extremely un–bourgeois but very 
sophisticated notion. Organization of history in Virginia continued to careen towards the 
North and pressured folks outside it to civilize themselves and care about history. 
Meanwhile, following the local reinscription of idealist aesthetics, historicism became 
more popular in the North.  
Chapter 5 looks at the main historical writings of Thomas Roderick Dew, influential 
slave theorist and political philosopher in Virginia in the 1830s and early–1840s and a 
representative of the Virginia organization. Though Dew made a great, even decisive and 
tragic, impact on southern historical awareness in his texts, his arguments are a potpourri 
that includes more historicist and northern tones than was the local norm: his views do not 
represent the white South as a whole. I will demonstrate how Dew actively and 
systematically distorted his sources to suit his agenda and that he was in close contact with 
the Catholic revival in England, a movement with a philosophically idealist side as 
cultural politics.  
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Chapter 6, covering the late–1830s and the early–1840s, returns to Charleston to 
investigate editor Daniel K. Whitaker’s two scholarly ventures: The Southern Literary 
Journal and Monthly Magazine and the early years of Southern Quarterly Review. 
Whitaker, born and schooled in New England, increased the similitude between South 
Carolina and New England about history metaphysically. However, even here there 
remained fairly violent differences about history, especially on the pages of the first 
journal. The controversies again bring up the strongly skeptical tradition about history that 
emanated from Jefferson’s university. Covering the early years of the latter, my particular 
focus is on George Frederick Holmes and Simms. Holmes was perhaps the first more 
sustained examiner of the novel German philosophy of history in the South he, like Dew, 
knew through Catholicism. However, he remained far from completely embracing it. 
Simms, in turn, moved into a more outright acceptance of romantic history in the early–
1840s. As in Lomax he probably had read, Simms was particularly receptive to the 
arguments of aesthete Friedrich Schiller, a significant precursor to Hegel about history and 
the relationship between literature, aesthetics and history. But Simms, like Dew, now also 
sympathized more with northern thinking about history. In the course of four decades, the 
different strands of southern thinking of and writing about history from New England and 
Europe did not disappear, but they became philosophically and textually steadily less 
pronounced, with the 1840s as the decisive decade. 
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2. Virginia historiography and New England, 1800s–
1820s: collisions in politics and poetics 
2.1 History and language after the Revolution 
This section has two aims. First, I will attempt to interpret historical discussion after the 
Revolution. The heavy utilitarianism of history and classical world up North was different 
in degree, if not in kind, from southerners and Jefferson’s more erudite approach. While 
scholars generally only took from Antiquity useful ideas for the present and disseminated 
them heavily and democratically in translation, he focused more on words and was more 
wary of translation. By clinging to ancient Rome and its exemplar history more 
tenaciously and retaining the humanistic view of language as key to reality, southerners–
unlike northerners–were less willing to embrace a Cartesian/Platonic rationalist notion of 
history. By contrast, influential northerners were blind to the philosophical contradictions 
involved. Second, I contend for a different reception of Scottish Philosophy and revivalist 
evangelical religion in the South. I argue responses were more guarded in Virginia, 
leading, with greater sensitivity to rhetoric, to more subtle and ironic figural awareness 
that paralleled Scottish linguists. Therefore, again unlike the northern custom, 
Evangelicalism was seldom linked to rationalist history in Virginia, yielding no austere 
“political science” as a synthesis of the two.  
2.1.1 History and language: postwar views 
History was too profane and too utilitarian a subject to be studied in the religiously strict 
American colleges before the Revolution, especially among the Calvinist colleges out of 
which Wiesen singles out Yale.
91
 However, history as a utilitarian pursuit crept onward: 
already in the 1750s at King’s College (later Columbia), New York, visionaries such as 
William Smith saw Americans not only as existing in a direct continuum with the ancient 
world which could teach them valuable lessons in ethics of virtue, heroism and politics in 
accordance with the classical standards, but also history as something useful. Antiquity 
was, to someone like John Adams, a reflective mirror to the past with no essential 
differences. Their programme connected history side by side with geography in a way 
what was to become a trend. This useful utilitarian side, something we could call the 
social and the political science of history today, began to gain ground after the Revolution 
in American higher education. Remarkably for my purposes, this was done at the expense 
of linguistics, literature and mythology of ancient history. The Enlightenment ideal of 
law–seeking and statecraft in history, fully underway by the 1790s, combined with a 
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desire to simplify and democratize the study of the ancient world while suspicions grew 
about the immorality of its content. This was a part of a trend, previously launched by 
Benjamin Franklin of Philadelphia, to only take from Antiquity what is useful in the 
present and disseminate the knowledge about the ancients without the cumbersome effort 
of mastering foreign languages.
92
 The grammatical study of Greek and Latin had ruled 
American higher education for more than two centuries. By comparison, history and 
literature had miniscule roles. Language was also seen as the key to classical language 
study. American scholars restricted themselves to recovery of texts from Antiquity and to 
examining texts. By the 1800s, history was separate from poetry and drama
93
 but 
especially in the South, there was no clear preference of history over the two as to 
depictions of the real. 
To these northern scholars, like for the 16th century humanists, language itself 
provided the key to all spheres of reality.
94
 They thus ignored John Locke on the 
referential power on language. For Locke, language was arbitrary and always distortive of 
the real and simple a–linguistic, “psychological” ideas of the mind and the individual.95 It 
was this thesis for instance Kant criticized. It “fails to acknowledge the discursive nature 
of human cognition,” leading to downgrading of conceptual representation.96 In other 
words, not only did the scholars ignore Locke on this issue, they ignored its critique by 
Kant.
97
  
However, critically for me, and departing from the humanist symmetry between 
rhetoric, grammar and logic, they underplayed rhetoric as contingent, empirical/spatial 
imprecision in favor of a rigorous, solid–indeed, eternal–system. This deduction reduced 
the phenomenal world, epistemologically secondary in any case, into theory.
98
 Americans 
such as Franklin emulated, instead, the Lockean ideals on education concerning rote 
repetition and translation of text into the 1820s, though the inclusion of translation was a 
century old even in Locke’s time.99 In addition, Locke’s anti–patriarch polemic in 
pedagogy, arguing for child as independent individual, had began to substitute the 
harmonious, ordered family by the late–1700s.100  
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According to influential northern pioneers such as physician Benjamin Rush, history 
was from the first conducted on a Federalist, pro–Constitution basis as utilitarian and 
rationalist. Rush sought to counter the anti–Constitution argument that was found in 
Virginia for example (2.1.2). In a scheme resembling Plato, he advocated a “federal 
university” to serve the whole country that would supercede local or state level education: 
after thirty years, a law should be made that would bar office seekers who had not 
attended. The highest object of this totalizing university was to unite natural law and 
political science for the needs of the new nation, immediately followed by ancient and 
modern history, though especially natural history was a useful field.The style of British 
authors such as Tory–leaning satirist and philologist Samuel Johnson and Edward 
Gibbon–powerful authors in the South–should be rejected: the U.S. present calls for 
simplicity of style, but it should also aim for perfection, because it will be the new 
language of mankind and the building block of commerce, happiness and civilization. The 
models for the scheme derived from “the wisest kings in Europe” and “[t]he inhabitants of 
Massachusetts.” Its aim was “a permanent foundation.”101   
In addition, the old Puritan wish to unite God’s law and human conduct was prevalent. 
Interestingly, it found nourishment in Presbyterian Evangelicalism, and became 
disseminated as semiotics: “Let all the heathen Writers join / To form one perfect book.” 
This semiotic to reconcile God and all language explicitly called for a rejection of Tory 
leader Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke–paragon of Universal History102 and also 
much followed in the South (chapters 3, 6)–as well as the French philosophes.103 In order 
to sustain the American government, knowledge of history had to be universal. Historical 
language was simply means to bring from the past ideas and thoughts for present 
sociopolitical ends. Words did not matter, ideas did: translation from Greek to English was 
a bridge more than a studious problem. This formed a secure basis for American 
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nationalism.
104
 Critically departing from southerners, they wanted to re–introduce 
certainty into history that mainstream Universal History had undermined. Mainstream 
Universal History, present in Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes and Bolingbroke, was 
essentially formal–thus rhetorical–about historical presenting. Thereby, the Yankees 
subverted rhetoric with rationalist philosophy of René Descartes, on the one hand, and 
Evangelical Christianity, on the other hand. This was an extremely anti–empirical position 
about history, because it was beyond even the formal and moralistic confines of Universal 
History. As we will discover, it also represented a stark contrast to southerners.These early 
American thinkers and institutions relied on Neoplatonism
105
 that later fused with German 
Idealism (chapter 3). The South had far less such a–poetic, rationalist, in Derrida’s phrase 
”heliotropic” enthusiasm whose vestiges survived into the U.S. reception of Hegel. In 
New England as we shall see, multiple anti–sensist references to light106 testify to the 
power of such a–poetic, rationalist episteme that extended to history through language.  
Furthermore, this entailed a change in history’s subject matter. Many northern pioneers 
sought to treat history as a synthesis of systematic and scientific natural philosophy and 
Universal History. Nadel contends these were difficult to reconcile with Locke’s 
philosophy that relied on the individual and the psychic. Thus, they abandoned history for 
social science. After Locke’s reductionism to a psyche, a systemic history of true 
propositions and Universal History’s ethics of exemplarity became incommensurable. The 
response was, in case of influential Scottish Philosophy, focus on sociology, anthropology, 
physiology and economics. The previous humanistic–Christian conception about history 
weakened but importantly, especially in the South, did not disappear. The model for the 
preceding exemplar history in America, in its pragmatic and stately concerns, was 
arguably ancient Rome.
107
 The Yankees had a social science with a vengeance however: 
the Cartesian rationalist bias about history they endorsed had been abandoned elsewhere 
                                                 
104
 Wiesen, ”Ancient History and Early American Education,” 61, 62. The practicalities of 
studying history was in Smith’s plan a recital of the text as a whole chopped into bits and then 
writing down its main parts, to be of service later in life, a sort of synthesis of Locke and the old 
tradition. ibid., 57. 
105
 Bregman states American philosophy was Neoplatonic and Scholastic “from the beginning.” 
It was dominant at King’s College, the cradle of classicist–utilitarian history. Bregman defines 
Neoplatonism as having a concept of a rational human soul intimately connected with three divine 
hypostases: “the One and the Good, the principle of Unity and the unknowable ground of all Being; 
Its first manifestation Intellect or Noûs (One–Many), the eternal intelligible paradigm of the sensible 
realm, and Universal Soul (One and Many) which moves away from the noetic and through different 
levels of experience and activity, gives rise to nature and to our world of time, space and body.” 
Plotinus held possible that all could become unified with the One itself because each of us is a 
microscopic intelligent realm. Our center is the center of All. Jay Bregman, “The Neoplatonic 
Revival in North America,” Hermathena 149 (1990), Special Issue: The Heritage of Platonism, 100, 
101, citations on 100, 101. 
106
 For light thematized this way, see Norris, Against Relativism, 24. 
107
 George H. Nadel, “Philosophy of History before Historicism,” History and Theory 3 (1964): 
312-14. For Rome, see ibid., 294-96. 
  
 
 
41 
by the late–1600s.108 Hence, they 1. rejected “pre–Lockean” humanism about history and 
2. wanted to ground Universal History more rationalistically than as poetry, rhetoric, or 
the example. The end result was grounded in God metaphysically, and in progressive 
social science methodologically. Free and rational, but pious, individual subject connected 
the two realms. This arrangement made them far more unsusceptible to skepticism about 
history. Instead, rationalism was incorporated into a peculiarly anti–figural reception of 
Enlightenment history and modern idealist history (chapter 3). According to Greeson, by 
the 1790s in the Yankee literary magazines, the South was an anomaly to history, a 
conclusion deduced from natural history
109
 that had utilitarian ends. But to southerners, a 
second problem was the rationalist–religious Universal History. Southerners were not 
squarely anti–modern, but almost all departed from such radicalization of Universal 
History. Even free individuality, presupposed by Universal History, was at times contested 
by them (2.2.3, chapter 4).  
2.1.1.1 A different interpretation of Scottish intellects in the South 
The U.S. was decisively impacted by this change Locke made on humanist history. 
Americans had known its remedy, Scottish thought, more since the 1760s thanks to John 
Witherspoon and Samuel Davies at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton 
University). Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge continued this work in the later 
decades of the century, spreading its influence. However, the differences between regions 
stand out: Up North, Princeton Evangelical interpretation simplified its content and 
ignored its split source.
110
 One needed not necessarily be an Evangelical to be a Scottish 
intellectual. In contrast, William Robertson, a noted historian and Principal at the 
University of Edinburgh, was the “leader and exemplar” of a more moderate take on 
religion that lost its majority position to the evangelicals in the 1790s, just when the 
Evangelical revival began to sweep America in what has been called the Second Great 
Awakening. While the more populist Evangelicals in Scotland wished for a return to 
austere Calvinism and insisted on doctrinal purity, the moderates of Robertson defended 
decorum and lawful government, “eloquent preaching, ethics, natural theology, 
scholarship, and free philosophic inquiry.” Their conduct in society was reportedly what 
the Evangelicals reprehended: noisy, bragging, licentious, undisciplined, sympathetic to 
heresy and gentlemanly in air and manner.
111
 Since Robertson “was a favourite among 
late–18th century Virginians” and his reputation as a modern historian and a supporter of 
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chivalry lasted into the Civil War in the South,
 112
 I think it safe to say Scottish Philosophy 
was interpreted differently between northern and southern intellectual centers, which 
created slightly different metaphysical makeups. Specifically, political moderation and 
rhetoric became more welcomed in the South: unlike the statecrafting neoplatonic 
rationalists, humanist rhetoric had never been exchanged there for the reason–religion 
dyad. The evangelical take on language as pure contributed to the previous rationalist 
rejection of phenomenal experience from eternity and mathematical science far more in 
the North.  
The Scottish philosophers left language undeveloped as a problem when they rejected 
David Hume’s ideational representationalism.113 This rejection combined with rationalism 
in the North. It became disseminated by early leading Virginian evangelicals in Virginia as 
well (2.2.1). However, other Scottish intellectuals had strong ambivalence about 
modernity as shown in their more historist stadialist theory of progress that, though not 
fully cyclic, was more doubtful about progress, and ungrounded in an ethnic hierarchy.
114
 
New England, rejecting nature for reason, never subscribed to it: the first wave of 
rationalist–neoplatonic historians and cultural theorists in Boston in the first years of the 
19th century took the ethnically hierarchic and linear theory of progress as a given.
115
 
Supplied by Locke, this counterintuitively led to racially normative metaphysics of history 
in the North, but not in the South (chapters 3, 5, 6). Southerners were more receptive to 
the non–racially hierarchic stadialism, because they retained more the humanistic, 
unreconstructed Christian theory about history that made no bones about a (mystical) 
unity of a people: they consequently had no comparable urge to sanctify and universalize 
American history. I could find only one published southern view about history that fully 
endorses the northern metaphysics from the 1840s (chapter 6).
116
 
As an instance of stadialism, Scot Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres (1783) was a staple in American colleges well into the 19th century and a 
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“formative” source of southern criticism.117 Blair offered a history of philosophy on 
language that ironically recognized its historical and contextual dependence: the increase 
of reason and philosophy, correctness and accuracy were done at the expense of the 
expressive, the figural, the poetic and the lively. O’Brien claims Blair was still no 
romantic.
118
 However, Harshbarger counters Blair “epitomized” a countercurrent of oral 
rhetorics that saw expressivity and pragmatics of discourse as compatible. This current 
would fuel the Romantic cause with “rhetorical appeal, social relevance, and revolutionary 
force.”119 Blair radicalized the conception that communication, especially poetry, was 
influenced by sociohistorical circumstances by making its human need independent of 
either place or civilization into a general economy of rhetoric. As an oral event of 
communication, oral communication had more value than the written word that cured the 
gap between thought and expression left in neoclassicism. The communal, instructive and 
appealing pattern of poetic communication that engaged values and beliefs instead of 
reason made the world of the Scots split into an oppressive “proper” writing and speech 
and “improper” feeling and chatting.120 Hence Blair fanned the southern flames about 
history as communication where phenomenal experience–nature, words and rhetoric–
indeed counted. Unlike in Universal History, expression also mattered, not only 
propositional (but rhetorical) representation
121
 weeded out by the Yankees, but by and 
large, the outcome was different from modern history. As I will show, southerners 
decisively differed from the Yankee extreme rigidity about language and history. The 
power of Blair is an example of southern unwillingness to subvert nature and the natural to 
the Yankee reason–religion binary.  
2.1.2 Strong version of “Austere Enlightenment” (SAE) and southerners’ 
awkward relationship to it  
The Scots situated in an ironic position between a propositional system of science, 
conceived as philosophy, and empirical particularity with a historist twist that Blair 
articulated. In this respect, southerners resembled them ontologically in history and 
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discourse that later extended to aesthetics (chapter 3). The difference has not often been 
registered: for instance Rodgers contends the historical sense of America as exceptional, 
i.e., suprahistorical as a rationalist synthesis of Enlightenment and religion, was “not 
widely doubted.”122 However, for southern history, the curious northern combination of 
Locke with natural philosophy was problematic, because it rejected: a) the humanist 
notion of rhetoric, b) expressive communication and phenomenal experience, c) “non–
utilitarian” linguistics and even d) the rhetoricity, or representational essence, of Universal 
History. Still, as early as the 1790s, New England sarcastically contrasted its learned and 
true syntax with the faulty southern one in literature.
123
 
Jefferson had few qualms about history as a secular enterprise of utility and social 
science. But religion was a non–issue to him.124 In addition, Jefferson was also more 
sensitive about the importance of studying the classics in the original, as well as an ardent 
amateur linguist. An interest in Saxon culture was not in conflict with Tory English 
aristocracy in Virginia. But in Jefferson’s case, interest in Saxon increased the appeal of 
paganism in relation to Christianity.
125
 Though Jefferson was a metaphysical optimist 
about progress into the 1820s as well, the important distinction is that for him, history was 
not reducible to Whig Federalist political science connected with nation–building 
according to the rationalist model. Thus, his relationship to Locke, Evangelicalism and 
modernization was one of tension.
126
 The unambiguous and natural national unity of 
postwar America disseminated by Noah Webster–one of the major original champions of 
classicism and utility–and other federal–minded historians thus deliberately excluded anti–
Federalist views: to the anti–Federalists, the Federalist connection of natural law, i.e., 
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Universal History, and God in history was not as obvious.
127
 Since Jefferson retained the 
classicist–humanistic emphasis on language as words, and was more cautious about 
jumping from words to utilitarian ideas grounded in God, he tried to reconcile classical 
humanism, including Tory views, with more popular democracy very differently from 
future President Andrew Jackson (chapter 3).  
Though they differed about politics and world–views, Patrick Henry, a powerful 
Virginian populist, lawyer, war hero and statesman, shared this difference. Henry became 
a Federalist in old age but in his youth he was deeply interested in history in the classicist 
mode as well.
128
 To this, he combined a critical attitude towards reason as a guide in 
politics.
129
 For a third powerful Virginian John Randolph, statesman and king’s former 
attorney–general, language and history were far different. Randolph was a classical 
rhetorician who refused to reduce rhetoric to dialectic. He criticized history’s reduction to 
reason and logic and opposed abstract dealings in public matters. Weaver remarks such 
intuition is the method of an artist and an aristocrat as a mixture of self–confidence and 
simplicity, while logic and dialectic belong to the scientist and democrat.
130
 But 
aristocracy as too much abstract reasoning and corruption in politics was also a target of 
southern criticism that extended to history (chapter 6).  
These cases indicate a significant–more ancient–departure from what was to them 
anomalous New England history. More democratic and emotion–driven–but not 
Rousseauan–anti–federalism and experience welcomed elements of humanism and even 
secular thinking. Murphy claims some anti–Federalists, distrustful of reason, opposed the 
statism and Gnosticism, i.e., excessive Platonism, manifest in the Constitution. Like the 
ancients and history before its change, they preferred practical experience
131
 of the non–
discursive exemplar history. As I shall explore below, a critical stance regarding 
regulating, ordered power of the Federalist “machine” was inherent.  
The protest was much obscured in French liberal theory (chapters 3, 5), key American 
historiography, and even organization of history within Virginia (2.2.4, chapter 3). To 
later liberals like Tocqueville, Federalism was intrinsic to the Revolution, and anti–
Federalism dating from the critics of George Washington–who Wingfield mentions 
counted among their ranks several of the leading Virginia figures–unreasoning excess.132 
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Since such “mechanist” federalism presupposed Lockean equality among enlightened 
citizens, I claim the conflict reached down to the body and its place in political theory as 
“a policy of coercions that act upon the body” made large analogous to Scotland above. It 
was categorically different from great many southerners who preferred–as in development 
of American art audiences to disciplined passivity intrinsic to a bourgeois stratified, 
instead of general, society–the public as an active body.133 They contested, rather than 
simply embraced, the re–allocation of bodily activity to writing, ideas or religious fervor, 
in short, the renovation of culture modern history was a part of. The Constitution was 
about legitimating democracy
134
 but this had ontic and political implications that excluded 
many southerners from such rigidified liberal federalism. In Kelley, the Constitution was 
born of the alliance between Virginia’s wealthiest crust and northern bourgeois visionaries 
in the framework of nationalism.
135
 However, not all opponents, not even Jefferson who 
was ambivalent about the Constitution,
136
 belonged to the other extreme of austere, anti–
intellectual Princeton Presbyterianism later represented by Jackson. Unlike the critics of 
the Constitution, the Virginia Presbyterians of the early–19th century became complicit 
with Anglican bourgeois ideology, but gained little headway (2.2). Compared to New 
England, southerners were far more oblivious to regulating excess in everyday life by 
either rationalist or religious means: Dionysian traces survive in historiography and 
semiotics (2.2, 2.3, chapters 3, 5, 6). Tocqueville’s position did not include all America, or 
even Virginia: still, his exemption of the South is ignored in scholarship such as the famed 
study by Bellah et al.
137
  
Further, Scottish ambivalence about language and progress was lost much more in the 
northern United States than in its southern part, though even Jefferson apparently failed to 
see it.
138
 In American popular education that did not exist in the pre–war South, the jump 
from “learning” of language by committing arbitrary pieces of syntax to memory to 
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Christian morality and romantic sensationalism in the 1830s was dubious aesthetically and 
epistemologically. It was overwhelmingly New England–biased. So were the anti–
European ideas about American nationalism in the books. Although no American history 
was taught separately until after the Civil War, geography alongside history and grammar 
cemented extrapolations about “minds” of entire nations and states within America. The 
American tradition should then choose what is worthy. The few southern educators had no 
choice but to adapt willy–nilly.139 This tactic also confused Lockean epistemology with 
Enlightenment natural law philosophy no Scot thinker endorsed. The educators, perhaps 
spurred by Evangelicalism, overlooked what language is: the syntactic form of language 
was true because it was logical and related directly to facts in the mind. Rational speech–
true, universal, and enlightening–covered real speech. The questions of semantics, 
rhetoric, or the relationship between language and reality did not appear.
140
  
Among the Yankees, the absolute truth of language co–existed with religion beside 
history in influential figures like Noah Webster. For Webster of Yale as late as 1839, 
language occupies an equal position with reason just like the Bible can be analyzed next to 
the classics. Since truth is the only object of the labors of literature and science, the task is 
to write true language. To illustrate this, he shows how the Word of the Bible, not shaky 
historical tradition, instructs even belated pagans such as Ovid.
141
 The Creator has created 
humans, thus not only must one be His servant, the Bible also has to be in plain, simple 
language: it contains all true knowledge of Him and His moral government, the duty of 
humans and means of happiness “political, social, and eternal.” He confesses the Bible, 
literally the foundation of life, becomes the cause for his whole endeavor as a linguist. The 
truth should be absolute to reason, a pure form. Mistaken terms and wrong and improper 
use of words have consequences for both religion and government which are identical.
142
 
Webster refers to “Histories of the United States” with a big H but in plural form–a 
Derridean gem. As a pioneer of America’s history education, Webster translates his 
methodology straight to history by pointing out school histories are not free of popular 
opinion and report. His personal knowledge of the facts shows them to be 
mispresentations.
143
 There is no truck with Humean misrepresenting related to 
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accessibility of knowledge. By this time, Federalist domination began in popular 
schoolbooks.
144
 In sum, New England propelled itself into another revelation as 
transcendence over history from post–Revolution history, identifying its old status as 
“redeeming community of God with the rise of the Union as a redemptive nation.”145 By 
contrast, Jefferson and his followers neither conflated Locke with universalism or 
divination linguistically, nor conceived of citizenship as, in De Hart’s phrase, Lockean 
individual mind as self–directed earning, instead of republican virtuous citizenry:146 Why?  
In the South, the family still counted for more than contractarian individual autonomy 
embraced by Locke in education, though Priest reminds this did not extend to property 
rights.
147
 Even the democratic Jefferson, though opposing primogeniture, held fast to 
feudal–derived English inheritance law where landed estates stayed and were ideally 
nurtured within the same family for generations. In England’s case, this bore into political 
influence, because land became the intransient guarantor of family status, impervious to 
capitalist buying and selling.
148
 This is critical, because Jefferson’s position was 
overshadowed by mainstream postwar state legislature and what Priest names commercial 
republicanism, that is, “the importance of the expansion of commerce to the creation of an 
American meritocracy.” Already supported by the powerful Noah Webster and later by his 
cousin Daniel, it would guarantee an antiaristocratic society, a vision strengthened by 
erasure of entailed property and primogeniture by 1800. This has been interpreted as an 
anti–English measure, overlooking that its instigators had been the English.149 Relevant 
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for me are two themes: 1. the implicit liberal bias against Jefferson reinforced by 
Tocqueville that conflates all land inheritance with aristocratic antibourgeois laziness and, 
following him, makes the resulting frontier mobility of land the central tenet of America 
that has lasted into Turner and beyond. It flatly ignores Jefferson’s sort of natural 
aristocracy founded on a relationship to land and nature that differs from the new space of 
modern history, because it was fundamentally protective, not wantonly exploitative–the 
northern credo. I glimpsed humility before nature among some southerners (chapter 6).
150
 
2. Therefore, I claim the patriarchic family arrangements held more in the South, but 
increasingly conflicted with the times. This contributed to the modernist pangs of disarray 
about modern history as well that was dependent on the new individual freedom. 
Jefferson’s interest in history thus was almost anything but rational: neither anti–humanist 
nor rationalist, as in New England.
151
 Opposition to the abolishment of primogeniture was 
widespread in Charleston as well.
152
 In that location, this extended to a difference about 
history between bourgeois and more aristocratic orders of society (chapter 3).  
Ironically, since those who shaped American identity in history and education were 
almost exclusively from the North, the application of Newtonian natural law into moral 
law survived into the early decades of the 19th century, and Evangelicalism fit this model 
perfectly.
153
 A sympathetic Tocqueville felt such a trait for universal reason and human 
perfection is a necessary counterpart to individual independence of and pride in the willing 
self, a union crystallized in the ratification of the Constitution. Like a lack of pride among 
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the non–whites, a lack of rational and universalistic self–determination went astray from 
“a democratic freedom” into self–destruction.154  
I will subsequently call this suprahistorical synthesis of Enlightenment received as 
antifigural, Evangelicalism, political science and rational history the strong version of 
Austere Enlightenment (SAE). The critique of northern resolution of systemic science of 
history into a–historical social–historical stereotypes within the metaphysical framework 
of progress–a move the Scot stadialist progress theory never granted–is applicable to 
Native Americans, because they were thereby seen inferior.
155
 But it is also applicable to 
southerners: many were less ignorant about progress as a problem, experience and 
representation Scots and the European tradition in general knew about, others continued to 
simply ignore the question, and still others adhered to a continuous classical identity: it is 
violent to reduce these strands to the North. 
2.2 History and language in Virginia, 1800–1817 
In this section, my attempt is to review discussion about language and history in Virginia. 
As in Scotland, there was a discrepancy and conflict between the hyperordered 
Presbyterian Evangelical linguistics that endorsed SAE and two more entrenched forces: 
a) “improper” communality and figuration as hint and b) ancient rhetoric and humanist 
semiotics that was in touch with classical republicanism. There was less conflict between 
a) and b) than between both and SAE. In other words, SAE as a combination of 
straitjacket religion, bourgeois culture and stern semiotics was a relatively minor 
phenomenon in Virginia at the period, if powerful for its size. This ontological aporia–
either ignorance of history or history as continuous identity, vs. SAE–remained unsolved 
and was reflected in the peculiar dynamic of southern cultural discourse.  
It is also evident in early southern historical biography that, in contrast to SAE, 
contains traces of a refusal to reduce the object under study neither to science–compulsory 
on a nationalist federal level by the 1800s–nor to unveiled and true presence. This 
exhibited a modernist, self–conscious and rhetorical awareness about such an operation 
that is comparable to Derrida’s semiotic investigations. The section finally looks at 
biography of Henry by Federalist Marylander William Wirt–influential statesman, lawyer, 
widely–read commentator and Presbyterian–as an instance of this difference. Importantly, 
Maryland was different from the South in Jefferson’s eyes, more in league with the 
northern states.
156
 Though Wirt was a Presbyterian and later a Whig, he did not fully 
subscribe to SAE. The difference was his preference for rhetoric and awareness of Blair’s 
symbolism that caused him conflict in history. I will call this approach the weak version of 
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Austere Enlightenment (WAE). My claim is, in the period under study, very few Virginian 
scholars advanced beyond Blair into “full” Romanticism157 as history and literature. 
2.2.1 Early Virginian representatives of SAE   
Presbyterian Evangelicalism in Virginia was spread further by Alexander, president of 
Hampden–Sidney College from 1794 to 1806.158 Alexander was to play an important role 
a few years later in exploiting the Richmond theater fire of 1811 for the Presbyterian 
cause.
159
 Another prominent figure in Virginian cultural discourse of the 1810s, almost 
forgotten today, was Conrad Speece. Speece was a Presbyterian minister from 1801 and 
functioned as a missionary of sorts, becoming a pastor in 1813. He served pretty much the 
whole state for more than twenty years.
160
 For the Federalist Republican Farmer, a weekly 
published in Staunton, Speece published pieces of social commentary between 1813 and 
1816, later gathered together into a book called The Mountaineer that was going through 
its third edition only less than a decade later.
161
  
Marsden notes Presbyterianism was one branch of Evangelicalism reacting against the 
amorality of the French Revolution. The Genoveses state the anti–Federalists had neither 
rejected nor fully agreed with it. However, Marsden claims Presbyterians saw Jefferson as 
the Antichrist ahead of general infidelity and immorality rampant in society. Accordingly, 
with the ultra–Calvinist Yale as the nexus, 800,000 New Englanders spread across 
northern states such as New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan between 1790 and 
1820. With ministers forming societies and centers of opinion, their mission became 
national out of which emerged not only a conception of American bourgeois culture but 
also a more developed philosophy of history for the nation (2.3). Instead of the internally 
conflict–free and gradual approval the Genoveses imply, I claim at least Virginia and 
South Carolina were discontent with Evangelicalism since, as we saw, it intimately 
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connected with SAE. Marsden argues the Presbyterians were strong in the Middle Atlantic 
and the South.
162
 I intend to examine this relationship more critically. An existential 
conflict between this religious zealotry and southern ways is implied in that unlike the 
mainstream, Speece was not enthusiastic or fanatical about his preaching in practice.
163
  
Interestingly, the rhetorical form both Speece and the editor of his book emulated was 
the Spectator, a famous newspaper published in London a century earlier and synecdoche 
of enlightened bourgeois culture.
164
 Speece not only explicitly recommends the Spectator, 
he also uses similar tropes and strategies of figuration in his pieces. The Mountaineer was 
compiled into a book from newspaper articles like many epistolary novels at the time. 
Wirt had praised the magazine in his The Letters of the British Spy–the first general 
commentary on Virginia society that originally appeared in 1803–to be now praised in 
turn by Speece. For Wirt in this work, “the love of genuine and exalted religion” had been 
“a far more important quality” than oratory.165 But as I will explain (2.2.4.1), Wirt would 
later realize the difficulty of history without rhetoric. This adaptation of bourgeois forms 
was extended to local southern history of Virginia in the 1830s, telling of the power 
bourgeois culture began to enjoy (chapter 5). However, tensions exhibited by Wirt 
continued. 
Speece operated along very similar lines to SAE: in a piece from 1814, he connects 
reason with reading, utility and religion. The Bible makes “the weakest sincere inquirer 
wise to salvation” while providing instruction for life and governance. Utilizing 
Enlightenment rhetoric, an extensive investigation leading to proper acquaintance “with 
our nature, and the modes in which our passions operate” is recommended.166 A right 
selection of reading material, instead of reading nothing or politicking emotionally in 
newspapers, combine with diligent study of history for politically useful ends, second only 
to “devotion and the interchange of kind affections.”167 The old have a disease that sees 
books as boring, but if reading is begun young, one acquires a taste to them better. But 
books of the 18th century, including religious, are dull in content and disgusting in form, 
“and after a little inspection, you wonder how such a book could possibly be read, even 
three ages ago.” Old poetry is deceptive pseudo–poetry to the eye. “A scrap” named a 
history turns out to be a mere chronicle, “as dry and empty as the shells of birds’ eggs 
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strung upon a thread, but without any of their prettiness.”168 Although some may consider 
it too strict, “extended knowledge” and “just application” of spoken language is 
imperative in society. Clear and distinct speaking or reading is a pleasure. Its opposite is 
caused most often by habitual laziness and negligence–southern cardinal sins for many 
contemporary observers. Too much emotion in speech is impolite, and a deviation from 
any standard, even if unknown, is disgusting unless done for a good reason. In deviating 
from the standard, the hearer receives a less than full knowledge of the communication, 
sometimes causing “troublesome misunderstandings and mispresentations” in public life. 
Knowledge and usefulness are compromised in any man “if he speak not clearly and 
gracefully the current language of his country.”169  
The tactics of Speece that pertain to governance tell of a change, because Virginia 
Presbyterians had in the 1780s emphasized the separation of their faith from national 
politics, and neither they nor the general populace of Virginia had supported even salaries 
for teachers of Christianity, though even Henry had supported the provision.
170
 Thus, the 
people of Virginia by and large were perhaps content with the Jeffersonian outlook. 
Variations survived remarkably long (chapter 6).  
This pattern of argument about language was continued by the Presbyterian leaders of 
Virginia to the late–1810s to the rise of bourgeois romantics up North. But now the 
format, already middle class, transformed into a journal. Edited by John Holt Rice, another 
Presbyterian pastor and a lifelong friend to Speece who was a contributor, the Virginia 
Evangelical and Literary Magazine circulated between years 1818–1828.171 Rice was also 
friends with Presbyterian Jonathan P. Cushing, president of Hampden–Sidney and the 
future 2nd vice–president of Virginia Historical and Philosophical Society established in 
1831 (chapter 3).
172
 Rice had taught at the place.
173
 He had moved to Virginia in 1812, but 
between 1812 and 1823 managed to get only 265 members to his church, indicative of the 
wary reception of the Presbyterians among the general populace.
174
  
The paper was “to be consecrated principally to the interests of religion, without 
however neglecting those of sound and good learning.”175 In the first issue, views about 
language have at first glance slightly evolved. The SAE objection about focusing on 
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language was still repeated: it takes attention “from things to words; from real important 
knowledge to things insignificant in themselves, [sic] and valuable only as a means for the 
attainment of an end.” But, although such studies may cloud the truth in some cases, this 
need not always be the case. The ideas of the author and the reader may connect 
simultaneously in reading. A tracing of words and their varieties may offer “insight into 
the principles” of everyday speech. The language of literature is from ancient times and 
multinational with multiple origins, and if one is unaware of the aesthetic and 
argumentative allusions, many passages of modern writers are lost to “our pleasure and 
our profit” in written word and polite conversation. Translations are no good.176  
Thus, instead of “crass” utilitarianism for its own sake and disdain of language, there is 
a semiotic tracing that is internal to language and correspondent with the classical 
episteme, that is, an internal taxonomy of discourse as general grammar that disappeared 
by late–1700s. What lacked was awareness of the paradigmatic connection between 
language and society
177
 and as in the Yankees, ignorance of rhetoric–the double split 
within representing inherent in the grammar and Universal History–for utility and religion. 
Further, the article was written in Edinburgh, Scotland, not Virginia. It was procured 
perhaps at the request of Rice and its tone, praising oratory and poetry, genres Rice 
disliked, seems more moderate than his request.
178
 Speece concurs spare time “should be 
marked with something worthy of rational and immortal beings” and one indication “is a 
sacred regard to truth.” 179 
In relating matters of fact, many seem to think it allowable to embellish the story, more or 
less, by the addition of fictitious circumstances. These may illustrate the narrator’s 
inventive powers, and please the hearer for a moment, by adding an air of the marvellous 
to common events. But they soon diminish that confidence which we should aim to enjoy; 
and moreover involve the guilt of sporting with truth and falsehood. You may, for our 
amusement, play with your own veracity, until you seriously impair it, and render us 
unable to place reliance upon your simplest assertions. 
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  ibid., 290-91. 
This fairly absolute austerity had apparently spilled to history earlier in the year: historical 
novels such as Sir Walter Scott’s Rob Roy were like mixing oil and water, possibly 
“calculated to do serious mischief” and without utilitarian value.180 SAE was very austere 
about language and about history. However, we need to be wary of saying it stood for the 
whole.   
2.2.2 Heterologies to SAE: Communal 
Semiotically, theory of language of most southerners at this early period differed from 
SAE. It was neither representationalist, enlightened, nor scientific. It was not rational, 
philosophical, nor even necessarily Christian. Rather, it was factual and experiential, 
situation–specific. Its truths were concrete and varied, not general or generalisable. They 
were anterior to philosophical discourse in that they combined immediacy, communality 
and rhetoricity.
181
  
I think Heidegger’s semiotics may illuminate the issue. Heidegger has been fully 
unknown in prewar southern analyses to my knowledge even though Heidegger was also a 
critic of rationalism, science and representation, emphasized language and ontology, 
admired the ancients and criticized urbanization and modernization. Further, his 
usefulness consists of the fact that he has tapped into what alterity from modern 
philosophy might entail for experience and thinking. What Heidegger calls a “hint” (Wink) 
functions differently from “sign” (Zeich). A hint does not define the object of expression 
unlike a sign based on previous agreement. Transformation from pointing to signifying 
meant a transformation in what was thought of as true. That signifying can be true is based 
on representationalism, i.e., on either a) correspondence between the sign and the real 
thing, b) its true definition as a sign, or c) its tautological form. The truth opened by a hint, 
in contrast, escapes all systematicity or modelling of reality. For Heidegger, signs are 
means because they indicate something. They are combined together to form wholes. But, 
signs should not only be looked at instrumentally, because they are not real in a sense of 
real life thing–hood. Hints are the first signs and discovered by poets.182 Regarding the 
problem of knowledge, a metaphor of Nietzsche’s used by Heidegger is “The desert 
grows!” It connects to Heidegger’s critique of representationalism and individual “self–
founded reason” (selbsterfundene Vernunft) that, in a democratic spirit, erases qualitative 
differences between all phenomena through analytic will. Instead, phenomena should be 
seen as something elusive of capture and full knowledge, respectful of their difference. 
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What Heidegger calls “care” or “worry” (Sorge) is a metonymical approach to something 
that is on–hand (Zuhandenheit), not as an individual to be known, but as a part necessarily 
connected to the whole and opening up to it. In contrast, approaching something as 
present–at–hand (Vorhandenheit) is based on knowledge for its own sake, independent of 
the whole. The thought process of knowledge means the disappearance of metonymy and 
qualitative difference, i.e., the increase of the desert. Abstraction and causality make 
phenomena disappear. Even concepts are only substitutes for reality.
183
 In this way, also 
Heidegger connects with the ironic “anthropological turn” Blair announced that is 
sympathetic to pre–science world views: I shall return to Heidegger later for philosophical 
similarities between him and southerners (chapters 4, 6).  
Comparing northern Ohio and southern Kentucky, de Tocqueville lists society, work 
ethic, industry and especially exploitative pursuit of wealth belonging to the former, 
nature, leisure, agitation and pleasure, hunting, combat and war to the latter. Plausibly, the 
latter characteristics were even more pronounced in Virginia and South Carolina. A less 
exploitative approach to nature, a vestige of premodern semiotics and family dynamic and 
separate from modern history, existed in the South. Tragically, the bourgeois formalization 
and accompanying atomization of the subject, accentuated by modern history and applied 
to America by key European theorists, rendered such residues irrelevant. This southern 
difference to and conflict with bourgeois, polite, refined and urban culture has been 
explored, but the transition as conflict and crisis in the 19th century remains uncovered.
184
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Since my focus is on language, I can only postulate a “communal South” that was “dirty” 
in comparison to bourgeois polished refinery and that had a semiotically divergent relation 
to SAE in terms of ontology and discursivity, which would affect historical experience. 
2.2.3 Heterologies to SAE: Classicism 
The lingering classical world was not unrelated to politics and religion. In this study, I can 
only point out some of their implications for history and historiography.
185
 My general 
interest is especially in its relationship to SAE and German romantic liberalism that were 
made compatible by northerners. In Germany, romantic liberalism as social change was 
revolutionary. Among central changes were mass movements towards more political and 
social equality, the process of industrialization, and the emergence of nationalism.
186
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Translated to America, such reforms were grounded in an interpretation of the Declaration 
of Independence, Enlightenment reason and religious ideals.
187
  
Philosophically, the keyword is ideals. Ideals made German Idealism particularly 
attractive as a metaphysical truth about history (chapter 3). According to SAE, religion 
was both the purpose and the end of history in America. Mintz claims religious fervor 
pervaded the reformers and influenced a new ideal social order that was grounded in 
morality. This order was composed of a missionary impulse, i.e., the submitting of leisure 
time to Protestant morals, a humanitarian impulse, i.e., erecting of institutions for 
nurturing middle class behavioral and character traits to attain the right kind of character, 
and a liberationist impulse, i.e., freeing individuals from corrupt customs and coercive 
institutions. Interestingly, in Mintz’s characterization, these “impulses” have seen only 
superficial criticism: before the 1960s next to none beyond them, and even afterwards 
little. When criticism has been made in history, it has been made mainly as social history, 
i.e., histories of groups and institutions.
188
 However, I contend a deeper and more 
amorphous criticism is more valuable when trying to meet southerners, especially 
Virginians, in history, because they existed in tension, including intellectual tension, to all 
these forces. I would argue all these reform premises are distant from southern 
commentators’ views on history and, as a corollary, society and politics.  
Perhaps partly because of a relative lack of concept history, powerful belief in history 
as a science and the utilitarian and moralising imperatives, more genealogical approaches 
to such concepts as liberty and liberalism have until recently been fairly scarce. The 
former term would be more relevant for me, since it can go beyond ideology that is itself a 
construct and tends to streamline all literary output into politics.
189
 For example Louis 
Hartz famously claimed in the 1950s that in America there was a single core idea of 
liberalism that, resembling reason’s dialectic, needed the perceived anti–liberalism of 
slavery as a merely erroneous antithesis, as fodder, to run its course of progress.
190
 Pretty 
much the whole progressive tradition of American history has agreed.
191
 That early 
American political thinking could be classically republican instead was first promoted by 
explicitly materialistic, conflict–seeking social historians.192 According to one influential 
adherent of dialectics, Gordon Wood, liberalism conquered republicanism in the 1780s in 
the Constitution to establish a recognizable modernity. Modifications to this view by 
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Wood himself among others survived into the 1990s and were widely accepted.
193
 A 
countercurrent to this interpretation about republicanism in America was that of J. G. A. 
Pocock that reflected problems with and pessimism as well as anxiety about historical 
time and continuity, a republicanism whose origins lay in Renaissance Italy and 
highlighted civic virtue instead of public good or utilitarianism. Some among Pocock’s 
camp maintained these problems survived to the Jackson era.
194
 However, in the 1980s, 
when Pocock’s interpretation had incorporated Geertz’s structuralism, those insisting on 
the continuity of liberalism joined forces with materialists and utilitarian thinkers about 
history, thereby also driving language away as a problem in history.
195
 Ultimately, the 
dialectic of liberalism was re–embraced around the 1990s.196 Most often republicanism 
was used “in opposition to liberalism” which was not Pocock’s argument.197 Beyond the 
early–1990s, conceptual discussion on republicanism seems to taper out in American 
history, but more recently, the dialectic dynamic has finally been questioned on a general 
level. In other words, thinking was “neither fully classical nor fully liberal,” consisting of 
complex idea webs or languages.
198
  
Pace a desire for “neat” explanation models, it is no argument to state that because 
liberalism was so pervasive, cohesive and dominant, an absence of an antithetical force of 
similar composition and popularity is a sufficient reason to adhere to liberalism.
199
 This 
would be to miss the whole point of dialectic’s deconstruction that argues precisely the 
reverse–though holding onto the relevance of the obverse: the demand for an antithesis is, 
in itself, a major philosophical, semiotic, epistemological and ethical problem in history. 
On scale of historical narrative, a similar error would be to treat language as a series of 
true–false statements reason could detect. This way of looking at history is deficient. 
Hence, I shall focus on liberty. Republican considerations have been applied to the South, 
but largely within a liberal framework of dialectic that is grounded in materialist forces, 
ignoring narrative, language, metaphysics, thinking or similar concerns.
200
 As Oakes 
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complains, antebellum South “has been obscured” in the debate.201 Only relatively 
recently have there been more sustained accounts on the hold classical writers and 
theorists had on southerners.
202
 To illustrate the power of older patterns of discourse about 
liberty, it is necessary to also touch briefly on the composition and function of southern 
discourse. 
In the early–18th century, utilitarianism became the force that spelled the end for 
classical theories of liberty with arrival of urban, polite, refined bourgeois culture.
203
 A 
hundred years later improvement, urbanity, utility and increasing heterogeneity through 
democracy played a leading role in northern moneyed and powerful centers of learning as 
well.
204
 However, although southern cities likewise grew rapidly and the region had its 
own bourgeoisie, southern states had next to none utilitarian thinkers.
205
 I thus propose to 
rethink Pocock’s position and examine Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Niccolo Machiavelli’s 
republican thought, and then compare it to the southerners’ take on classical 
historiography.
206
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The Genoveses assert the 19th century saw a Machiavelli revival in the South. 
Machiavelli “enjoyed a pride of place” for almost all southern commentators.207 
Machiavelli drew on Livy and was inspired by the latter’s account of ancient freedom as 
libertas, the ability “to stand upright by means of one’s own strength without depending 
on the will of anyone else.”208 To such body politic, public servitude or slavery was 
marked in its second definition, besides the obvious one, by “living in a condition of 
dependence on the will of another nation or state.” Skinner maintains the analogy between 
a human and a political body was complete so the latter will lose its liberty if forcibly or 
coercively deprived of its ability to act at will in pursuance of its chosen ends. If such a 
force is used against a free people, it defines tyranny.
209
 According to Skinner, this was the 
rationale behind the Declaration of Independence,
210
 which would support the “no broken 
identity” thesis in terms of historical consciousness and undermine the persistent liberal 
essentialism of the document.  
In Berlin’s erudite research, Machiavelli is very far from a moralist or a humanitarian: 
in addition to pragmatic attitude to politics and immoral realism, there are other 
anomalous traits about him that could be summarized as a lack of positivity. The account 
of politics is strictly empirical: there is no natural law philosophy, no teleology, no 
Christianity, no mention of an ideal order of things, in brief, a lack of abstractionism, a 
lack of utopian “reason” or “mind.”211 Importantly for me, for Machiavelli, religion is not 
an end in itself but only a means, an instrument for social cohesion and solidarity. Roman 
paganism is good for society because of its strong and spirited characteristics. In contrast, 
Christian otherworldly meekness is a source of decay. There is no God–based law: what 
counts is republican political freedom, freedom of one State, or more accurately city or 
patria, from control by any other State. There is practically no historical sense and no 
notion of progress, no metaphysical explanation of the whole, no eternal values, only a 
notion that the classical age can be brought back if a leader exercises virtù and the citizens 
are appropriately trained and bravely and skillfully led.
212
 Berlin claims he speaks of 
strong, well–governed social wholes, where a necessity for leadership is both right 
knowledge and self–knowledge: direct perception of reality and the self, and this is 
accomplished with observation of current events and consulting Antiquity. Reality 
precedes ideas about it.
213
 Cities became great by developing citizens’ “inner moral 
strength, magnanimity, vigour, vitality, generosity, loyalty, above all public spirit, civic 
sense, dedication to the security, power, glory, expansion of the patria” as well as 
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“[p]ower, magnificence, pride, austerity, pursuit of glory” and “discipline, antiqua virtus” 
disseminated through “legislation and education that promoted pagan virtues.”214  
This pagan life ideal and morality, rooted partly in Livy’s Rome and whose 
disappearance was lamented in Tacitus and Juvenal, was in Machiavelli the Renaissance 
humanist impossible to reconcile with Christian life ideal and morality.
215
 The latter is 
based on imagination, not reality of how men are universally, and is hence shoddy as 
society material. However, there is no subverting Christianity, because the pagan ideal is 
not based on reason but instead on practical lessons garnered from Antiquity and 
disseminated through pagan education. Christian education was contradictory to the 
flourishing of civic spirit and pride.
216
 Importantly, a State cannot be led on a Christian 
basis because, as Aristotle had held, a good citizen need not be a good man.
217
 Violence 
was not exempt from good governance, but it is not an end in itself because it disrupts 
order, harmony and strength.
218
 As Aristotle had shown, society modeled on Greek polis 
can be ethical without utilitarian ethics, word of God, reason or other philosophical 
construct or, I would add, Lockean natural law.
219
  
The ends of individuals are those of his or her community, and one cannot evade this 
fact because a membership in polis is a part of being human. There is no separation of the 
individual from his community even in thought, because an individual cannot tear loose 
from community.
220
 As Berlin notes, this is not amorality, only a different morality based 
on Rome and classical values.
221
 Though Christian values need to be supported as far as 
they advance communal cohesion and solidarity, the State cannot be a Christian Paradise, 
and violence is a normal part of it, because public life cannot be reduced to Christian 
principles.
222
 He emphasizes Machiavelli sets the two worlds side by side in an antinomy 
so men could “choose either a good, virtuous, private life, or a good, successful, social 
existence, but not both.”223 Philosophically, this deconstructs the idea of a single structure, 
truth or idea, “a monistic pattern” Berlin finds in “traditional rationalism, religious and 
atheistic, metaphysical and scientific, transcendental and naturalistic” at the basis of 
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Western civilization and political thought.
224
 Though certainty or “final truth” is thus 
severely shaken, there are also positive implications that are not anti–liberal: 
If there is only one solution to the puzzle, then the only problems are firstly how to find it, 
then how to realise it, and finally how to convert others to the solution by persuasion or by 
force. But if this is not so . . . then the path is open to empiricism, pluralism, toleration, 
compromise. Toleration is historically the product of the realisation of the irreconcilability 
of equally dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one over 
the other. Those who wished to survive realised they had to tolerate error. They gradually 
came to see merits in diversity, and so became skeptical about definitive solutions in 
human affairs.       
ibid., 324. 
It remains to connect such social and political outlook to my concerns. Unlike SAE, 
Machiavelli lacks many of the positive traits many modern Western thinkers in general 
and northern Americans in particular advocate. Especially, the grounding of history and 
politics in God and Plato is much ill at ease with him. Unlike New England, very few 
southerners advocated that politics be based on Christianity, or that Christianity be based 
on philosophy, genres modern history blurred.
225
 In Jefferson among others, the tension 
between Christianity and paganism was present and, as far as historical figuration, its 
humanistic impulses would continue to flourish, especially in Virginia but elsewhere as 
well.
226
 Further, the Genoveses assert “almost every southern writer followed Aristotle in 
insisting upon the social basis of individuality” and Tate plays off Aristotelian rhetoric 
against Platonic ideas at the period.
227
 Even a vehement and pioneering Yankee critic 
Royall Tyler insists in the South, knowledge was more a craft than the preferred modern 
and New England way of the book and mind, but I question his conventional reduction of 
the theme to economics.
228
 Such thoughts were very familiar to many in the South, but 
increasingly repulsive in the North, because they were antagonistic to SAE, the 
individualistic liberal ethos of Locke and, in aesthetics and history, Romanticism.
229
 Rice 
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was complaining precisely of lack of religious faith as an existential outlook and lack of 
religious education in Virginia. It continued, though weakened, up to the Civil War.
230
 My 
corollary claim that departs from Genovese and Bradford
231
 is that Christianity was more 
often a resource in governance than an end in itself in Virginia and South Carolina at this 
time. Thus, the humanistic, comparatively secular approach to history died only slowly as 
well. I argue their positions are too informed by especially Donald Davidson’s 
sacralisation of southern history.
232
 In my view, more research into “pagan” southern 
attitudes would be welcome without reductionism to Christianity. 
Indeed, the commanding and restricting nature of the Word and its hearing SAE 
required is phenomenologically in sharp contrast with the classicism of vision pertaining 
to freedom especially southern elites and the region in general was more aware of.
233
 
Momigliano states recommendations for history in the early–17th century could not 
conceive a replacement of ancient historians by modern work.
234
 Similarly, in their choice 
materials of ancient history, southerners exhibit a deep awareness of history as a 
counterweight to formal philosophy and SAE. This would put into question Buckley’s 
blanket claim in Virginia, “evangelical Protestants . . . profoundly influenced the political 
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culture.”235 I question it, because as de Certeau has shown, the Evangelical revival 
connects intimately to changes about dynamics of society that already entail a changed 
history.
236
 The wary receiving of the Evangelicals especially about history indicate 
southerners were not fully prepared for them and, consequently, for the workings of 
modern history. Further, O’Brien contends Polybius, practical historian and disseminator 
of the Roman model of historians as men of political action, was rare reading. Instead 
popular were the Greeks Thucydides and Herodotus, the latter more concerned with 
rhetoric and style of history, the former with emphasis on seriousness and truth along with 
cyclical ethics and oratory. I claim both had an “un–Platonic” conception about the nature 
of history. Past experience, rather than Platonic philosophical precepts, was the locus of 
historical learning, a direction hinted at by Aristotle. Tacitus was read as social criticism 
and danger of a corrupt government and cautious guide for politics.
237
  
Unlike Plato and New England, southerners did not–especially before the Turner 
rebellion in the 1830s (chapters 3, 5)–worry literature and the arts diverted from their 
prescribed objective: “the potential imitation of the true and the morally good” and “the 
politically necessary” through distortion. Conception of literature as unpredictable and 
potentially dangerous, politically unreliable and irresponsible survived in Scholastics such 
as Saint Augustine who regretted his weeping over Dido’s death in Virgil’s Aenid.238 By 
contrast, southerners of the period by and large did not object to tears, and those in the 
higher education had knowledge of Virgil as a part of their cult of chivalry.
239
 Plato 
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disparaged Homer for his complexity and mythology in the Iliad and the Odyssey. It 
threatened the rational structure of propositions and fixed social order and undermined the 
call to perfection by catering instead to human emotions. The application of signs to 
worldly objects diverted from the ideal realm and was didactically harmful.
240
 But in the 
South, not only was Homer found in Virginia’s higher education of the 1810s and 
recommended reading for South Carolina ladies in at least one instance, both the Iliad and 
the Aeneid appeared translated in the 1840s and 1850s in prestigious southern journals.
241
 
Essential was also Plutarch, favored by Nietzsche (2.3.3). Plutarch provided the only more 
systematic account of the virtuous example. It was based–not on Platonic and neoclassical 
passive imitation–but on active investigation of the circumstances. Aesthetic sensibility of 
history as mainly literary of Dionysus of Halicarnassus in Letter to Pompey was also read 
by at least some southerners.
242
  
Greece and Rome enabled southerners to be aware of history as literary, not just 
rationalist. But despite this, southerners were not romantics or antiquarians. Rather, they 
simply did not have a “general” philosophy of history. Neither Universal History as a 
science, nor exemplary history that had an inherently religious undertone, were truisms to 
them (2.3.4, chapter 6).
243
 
2.2.3.1 Differential southern dynamic of public discourse  
Southern intellectual culture, of which area books will be discussed later (chapters 3, 4), 
was little confined to–even represented in–the urban world. While London had 3,000 
coffee houses for discussion and debate by the 1710s,
244
 southern debating societies were 
far different. They had no similarly stable, externally abstract organization in space. 
Usually, they met haphazardly at some local place. In execution, they intentionally 
parodied miniature parliaments, existed mostly only in small towns, and were usually only 
for men.
245
 There were more conversation clubs, far more conservatively executed, that 
served travelling intellectuals. But they were apparently not open for all, were only for 
men, their members were old, and most of their discussions never went public.
246
  
The former trained young southern men to gentility and propriety, the latter pursued 
knowledge for its own sake without instrumentality. Their rationale thus was categorically 
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different from novel bourgeois interests.
247
 The 17th century dialectic between the state 
and private individual Habermas has covered had not yet been resolved in the South. 
Especially in case of southern debating societies, lack of stable space and serious political 
discourse combined with a Christianized form of Aristotelian virtues. They served as an 
index of social status and authority as public representation of virtue similar to the High 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
248
 In other words, in the South, a private self was not as 
developed as elsewhere, because the state that demolished the feudal order was weaker. 
“Privacy” meant exclusion from outsiders more than individuality. This resulted in an 
amalgamation of local feudalism and state–based aristocracy. It was not without the 
impact of the state, capitalism and trade that demolished the feudal order, but neither had 
it fully separated the public and the private as dialectic within the state as had happened in 
Europe by the 1700s. Therefore, the next step in the development of private personality 
Habermas dates to German neohumanism
249–that of “freely self–actualizing” for 
bourgeois ends
250–also had not yet been fully taken, as the function of discussion clubs 
indicates. The South was not immune to it, but its philosophical implications for the social 
order and social dynamic had not sunk in.  
For history, this meant that the new interpretation towards the ancients that was 
launched mainly by neohumanism that was collapsing the old one by the 1750s
251
 and that 
was vital for the German take on modern history had not yet reached the South in a way 
that would alter individuality. The grounders of American history in the idea of liberalism 
tend to miss such absence or ignorance of ideas as discursive. That ideas are discoursed 
about is today self–evident. However, in the South in the early decades of the 19th 
century, not everything was up for grabs as discourse, nor did discourse function similarly. 
Historical identity within a classical republican vision was not discursive, because for 
those outside SAE, there was not yet even singular History as a metaphysical construct, 
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nor a public sphere for discussion that would be identical with major western locations 
and the North. Bradford even claims a continuous identity of ancient Rome was not 
shattered in or by the Revolution.
252
  
2.2.4 Impact on biography: presence and spatial dynamism of historical 
signification 
When one looks at the first histories written by southerners at this period, they turn out to 
be biographies–excepting Wirt’s Letters that also was, in one function, a study of 
rhetoric.
253
 While they certainly had political functions, they also were deeply conscious 
of the rhetoric of history. Their utility was in classical republicanism and sometimes, they 
were even critical of neoclassicism. The tension between form of literature and reality is 
present, if more rhetorically than aesthetically–a step taken in the 1820s (chapter 3).254 It 
relates to a philosophical difference about history taken as knowledge as well.  
For instance Jefferson felt the pressure of history’s “federalization” in the 1800s in 
case of the last volume of the hugely influential arch–Federalist John Marshall’s George 
Washington biography. To Jefferson’s chagrin, Marshall portrayed the republicans “as 
lawless rabble” and a disorganizing force to the smooth–running, fixed, Constitution–
based government, an old Federalist theme.
255
 De Tocqueville, explicitly drawing from 
Marshall, echoed this judgment and extended it to cover “the South.” He extrapolated 
from the first wave of Virginia migrants led by greedy, immoral, unstable and excessive 
persons, and from the second, “elevated at almost no points above the level of the lower 
classes of England,” that the future of the region is doomed. This argument was closely in 
line with Marshall and with earlier Yankee accounts from the 1790s.
256
 Marshall saw the 
republicans as enemies to SAE. Federalism had already distanced itself from Jefferson’s 
republicanism in history, which New Englanders would begin to exploit in the same 
decade.
257
 It is not that Jefferson had no nationalism: what counts are functional, 
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metaphysical and conceptual differences from both SAE and bourgeois liberal–romantic 
nationalism.
258
 This difference was not missed by, at this level, southern–sympathetic and 
Virginia–educated poet and essayist Edgar Allan Poe (chapters 3, 6). 
In addition, for me important is Jefferson’s semiotically different attitude to history as 
rhetoric of presence. When Jefferson wanted to counter Marshall’s portrayal, he preferred 
bodily presence, locality and speech to the sign. Jefferson protested against the existence 
of singular History as sign: to the contrary, the sign as history “should free men from the 
past.” Unlike Montesquieu, the model for de Tocqueville259 and for Wirt (2.2.4.1), 
Jefferson could not agree history was a determinate and binding causal link. Instead, he 
wanted to reject such links. Importantly, he still did not romanticize presence over writing. 
Italian “hot” enthusiasm about liberty in the present, referred to by some as pure 
republicanism (chapter 6), was more valuable than its “cold” exposition and arrangement 
like in Marshall. I argue this pertains to the peculiar communal culture of the South that 
was philosophically at odds with bourgeois ideology and SAE. It is skeptical or even 
modernist about language as such communication. Ironically, van Tassel concludes the 
publishers he contacted could not spot this dilemma and Jefferson’s history remained 
unpublished.
260
  
Jefferson played his own collections of various scraps and notes, i.e., haphazard 
writing, off against Marshall’s book that pretended to be the sole history of the 
Washington period. Without Marshall’s history book, he would have thrown away the 
scraps. Yet, he also had bound them together with a cabinet binder “under [his] own eye” 
and finally, self–critically censored them for publicity.261 This indicates a formal 
discrepancy between history as book and history as memory scraps. My argument, partly 
deriving from Derrida, concerns southern resistance to the tendency at unification and 
homogeneity of communication about history. Marshall’s book of history differed greatly 
from Jefferson’s convention about history in terms of experience, form, philosophy and 
communication. Although Jefferson had no “theory” about history, in this instance the 
former but not the latter presumed the book format as true and complete history. Indeed, 
this presents the stark confrontation of austere theory and lack of theory about history. 
Marshall’s presumption was virtually never shared, and often repudiated, by southern 
scholars (chapters 3, 4, 6). Semiotically, Marshall de–ontologized presence to absence of 
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the receiver and, paradoxically, turned absence as true and stand–in or substitute.262 I 
agree with Derrida all writing is beset by this phenomenon, but the important aspect for 
me is qualitative differences within writing as conflict and crisis. The resistance took more 
aesthetic, ironically symbolic forms later in the South (chapter 3). It was the radical, 
peculiarly Yankee novel deduction from idea to thought/signification in Universal 
History–the rejection of the discrepancy between them–that troubled southern critics. It 
attempted to unify idea and reality in the sign as paradoxical “true commodity” to make 
presentation as sanctified legitimacy of the (capitalist-Christian) book. This was done at 
the cost of absence and representation. Most southerners never lost sight of the 
discrepancy between signification and presence and absent signification and present 
reality. I shall apply Dekker and Greeson
263
 and call Marshall an instance of imperial 
writing to rival Europe that was imposed on the South from within and outside.  
Unlike Whig John Quincy Adams, Jefferson reluctantly co–operated with Federalist 
historians such as William Plumer of New Hampshire. Plumer was at this time planning 
an American history. Adams ordered Plumer to write a Federalist history with the moral 
that there was an unbreakable union covering the whole continent of North America.
264
  
The biography of George Washington by Episcopalian M. L. “Parson” Weems who 
lived mostly in Virginia explicitly renounces the public life as the sphere that contains the 
truth of a character. It is artificial and less than half the whole picture. Weems uses an 
organicist and romantic simile: like “a forced plant robbed of its hot–bed” a person in 
privacy “will drop his false foliage and fruit, and stand forth confessed in native stickweed 
sterility and worthlessness.” He mentions many romantic tropes such as song, picturesque 
nature and rural events that are, in their more profound, concrete and older ways, marks of 
greatness, but–ironically–pushed to the background like the noblemen of Paris and 
London push the elderly so as not to “depress the fine laundanum–raised spirits of the 
young sparklers.” Weems connects light with public oratory praise and dark with private 
truth so he seems aware of Plato and anti–neoclassicism. He uses three exclamation marks 
at the end of his sentences.  
At one point illuminating for me, Weems compares the difference between polished 
public printed text used by the eyes, and mere scribbling–which turns out to be true 
because of young age and intuition–while also keeping the Scottish way of speaking 
intact. What is striking is this early example of aesthetic of spontaneity as a communal 
medium. It was to appear in several southern arguments about history, and has similarities 
to Derrida as intense preoccupation with becoming and time versus the sign as praxis and 
reality. In this regard, it resembled baroque painting where, according to Hollander, 
sketches and single moments in temporality were valued for the first time. However, 
juxtaposed to the 19th century, it develops into modernist discord: Weems wrote about 
more temporarily conventional themes as well. Religious rhetoric of perfectibility of man; 
a concern, clothed in Old Testament language, of a civil war as a result of disunion in 
America; a statement about progress “in riches and strength” and “arts, manufactures, and 
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commerce.” Not surprisingly, especially northern commentators found the religious 
element welcome.
265
 A further possibility, implied by Foucault, would connect to the 
Scots–English conflict: the aesthetic of spontaneity was common, because it challenged 
the deontological “profound establishment of order in space”266 by New England 
signification and British neoclassical culture. That is, it challenged their extreme semiotic 
and scientific rigidness. Southern temporality was in process of negotiation between 
bourgeois world view that included the predominant conception (social science and 
historicism) of linearity,
267
 and what preceded and contested it. The important point is not 
to reduce it to romantic theory or SAE. The aesthetic of spontaneity at times explicitly 
manifested as secularity: since Hobbes, relying on appearances had been un–Christian 
(2.3.4, chapters 3, 4, 6). Further, I interpret this recurring observation in social terms as 
un–education as a resource. While education was critical for Locke, New England and 
neohumanism, several learned southerners seemed to prefer lack of it in the context of 
history.  
O’Brien claims that David Ramsay of Charleston, a physician and public official who 
wrote a history of Washington at the same time, represented a historian more concerned 
about evidence and exhibited “utmost formality” in style.268 However, though Ramsay 
fills up his account with public speaking, it does not to me imply he was more concerned 
about truth in an epistemological, enlightened sense. Instead, Ramsay seems to celebrate 
public oratory as a republican–not utilitarian–virtue. Not only is historical signification 
qualitatively different from life, the “great” events that do end up as history do so in 
“enlivening” and “adorning” ways.269 In other words, the element of persuasion is present, 
as is the ironic mixture, here more aesthetic and humanistic, of reality and signification 
expressed as a classicist rather than neoclassicist, let alone positivist, practice. In 
categorical distinction to southerners, those northern historians who were inspired by 
Enlightenment history ignored its epistemological status of language as rhetorical (2.2.4.1, 
2.3, chapter 3). 
2.2.4.1 Weak version of “Austere Enlightenment” (WAE)  
One marked exception addressed more recent and northern theories: Wirt’s biography of 
Patrick Henry from the late–1810s. Wirt, born in Maryland to Swiss and German parents, 
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was a critic of Virginia and an admirer of the French Enlightenment and rationality. His 
approach to letters made him unpopular in some circles.
270
 However, he never goes the 
full way of SAE, settling on WAE. This shows in his complex methodology that indicates 
him to be an ironist about history: simultaneously an admirer of the French Enlightenment 
and an extreme case of a classical rhetorician, a text critic and one who laid emphasis on 
personal acquaintance, Wirt was a reconciler of two worlds, a southern trend about history 
even among its more progressive thinkers (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6).  
In the British Spy, Wirt’s use of history is still rare and disorganized, using the word in 
battles of natural history of the 18th century against the anti–American Buffon as well as 
to refer only to the events of a single person.
271
 However, he complains the style of the 
day is too ornamental instead of “pure, substantial and useful thought.” He laments “a 
feast of reason” becomes “a concert of sounds.” Public taste had degraded, and authors 
had responded accordingly. A history of the changes of style, “philosophical, as well as 
chronological,” would be a curious and highly interesting one. Wirt refers explicitly to 
Blair and casts some doubt on the progress of history, which indicates his historist “proto–
romantic” stance.272  
However, only a year later, in 1804, his views on history have become more rigorous: 
he holds on to natural history as “authentic history,” writes history in the singular and 
without “H,” and implies this singular history, even in its modern sense, can be known as 
true.
273
 Again a few years later, he turns to glorifying history as “splendid and immortal” 
in its pages, mentioning astronomy in the same connection.
274
 Most radical in the South, 
however, is his assertion that historical language and language of journalism are equally 
true.
275
 Thus he apparently had become immersed in the SAE metaphysics about history. 
There are other neoplatonic passages: the whole “Number XXIV” is a lengthy and 
skillfully crafted allegory on the superiority of enlightened, neohumanistic and romantic 
thought, gathered in a single person named Sidney–a possible catachersis of Algernon 
Sidney (chapter 6)–compared to contending values and world–views represented by three 
persons.
276
 In other words, aesthetically, scholars, like artists, “are born, not made,” and 
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their “writing is individual, isolated, and internal; not social but eccentric.”277 I cannot 
dwell on it here more however except to note that as in New England, history is natural 
history with religious and rational dimensions. Here Wirt spells out his historical 
epistemology: the ideal is  Locke’s “large, sound round–about sense,” i.e., ”the ability to 
scrutinize the presuppositions from which one reasons,” but before this, willingness “to 
recognize the  contingencies that provide the basis for one’s premises, and to engage with 
those alternate premises that develop within different sets of contingencies.”278 Wirt, 
ahead of his peers, is thus covertly criticizing Virginians of not being rationalist 
subjectivists enough in history–the premise with which useful history is grasped–instead 
settling on, as Locke had had it, deductive reasoning found on chance, laziness or conceit 
that has no notion of a boundary. The men were acquainted with “all the pre–eminent 
incidents” of history but, settling on custom, they had not applied this rational measure to 
cause and effect. They appealed to them rhetorically–for aid–but lacking this theory of 
epistemology, Sidney “was able to seize and drive back upon them like routed Elephants 
upon their own army.”279 Wirt’s fascination with causality in history derived probably 
from Montesquieu’s general anthropology that was a–historical and a –particularistic at 
the basis, i.e., the reverse of the southern heterologies.
280
 This criticism seems remarkably 
unsympathetic and lacking in poesy. Gone are the poetic speculations of Blair or attempts 
to sympathize with different views, though on the surface the description is not hostile. It 
is one of the best examples of the different quality of historical thinking in Virginia at this 
time. 
In the biography, Wirt begins with an abstract “right to know what credit is due to the 
following narrative.” He admits he lacks personal connection to Henry. But, in his 
research he has been assisted among others by Nathaniel Pope, a colonel in the Revolution 
killed in a duel in 1810 before Wirt’s study was published. Wirt tells Pope was a “sacred 
observer of truth” and a lawyer who indefatigably collected information from every 
quarter, but accepted only that coming “from the purest sources,” thus a reliable 
intermediary. Wirt is not only prepared to use written sources alongside oral and 
communal ones, he also contends the written sign is superior in epistemic value to human 
memory and acquaintance. On the face of it, then, epistemological reason and logic have 
displaced the more human communal, rhetoric ways. It is the printed word of the archive, 
the court, and the newspaper that is now the judge of true history. They provide the 
sources of “certain and permanent evidence” that have allowed the author “to correct some 
strange mistakes in historical facts.” Like Locke’s inhabitants of the isolated Mariana 
Islands, “even those most respectable gentlemen” of Virginia had false memories, not 
having been in contact to each other. He reduces history to logic so that out of these 
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scattered reminiscences and tales–i.e., “premodern” history–“the author has been obliged, 
in several instances, to contradict even the several histories of the times concerning which 
he writes.” But he has never done this “without the most decisive proofs of his own 
correctness, which he has always cited: nor has he never departed from the narratives of 
his several correspondents, except under the direction of prepondering evidence.” And if 
those could not be obtained, he has chosen those he has considered most reliable. He 
stresses this is nothing personal, with no intention to question any of the gentlemen, only 
something he had to do “or else [abandon] the work altogether.” The straightening out of 
the story, disentangled intricacies and inconsistencies in his words, was extremely hard 
work. Even so, the result is “crude sketches” far from the truth but that may still live on 
rather than perish “on [my] hands.” There is “that larger portion of readers” who are 
“willing to be pleased” with the best reasonable effort at such a goal in history i.e., the 
truth, but “[t]he most indulgent reader,” nevertheless in sympathy for defects, will become 
“disappointed in the matter itself,” so scanty and meager is the result in comparison to 
Henry’s fame. In terms of knowledge, much remains unknown and much has perished. 
American history’s pages are “immortal” and can be disgraced.281 
We have to remember Wirt was a master rhetorician, a literary polymath, and a 
powerful theorist of the public sphere. In frame of mind more an outsider looking in, his 
language about historical veracity is only a calculated metalanguage. The late Pope is 
more a literary trope who serves two functions: a) an ideal methodologist of history for 
Wirt’s own stated desire of history as neoplatonic natural history, b) a symbolic entry 
point of access, a diamond drill of sorts, to respectability of the work on the inside. Wirt’s 
extensive argumentation for his methodology of “disturbing” the inchoate mass of 
memory and tales suggests his procedures and episteme was rare in Virginia at the time. 
This further indicates a different understanding of history around him–something Wirt 
himself was not free from. Wirt values independent literary works highly as permanent 
signs. But, his sign desires the truth but must yet differ from it, a conundrum he is 
unwilling to publicly confront. Assuring the truth of the sign is more an aporia than 
conviction as I will explore shortly. Even Wirt’s portrayal of his audience as equally 
interested in truth of the sign is more his own implied reader, his own nationalist–
neoplatonic idea of America and a bow to the prominent public figures than reality. 
To illustrate, let’s look at an interesting discussion about a stenographic recording of 
Henry’s speech in 1791. Henry had delivered a stunning piece of oratory and its first 
argument had been recorded on stenograph. Wirt had obtained this record and “extracted” 
from it “an imperfect analysis” of the speech. Wirt laments the speech is only on 
manuscript form, that it is not something esteemed higher. It “may be unquestionably 
relied on” since it provides “the substance of the arguments” and the state of law. 
However, it is marred “as a sample of Mr. Henry’s peculiar and inimitable eloquence” for 
the same reasons printed debates of the Virginia convention are. The manuscript had been 
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tidied up too much: it failed to catch “either the captivating flights of Mr. Henry’s fancy, 
or those unexpected and overwhelming assaults which he made upon the hearts of his 
judges.” All such passages in the copy had been crossed out with a pen in a way that still 
left the words legible. Simultaneously, “the same thought, or something like it, had been 
interlined in other words.” But even the interlineations themselves are almost always 
“erased, altered, and farther interlined” to “amend the expression.” The best expressions, 
“without the hazard of mistake,” were the ones most blotted and interlineated. The notes 
had not “the very expression” of Henry in them, only “some hint merely of the thought” 
the writer “was afterward unable to fill up to his own satisfaction.” These “imperfect 
specimens” to which Wirt had been “compelled to resort” were mere imitations. This is 
proven by the negative reaction “with strongest expressions of disappointment” they 
caused when read to several people. In some cases, they were corrected with memory. If 
they were to be a synecdoche of his whole work, it would be fully discredited and treated 
“rather as romance than history.” Practical effects of his speech, not the language of Wirt’s 
study, nor the stenograph, is where the reader should look. 
282
  
This passage is very interesting and illuminating for several reasons. First, the 
stenographer on Wirt’s account does not share Wirt’s romanticized fetishism for oral 
expression. He did not record the second argument Henry delivered, because “it would be 
nothing more than a repetition of the first” and “he was afterward told it was much 
inferior.”283 Thus, while for him, oratory was merely better or worse as rhetoric, for Wirt, 
reverting to Blair and romantic thought, it is the source of truth, a unique event as is 
proven by a live audience and its concrete emotional reaction. Wirt mixes together 
nationalism, Christian metaphors, bar eloquence and Antiquity to support this claim.
284
 
Second, unlike those around him, Wirt upholds the value of the work as a sign, though he 
admits it is not concretely real in the way speeches are, a perfectly coherent estimation in 
Universal History, but not in SAE that wanted to reduce reality to form. By comparison, 
even Virginia general court decisions and their grounds were not preserved in writing until 
1819, indicative of the persistence of an oral Renaissance culture, instead of the 
typographical one of Universal History.
 285
 Third, the rhetoric of rational methodology 
manifest as literal “arche–writing” is obvious. But juxtaposed to the condition of the 
stenograph, it shows the irony associated with it like a crack in a mask, or a Derridean 
trace. Not only is Wirt now drawing on Calvinist rhetoric of reason’s imperfections, his 
assurance the stenograph–more a steganograph in form–is nevertheless something to be 
trusted without criticism and substantially true is catachretic, since the very substantiality 
of the sign was denied in Universal History, but not by the Yankees.
286
 Fourth, for the 
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stenographer, interpretation and allegory are the tools of choice, i.e., the signs are not true, 
they resemble or hint at that which is itself a resemblance but secure in its identity via 
metonymy. There is no enlightened rationality involved. For Wirt, by contrast, the 
inability to order the signs, though not according to epistemological but aesthetic criteria, 
would jeopardize the whole work as romance and not history. However, this dyadic 
dichotomy is a romantic ordering of the world. Wirt’s own attitude to Romanticism is a 
romance in White’s terms, a recuperative one that surely did not enjoy full acceptance in 
Virginia. He does not consider the stenographer is not a believer in truth in the sign, more 
a humanist than SAE about signification. He overtly juxtaposes Universal History and 
Renaissance, while covertly, he appeals to his own extrapolations from romanticized 
expressivity. Fifth, his dismissal of passive imitation in comparison to original oral 
utterance is an aesthetic judgment couched in Romanticism. But it is awkward given the 
dis–ordered character of the stenograph. Since the stenographer tried to “fill [it] up,” Wirt 
sees the sign as desire for fulfillment with what was spoken and thought, with expression 
and idea. Overtly, Wirt is looking at semiotics through philosophy instead of spatial 
ambiguity. But covertly, he is assured of the less philosophical symbolic and poetic nature 
of historical language, since he was torn between representation, expression and 
ambiguity. In other words, profoundly dislocated, Wirt could firmly settle neither with 
Universal History’s ordered rhetorical representation, SAE’s grounding of representation 
in reality, humanism’s inexactitude, nor romantic valorization of expressivity.  
Though he stopped at Romanticism, Wirt entertained a modernist notion of history as a 
result of his disawoval of Montesquieu’s Universal History causality. In a letter to a 
friend, he lets the cat out of the bag. When James Boswell, the famed Scottish biographer 
of Johnson, mentioned “the infinite difficulty and trouble” of accurate fixing of time with 
newspapers, he thought it was only ranting. But now he was beginning to learn “by woful 
experience Bozzy was right.” Collecting of facts was much more difficult than he had 
thought. Instead of having them “all ready cut and dry, “at every turn of Henry’s life” he 
“had to stop and let fly a volley of letters over the State, in all directions, to collect dates 
and explanations, and try to reconcile contradictions.” Notably, even such writing is 
referred to in aesthetic terms as saddling Pegasus and riding up Parnassus. He mocks his 
own methodology of rigid and precise statement of facts and truth: “what the deuce has a 
lawyer to do with truth!” This bar he had set for himself and historical writing is “entirely 
a new business” even to him, and he found it and scrupulous regard of fettering facts 
awkward. “It is like attempting to run, tied up in a bag. My pen wants perpetually to career 
and frolic it away. But it must not be.” Instead, he “must move like Sterne’s mule over the 
plains of Languedoc,” “without one vintage frolic with Nanette on the green,” without 
“even the relief of a mulberry–tree to stop and take a pinch of snuff at.”287 Wirt 
acknowledges he has not succeeded with his narrative gait with his “palfrey”–
etymologically a post horse and semantically the horse of choice in the Middle Ages. 
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More than a hundred pages on, he is “as far to seek, as ever, for the lightsome, lucid, 
simple graces of narrative.”288 In other words, the de–rhetorized boots of the romantic’s 
view of historical narrative as middle style
289
 did not fit. This shows Wirt’s knowledge of 
Laurence Sterne’s–a very popular author in connection with history in the South (chapters 
3, 6)–metafictional strategies in Tristram Shandy. The reader “is no longer a safe observer 
who looks in but is a player in a game which the narrator directs and alone knows the 
rules.” The work has no rigorous and linear beginning and ending and referentiality of 
language does not hold.
290
 Wirt enjoys the play of language too much for such simplicity.  
Wirt was very conscious of history as literary narrative. Even the enlightened 
Jefferson, no friend of Henry’s but more concerned about history than most and recipient 
of an early manuscript for approval, had not gone out of his way about the truth of history 
as narrative language. Instead, he was going by memory. Jefferson referred to the work 
with the romantic metaphor of canvas.
291
 A more “general” history of Virginia would have 
to wait until the 1830s (chapter 3). Wirt is among the first southern theorists of history. As 
a paradigm setter of WAE, i.e., history as necessarily rhetorical and symbolic, his 
influence would be felt later. In comparison to his intellectual and creative wealth, he is 
today forgotten.  
By the early–1830s, the influental Harper brothers of New York thought the work too 
ambitious in method. Significant is their condemnation of both rhetoric and un–truth 
found in the text. These “repel” a reader who exercises his reason. This illustrates the 
difference between SAE and WAE. Rhetoric in history is, by now, almost a cardinal sin 
and clearly separable from personage of history, as in history itself cause and effect are 
separable. An audience that falls to its victim–and here the North American Review, the 
primary mouthpiece of New England opinion, is quoted–is not rational enough. But, they 
point out, rhetoric is very popular in Virginia, including, but not limited to, eminent 
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members of society. More than the North American Review, the authors sympathise with 
the different role rhetoric and powerful individuals hold in Virginia. Thus, while New 
England had rejected rhetoric from history by the late–1810s, it flourished in Virginia 
even in the early–1830s and beyond.292 Historian, intellectual, lawyer, journalist and 
statesman Hugh Blair Grigsby, Virginian himself, reported as late as 1858 that Virginians 
were reading the work.
293
  
2.3 The “German renaissance”: widely different interpretations 
Here my attempt is threefold: first, an outline of the German renaissance in its northern 
interpretations as regards history and literature. By the term I mean powerful interest in 
German aesthetics, philosophy, politics, education and culture, including history, in 
America from the late–1810s. I contend northerners, buoyed by SAE, overwhelmingly 
received German Romanticism as a positive resource for nationalism and romance 
history.
294
 Second, I will examine how at the same time, Sir Walter Scott offered the 
southerners outside SAE and WAE a far more nuanced and skeptical view about romance 
in/as history. At the same time, Rome historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr’s combined 
humanism, philology and Kantian historism made southerners far more critical of 
historiography in ways that resembled Nietzsche. Third, I will focus more specifically on 
Virginia, where southerners found a nexus of support for such history at Jefferson’s new 
University of Virginia. Indicative of the persistent heterology is that the German onslaught 
was kept fairly at bay in Virginia.   
2.3.1 Northern enthusiasm and dominance 
Between the late–1810s and 1830s in white American culture, the popularity of Rome 
began to decline while that of Greece began to rise as a part of European romantic 
nationalism, especially its German variation, and its neohumanistic interpretation of 
Greece. Rome became more associated with pragmatic political state philosophy. The 
language and culture of Greece interpreted by Germans became the language of the self, 
the spiritual, and the ideal.
295
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These revolutionary bourgeois developments were first introduced in the U.S. in 
education. A new generation of American classical linguistic reformers criticized and 
refashioned the previous ways of approaching Antiquity and its methods. With Edward 
Everett (schooled in Göttingen in 1817), German scholarship and admiration of German 
education poured across the Atlantic from the early–1820s. The first audiences were the 
students at Harvard and the citizenry of Boston.
296
 By 1826, Everett was applying his 
German theories to American history.
297
 I contend another factor in the process was the 
rediscovered worth of German letters in England and the formation of British 
nationalism.
298
 In other words, northern United States felt secure enough to open up to 
Germany after Napoleon was defeated. Strikingly, however, all the major reformers were 
very young, roughly in their mid–twenties–and only one was southern.299 Similarly, only 
two institutions the reformers occupied were southern, located in South Carolina. 
Significantly, the first specialist American historian, George Bancroft and northern literary 
scholar George Ticknor were among the earliest and most ardent of the Germany–dazzled 
“philhellenists.”300 This epistemic loading of language with knowledge made manifest as 
ideal unity has not been studied as a disruptive change. The implications of this revolution 
in its philosophical, social and political spheres are hard to disconnect from those of the 
aesthetic and linguistic. If Gura is correct that in America, there occurred a culture–wide 
shift towards a more symbolic ordering of reality, the varying positions to it should be 
examined.
301
  
What cannot be emphasised too much is, besides being northern almost to a man, the 
major reformers were mostly Unitarians or friendly with them. Harvard had become their 
nerve center. The main difference in powerful Unitarians such as William E. Channing 
and Andrews Norton to SAE was extension of Locke’s view of language as arbitrary to 
Biblical truth. However, though liberals, they still did not take into account Kant’s 
critique, let alone Hume’s skepticism. Instead, they jumped to material conditions 
surrounding shaky words. Human reason, with its absolute principles independent of 
experience, could then grasp the emerging idea. There was no need for figuration or 
poetics of language in a rational person. This was the view of New England’s intellectual 
centers for the most part of the 1820s, and it had spread to such powerful northern 
institutions as Harvard, Yale and Princeton.  
Their opponents, the Trinitarians such as Moses Stuart, operated in institutions such as 
Andover Theological Seminary that was founded to counter these liberal ideas. They held 
                                                 
296
 ibid., 49-50, 52. 
297
 Van Tassel, Recording America’s Past, 106-7. 
298
 Hege R. Segerblad, “Transcending the Gothic: ‘The Extravagancies of Blackwood’,” (MA 
thesis, University of Glasgow, 2010), 52-53. For the linkage between linguistics and nationalism in 
Germany at the time, see for example Adam R. Nelson, “Nationalism, Transnationalism, and the 
American Scholar in the Nineteenth Century: Thoughts on the Career of William Dwight Whitney,” 
The New England Quarterly 78 (2005): 354, 358. 
299
 Winterer, Culture of Classicism, 50. Winterer lists nine key names. 
300
 ibid., 61, 52. 
301
 Gura, Wisdom of Words, 18. 
  
 
 
80 
views closer to, but not identical with, the Virginia SAEs: first, they separated philosophy 
from philology, a bold move in this context, because it undercut the basis of language in 
rationality. An orthodox Calvinist–the main religious sect in Virginia that only grudgingly 
gave ground to SAE–Stuart kept in mind the limited faculties of man. He entertained the 
possibility of the poetic character of language in religion before the indescribable, but 
without drawing the bold Gnostic conclusions of the liberals. Though words were more a 
façade to God’s light and the definite meanings of the text were binding ideas, Stuart’s 
arguments did not point to a Gnostic dualism that assailed the frailty of “natural” existence 
and reduced it to function only as an antithesis to light, i.e., the dominant northern 
metaphysics. “Natural” being is dependent on light and its truth, not reduced from light: 
being is capable of existing attached to a wire as it were. There is no transcendence but 
difference, though conditioned, between the realms of Being and truth.
302
 
Beginning in the 1820s, northern authors exploited their unrefined language theory and 
published and disseminated literary works that purportedly were true history but which 
later scholars have exposed as mythical.
303
 I cannot enter into this criticism in depth. For 
instance, Hazlett states Washington Irving wanted to create an American hero while at the 
same time insisting on a completely unmediated vision of history.
304
 Their philosophy in 
history rested on a linguistics they applied aesthetically as romantic symbolism for 
philosophical, political, ethical and social ends. Their SAE audiences took it as referential 
truth. In other words, they used romantic aesthetics and literature to make social science 
out of history. The reader overlooked language for the didactic romance. In terms of 
genre, Lincoln explains, such a theory of literature violated the everyday of the novel with 
the extraordinary of the romance and erected morality on the result. The emerging 
morality of the romance connected to historicism: a larger, law–like process beyond one’s 
control. The resulting world–view is that of a disinterested winner in a world where 
morality significantly determines action and truth and virtue are absolutes. I claim this 
aesthetics bolstered SAE. Even a mild ironist such as James Fenimore Cooper applies 
dialectic anthropology, not philology let alone rhetoric, to his works that deal with history 
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and wraps it in neoplatonic imagery of northern nationalism. Classicism and rhetoric were 
getting more irrelevant.
305
  
2.3.2 Southern responses: A skeptical reading of Sir Walter Scott  
There was a relative hiatus of several years of published historical thought in the main 
southern intellectual centers, indicative of the bafflement at the northern game changer 
and the new theory of subjectivity.
306
 Besides institutional power, the initiative about 
historical language theory and historical metaphysics was now firmly in the hands of 
northerners.  
Walter Scott now began his rise to prominence among southerners everywhere.
307
 
However, Scott did not exist in a vacuum so that historical thinking could be reduced to 
his works–until recently the American credo in southern context.308 Here I contend to 
point out his relationship to historical narrative and for southern historical theory in the 
1820s.  
Scott’s differences to northern romancers of history and their implied readers are 
several. First, Scott did not distinguish between genres as story and history, history and 
philosophy of history, romance and novel. He knew history was always a constructed 
narrative. O’Brien states Scott thought fiction had inherited Aristotle’s epic as poetry of 
greater truth in philosophical terms than history. Lincoln points out that he was also aware 
of the newfound cultural authority of history. Second, Scott left the connection between 
morality and history contingent. In other words, immoral actions may turn out to be 
beneficial to all. The hero, though humanitarian in principle, loses to the calculating 
environment of moderation. The winning aspect of environmental calculation is always 
virtuous and beneficial to others. Scott entertains the possibility of a divinely ordered 
history and is a qualified believer in progress, but does not valorise them. As Nakamura 
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has it, Scott is free from Whig idealistic glorification of the victors that, I shall show, was 
evident in New England (chapters 3, 5). Third, Lincoln adds that similar to other Scottish 
theorists of society, the conflicts are often resolved more explicitly as tragedies that leave 
the philosophical bases of knowledge and social order more inconclusive and uncertain. 
This invited Tory skepticism that criticized Romantic idealist philosophy. Crucial for my 
purposes, his novels could be read both as a “warm” romance of moral sympathy and 
identification, as mainly literary, and as a “cold,” skeptical and more analytic commentary 
on history, as mainly historical. This type of reading was what Scott had in common with 
other Scottish and Irish authors. In history, such a reading had been offered by Gibbon and 
Edmund Burke, another southern favorite. Conservatism for these authors becomes a 
cover for expression of ironic social discontent.
309
  
Scott’s novels not only serve as “foundational tropes” about the problematic and 
unstable boundary between history and fiction, they also appeal “to those who see through 
the fiction (of national cohesion, of historical progress, of liberal participation).”310 
Southerners were never keen practitioners of (post–Rousseau) Romanticism politically or 
aesthetically instead of 18th century
311
 and even more ancient ways. But they often 
engaged novel theories critically or ironically. It is therefore conceivable that southern 
audiences included similar reception. By contrast, Levin claims New England read Scott 
mainly for romance qualities.
312
  
Some southern theorists possibly read Scott cynically against the grain of northern 
historical romance. For example, Irving’s history of Columbus received scathing criticism 
from an anonymous reviewer in the Southern Literary Messenger, a major artery of 
southern critical opinion established in the 1830s (chapter 3). The critic appeals to Gibbon 
and almost reverently to Robertson and, from the viewpoint of common sense, questions 
Irving’s mixing of romance with history and Neoplatonism.313 Hugh Swinton Legaré of 
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South Carolina, possibly the best–read intellectual in the South, wrote to Virginian Jesse 
Burton Harrison, a German scholar and another Hampden man, to hold fast to Greek 
literature instead of Irving, Cooper or similar “smatterers” up North where, echoing 
Johnson’s observation on Scots, in–depth knowledge was absent. Northerners lacked even 
the rudiments of scholarship before Europe travels: Philadelphians and New Yorkers will 
remain satisfied with “’souvenirs’ and such stuff” in taste and capacity for a while yet.314 
Another prominent South Carolinian, historian, novelist and poet William Gilmore 
Simms, enthusiastic about neohumanism and German culture and an admirer of Scott, 
declared romance in history unrealistic. With irony, Simms realised the faulty dialectic 
apparatus between “civilized” and “savage” in Cooper was the only thing America–I argue 
especially northerners–saw.315  
2.3.3 Southern responses: A more critical historiography 
In general, southerners were by now far more nuanced than northerners about history, and 
leaps and bounds ahead as critics. Of the modern historians, essential were, in addition to 
Robertson, the anti–Whig, anti–Puritan David Hume and Edward Gibbon, the historian of 
Rome,
316
 remarkably modern in his methodology, style and religious relativism. Thus, 
southerners apparently did not agree with SAE nor held Puritan religion a key element in 
history. Since the immensely read Hume was not entirely distinct as a historian than as a 
philosopher, they were uniquely more disposed to demarcate clearly between tautological 
realm of ideas and real–life inductions of fact. For Hume, the latter were always “a result 
of fixed prejudice or indurate habits of belief.”317 In other words, the phenomenal–
empirical realm of history was not reduced to the peculiar northern mix of utilitarian–
rationalist pseudo–social science and Christianity. This is critical, because such separation 
extended to seeing rhetoric at work in historiography–never abandoned by leading 
Enlightenment historians
318–even in case of more bourgeois theorists like Wirt as we saw. 
Further, it corroborates the argument that instead of a unified nation or even a state 
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presupposed by modern history, the South was more an internally variegated collection of 
constituencies or patrias that had an instrumentalist, rather than mystical–collectivist, 
character. For Hume, the whole notion of an enlightened public sphere was less a source 
of ground for national pride and identification–as in the North and southern bourgeois 
theorists of history–and more “a set of potentially irrational wishes that must be appeased 
if any system of power is to remain stable.” In other words, more cynically, it was a 
necessary evil to settle with and check private interests through institutions. It rested 
neither on enlightened citizenry as in Locke and SAE, nor on maximum democratic willed 
participation, the position of major liberal northern historians like Bancroft.
319
 The 
subsequent American glorification of institutions is, at the very least, an ambiguous 
undertaking to such political philosophy (chapter 3). Since they failed to dispense with 
historical particularity, southerners were not suprahistorical where the future counted more 
than the past, nor were all advocates of universalized Lockean citizenship adhered to by 
most other liberals around them and, in cases, among them.  
One indication of these discrepancies relevant for me is that by the late–1820s, many 
southerners had adopted Kantian historism. Kant was the first philosopher to go beyond 
Hume to introduce discourse, not just mental representation, as ground for concept 
formation. Accordingly, southerners were radically sensitive about modern history as 
production, a notion increasingly strongly rejected in the North. I gather this from 
popularity of Barthold Niebuhr.  Besides strong appreciation of Antiquity and criticism of 
the French Revolution, Niebuhr’s mixture of historism and deep erudition appealed to 
southerners and influenced them more than Leopold von Ranke, O’Brien contends. 
Niebuhr showed an ability to create order from chaos on a historist premise. However, I 
would disagree with O’Brien Niebuhr subscribed to the neohumanistic expulsion of 
aesthetics from history, and his assessment that Nietzsche completely rejected historical 
knowledge. Both Niebuhr and his southern readers rejoiced at the possibility of uniting 
history and natural science.
320
 But, from this possibility they drew conclusions more akin 
to Nietzsche than Schiller. This is first of all because Niebuhr desired his historiography to 
be grounded in Kant’s second Critique.321 We have to distinguish Kant’s philosophy of 
history–ungrounded in paradigmatic, empirical history–from Kant’s theory of knowledge 
Niebuhr became immersed with. Kant’s philosophical critique of philology can be related 
back to reflective judgment of the third Critique, which uncouples philology from 
deductive reasoning and only leaves analogy or induction as modes of generalisation. 
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Thus, history cannot be known to be progress of God as SAE insisted, and empirical 
phenomena are only locally or intersubjectively true and purposive in analogy with the 
intellect in reflection. There is no a priori objective standard or Scholastic prescriptivism, 
only communality, and no higher ideal than human authenticity.
322
 I contend Kant’s 
practical reason was carried to southerners in Niebuhr’s history and, in places, radicalised 
to question modernity’s free will manifest in history from natural scientific view. 
Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer rejected free will, historical causality and philosophical 
moral repentance on a Kantian basis. Not all southerners took this step from Kant, but 
some did (chapter 3). My point is, many still reflected on the discrepancy as 
modernization critique, which strengthened the strands of opinion about history separate 
from SAE.
323
 By contrast, for example the pioneering Briton, Oxford clergyman Thomas 
Arnold received Niebuhr not as a progressive or cyclic but pessimistic philosopher of 
history,
324
 and this view was disseminated to Boston.  
My reasons are: a) southerners’ faith in universal being was crumbling, b) for the many 
outside SAE, history had no meaning as a grand metaphysical totality or anthropological 
romance, c) the postulate that reason guides history was suspect and d) the appreciation of 
rigorous philology and science was strong. For example George Tucker, Virginia 
politician, essayist and educator, engaged Malthus, and Presbyterian historian Mitchell 
King, despite his religion, treated natural sciences and history together.
325
 Thus, I claim 
some southerners were, rather uniquely, positioned in a polemic against an optimistic, 
democratic and Judeo–Christian–liberal teleology of history.326 Few southerners were 
downright pessimists, though some were. But they resembled Schopenhauer and 
particularly Nietzsche who came later as critics of such an apparatus. Specifically, they 
embraced a version of Anglo–French Enlightenment Miller defines roughly as anti–
Christian, skeptical and positivist.
327
 The biggest differences are a less negative stand 
against religion and a more communal self as a part of the whole. Still, there were 
functional similarities: 1. Intellect and perception were deep and powerful, classical, 
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aristocratic or simple, not mechanist, bourgeois, or grounded in faith.
328
 2. Ontologically, 
many southerners were outside Christianity and morality in their renovated (or Gnostic) 
guises of abstraction, prescription, knowledge or modern liberalism. 3. Persevering will, 
effort and the body preceded a (cultured) intellect, which was only an instrument, not a 
ground.
329
 4. Suspicion about and focus on form, because reality was about becoming, a 
process. Being was not universal, nor grounded in history.
330
 5. Neither Nietzsche, 
southerners or Niebuhr were enemies to aesthetics in history tout court. Romantic 
aesthetics that placed art outside history was the problem.
331
  
As readers of Niebuhr, Nietzsche–a diligent student of Wolf and Niebuhr–and 
southerners are comparable. First, history for Nietzsche was not a utilitarian, social 
scientific, nor necessarily even a Christian pursuit, attitudes that also circulated in the 
South. Second, Nietzsche “valued historical method and scholarship as a precondition of 
culture (and of cultural discussions and diagnosis), but objected to them as the goal of 
culture.” This is reminiscent of southern suspicion of historical romancing and associated 
teleology of liberal progress. Third, Nietzsche saw history not as a romantic undertaking 
but in his words “a new and stronger genii of that very Enlightenment” out of which it had 
developed into prominence. Enlightened skepticism granted by Scott and the appreciation 
of authentic history was what southern theorists at the period likewise appreciated. This 
coolness of “new” skepticism is what Nietzsche valued. He quipped: “There may be good 
reason for warm–blooded and superficial humanitarians to cross themselves before 
precisely this spirit.” Neither Nietzsche nor southerners were reformists or humanitarians 
in historical thinking. Fourth, Nietzsche put philology before idealistic philosophy and 
neohumanism. Similarly, southerners had only a qualified acceptance of both. Fifth, like 
many southerners, Nietzsche hated abstraction in history and historical methodology 
instead of the personal, “the example, the habit, the simile.” He combined hard work with 
philology and original thinking without too many books. Sixth, the highest goal for him in 
history was the comprehension of Antiquity, coinciding with southern admiration. 
Seventh, Nietzsche probably had Niebuhr in mind in many of his statements about history, 
many of which were critical of Romanticism.
332
 Eighth, besides Plutarch he praised 
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Thucydides, southern favorites in contrast to Plato. Most southerners probably would have 
agreed with his assessment: “Plato is a coward in face of reality–consequently he flees into 
the ideal; Thucydides has himself under control—consequently he retains control over 
things.”333 
2.3.4 Southern responses: Virginia 
By 1820, Jefferson, worrying about education, charged that southerners “are not trusting 
to those who are against us in position and principle,” who “fashion to their own form the 
minds and affections of our youth.” Simpson insists that in this context, though not in 
these letters, Jefferson singled out Harvard–the nerve center of new German thought–“as 
in institution particularly antagonistic to southern principles”: Dunn holds that Jefferson 
started to suspect all major northern education at the time. In education–like at times 
previously, I add–“the country” was now Virginia.334 Jefferson’s reaction is 
understandable given this new thought alien to Virginians in general. Indicative of widely 
different aims, the first faculty at the University of Virginia was almost entirely British 
and continental Europeans were welcomed as well.
335
 There was, thus, less zealotry about 
uniquely American nationalism in learning.  
For the southerners outside SAE, choices within northern discussion were not inviting. 
Clemmer summarises the historical thinking in Pennsylvania and New England: “With 
respect to the attitude toward history . . . the New England movement must be regarded as 
an extension or prolongation of the Enlightenment, whereas the Pennsylvania movement 
[of the 1830s] was ‘in phase’ with the development of idealism and romanticism in 
Europe.”336 That is, either SAE or German Idealism. The Tory–leaning Virginians were 
suspicious of the German renaissance, and the old Tory dismissal of German culture 
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between late–1790s and early–1810s persisted far longer.337 Pretty much the only inroad 
of novel German ideas in Virginia in the 1820s was made by Harrison in 1827, but even 
he was in contact with northerner James Marsh, another Hampden teacher and his protégé 
(chapter 3).
338
 The Harvard and Göttingen–schooled Harrison leaned to Quakers, 
Episcopalians and Puritans and was a cousin to Henry Clay. However, he was rejected 
from Jefferson’s university.339 This would suggest a cultural tension in Virginia with both 
German romantic liberalism and New England I shall briefly explore below as related to 
history.  
Tucker had become Jefferson’s educator of choice. He taught moral philosophy until 
1845.  The differences between Tucker and northerners are significant. Though a believer 
in American progress and a supporter of science like Jefferson, Tucker also prophesied the 
ultimate decline of American history more than a decade before Cooper. He shared the 
topoi of a conservative enlightened skeptic: contrary to popular northern opinion, he had 
great admiration for Tory Hume as a philosopher, a Scott influence. Tucker criticized 
utilitarianism at the expense of the humanities and classical languages. He distinguished 
between “real eloquence,” apparently ancient rhetoric, and “affectation,” “gaudy epithets, 
striking metaphors, and fanciful allusions.” He protested against style for its own sake–the 
northern literary paradigm by the 1820s–and contended all languages must ultimately 
corrupt and decay. He was also practically an atheist. Tucker was inspired by Scott when 
he published The Valley of Shenandoah in 1824, a tragedy about the economic ruin of a 
Virginia family.
340
  
Historiographical thought in Virginia retained emphasis on ancient rhetoric and older 
history. In a satire à la Wirt but far less a bourgeois social criticism, Grigsby wrote Letters 
of a South–Carolinian in 1827. It studied several prominent Virginian orators since 
“Virginia is the land of orators.” O’Brien comments Grigsby’s assessments were 
“implausible.” However, I think he misses the different semiotics and episteme involved. 
Though there was a contending one based on German neohumanism in Charleston, 
Grigsby comments Virginians were not interested in the German idea of a native literary 
genius, nor should they necessarily be.
341
 Grigsby was elected to the Virginia 
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Constitutional Convention of 1829–1830 where he began a sketchbook of the other 
members.
342
 
Grigsby is a good example of a southern historian working in the mold of enlightened 
Tory skepticism. He names Tory Jonathan Swift, a Scott favorite, as model. This indicates 
another stand taken against neoclassicism. Swift’s writing was anathema to Augustan 
polite refinement by its inclusiveness of polite and vulgar, refined and popular modes. 
Lincoln states he did not reject politeness, but he played with it and with many different 
genres. Other similar authors popular in the South were Sterne and François Rabelais 
(chapters 3, 6). That Grigsby admired Swift but chose not to publish the notebook until 
much later in a polished form suggests a transformation about historical representation 
concerning bourgeois public sphere had occurred (chapter 6). To my knowledge, the 
original has still not been published in entirety. As an example of playful genre blending, 
he in the original mentions “structure of minds” of the participants in the same breath as 
“delineation” of their personal appearances and styles of eloquence.343 His interest is not 
in ideas but in living men. They, not abstract forces, made history. There are practically no 
abstract or even social patterns in history outside the men. This was an aristocratic practice 
of history according to de Tocqueville.
344
 This sort of history predates Universal History–
that presupposed ideas as primary–all the way to Renaissance humanism. Further, it shows 
history was not everywhere discursive in the South. The language of the sketches 
functions as allegory rather than historical realism, as commentary, not criticism, a 
categorical difference.
345
 Grigsby’s goal is not to capture the truth of his subject, reduce it 
to words or treat it rationally or philosophically, but to hint at it and its entangled, 
metonymic wholeness. Nor is the object a separate entity from the rest. Rather, the whole 
seems greater than the parts. Compared to Cooper, what is lacking is an anthropological 
and ethnic haphazard individualism. No romantic style, no serious moral message 
underneath the comic. No communal division, no newness of experience. Figuration, not 
social politics, solidarity, not social conflict.
346
 Grigsby, like Tucker, also does not appear 
very evangelical, indicating the humanistic counter–current to SAE. 
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2.3.4.1 Humanism, historiality, and pyrrhonism at the University of Virginia 
  
Humanism about history spread at the University of Virginia–the world’s first purely 
secular agency of learning and letters
347–due to its European faculty members George 
Long and Georg Blättermann. Edgar A. Poe studied under both during his ten–month stay 
as a student of linguistics in 1826.
348
 I argue Poe was influenced by this:
349
 it would 
illuminate his poetics of culture (chapters 3, 6). Poe had his Tory sympathies: he may have 
admired John Wilson, the famed contributor to Tory Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
though he also satirized him and the paper.
350
 Blackwood’s may have been the magazine 
he was most familiar with.
351
  
Blättermann was a philologist like Jefferson, but for history, perhaps more relevant is 
Long.
352
 An eminent classicist admired by Matthew Arnold, he “represented history with 
the classics”: he affirmed the relevance of the classics to the present.353 I claim this take on 
classical culture was ethical, philological, aesthetic and rhetorical, not utilitarian, 
rationalist or bourgeois neohumanist as it became in the North. This sharpened the critical 
tools of his pupils about modernity and history, because it enabled for a theory of signs 
about history to extend simultaneously far back to the Renaissance and far forward to 
skeptical “protoromanticism.”  
Specifically, I contend Long juxtaposed 16th century Renaissance humanist histories 
of Artes Historicae with Kant’s and Blair’s discursive semiotics of Universal History.  
Artes Historicae generally had little philosophy. Instead, they embarked from the 
literary and rhetorical qualities of history. Following Dionysus and Lucian, these were not 
history’s purpose. However, since in the South, the underlying Polybean pragmatism 
about history was not widespread, these concerns and accompanying imitation of the 
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Ancients arguably held. Artes Historicae probably also existed because the absence of 
Christianity at the university implied history needed not be exemplary. History could be 
without philosophy, i.e., without inherent meaning, moral, method or episteme. Secular 
and sacred history were categorically different, though even the latter acceded history was 
res gestae, the lived, and beyond study.
354
  
I shall refer to this mix of humanism and enlightened skepticism as historiality. 
Historiality critiqued even spatial unity within a time period, the basic assumption of 
modern history. It chopped historism more finely into individual textual productions that 
partake in reality but fail to yield any larger or higher (metaphysical, idealist) spatial 
patterns that the new space presupposed. Further, historiality thought such “unity–
dependent” historiography potentially occludes its normative, philosophical and aesthetic 
qualities. Because opposed to Plato and sacredness/morality of history and very skeptical, 
it is perhaps best represented by Nietzsche. On Nietzsche’s scale, Artes Historicae is 
closest to monumental history. Central for me in monumental history is the nonreflected 
presence of the heroic individual in the sign and humanity as beautiful decisive action that 
manifests in such unreflected representation and existence. This echoes the Jeffersonian, 
and broadly southern, dynamism to tear loose from metaphysical networks. But since even 
Nietzsche takes Polybius as his point of departure,
355
 it is possible Long or his hearers 
emphasized the origins of Artes Historicae even more. This was extreme heterodoxy to 
SAE. But it was also distant from Universal History: after “Vossius” in the 1620s, the 
moral value of history had been on the rise. In other words, the reduction of empirical 
exemplary existence to the sign was grafted on Universal History as a guide to prudential 
existence. Universal historians Bacon and Hobbes reinforced this trend.
356
  
Monumental history was opposed to antiquarian history. The latter denied life as 
becoming, the former celebrated it; the latter made no internal value and proportional 
judgments but treated everything equally; the former saw greatness in unique protean 
individuality. Nietzsche seems to disagree especially with neoplatonic immortalizing of 
the past as life–enervating357 that corresponds to the historical rationalism present in New 
England. Ironically, antiquarian history was the state–run paradigm about history the 
Yankees introduced (chapters 3, 4, 5). A further parallel between the university and 
Nietzsche is balancing monumental history with what he names critical history, the 
dismantling of the past as binding Jefferson had explicitly recommended. The resulting 
synthesis, if done right, was “a conflict between our inherited customary nature and our 
knowledge . . . a war between a new strict discipline and how we have been brought up 
and what we have inherited from time immemorial.” It was achievable through cultivation, 
but hard to attain. If successful, it created individuals with profound innate distrust about 
the past. I perceived this attitude especially among Virginia intellectuals. It proceeded 
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from real life, i.e., past a posteriori “out of which we may be descended in opposition to 
the one from which we are descended.”358  
Such history broke out of the linear temporality of modern history and combined the 
Artes Historicae with enlightened semiotic skepticism and, as a third intellectual element, 
pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonist history, most popular from the late–1500s to the early–1600s, was 
what Vossius had explicitly resisted. According to one definition of pyrrhonism, “history 
is no more than an imperfect record of singular events, not a discipline subject to a definite 
method.”359 Pyrrhonism was extreme skepticism about history as an epistemic or 
philosophical pursuit–history as either Universal History or exemplary, i.e., the places 
modernity allocated for history from the 1600s onwards. Often, pyrrhonism included 
intense source criticism of language. Pyrrhonism had to do with secular attitudes about 
history and revolutionary attitudes about its teaching.
360
 Exemplarity and Universal 
History overcame it until historism brought some of its aspects back. In my material, 
especially those southerners who were Virginia students, alumni or faculty persisted with 
pyrrhonist attitudes at least to the 1840s. Conversely, almost no–one settled for “simple” 
Universal History and its societally more radical variants historicism and social science, 
let alone SAE. The Virginia approach was thus very distant from the hegemonic, much 
better–known New England. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
358
 ibid., 19. 
359
 Nadel, “Philosophy of History before Historicism,” 309. 
360
 Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” 295-96. 
  
 
 
93 
3. Critical reactions to German theories about history 
and their northern applications in Charleston, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, mid–1820s–1841 
3.1 The “German renaissance”: widely different interpretations 
continued 
In this section, I will continue to back up my claim about the very different reading of 
Germany in the South in the late–1820s and early–1830s. First, I will argue for the 
emergence of a symbolic, ironic interpretation of history in the journal Southern Review. 
This was a result of rejecting SAE and WAE, guardedness about the idealistic and 
metaphoric element in German Romanticism in literature and history, and feelings of 
confusion and irony at New England –imposed discourse about culture and history. 
Second, I will examine the versions of this ironic symbolist critique in Charleston. My 
claim is, the initial reception of German Romanticism was far stronger there than in 
Virginia, but far from uncritical. Crucially for me, though Charleston shared in the fervor 
to establish a national literature, reception of German Romanticism also contained its 
criticism that is modernist. In sum, Virginia and Charleston critics had more in common 
with each other than either had with the northerners who were simply enthusiastic and 
utilitarian about romance and German Romanticism. This I shall illustrate by comparing 
and contrasting Poe with Simms, and by examining the latter in context of southern 
thinking and experience as related to function of books and prose. 
3.1.1 A symbolic mode of historical discourse 
As Grigsby had implied, a stronger center of southern cultural opinion, including history, 
was now Charleston and to an extent Columbia–the two southern places the reform 
impacted. Intellectuals had to respond to the northern intellectual armsrace on northern 
terms. Pennsylvania, where Hegelian thought would be welcomed in the 1840s (chapter 
4), had taken the task of writing history for all the states to the south of Pennsylvania in 
1815. It neglected to do so in practice, preferring Pennsylvania. To remedy this, the 
Pennsylvania State Historical Society was formed in 1824, which “began as an attempt to 
control national historiography through state organization.” In the 1800s and 1810s, New 
York and Massachusetts respectively had founded similar organizations. Importantly for 
me, the methods of these regional organizations about history were antiquarian,
361
 not 
humanist let alone modernist. In other words, the level of sophistication about history was 
categorically different compared to the southern centers of intellect. Still, southerners 
apparently had to respond to the weight Pennsylvania and the young northern German–
educated historian George Bancroft (3.3.2) had recently added to historical discussion.  
 
                                                 
361
 Van Tassel, Recording America’s Past, 63-65. 
  
 
 
94 
By 1827, frustration with intellectual dependency helped establish the Southern 
Review, a learned and cosmopolitan journal for various intellectual discussions. It ceased 
publication in 1832 after Legaré was sent to Brussels by Jackson. However, there was no 
separatist fervor, no attempt to define or conceptualise a “southern” culture or identity. 
Though patriotic and interested in national literature, southerners were forced to play on a 
foreign turf: these concerns would not appear even as concepts until the 1840s.
362
 There 
was less organicist fetishism of the soil and nature, topoi northern romancers enjoyed and 
linked to American nationalism. Thus, modern history was less endorsed.  
Indicative of the different cultural dynamic that prevailed, and the Humean cynicism 
about public institutions (chapter 2), the Southern Review was explicitly advocated as a 
countermeasure to the evils of printed discourse and its ideologies. In a Nietzschean 
argument, these turn presumptions of today into future fact. There was acuteness of 
perception of the press as a despot that, in its functions, was directly connected to 
absorptive and hegemonic abuse of power–“constructive power”–against southerners that 
extended to the signifier. The writers also exhibit the attitude of waking up innocous 
southern readers to this pressing fact of discourse. It is both novel and unfortunate that 
print and public opinion today possess such power, and mass education is the cause: it 
must be countered, or loss of power may result. Phenomenologically, this again harks 
back to the Renaissance–baroque era (chapter 2). Palpable concern about the South as 
Other is present. But the writers depart from sectionalism: the world–famed Constitution 
is an instrument and virgin. Its permanence and purity–as it was created–is the nail that 
keeps the nation united in friendly terms. Interestingly, the effusions of intellect are still 
described in neoplatonic and organicist imagery close to the North and much closer to 
modern history.
363
 In sum, southerners had to begin to see double between alienation and 
community.  
Although the journal engaged Romanticism, it did not follow they held a similar view 
about history or even language as the northern mainstream. Instead, there is a heightening 
of the symbolic mode reminiscent of modernism, a different semiotic economy, where 
Calvinist symbolism, rhetorical emphasis, philology and the “cold” Scott reception were 
transformed into a much darker and pessimistic view about language and history and 
idealist philosophy.  
Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has illustrated this in case of Poe’s “The Purloined 
Letter.” By way of Shoshana Felman and Derrida, I would extend his analysis to cover the 
cultural semiotic of leading contemporary southerners.
364
 Southerners occupied a third, 
symbolic, perspective that sees the limitations of the dialectic of romance and supposedly 
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rational language. This entailed a simultaneous lack and rejection of these modes to 
overarching mastery and stable, secure identity. This was almost diametrically opposed to 
the imperialist, aggressively outreaching figuration of New England that the southerners 
had already put up with since the 1790s (chapter 2). Not only does history lose its place as 
the analyst of the real (history as true language), the analysand (history as romance) 
become disenchanted: they stop seeing themselves in the analyst’s mirror and perceive the 
mirror itself as imaginary. This became the condition of southern textual theorists, because 
many failed to believe that either reason or mirror mastered nature in history. Because of 
this heterology (chapter 2), they perceived the limitations, dimensions of ethics and power, 
and illusions of such figuration of truth. For them, as for Poe in Lacan’s analysis, “to feel 
safe is itself a great danger, to believe that one has arrived at the truth is to be deluded, to 
declare one’s mastery over a situation or body of knowledge is to declare one’s blindness 
to the forces that overwhelm and control us all.” As Derrida notes, the realization is still 
open to perennial metaphysical dispute.
365
 This drives a wedge between: a) history vs. 
textuality, b) ideality vs. textual ontology, and c) history as the morally conscientious 
psychologist vs. the “sick unethical” patient.  
3.1.1.1 Effects on history in the Southern Review 
In historical discussion, many southerners would probably have agreed with historian 
Jacob Burckhardt’s assessment of the neohumanist liberal spin about ancient Greece–the 
interpretation in the North– as fallacious.366 This different understanding of liberty from 
German romantic liberalism is vital for southerners.
367
 As in case of Burckhardt, their 
rhetoric of political conservatism and awareness of language as figural produced critical 
commentary about history inside and outside history proper. Southern emphasis in history 
remained on philology, literature and rhetoric besides a qualified romantic aesthetics, 
instead of social–made–political science that was grounded in natural science and religion. 
Legaré in the Southern Review stated classical history is better than modern in a 
criticism of education policy by Thomas Grimké, an ardent Christian and a stark opponent 
of the ancients. History should not be made a utilitarian pursuit. Democratic spirit 
contained in phrases like “practical” and “the people” is distasteful and vulgar Platonic 
idealism and scholasticism. Like in Plato’s scheme, poets–except the harmless didactics–
orators, stunning literary individuals and their divine spirit would vanish as a result. 
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History, it is implied, is among the arts that addresses taste, imagination, and the heart
368–
and in no need of Yankee uplift. Those who question classical learning are equally ill–
disposed to all elegant studies, and will ultimately rid themselves of all literariness.
369
 
Historical assessment of the classical world is about written and spoken language of the 
leaders, not about the masses, what they were or did. Classical rhetoric as the mode of 
moral lessons–now sadly neglected outside grammar schools–is superior to modern 
metaphysical ethical theories.
370
 Because of the interpreters of the Germans, literature is in 
danger of forgetting the simplicity of classicism that drew from real, material and 
everyday instead of passions and human heart, abstract ideas and the spirit world. In “this 
philosophic age,” with its “broad and garish light,” increase of knowledge and current 
philosophy actually threaten the poetic realm. Interestingly, Legaré here alludes to 
Edmund Spenser through John Milton and to the 16th century theory of knowledge: a 
skull is now not a memento mori but a sign that “mysteries of phrenology” have “brought 
to light.” Legaré thus seems painfully aware of the rage for neoplatonic blinding light, 
prevalent and fateful in northern discussion. Likewise, he acknowledges philosophy as an 
enemy to the poetic–and its overlap into natural history prevalent in New England. 
Translations are not only bad, they are dangerous, Legaré implies, if religious revelation 
for instance is not left to the philological scholars.
371
  
Robert Henry, a reviewer of Niebuhr’s Roman History, assures the chronicle is in truth 
the only history there is. The rest is reflection and embellishment–contrary to Speece 
(chapter 2). In an anti–neohumanist argument, art in history has been in history for all 
time, but the Romans managed to keep it in check better than most. Rigorous philology 
may shift among history what is added and what is in the core.
372
 But, a bit of warmth of 
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Friedrich Schlegel–the most radical German historist–was not so bad in a work of history, 
“lively interest” and “warm, delightful colouring,” Legaré contends. Even Roman history 
should not be “mere compilation,” though the literature of the Romans themselves did not 
inspire enthusiasm like that of the Greeks. The Greeks had originality, not by way of 
Augustan neoclassicism, but as intrinsic to their whole society as Bildung, a national 
literature. Next to the Greeks in originality are South European Troubadours, “full of 
gallantry and sentimental love.” “These simple effusions, the first language, perhaps the 
first lessons of chivalry” were exempt from all classical models. An allusion to the 16th 
century in connection with Ludovico Ariosto, Torquato Tasso and others: “Their subjects 
alone are full of poetry.” The more polished and elegant versions of these 16th century 
writers do not quite capture the “freedom, freshness, and originality” of primitive 
literature.
373
  
Legaré satirises modern history by a chiasm reminiscent of de Man’s reading of 
German poet Rainer–Maria Rilke, who similarly tied symbol to physicality.374 The format 
of history of an American experience, as in Grigsby, is a journal or diary written by 
Bernhard, Duke of Saxe–Weimar Eisenach. Legaré reverses the truth content of the duke’s 
diary and modern historical study. The truth of a desire for non–publication is actually 
greater than publication proper. Legaré states it is far from certain the current forms of 
historiography that differ greatly from the duke’s are well–founded. Histories have 
become philosophies of history, something far different from Thucydides or Xenophon: 
atop narration of causality proper to understanding, histories now exhibit such things as 
“ponderous disquisitions about political economy and national wealth, excursions on the 
march of intellect, and the state of letters and science.” Biography and travel books have 
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had the same fate. All these genres are full of “speculation[,] fine–spun theories [and] 
high–flown rhetoric.” Legaré entertains the possibility such models “form our ideas.” The 
duke only tells what he personally saw and heard, and cautions if hearsay is presented. 
There are still errors, so how many more are there in larger corpuses that treat subjective 
speculation as fact and build conclusions on loose materials as if they were demonstrative 
evidence? A stated purpose of a hasty glance over the surface is more reliable as a guide to 
truth.
375
 This was a strikingly secular conclusion about history (chapter 6).  
By comparison, in Rilke’s “Archaischer Torso Apollos,” only the broken and 
fragmentary statue is capable of observation. The absent eyes create the space and the play 
for the chiasmus in which they become a new totality. In Legaré, the intact, incorporating 
view of history is ironically the blind one, while the superficial one is the more authentic. 
Save for the mystic conclusions of Rilke–Legaré stays on the ground–the rhetorical 
structures are remarkably similar. As in Rilke, it is not a question of deepening knowledge 
of reality, but a virtuoso, rhetorical ploy that captures and fascinates. In both, there is a 
protest against referentiality of language, and primacy of epistemological object: in de 
Man’s phrase, it is lexis over logos. In figuration, both go beyond metaphor as 
recuperative agent of stable meaning or meaning–set where presence overcomes language. 
Legaré goes even further: like Nietzsche and Derrida, he does not treat even the careless 
observer a faultless totality. De Man observes chiasmus can only exist as a void, a lack. 
For both, only negative experiences can be poetic that make figuration possible. And for 
both, figuration is capped with a new positivity, in Legaré’s case, simplicity of description 
and honesty. I would not go so far as de Man this implies full renounciation of extra–
textual reality,
 376
 but I would insist, like Derrida, this opens the paradoxic play of the sign 
within discourse, where it both means and means not.  
Modern history, full of “finished, courteous and brilliant colours” with which to dress 
“the meagerness of reality,” was not harsh and severe enough according to Henry Junius 
Nott. A better history is found, for instance, in the letters of Paul Louis Courier, the 
French satirist and anarchist.
377
 Like in Nietzsche, art as such was not antithetical to 
history–Courier being a Hellenist and a lover of the arts and literature–but history as 
romantic aesthetics was to be questioned. Modern history is no longer teacher of life by 
example. It frequently becomes “the discoloured representation of the prejudices, the 
feelings, or the ignorance” of historical writers because of politeness and perishing of the 
agents.
378
 Christian sermons, sort of rhetoric for the masses, though fine, have been one 
factor that has lessened classical oratory’s relevance to political freedom, and science and 
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reason have weakened rhetoric and imagination.
379
 To Legaré, Byron’s letters and their 
masterful use of rhetoric he compares to the ancients offer a perspective more akin to 
history and philosophy than do romantic aesthetics and, apparently, liberal romanticism. 
Legaré’s concept of rhetoric is not cold or calculative. It is hot, but without relapsing to 
bourgeois affectation. Previous efforts to sugarcoat Byron were “disgusting,” “whining 
and mawkish hypocrisy.” Legaré’s language resembles Nietzsche here.380 To Nott 
elsewhere, it is not because chivalric poetry or way of life was moral, neoclassically 
refined, imitative or concerned with science or philosophy that it is valuable. The simple 
and earnest, in a romantic sense a–rhetorical honesty, and wicked seduction of “loose and 
lustful” ladies and “ravishing, robbing, rioting gallants,” its “colloquial ease,” is what is 
attractive. Moral or poetic genius does not require aesthetic alteration. Nevertheless, Nott 
does not go the way of Poe, Nietzsche or Legaré. Modern society is not worse: to the 
contrary, for Nott, it is because society is now better that fiction has become more 
correct.
381
 Nott takes a step towards the Schiller–Whig barrier between art and society that 
rules out the postmodern possibility that in history, figural poetics becomes politics. Still, 
notable is his decisive departure from Victorian womanhood (chapter 4).  
To another writer, however, modern increase in historical productions has meant 
increased departure from philologically–arrived truth of the stern genius that Rome and 
Greek historians had. The good name of Christianity and the truth of philology–guided 
history have been abused by catering to the masses. This has been done by facile and false 
semi–barbaric spirit, in the former, and politicking of various generalised interest groups, 
in the latter. There is much skepticism about modernity as superior to the ancients. The 
masses have improved to be sure, but individual moral grandeur, “a stern sense of justice, 
a strict regard for truth, and a devoted patriotism, an exalted and uncompromising love of 
country” are not found today, probably never again will. Modernity’s claims of mental and 
social refinement are an emperor without clothes. In their domestic manner, the Romans 
were “infinitely superior” to half the moderns.382 The liberal arts of the Romans the 
reviewer refers to were very different from the liberal institutions that the theorists in 
Europe and the northern states preferred. 
3.1.2 Figuration as history: the diverging paths of Poe and Simms 
The young Poe, fresh out of the University of Virginia, had implemented the idiosyncratic 
southern idea of un–education as something positive (chapter 2). Knowledge was an 
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enemy of “true” knowledge made more authentic because it is non–perfect. Firstly, 
masking himself as child prodigy, he put his age as fourteen in his first collection of 
poems of only forty pages. He signed them “By a Bostonian” despite having lived there 
less than three months and only once returning to the place afterward, to lecture.
383
 
Secondly, he contends enlightened, powerful, pompous, ambitious and rational society is 
an inhuman one: on the pinnacle of historical Turko–Mongol ruler Timur’s (Tamerlane’s) 
earthly success that drives men and society he comments: “And now what has he? what! A 
name.” He has become a sign in a history book of civilization. Power and refinery entail 
the dying of God, of the force behind the poesy of the young and what is human that 
exceeds figuration (“There are no words / Unless of Heaven”), and even of “him, whose 
loving spirit will dwell / With Nature, in her wild paths; tell / Of her wondrous ways, and 
telling bless / Her overpowering loveliness.” There is “the good” light of unrefined youth 
and “the bad” light of societal power and excessive refinery. One cannot but look at the 
world dimly through the shades of dark and tears after the latter has lost its charms and life 
because of the dual combination of time, i.e., history, and societal power. After Timur has 
possessed a mere sign and the “successful” narrator has been exposed to “[t]he sound of 
revelry by night . . . with the mingled voice” coming from the first group, he contends in a 
leader, “[p]ower / Its venom secretly imparts;” and concludes: “Nothing have I with 
human hearts.”384 Nature is not the enemy, society and opportunism, though part and 
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parcel of existence, are. Hovey states Poe would in the next few years move more toward 
Byron and away from New England poet William Cullen Bryant, a particularly vehement 
critic of Jefferson.
385
  
Nakamura contends Poe was no social commentator.
386
 However, I claim it is not a 
question of individual volition discursively. In addition, as elaborated below and 
elsewhere (chapter 6), Poe actively engaged historiography and culture politics. The 
problems between Poe and Simms about history are similar, but their solutions differ in 
important ways.  
Poe joins, by aesthetic and semiotic channels, the criticism of romance as the backbone 
of history when he suggests history is only one signifier among others. Humphries refers 
to this as translatedness: as in Derrida, the signifier does not connect to the signified. In 
my context, romance does not happen, tragedy of symbolism does, nor does historical 
reality happen in a historical text. Therefore, linguistically–oriented perception is 
necessarily ironic. In Poe’s case, rebellion against derivativeness from and dependence on 
New England influenced the critique of Romanticism and his semiotic of translatedness. 
In it, history is simply “the beginning of a self–conscious translatedness in literature.” 
Already Quintillian named translatedness metalepsis in rhetoric, an intermediary step 
omitted in syllogism “if a is like b and b is like c, a is like c.” There is no bridge between 
reality and description in the sign–only allegory of rhetoric by other means as (bourgeois) 
production. It precludes any secure linkage of phenomena together as form, awareness that 
romance and a metaphysical structure that connects phenomena lack. Since southerners 
were strongly linguistic and rhetorical in their orientation to history, and since they 
rebelled against its hegemonic northern connections, Poe’s semiotics comes close to 
theirs. Translatedness is the rhetorical space of maneuver between idealist tautology of 
identity, and a syllogism.
387
 As rhetoric and style, Quintillian’s influence on southern 
theorists of history was strong, as was that of Aristotle’s Poetics.388  
Poe’s semiotic is thus not restricted to poetry but extends to history. He criticizes 
modern history for too much romance and idealism, though these are human impulses: 
“We are perfectly aware that the history of remote antiquity has for every mind a charm 
which does not belong to the genius or the taste of the historian.” He rejects the 
neohumanist emotional fondness for the ancients, and any history produced on that basis. 
Historical records are an “eternal tale of empty vanity and misbegotten hopes.” Echoing 
Burke, Poe turns the historical pursuit into a pursuit of shadows by shadows, a “silent 
communion with the dead” that only confirms the absolute separation from truth, as spirit, 
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of all negative mortal existence of “perhaps an awful home.” In comparison to modern 
historians, “the ancients are still unequalled,” all of them but especially Thucydides, 
Tacitus and Plutarch, “great masters in their respective styles.” This is because Thucydides 
is free from personal injury and party spirit and acts himself in his histories, revealing 
“naked simplicity.” Niebuhr is great as a critical philologist, but nothing Thucydides 
would not offer. Included is a barb toward an unbalanced democracy. This suggests a 
Burckhardtian critique of neohumanism as democratic liberalism, a heterological political 
science that is enlightened but very skeptical and figural as in Nietzsche. Tacitus gives 
“glowing sketches, not pictures”–another barb at Romantic aesthetics resembling Legaré 
and Grigsby, if more neoplatonic. Reminiscent of Virginians and Derrida, Poe plays the 
energetics of spatialization as present rhetorical communication as sign/sketch about 
history off against any fixity of structure or form, no matter how beautiful or 
metaphysical. Poe states:
389
  
Each sketch bears within itself the evidence of lofty conception, and shows in every line 
the traces of a master’s hand whose rapid touch is too busy in embodying the forms with 
which his brain is teeming to waste its energies in those minuter cares so necessary for 
filling out a perfect picture. With rapid pencil he leaves perhaps a simple line, but it is the 
line of Apelles–the hand of the master was there. 
Poe, “The Classics,” 228. 
Thus, once again, form really is a problem when figuring history: the more finalized, the 
more suspect. Again, this is fundamental questioning of both Universal History–that 
considered form a given instrument of the mind–and modern history based on form. 
Individual brain exceeds any form, which is close to a Renaissance ideal about the ground 
of history. A study of Plutarch’s models leads to knowledge and estimation what qualities 
are needed to rise far above “the common mass.” But it is mixed with enlightened 
skepticism: “[A] course of self–reflection will teach [the student] to exercise and improve 
his strength, and to measure the proportions in which it must be applied to the levers 
which move the ball of public opinion.” Plutarch’s Lives was the book of books, greater 
than all history and biography. Only Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon, is on the same 
rank of the English–speaking historians, others forget Cicero’s maxim epistola non 
erubescit [a letter does not blush]. This is, again, a Nietzschean judgement and suggests 
parallels between rhetoric and sign. Only two historians, Francesco Guicciardini (1483–
1540) and Enrico Caterino Davila (1576–1631)–both wildly different from modern 
history–are almost as great as Thucydides and Tacitus, but still far from Plutarch.390 Poe is 
here actually exhibiting my reconstructed version about history at Virginia (chapter 2). 
Specifically, as Nadel has shown, Poe’s arrangement of history presents a prime example 
of thinking about history between humanism and exemplarity that is compatible with 
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Tories and that predates Rousseau.
391
 History was in no need of revision from the classical 
era: there was no shattered identity or a new beginning of modern history found, in 
extremis, in New England. Other Virginia students interested in history would follow 
historiality (chapter 4).  
In comparison to Poe, Simms’s first novel Martin Faber (1833) is likewise a critique 
of Civilization vs. Nature in Nakamura’s analysis. For both, civilization is no requirement 
for ethical conduct. Martin, depicted as Nature, defends and loves William, depicted as 
Civilization. Still, Simms takes the more compromising and decidedly more courant view 
that Nature and Civilization can co–exist simultaneously, if with the latter on the verge of 
dominating the former, at times destructively. In addition, Simms puts the public life and 
calm, epistemological judgement on the side of civilization via “[tracing] the story . . . 
perpetual associations . . . close examination . . . to find out the materials of evidence.” In 
other words, though nature and civilization are different, it is civilization that is able to 
rationalize and check nature by way of legal–and, by implication, historical–study. 
Besides, the impulses and inchoateness of Martin’s speech are formally controlled and 
chronologically arranged by William by painting them into pictures. This is obviously a 
preference for aesthetically controlled sublime as structure. Alterton argues Poe, to the 
contrary, would not accept reduction of poetry and figuration into painting.
392
 However, 
even these operations never fully expunge Martin from William, which keeps the 
symbolic, triangular vision. The constructed character of historical narrative is not 
hidden.
393
 Later, in The Yemassee (1835) and Mellichampe (1836), Simms has apparently 
come to agree with Poe romantic artistry is often about power politics and oxymoronic 
social science.
394
 However, by The Yemassee, he is also willing to broadly accept Schiller, 
and grant the separateness of poetics from history.
395
 Faber served as topos for subsequent 
Charleston opinion about the relationship between painting and history (chapter 6). 
Simms did not prefer literature as immoral, but he agonized over southern place in 
romantic thought.
396
 He took part in the ideological struggle of letters. But in time, his 
method increasingly became more pragmatic, less approving of southern aesthetic or 
philosophical peculiarities and its philosophically different episteme about letters and 
history. Increasingly, Simms preached to the national choir (chapter 6).  
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3.1.3 Simms in the context of books and prose in the South 
Simms, in his early twenties, echoed Southern Review in his short–lived Southern Literary 
Gazette. However, unlike in Poe, Simms’s early mode of conceptualizing southern culture 
was organicist, in other words, complicit with modern history. With his co–editor, he 
wanted “to do justice to the claims of native genius, and show that the natural products of 
our own soil, want but the favouring warmth of local attention, [sic] to render unnecessary 
much that is furnished us from abroad.” The magazine will provide the reader respite from 
the more complex Southern Review. In addition, the editors are all for erecting “a 
department” and “a sanctuary” for women “to which nothing but that which may properly 
belong to them shall be permitted to enter.” In a very bourgeois sense, women are 
compared to the best of diamonds toiled on by a jeweler, for which they are expected to be 
grateful as patrons. In a 1829 book review of Virginian James E. Heath, later the first 
editor of Southern Literary Messenger, Simms writes southern books are rough, uncourtly 
in outside, as well as lacking the “meretricious aids and ornaments” of the polite societies 
of England and northerners. But, these are too often the only beauty their books have. This 
ironic realization, still approving of southern peculiarity, is then accepted and denied in a 
true ironically symbolic fashion. The southern niche in metaphorical future books of 
American Classics “may be, (if we determine, not otherwise) like the monument of the 
decapitated Doge, all black, blank and barren.”397  
This is a very interesting simile I cannot exhaust here. It illustrates the deep–seated 
modernism in Simms’ historical thought and his sympathies with the organicist 
metaphysics of the romantics. Simms probably refers to Lord Byron’s Marino Faliero, a 
Venetian tragedy, and not Schiller’s Fiesco. First, a comparison of southern history with 
Byronian tragedy is significant. Importantly, in this play, Byron simultaneously admired 
and wanted to take distance from Schiller and Shakespeare, the whole British scene of 
drama.
398
 Tragedy is not in the incidents: there are only five tragic moments in about three 
hours, unlike in Fiesco that is filled with events and drama. Marino Faliero’s heroine is 
likewise cool and collected. Despite containing far less emotion, Marino Faliero is much 
more fatalistic: unlike Schiller who keeps the viewer guessing to the end, Byron makes the 
situation hopeless halfway through.
399
 Simms may be diagnosing the dark, skeptical 
atmosphere that prevailed in the South and its implications for history. Second, there is the 
symbolism of the doge’s beheading and the black curtain. Even as figuration, it is hard to 
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say for sure whether: a) Simms is giving a parable for the ruinous and radical unsuitability 
of southern books and thinking in a polite national context, b) drawing a metaphor of its 
present tragic state, c) as an admirer of Byron at the time and friend of realism, 
encouraging southerners to only rethink their pragmatics but keep their ethos, in Byron’s 
words, not feminine “hysterics–but the agony of reluctant tears–and the choaking shudder” 
of pure, chaste and dignified diction,
400
 d) simply noting the skepticism both Byron–who 
desired the whole thing be read instead of acted–and southerners felt about romantic 
tropes,
401
 or e) taking a jibe at politics. Third, a “Schillerian” Scottish reviewer thought the 
play was more a rhetorical disquisition in politics than a romantic piece of drama as well: 
“there is a difference betwixt mere rhetoric, however splendid, and genuine poetry, 
especially genuine dramatic poetry.” Instead of the head, dramatic poetry belongs “to the 
heart alone.” Marino Faliero did not arouse sympathy, its social norms were dubious, 
moral was questionable: an eighty–year–old proud, arrogant man avenging an insult to the 
honour of his child–wife–received at her father’s bequest–and to the man’s family by 
planning to murder the ruling aristocracy. The reviewer would prefer the protagonist “a 
young, warm and devoted spirit, eagerly bent, even while inflicting carnage and ruin, on 
an object of its deepest and fondest adoration.”402  
In a magazine aimed more at a lay audience, such a cursory reference to Byron 
suggests southern readership was not attuned to the romantic mode the Whig reviewer 
desires. In the dominant northern Unitarian circles, in contrast, it was turning into 
commonplace to reject Byron for his (satanic) immorality by the 1820s. Northerners 
wanted to evade the gothic and the socially dangerous. Chivalry such as Scott’s “may 
dispense with knowledge of men, taste, and reason,” so it was the poorest form of 
romance. Romance on character was the best type, better than even German 
neohumanists’ works, because faithful to life. Everett, Norton and the future historian 
William H. Prescott all renounced Byron.
403
 In poetry, the reception of William 
Wordsworth by the “American Lake School,” with Bryant at its head, was putting aside 
Byron.
404
 As in the Scott reception, the pessimism of Wordsworth about the harmony 
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between nature and history and its implications for identity was lost on these scholars.
405
 
Legaré countered those who think Byron immoral and harmful are children. “[W]e must 
only take care to deny [him] to such people, as edged tools and dangerous drugs are kept 
out of the way of children, and adults who are no better than children.”406 Henry’s review 
of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister likewise insists deformity of form may, sometimes, be more 
interesting than perfection. Temptations, miseries and vice should not be moralized out of 
existence, because virtue, the pillar of society, can discern them without such contrived 
help.
407
 
In sum, at least in relation to literary cultural poetics, character–a central Whig theme–
was not by any means the sole pressing didactic concern in the South, unlike in the 
whiggish North. Edward M. Michaelowitz, a Russian tutor of Oriental languages and 
Professor of German at South Carolina College, observed “intellectual ideas” and 
“philosophical power” that now are a necessity for poetics stood opposed to coarse, rude, 
sensual, undisciplined expressions. “Progressive reason has to struggle with an uncultured 
language, to dress its thoughts in an idiom not its own, to divide its power between 
language and ideas, and to form a middle state between roughness and refinement, 
between the crude wanderings of thei magination [sic], and the perfect exercise of the 
understanding.” First prose is thus born. The emerging figuration of language of 
philosophy enables to represent “graphically and truly” the forms found in external world 
as well as internal passions and feelings. The Middle Ages represent this synthesis. The 
associated metaphor of light as “between utter darkness and the brightness of meridian 
day” is poetic. But importantly, before philosophy interfered–at the time of chivalry 
before first prose–thought and passion were possible with the rude and primal language as 
well. All understood such verses that spoke of religion and virtue in patriotic song. They 
still have relevance for study, but a philosophically correct language leads to their 
disappearance. Readers should reject more advanced cultivation and embrace these 
originating roots in literature and morals.
408
 Such poetry, Legaré agrees, “is more 
subservient to the purposes of truth than of fiction” and more true than early history. It is 
superior to philosophers and historians of their time. Homer was the truest narrator. The 
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minute oral poetry began to be driven by a desire to write and publish it, things got too 
polished.
409
 
However, Simms seems to differ from contemporary southern society regarding print 
culture, especially books. By 1834, he had begun to co–operate with the “excellent” John 
P. Beile, a Charleston book publisher of some prestige and popularity. According to 
Mazyck, book selling alongside Evangelical tracts launched in Charleston only around 
1840 by Fogartie’s Book Company.410 The date is off, since Simms refers to Beile as 
bookseller in 1835 and Beile, among the pioneers of photography, had had the business at 
least a few years earlier.
411
 But the important point is scarcity of customers in, at least, 
minor southern book stores. In O’Brien’s research based on southern Nachez, Louisiana of 
the mid–1840s, only slightly more than one per cent of the population visited them as new 
customers in the course of one year. The average turnout was one new buyer per week. 
Further, there were very few novels for sale.
412
 Only in 1846 there emerged a book store in 
Charleston that was cosmopolitan in content. In other words, it had a wide variety of, and 
actively sought after, modern books and novels all across the world. In addition, 
considering O’Brien’s observation on scarcity of dialogue of variegated persons and 
voices in contemporary southern prose,
413
 and Virginia’s prolongation of Renaissance oral 
culture in law (chapter 2) that was common a century before to exalt the king,
414
 southern 
literary culture lagged behind Simms’s novel notions about it.  
Simms represented the new in terms of authorship, subject matter, manner of delivery 
and audience. But since the stratification of society the bourgeois cultural order 
presupposed was not complete in the South (chapter 2), “idealization of private 
communication”–an integral part of the bourgeois public sphere–was lacking as well.415 
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Rousseau and neohumanism were the main intellectual, philosophical and aesthetic 
creators of this expansive discourse.
416
 In practical terms, despite the book–dependent 
print culture, information had not yet fully devalued storytelling in the South: in my period 
of study, there was no alienated–hence mediated and diluded–individual experience with 
fragmentory space and time, only reflections on it (3.3.4.1, chapters 2, 4). In Godzich’s 
chronology, this capitalist spread of information from memoir writing and the epistolary 
novel to the novel of manners paralleled the increased demand for freedom of the aesthetic 
function of art as supplementary mediator. By the third genre, the organicist fragmented 
experience–totality binary was presupposed. But in the South at this time, there were few 
books, either produced or read, that would classify as novel of manners. Thus, the South 
was on the threshold of commodified and objectified culture of print following the 
explosive change, but sensitivity to southern difference about constraining aesthetic 
freedom–an issue until now much ignored to my knowledge–is critical.417 The major 
exception would be the reading of Scott as romancer that was not unanimous (chapter 2). 
Such a “literary anthropology” I can only outline here is needed to come to grips with the 
dynamics of southern literary “discourse” as Other. 
Violent southern attacks on authors as social critics who were influenced by 
Romanticism and modern history also indicate this. As in case of Thomas Dew (chapter 
5), slavery exposed the extent of southern difference from modern history concerning lack 
of books: the antislavery words inside English novelist Anne Marsh’s North–printed Tales 
of the Woods and Fields (1836) passed on to southern readers unnoticed. Angered, Beile, 
as well as the partner of Fogartie, W. R. Babcock &Co., announced they would withdraw 
the book and urged their tighter preview up North, a neglect that “has been too often 
repeated of late.” Marsh was only one example of historians, educators and novelists 
denouncing slavery: New England’s Samuel Goodrich initiated the tendency in the late–
1820s, but it was the mid–1830s that witnessed a spate of Charleston censorship: among 
New Englanders, Francis Wayland’s Elements of Moral Science (1835), Catharine 
Sedgwick’s The Linwoods (1835), Cooper’s The Monikins (1835), and Goodrich’s journal 
The Token (1836). Among the British, historian John Howard Hinton’s The History and 
Topography of the United States of North America (1834)–dedicated to Irving and 
“assisted by several literary gentlemen in England and America” including New England 
lawyer Samuel Lorenzo Knapp (3.3.1)–and Marsh.418  
A Yankee newspaper dedicated an entire column to ridicule the issue and grafted it on 
national politics. The context was John Quincy Adams’s recent defeat in Congress over 
antislavery legislation in Arkansas. The headings read “The Arrogance of Slavery” and 
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“Literature adversus Slavery.” The editor contrasted Marsh’s Rousseauan “natural 
sentiments of the human heart”–well within confines of Evangelicalism–with corrupt 
slavery. Further, he also made a point about the sacredness of artistic genius that cannot be 
violated for the good of community–a romantic axiom–and ridiculed the sensitivity of the 
dissenters. He named the attempt “Index Expurgatorius,” a reference to the Catholic list of 
banned books, and sarcastically suggested the Declaration and Milton would lead such a 
southern list.
419
 There was very little regard to the difference print culture–only a fledgling 
in Charleston–and the Declaration made across the regions.  
3.2 From romance to confidence 
In this shorter section, covering the time around the 1830s, I have two points of interest. 
First, northern religious theorists of language began to modify SAE and open up to 
mysticist interpretations as radicalizations of German Idealism. This was even more at 
odds with southern aesthetics and pragmatics of language as attested by the journal 
Virginia Literary Museum and Journal of Belles Lettres, Arts &c. of the University of 
Viginia. Second, a modified WAE view of history made a transition in the South in the 
form of author John Pendleton Kennedy. Like Wirt but with far less rhetoric and erudition, 
Whig Kennedy set out to criticize Virginia’s toryist culture. His stance would become 
harder later in the decade. Kennedy’s aim was to laugh the humanists in Virginia off and 
advocate a more moral ethos. However, he still did not offer a solid history as distinct 
from literature. History is not, even for him, a separate entity. This period was calm before 
the storm: the confidence in language by northern authors would soon find its counterpart 
in history in forms that would actually strengthen SAE. 
3.2.1 Northern linguistic modification of SAE 
Northern theologians finally began to criticise Lockean linguistics more in the late–1820s. 
However, they diverged even more from southern views: instead of classicism, philology, 
the Middle Ages, humanism, poetics or rhetoric, they turned their eyes to imagination 
grounded in Calvinist religion. Skepticism was rejected with Locke.  
Theologian James Marsh–teacher at Hampden–Sidney and Harrison’s teacher (chapter 
2)–was a noted figure in the change. Already in 1820, Marsh had become dissatisfied with 
the Unitarian view of language as a–poetic and rational, so he moved to study under the 
Trinitarian Stuart. Marsh immersed himself with Samuel Coleridge’s theologisation of 
Schiller.
420
 In 1821, Marsh wrote how imagination–manifest in nature, not in words, nor in 
rationality–had led to a happy conjunction of religion and imagination among ancient 
peoples. Under the guidance of religion as intuitive faith, imagination would recuperate 
the gap between a too rational people and nature in a joyous reunion. The job of linguistics 
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was to elucidate this spiritual truth of mankind by careful precision in the terminology of 
words. Semantics was a problem, but capable of sure solution with and within the 
Christian–spiritual realm of Reason. Marsh’s views, stated in the preface to Coleridge’s 
Aids to Reflection in 1829, greatly influenced the transcendentalists, the powerful 
northern, mainly New England –based radical liberal group of artists and thinkers. 
Ironically, Gura contends Marsh never intended to woo them, but return the Unitarians 
back to the fold of Calvinism. He was never a transcendentalist and felt increasingly 
uneasy about them through the 1830s. Nevertheless, by aid of Coleridge, the linkage 
between the word and the thought was restored without their implosion to the rationality 
of the utilitarian classicists (chapter 2), and a focus on language was introduced to 
northern audiences for the first time in a poetic sense.
421
 Frederic Henry Hedge, the 
principal organizer of the group,
422
 and Parker wrote influentially about the new German 
philosophy through the 1830s.
423
 Hedge, who had lived in Germany, was in his writings in 
1833 more knowledgeable about Idealism than Coleridge reception.
424
 But from a 
viewpoint of critical thought about history, victory over Locke was far from beneficial. 
Clemmer maintains that the emerging hyperindividualistic spiritualism in New England 
that backed away from common sense was even more antagonistic to it.
425
 
Philosophically, this was a variant of the German romantic liberals, grounded in Kant, 
and therefore modern organicist bourgeois social philosophy of the free–but universally 
dependent and organistically as well as nationalistically united–aesthetic mind (chapter 5). 
Schiller had gone beyond Kant to see historical process itself as an ever higher spiral that 
causes greater good through evil. Being neohumanist, he contrasted the wholeness of 
Classical Greece with fragmentary modernity and, inspired by Adam Ferguson, noted the 
negative aspects of the business world by contrasting bourgeois life with natural organic 
society and allegiance with permanent institutions. For him, as one of the most central 
tenets of Romanticism, only art, the imaginative faculty, could reconcile this 
disintegration.
426
 
Through his Coleridge reading, Marsh went further than Schiller, because he 
constrained Schiller’s pantheist and comparatively secular “aesthetic anthropology” to 
religion, dismissed the ironic side of romantic theory, underplayed art as freedom and, 
contrary to the Europeans, paradoxically restricted language into analytic instead of 
practical reason. Marsh therefore anticipated the U.S. version of Hegel’s philosophy of 
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history and enabled the synergy between major northern historians and transcendentalists 
(3.3.2, 3.3.5). For southerners, Marsh made a radical move. On the one hand, Marsh 
subscribed to modern individuality as ungrounded and the heightening of aesthetic 
freedom they were not ready for (chapter 2, 3.1.3). On the other hand, Marsh limited even 
the resulting synthetic-collectivist freedom to reason and Calvinism, thereby severely 
compartmentalizing and disciplining the empirical realm of being. Although southerners 
knew about Kant as well in history (chapters 2, 6), fairly few were ready for his romantic 
renovation in history. Hence, I somewhat depart from O’Brien427 and claim that especially 
before the early–1840s, Coleridge was little welcomed in Virginia and South Carolina at 
the period under study outside the Marsh–Harrison duo in connection with history. 
Notably, Wilson of Blackwood’s had also attacked Coleridge’s theses strongly for their 
mysticism, excessive egotism and an idealism that simply mirrors the self. In addition, he 
called the original Lake School of poetry members like Wordsworth arrogant.
428
 Poe 
echoed the sarcasm of Wilson’s critique that compared the “[s]o deplorable a delusion” of 
Coleridge’s to a “divine afflatus” by using the same expression as parody in his poem 
“Lionizing” he submitted to Baltimore in 1833.429 Though admiring both, Poe discerned 
the difference between his own symbolic musical aesthetic and Coleridge’s idealism. He 
also criticized Coleridge for being too philosophical and programmatic about poetry.
430
  
3.2.2 History and Virginia around 1830 
Northern novelists of history, after the historical romance tradition, were already operating 
along Schillerian lines in establishing clear boundaries between local tradition and 
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history.
431
 The separation was found in the fairly secular Virginia Literary Museum and 
Journal of Belles Lettres, Arts &c. (1829–1830) published by the University of Virginia, 
but in a more qualified and critical tone of “correct history.” There was emphasis on “a 
facility in seizing on the authentic” by way of Walter Scott and Kant (chapter 2). Thus, by 
the late–1820s, spearheaded by Harrison, modern history had gained a foothold in the 
state. However, it would take roughly twenty years to increase in popularity. Instead, the 
old emphasis on philology that was mixed with skepticism and ancient rhetoric was more 
prevalent. For instance Tucker maintained on its pages that history cannot be trusted to 
yield truthful representations of individuals. In his philological article, “Wr.” rejected the 
central tenet of the frontier as summing up America, soon afterwards enlarged upon by 
Tocqueville (chapter 2). As an example of collision of differences about history, the 
Museum rejected Bancroft’s translation of historian Arnold H. L. Heeren.432 Bancroft’s 
study relied a lot on a German modification of enlightened history (3.3.2).  
Another peep into Virginia was done by novelist Kennedy, a Marylander and a Whig 
like Wirt. His Swallow Barn (1832) was not yet serious about history. Instead, history was 
only one genre among a potpourri of a travel book, a diary and a letter collection. Kennedy 
was an admirer of Irving’s early pieces of satire and episodic novel.433 But the clear 
ordering into history and literature is not in place; “history” still means many plural things. 
Wirt did not like Swallow Barn, calling it “showy, shallow and pretentious,” nor the early 
poetry of Poe.
434
  
Perhaps due to his Whig background, Kennedy ruffles some feathers compared to the 
symbolic modernists: unlike Legaré, he satirises the ancient historians’–“old wights’”–
way of narrating only what they had seen themselves by claiming that since the bulk of 
their argument was dependent on hearsay, he may follow in their footsteps.
435
 In the same 
                                                 
431
 Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory, 80. 
432
 O., “[Review:] Norman–Saxon History,” Virginia Literary Museum 1 (1829): 368. This 
review was about a work in Anglo–Saxon history by French historian Augustin Thierry, a keen 
supporter of the French Revolution who was convinced that Scott’s Ivanhoe was more truthful history 
than historians’ version. Fox–Genovese and Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class, 135. For 
Kant’s reconciliability with authentic in philological criticism, see Makkreel, “Confluence of 
Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” 69-70. There also was a conception of history as natural history 
approached as an anthropological study. ɸ, “Cradle of Mankind,” Virginia Literary Museum 1 
(1830): 677-81. However, such themes seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Omicron 
[George Tucker], “Contemporary Fame,” Virginia Literary Museum 1 (1830): 533; “Wr.” claims 
that the U.S. population is motley: some areas have witnessed constant migration,”in others but little 
change has occurred.” Wr., “English Provincialisms–No. 6,” Virginia Literary Museum 1 (1829a): 
361;  Fox–Genovese and Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class, 723. 
433
 CO2, 759-60. 
434
 William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character 
(Garden City: Anchor, 1963), 158; Ostrom et al., Edgar Allan Poe, 1, 28. 
435
 John Pendleton Kennedy, The Swallow Barn or A Sojourn in the Old Dominion, 2nd rev. ed. 
(New York: Putnam, 1853), 374-75. I have been unable to procure the original edition. O’Brien 
  
 
 
113 
vein, he calls his own satire history.
436
 Kennedy’s strongest metaphysical pronouncements 
come in sympathetic depiction of blacks who do not get their place in history. Time is 
linear, but History, Time’s wife and step–mother of persons, is very selective: it leaves out 
such modest figures.
437
 Thus, Kennedy ironises the preference for ancient historians’ style 
then current, since his own observations are not true: he imposes discourse even on the 
ancient world and direct observation, contrary to the mainstream. History can well be a 
romantic art as long as it is a utilitarian pursuit. Text is not the guarantee of historical 
reality though, but only one medium beside an object, a picture, and imagination.
438
 In 
comparison to Simms, Kennedy edges towards Civilization: marriage is the absolute 
stamp of moral life because it is a public institution–no ambiguity and questioning about 
this as there was in Martin Faber.
439
 But, Kennedy’s civilization does not cover the 
toryism rampant in Virginia: he lists laziness, introspection, rhetoric, too much classicism, 
subscription to Jeffersonian views, lack of utilitarian public spirit, lack of piety, peculiar 
discourse formation and extravagant dress as its vices. Both plantations the novel deals 
with were run by Tory sympathizers.
440
 Kennedy hints Jefferson’s only favorite 
newspaper, the very rhetorical Richmond Enquirer, was anti–intellectual in tone. This 
echoes the Federalist charge of Marshall about Jeffersonians as rabble.
441
 Like Wirt, he 
does not reject or hate his objects, but he satirises them, at times quite heavily. However, 
unlike him, Kennedy goes much further, since he evokes previous 1790s New England 
imagery about the South when he bashes Virginia culture as a deposit of British 
aristocratic conceit.
442
 Therefore, the book was perhaps the sharpest history–related 
critique on southern society by at least a semi–southern author to date, the first half of the 
1830s, a time of intense cultural–historical contestation about the South. 
3.3 The first “professional” histories, the first overall Virginia 
history, and southern reactions 
Historian Peter Novick devotes only three pages, less than 0.5 per cent, to the first four 
American historians trained in German methods in his magnum opus That Noble Dream, 
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two of whom I will attempt to cover in this study as for their first writings.
443
 Scholarship 
on the quartet’s historical work has been surprisingly meager.444 For my purposes, it is 
significant that both subscribed to Hegel’s philosophy of history, or historicism, they 
emphasized as political history.
445
 Two of the men, Bancroft and Prescott, wrote in the 
1830s. Therefore, I will begin this section by first canvassing how northern cosmopolitan 
interests about history became stacked against the South as a desire to fit the U. S. into a 
transatlantic culture that, from the first, turned a blind eye to the South as we already 
examined in case of Tocqueville (chapter 2). This tendency only increased in the 
historiography of the 1820s and 1830s. Bancroft and Prescott represented the German 
variant of this argument that extended to South Carolina in the person of Francis Lieber. 
Next, I will attempt to examine Bancroft’s historical, linguistic and aesthetic backgrounds 
and narrative strategies around the mid–1830s. I will argue Bancroft’s figuration of history 
was profoundly at odds with southern discussion. Nevertheless, Bancroft’s book was a 
huge success as historical discourse: in many respects, it imitated the German roots, but its 
northern tweaks made it fit perfectly with new linguistic, philosophical and metaphysical 
northern theories and the previous synthesis between literary romance and SAE (chapter 
2). Thus, it further cemented northern historical thinking and identity. Turning to Virginia, 
I will then examine initial reactions to Bancroft and the first more “general” history of 
Virginia that exhibited vacillation about modern history. The Whigs–WAE (chapter 2)–
now became dominant in Virginian historiography instead of Charleston’s more radical 
theories or Jefferson. However, given the ambivalences southern textual theorists had 
about philosophy of history and Germany, it becomes imperative to investigate the matter. 
Next, I will look at Prescott in more detail. He was poor as a figural and aesthetic scholar 
of history, and he used history more as a means for politicking in the present, something 
many southerners abhorred. Like Bancroft, he drew from Americanized Universalhistorie 
his epistemology of history. Finally, I will look at Prescott’s southern reception that was 
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surprisingly quiet at first. When it was praised, it was done functionally, as a part of 
metahistorical criticism of New England romance history. This criticism was likewise 
acutely aware of functional dangers and institutional power of history. 
3.3.1 The over–all context: the South as an anomaly to New England’s 
cosmopolitan schemes of history and culture 
When the U.S. was welcomed as a part of cosmopolitan culture, it was done by dismissing 
the South, particularly the Plantation South. The yeoman, non–slaveholding small farmer, 
as a figure was a fictive production and renovation of the planter disseminated by Tory–
leaning J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur that addressed U.S. postwar nationalist ends 
through epistolary novels. Planter life was the past, something aberrant and southern, from 
the vantage point of yeoman New York and Pennsylvania. Such yeoman as “new man,” 
unlike the southerner, was untainted by history and its evils.
446
 By dedicating the piece to 
scholar Guillaume Thomas François Raynal, and by stating such an American farmer was 
a far–flung but natural representative of ultra–bourgeois cosmopolitan ideal of the 
philosophes and not some degenerate rabble, de Crèvecoeur contributed to the growing 
European tide of more sympathetic reception of the U.S. as the terminus point of history 
and civilization that was later affirmed by German scholars. Raynal had still had doubts, 
compounded by the illustration of his history of American southern degeneracy.
447
 
Crèvecoeur’s view had been agreed on by Kant to be America’s basis448 and it was 
reconfirmed by Tocqueville. This tide had been avidly seized upon by SAE: by Noah 
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economic, and political realities of that period in cosmopolitan terms.” Thomas J. Schlereth, 
introduction to The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the 
Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790, by Thomas J. Schlereth (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1977), xiv, cited in Frank Ejby Poulsen, “Schlereth: The Cosmopolitan Ideal in 
Enlightenment Thought,” Frank Ejby Poulsen’s Blog, accessed October 29, 2013, 
frankejbypoulsen.wordpress.com/2008/11/03/schlereth-the-cosmopolitan-ideal-in-enlightenment-
thought/; Gerbi, Dispute of the New World, 45-48, 129, 141. For Raynal’s degenerate illustration of 
America in his history, see Greeson, Our South, 47-48. 
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Webster
449
 and John Quincy Adams.
450
 Tellingly, there is pantheism–great metaphysical 
force behind Transcendentalism and Idealism–already in de Crèvecoeur.451 This 
interpretation differed from southerners, especially Jefferson and his tradition, as well as 
southern social dynamic.
452
  
The suprahistorical cosmopolitan–civilized unity was suspect to several southerners, 
because it was reconcilable with SAE, which meant it rejected older history, older ways 
and, in its American variant, the problem of language. It even flew in the face of Hume’s 
notion of the public sphere that was different from an enlightened cosmopolitan elite 
commonwealth (chapters 2, 5). Although, as Hettle reminds, there is very little solid 
historical evidence about yeomanry’s political thinking, it has been persistently used for 
the purpose of continuity by many later liberal theorists of southern history and even 
southern regionalist sociology as well.
453
 The extreme liberal bias of the 1930s made even 
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some conservatives adopt the same attitude. Until very recently, some well–established 
scholars have evoked it. This flexible but at the same time dangerously scientistic 
metaphorology and corresponding epistemological and literary dearth annexed to 
historical continuity in the South–the scientism extended at least to the 1960s according to 
Grantham–may benefit from criticism.454 
Cosmopolitan history was related to the cosmopolitan ideal as social ontology. Typical 
cosmopolitan history a) was detached about nationalism, opting for the approach of a 
philosophe b) emphasized civilization, and c) had no faith in referential narrative language 
instead of rhetoric. Already for Joseph Addison in the 1710s–co–founder of the bourgeois 
Spectator and hero for Virginia SAE representatives (chapter 2)–history was to be a 
spectacle of the imagination, a picture to be admired. The “enchanted” romance reading of 
Scott had generally subverted this approach by the 1820s. Unlike in Romanticism, writer’s 
and reader’s spectatorships never fully converge, and the writer as the observer never 
becomes a participant. Importantly, cosmopolitan history was ironic, a notion several 
northern–minded historical scholars missed (3.3.5, chapters 4, 5).455 This is a critical 
epistemological difference to southerners, who seldom ignored referentiality. Besides SAE 
(chapter 2), the Yankee tendency may derive from de Crévecoeur’s explicit devaluation of 
rhetoric for simple true language of an honest, industrious northern farmer to whom sign 
and speech are eqally true, unlike for the learned Europeans.
456
 Such an attitude did not 
prevail among major Virginia and South Carolina theorists and philologists however, and 
was not concurred to even by the comparatively progressive Wirt (chapter 2). 
Moving to the 1800s, we encounter a furthering of the unity in Hinton’s history in the 
1830s, written with help from New England scholars, that came out the same year as 
Bancroft’s history (3.3.2). This outsider treatment of recent American history was 
supposedly founded on strict objectivity. Its aims: to serve the American public, offer a 
continuation of American schoolbook history, and a corrective to memory. However, 
covertly, the message was polemical: slavery was an obstacle to the blessed union of 
commerce between the United States and her “older sister” England. According to Green, 
slave owners in Charleston forced Hinton to alter his history.
457
 The South diverged from 
the Federalist SAE agenda in history (chapter 2). Hinton’s argument was founded on 
philologist Sir William Jones’s invented allegory from Polybius about Athens presented to 
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Franklin–alluded to later by Dew (chapter 5)–on the one hand, and the Treaty of Ghent 
signed by Washington, on the other hand.
458
 It, thereby, fully obscured southern 
anomalities in relation to such capitalist–imperialist discourse and historical theory 
(chapter 2). The South misfitted, but simultaneously had to reckon with, the Whig and 
northern cultural imperative of character and with it, the new philosophical way of 
thinking about humanity as a central part of modern history, its aesthetics and philosophy, 
aspects that were made more intense by shared Evangelicalism among the opposition.
459
 
Moralism about literature had increased in the North: earlier, Everett, Bancroft and other 
northern scholars had condemned Goethe for being a–political, impractical and morally 
neutral.
460
 Similarly, Poe’s collection never took off461 possibly because of its pessimistic 
symbolism.  
The first pioneers of the German renaissance in the North became attracted by a 
variant of cosmopolitan history named Universalhistorie, especially as it was represented 
by Heeren. Like the Yankees, Heeren, a main expositor of modern history, exited history 
for social science: The ambition of Montesquieu to analyse history to its empirical causes 
Wirt had flashed but secretly abandoned, the Scottish philosophers’ focus on social 
science, and the new philological criticism all influenced a Göttingen man such as Heeren. 
The state became the objective, not as an abstract form, but as an empirical entity 
reducible to facts of geography, climate, economics and societal structures. 
Staatengeschichte, “state history” as unique and constantly developing, became the focus. 
“The people” was one such major force of development. Universalhistorie hailed religion 
as a positive good and absolute truth in human life. Further, reason could now affirm faith, 
unlike for the skeptical and atheist universal historians and philosophes, but its progress 
was not linear or ascending.
462
 A third characteristic was ignorance of language as a 
concern in historiography.  
Heeren claimed Greek sciences had been independent, and this instructs modern 
states.
463
 He borrows Montesquieu by grounding European political freedom in “a germ” 
with innumerable forms.
464
 His main argument is syllogistic: since the measure of 
intellectual culture is science, and since its branch political science is inseparable from 
state and its institutions as a utilitarian pursuit, state guarantees, at least in some cases, 
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history’s scientific status like philosophy guarantees the legitimacy of the state. Although 
history cannot do without tradition, including poetry and religion, one can discern between 
them, and history is reducible to the state. Even ancient history had nothing to do with 
symbol: when its form switched from poetry to prose, this simply marked an improvement 
in historical writing. Herodotus became the first independent scientific historian, a 
progenitor of Universalhistorie.
465
 “Not the historian, History herself seems to address us” 
in Herodotus. When Greek liberty fell, rhetoric and style clouded this.
466
 Modern 
historical science of the state is able to pick this project up and reconnect to it.   
The South was not outside this new tendency to universalize history. In the 1830s, it 
had a Hegelian historicist in the person of Franz “Francis” Lieber.467 Early on, Lieber 
implied Niebuhr was pro–Yankee and anti–Virginia, thereby ignoring the latter’s coolness 
about romantic liberalism (chapter 2).
468
 In 1836, at his inaugural in South Carolina, 
Lieber had revealed his Hegelian bias by 1. linking a positive appreciation of religion with 
history, and 2. contending history “has a more elevated aim” that annuls individual 
histories, deaths and skepticism about it. A study of history as history of the masses, 
supported by inquiries into institutions and causes, would reveal this aim. In support of my 
argument about southern difference, in his review of the inaugural address editor Daniel 
Whitaker (chapter 6) disagreed with such social policy, preferring individual leaders, 
rhetoric and a privately–owned press as catalysts. Yet, by the 1850s Lieber was taking part 
in directing American history away from toryism, and during the Civil War, he propagated 
for a full–scale Hegelian philosophy of history founded on yeomen as America’s national 
ground.
469
 To him, federalism and German liberalism were interchangeable as philosophy 
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of history.
470
 Under this remarkably enduring metaphysical umbrella about yeomanry as 
antithetical to planters and (toryist) aristocrats–a myth at first peculiar to New England–
yeomen were valorized for sake of historical continuity. Lieber had been a student at Jena 
just after Hegel had left the place. Parrington contends his liberalism was strengthened by 
the Greek Revolution. I claim Lieber’s doctrine of historical development shared with 
Universalhistorie. Lieber, like Bancroft, Prescott, Heeren and Tocqueville, took the 
Montesquieu trope of history from the perspective of organicist evolution as “germs” of 
freedom manifest in institutions against the backdrop of the state.
471
 But philosophically, 
equally important is the overlap of Universalhistorie and Hegelian historicism in the U.S. 
(3.3.2, 3.3.5). 
3.3.2 Bancroft  
Ross is among the few scholars who have noted Bancroft’s history as a romance, and even 
she is content to mention this from the perspective of structuralism of Frye and White.
472
 
She states romancing and grand narrativising of history took their “most popular and 
compelling” forms in Bancroft. Breisach contends Bancroft was the most influential 19th–
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century historian in America.
473
 The scant attention despite massive influence is a good 
opportunity to examine “industry, industry–prodigious and indefatigable.”474  
Bancroft adopted German liberalism full–scale. He was maybe the first American to be 
present at Hegel’s lectures in 1820, and his “later views closely parallel Hegel’s 
philosophy of history.”475 In addition, former philologist Bancroft had the same mentors 
as Johann Gustav Droysen, maybe the most Hegelian historian (chapter 5). A staunch 
Democrat and one–time schoolmaster, Bancroft had become an active contributor to the 
North American Review edited by Everett, publishing seventeen articles between 1823 and 
1834.
476
 In the 1820s, he translated one historical work in full and another in part from 
German into English written by his Göttingen mentor of history Heeren.
477
 Bancroft 
treated history in the old way of plural meanings in the early–1820s.478 Why, then, did he 
come to refer to Heeren’s department as “science” and thus the work as scientific?479  
Bancroft probably liked Heeren’s explicit ascendant Eurocentric version of the 
Scottish stadialist model northerners were already familiar with (chapters 2, 5) that 
emanated from Göttingen. Unlike Heeren, he was an anti–historicist, believing in God’s 
plan of history. Like Heeren, he highlighted religion and race theory. Like many New 
England intellects, Bancroft was a Spencerian social Darwinist, and his assistant had an 
extreme natural scientific bias as well.
480
 Universalhistorie was extremely universalistic 
and abstract: it emphasized the necessity of “a universal principle” and transatlantic ties at 
the cost of obscuring concrete empirical differences and relativity,
481
 i.e., paramount 
southern concerns.  
Heeren’s metaphysics and politics were profound, but from a southern perspective, 
exceedingly problematic. First, I claim Bancroft’s ethos was relatively close to the 
Workingmen parties in New York and Philadelphia of the 1820s. This is significant, 
because they were possibly the first to claim that the Revolution and the Declaration were 
about middle class and humanitarian reform ideals to be realized in the future, an enduring 
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narrative in America.
482
 Accordingly, the first public speech of Bancroft, a few years after 
his German experiences, was on the Fourth of July, 1826, when Jefferson, like John 
Adams, was dying. Blatantly ignoring translatedness (3.1), Bancroft claimed Virginia’s 
principles are the same as the Federal government’s and guide American political history 
as Universalhistorie in a worldwide progress of civil liberty. The meaning of civil liberty, 
however, he now reinscribed as Jackson–esque popular democracy: the popular voice of 
the people is the voice of God, and this voice is grounded in the Constitution.
483
 As I will 
elaborate (3.3.3), such talk was unsettling heresy to many southern intellectuals, and 
indicates a deep paradigm shift about history towards modernity and away from skeptical 
and particular. Second, Bancroft followed his master closely and gave as good as he got: 
the United States are “an essential portion of a great political system” of all civilized 
nations. The states are leaders of the world in morality, democracy and equality. The 
constitution was for the people by the people and of the people (this he stresses by 
repeating it twice). Equal justice turns to prosperity, free competition feeds utilitarian 
inventions, labor is surely rewarded. Army is minimal, commerce cosmopolitan, 
diplomacy friendly and equal, national resources developed peacefully, fruits of industry 
enjoyed by all, freedom of publication for every individual is absolute. The Constitution 
can be changed whenever the will of the people and time want and this will keep it pure. 
America is a progressive nation: new states form in the wilderness, canals for commerce 
are opened, manufacturers are prospering, steam power on ships and railroads shortens 
distances. Wealth cumulates, population cumulates, treasury is full, debt is zero, religion is 
civilized, intelligence amazingly diffused with unparalleled universality, the press is free 
and cosmopolitan with more journals than in all the rest of the world put together so that 
every individual is a part of its network. Ever more immigrants are coming, sorted to 
harmonious union by principles of liberty manifest as equality of law. The Constitution, as 
a product of the affections of the people, renders external influences neutral and is an 
asylum to all virtuous, oppressed and unfortunate persons. Thanks to “a favouring 
Providence, calling our institutions into being,” God has guided the country to its present 
glory and prominence.
484
 Hegelian dialectic is visible already in this work: for instance, 
Bancroft speaks of dialectic as a rational instrument against excessive religion and an 
illuminating guide in dim and dark speculative science.
485
 
Bancroft’s sources were fully textual and thus, he thinks, authentic: no memory or oral 
speech was allowed. He wanted to weed American History of myth, hearsay, authorial 
subjectivism and poesy and bring its political structure to the fore. Authority is now the 
original records.
486
 Thus he finished bona fide what Wirt had attempted and ironically 
realised was futile on a much smaller scale nearly twenty years earlier. Like in Wirt, the 
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project was utilitarian, but purportedly stripped of all rhetoric Wirt had relished. But 
already in the next sentence Bancroft speaks of “spirit,” “stern[ness],” “love,” 
“independence.” Such rhetorical flourishes of anthropology and romance he proceeds to 
affix on places. There is Montesquieuan scientist jargon of “cause” and “nature” and 
Universalhistorie rhetoric of “commercial,” “policy,” “will,” “germ” and “institutions.” 
He contends “[t]he spirit” manifest in colonies “demanded freedom from the beginning” 
and “the germ” to American institutions was already present in its first moments. More 
rhetoric from them follows:  “The maturity of the nation is but a continuation of its 
youth.” He informs the reader of his desire “to give unity” to historical narrative about 
New Belgium as the romantic aesthetic of the novel demanded. He aims to “give a full 
picture of the progress of American Institutions” using the conventional bourgeois 
romantic metaphor of canvas instead of speech, figurality, poetics and rhetoric.
487
 
Tellingly, for Bancroft, moral becomes scientific and history assists humanity in moral 
judgments. Moral has become liberalized and, in this form, universal.
488
 It easy to deduce: 
a) moral is scientific, b) Universalhistorie is political, c) political is moral, therefore 
history is scientific.  
Certainly the ethos of Jackson would support this chain of reasoning.
489
 Bancroft–like 
Cooper, Bryant, and writers Nathaniel Hawthorne, James Kirke Paulding, later Walt 
Whitman among others–much admired Jackson. Overtly, Jackson’s ideology was strongly 
anti–intellectual, anti–classicist and utilitarian.490 Bancroft was among the few 
intellectuals he liked.
491
 Jackson was of Presbyterian faith, and thus only implicitly 
Jeffersonian: he lacked Jefferson’s appreciation of Antiquity and humanism as well as his 
secularism and intellectual pursuits. Bancroft’s focus on political structure and his 
arguments would point to Jackson. However, the belief, then and now, in Jackson as a 
bringer of positive democracy was ironic. His covert strategy, to the contrary, was the 
strengthening of the might of the Constitution.
492
 The transition from Jefferson and 
toryism to Jackson has not been often focused on in the literature and its implications for 
the South even less. Rather, there has been a tendency to valorize Jackson that has cracked 
only since the 1970s.
493
 The continuum from Jefferson to Jackson was already envisioned 
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by Jacksonians themselves.
494
 Especially for historical theory, the difference is significant 
however (3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.2, 3.3.3). Bancroft’s work was a dumbed–down Wirt. But Everett 
and Heeren loved the first volume of A History of the United States. Further volumes 
would continue to appear almost throughout the century. Heeren applauded his approach 
that was warmly statist but still without poesy as he wanted. The work was “thoroughly 
complete,” Bancroft “the historian of the United States.”495 Some northerners, such as his 
Whig brother–in–law, criticized the work mildly for ideological implications: it strayed 
from recording the past. Other northern Democrats loved the work for being thoroughly 
imbued with American democratic principles.
496
  
3.3.2.1 Bancroft in the northern context 
Bancroft united two separate threads of historical thinking. First, by becoming immersed 
in political science away from philology, he provided grounds for history as political 
science, not language, rhetoric, figuration, aesthetics, literature and so on. More 
concretely, as Lieber had misread Niebuhr to be a romantic liberal about history, so 
Bancroft misread Ranke who, critically for my purposes, was definitely closer to Niebuhr 
than Hegel.
497
 Hegelian philosophical “liberalized” history, or historicism, was separate in 
degree from Rankean history as hermeneutical and philological criticism, or historism. 
What SAE as political science meant up North was, in Lyman Beecher’s words, God’s 
Moral Government. Beecher was the leading figure of New England Presbyterian 
evangelicalism at the time. He thundered about America’s moral welfare in explicitly 
nationalist rhetoric. The American nation, he contended, must be grounded in God and 
was in fact so grounded. This meant the restoration of Puritan theory of the covenant, i.e., 
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the Old Testament as the law in New England. This was radicalized by Beecher to cover 
the whole nation. If one broke the law of the Old Testament, it led straight to the 
floundering of nationalism. Everyone needed to be moral, or the laws of God–American 
society, its morals and political structure–would be broken.498 By the late–1820s, Beecher 
had connected his political science with an unbroken continuum of American history.
499
  
Second, the shift of history to political science fueled the neohumanism of the 
transcendentalists.
500
 Many of them such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, student of Everett, 
being Unitarians, made the line between religion and neohumanism fuzzy, a tendency 
Heeren’s Universalhistorie reinforced. To them, the two were not really in conflict in 
history. Powerful transcendentalists Emerson and Theodore Parker praised Bancroft. 
Emerson said almost every page brings him to tears while Parker named it the most 
splendid and noble history of all time. By 1878, the first volume had reached its 26th 
edition.
501
 
Emerson is relevant for my immediate purposes as a close friend to Bancroft and the 
positive influence his “Historical Discourse” address on history–delivered in 1835 in 
Concord, Massachusetts–had on Bancroft in his revision of the History.502 Transition from 
neoplatonc thought (chapter 2), specifically, Proclus
503
 to romantic liberalism, specifically, 
Coleridge and Carlyle, in Emerson, and from Emerson into history as their synthesis has 
been pretty much neglected. Similar to Marsh, Emerson had shed himself of Lockean 
linguistics, only a decade later. Gura states Emerson’s long 1832–1833 trip to Europe 
made his abandonment of Locke final, but even before the trip he had been influenced by 
influential theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg. Swedenborg’s anthropocentric 
mysticism was represented in America by Sampson Reed, whose admirers included Parker 
and Channing. Emerson would come to disawow his links to Swedenborg in 1850 for the 
latter’s too narrow an application of his theory, but Reed still had made a strong impact on 
him. Reed had pretty much travelled the path of Marsh and his argument. What was new 
was the ever nearer approximation to God through spirit manifest in nature where 
everything was a symbol of Him. The signifier covered the signified, so one could one day 
dispense with signs altogether. This provided another metaphoric recuperation between 
Christian rationalist and idealist Reason and reality. Unlike Swedenborg, Reed radicalized 
this into a general semiotic theory, and this impressed Emerson. Another contemporary 
influence was French Catholic priest Guillaume Oegger. To Oegger, worldly objects 
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originated from God as extensions of Logos: everything visible was spiritual and moral. 
The split in consciousness had destroyed this unity. Once restored, one could speak like 
Christ, conventionally and universally. Emerson would reject Oegger for the same reasons 
as Swedenborg, but keep the core idea. Nature as manifested God accessible via Reason 
meant transcendence of man to a higher spiritual plane. Emerson’s Nature (1836), where 
this view of language was introduced, shattered the authority of Locke on linguistics in the 
North, and was to occupy Emerson for the next decade.
504
 Thus, it is no surprise 
Emerson’s trip to Europe was done mainly to meet such figures as Wordsworth and 
Coleridge who, broadly speaking, shared his concerns. Carlyle was also a figure of 
interest. While Heeren deduced history from the state and its institutions, Emerson 
dialectically deduced reality from God. In other words, by rejecting Locke Emerson also 
rejected rhetoric, discourse, modernism and other critically idealist language use in terms 
of philosophy. Language, manifest as reality and God, was to close the gap between man 
and God like Christ closed the gap between man and God in theology. Like in Coleridge, 
the theory could be extended to ethics and aesthetics. I argue Emerson extended it to 
history as well. Everyone could rejoice in a natural history, where facts were rejoined 
symbolically to God. The ideal of uniting natural law and moral law so dear to northern 
SAE was now in sight: a return to Eden.
505
  
The crucial difference to even Coleridge, Simpson points out, is this radical–perhaps 
nonsensical and ethically dangerous–aspiration to realism transcendentalists shared506 that 
thus made it more relevant for history. While critical southerners pondered the relationship 
between natural science and history, Emerson tried to collapse history into natural science 
in tune with SAE (chapter 2). Specifically, at this time he tried to establish “the 
correspondence between the laws of physics and those of ethics” added with “validity of 
moral law,” “divinity of man” and “faith in self–reliance.”507 Arguably, both southerners 
and Emerson shared considerations with Kantian epistemology (chapter 2). Emerson got 
his Kant mostly from Carlyle. This is unfortunate, because Carlyle’s Kant was even less 
sophisticated than Coleridge’s. Carlyle tried to collapse understanding and practical 
reason–the empirical dimensions of Kant–into analytic reason that now was the source of 
religion, poetics and virtue besides science.
508
 Carlyle thus drew conclusions from Kant 
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exactly opposite to Schopenhauer: time and space are illusory, and it is reason so defined 
that has to be eternal. Similarly, Marsh and Emerson try to fit analytic reason into the 
realm of practical reason and disparage “dirty” antinomical understanding, a category 
mistake. Since to Carlyle Kant had taught all matter was illusory, Emerson embarked on 
sterile speculation in his philosophy as well.
509
 For Emerson, empirical understanding was 
now only the middle part of an optimistic, reason–guided metaphysics that he grounded, 
incredibly enough, in Jesus and Paul.
510
 This is significant for history, because Emerson 
consistently proposed “that history must be read and written for the purposes of realizing 
the human potential resulting from the influx of a Universal Mind” where “a Divine Mind 
permeates humanity and nature” and embraced “a presentist, sympathetic, moral, all–
inclusive, and self–revealing approach to the study of the past.”511 Bancroft’s Kant was the 
same as Emerson’s and Marsh’s.512 Ironically, although even Emerson’s hierarchy in 
literary and historical discourse was too elitist to the critics who favored their vocational, 
practical and societal dimensions, Emerson’s language views had become almost 
compulsory for all except the most conservative, critical and skeptical by the end of the 
decade. Gone were even the vestiges of Cooper’s ironies. In place was “the literary and 
philosophical correlative of the mythology of manifest destiny.”513 Northerners, by 
borrowing liberally from Idealism, extended their might from SAE to philosophy, 
language and historical epistemology into a core structure supported by a network of 
commitments. Bancroft drew light “on the philosophy of society in the United States; light 
drawn from history, and shed into all the present relations of races and parties to each 
other.”514 
3.3.2.2 Bancroft and Emerson in tandem on history 
In his speech, Emerson cites from Bancroft
515
 and pulls no punches: he compares 
historical time to the voice of Jesus and historical judgments to those of God.
516
 America’s 
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population is number one historically thanks to the wise actions of the State of 
Massachusetts. Massachusetts is an organicist harmony between wholes and parts that 
grew out of natural circumstance with zero invention. Man’s nature and his condition 
formed the State “for the first time within the period of certain history.” Emerson wants to 
turn history into anthropological truth by referring to a Revolution veteran as “ancient 
friend” who embodies history. He deals with the Revolution in the rhetoric of political 
science: it was a predictable experiment grounded in nature, with nothing artificial about it 
to anyone who knows about “the spirits and habits” of the God–fearing community. The 
war was actually a sermon to God. The men who are present bring the past nearer, they are 
the representatives of Puritanism and messengers of history run by God. Both history and 
God have ennobled the veterans. His own sketch of history was an incomplete one, but 
there is an unpublished History of it he had used. “I hope that History will not long remain 
unknown.” Emerson combines Christian and philosophical rhetoric when he states this 
work of kindness lives on in posterity and its method was wisely that of political and 
economic history of Heeren. Town records Emerson had examined “must ever be the 
fountains of all just information respecting your character and customs,” “they are the 
history” of it. The records of the town, or any American town,  
should be printed, and presented to the governments of Europe; to the English nation, as a 
thank–offering, and as a certificate of the progress of the Saxon race; to the continental 
nations as a lesson of humanity and love. Tell them, the Union has twenty–four States, and 
Massachusetts is one. Tell them, Massachusetts has three hundred towns, and Concord is 
one; that in Concord are five hundred ratable polls, and every one has an equal vote.  
 Emerson, “Historical Discourse,” 53. 
The records exhibit a picturesque agricultural community “where no man has much time 
for words, in his search after things.” The annals are “marked with uniform good sense.” 
The more dignified the event, the holier the tone of the archive. “These soiled and musty 
books are luminous and electric within.” The will of the people comes through despite bad 
grammar and syntax. The town is “in many respects, a financial corporation”: holiness and 
business are both necessary. Time is the enemy of history and of “the two great epochs of 
public principle,” i.e., the founding of the colony and the Revolution. Their spirit has 
infused Concord of purest men and their consecrating presence and activity among other 
snow–white towns. The people of Concord were excellent, pious, meek walkers of the 
paths of common life, God–serving, man–loving and ever hoping for immortality. The 
public leaders “fill a space in the world’s history”–join Universalhistorie–borne forward 
by the weight of thousands. Again a mixture of religion and philosophy: “The benediction 
of their prayers and of their principles” is around everyone like a spirit. Religion, history 
as political history, philosophy: “The acknowledgement of the Supreme Being exalts the 
history of this people,” it “brought the fathers” and “delivered their sons” “[i]n a war of 
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principle.” The spark of this faith needs to be kept alive for all time to come.517 History is 
political science and economics, certain, anthropological, democratic, scientific and 
grounded in philosophy, God and religion. It is Universalhistorie with God and 
philosophy, i.e., neoplatonic total light, at the helm. 
3.3.3 Virginia’s paradigm shift and responses: strong version of Whig 
history (SW) and weak version of Whig history (WW)  
Remarkably, up to Bancroft, history is not to my knowledge once mentioned in the same 
breath as science by any theorist in Virginia or South Carolina. Momentously, however, in 
Virginia, Federalist Whigs–not the Jeffersonian humanists–had taken the lead of historical 
discourse by the early–1830s. The cosmopolitan discourse about history many of them 
represented took its toll on Virginia history and social ontology (chapter 5). Like Jefferson 
supporters more generally,
518
 the theorists of history influenced by his university, 
suspicious of Jackson, were compelled to more or less adapt to Whig ways. Caught 
between the rock and a hard place, Jackson’s anti–intellectualist “hyperdemocracy” as 
applied to history was a greater menace than northern business interests. This was logical, 
since Jefferson never approved Princeton extreme Presbyterianism, an SAE variant 
(chapter 2). As Genovese reminds, the republicanism and aristocratic ethos held up to the 
Civil War.
519
 Neither Whigs nor Jeffersonians would accept the changes in language, tone 
and mood the Evangelicals introduced to politics toward the uncompromising, utopian and 
visionary moral reductionism on a national level
520
 that formed an integral part of modern 
history. As Bancroft had showed, liberalism about/in history was a Democratic thing.
521
 
Jackson was interpreted in the South as supporting a “popular,” in my context Bancroftian, 
reading of the Constitution, when he reacted against the radical anti–tariff protest led by 
the formidable South Carolina statesman John C. Calhoun.
522
 In South Carolina, “Tory” 
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became a slogan that signaled anti–liberty while “Whig” meant liberty.523 Generally, 
eastern Virginians distanced themselves from Jackson’s nationalism and were more 
supportive of Calhoun, while even the poorer western part later joined in the renunciation 
of Jackson’s anti–bank policies.524 Thus, the view about the Constitution being 
philosophically wrong (chapter 2) had decayed as well: what remained was the liberal 
Whig interpretation of Calhoun balanced with concern about premodern history (chapter 
5), versus the liberal Democrat interpretation of Bancroft that saw the Constitution as 
establishing bourgeois universality that functioned like Hegelian idealist dialectic but 
greatly upped the ante from Hegel concerning religion, rationalism, and science. 
The editor of the Enquirer, Thomas Ritchie, initially backed Jackson,
525
 though at least 
initially more in hopes of reviving Jeffersonian republicanism through Jackson.
526
  
Similarly, Randolph became a Democrat, but his motives were not nationalistic either, let 
alone statist as in Bancroft, but to protest against the Federalist–oligarchic decay of the 
former Jeffersonians. This motif was probably familiar to many southerners from ancient 
Athens and Sparta, but they did not draw the Yankee and neohumanist conclusions from it 
(chapter 5). Randolph disliked the federalism of the Whig Adams from the start.
527
 Thus, 
the democratic theory of Bancroft was categorically different from such Virginia 
Democratic positions in Virginia as in Jefferson’s time (chapter 2).  
In the volatile confusion, Jefferson’s supporters were no longer a monolith, nor behind 
Jackson, but not Whigs or Federalists either. For my concerns, this would translate to a 
tension about history as God–grounded, utilitarian political science or romance (the 
position of northern and North–sympathetic Whigs and many Democrats) vs. history as 
textual figuration, rhetoric and philology (Jefferson humanists, the first Charleston critics, 
the early Simms, Grayson). I thus distinguish between Strong Whig (SW) and Weak Whig 
(WW) realignment. The difference is in the amount modern history–that now had been 
bolstered by Bancroft’s historicist interpretation of Idealism–was criticized as historical 
figuration, language, aesthetics and style and in how strong the emphasis on textuality, 
philology, irony and figuration as well as personal experience remained. 
The organization established in 1831 became the Virginia Historical and Philosophical 
Society (VHPS). It was apparently run by Jonathan P. Cushing but, strikingly, its president 
was Marshall. Not only had Marshall been Jefferson’s nemesis about history (chapter 2), 
northern–born scientist Cushing was no humanist nor historialist about history.528 
Marshall was “perhaps the most reactionary man in America” at the time. Strong 
Federalist, he was a businessman to boot, a hater of democracy, and a very controversial 
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figure within Virginia especially among supporters of Jefferson and Randolph.
529
 The 
Whig dominance is therefore explainable as rejection of the far more intellectually radical 
history at Jefferson’s university (chapter 2) as misfitting the desired institutionalized 
nationalistic level. In addition, it seems probable the strongly Whig organizing was an 
anti–democratic measure530 that contributed to lessening of Jeffersonian concerns. It had 
significant, even dramatic metaphysical consequences for southern history (chapter 5). 
Despite such an organizing and its northern–derived antiquarian mode and purpose, 
initial emphasis was still on texts in a way that accommodated premodern history. The 
earliest pieces submitted were a memoir of the Revolution and a record of a witchcraft 
trial from the first years of the 18th century with its old language intact. For the memoir 
writer, Charles A. Stuart, truth about history was intimately connected with personal 
experience and observation. Since his father John, the narrator in the memoir, did not 
experience and observe the happenings, the narration was probably imperfect. Marshall 
had got his history of the event from George Washington’s oral narration, whose superior 
position would, the son thought, probably guarantee the veracity of Marshall’s history. 
The source for his father’s tale emanated from direct, that is physical, comprehension of 
the event done by General Andrew Lewis. It was true, because John Stuart had a felicitous 
station in society, good character, and tradition supported it. Textual criticism of the text 
assures this–at least to the son–since many amusing anecdotes he told to his acquaintances 
and associates for “recreation” had been “pretermitted.” Quoting Shakespeare, Stuart 
muses the written sign rescues from the total extinction that belongs to time and life. But 
the difference between it and oral speech is made explicit.
531
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Though Charles Stuart thereby politely ends up trusting in Marshall’s history, his own 
notion of history is much older and treats printed history with deep irony. In addition, 
Stuart’s history is far from the political science of Bancroft. It is dependent on live 
narration, space, status, metonymy and morality just like in organic–in modern history’s 
context, “premodern”–society. Text is inferior to oral recounting, but still philologically 
interesting. In such a situation, history is a dialectical tension, far from a stable object and 
simply one of the dialects of the symbolic, with no necessary priority over others such as 
speech, and with no mimetic imperative as a sign.
532
 As in case of Jefferson (chapter 2), 
immediacy as a guarantor of history is not grounded in philosophy, but in present 
experience and philology. This makes Stuart WW about history, because history for him 
was not knowledge for its own sake or a (social) scientific object of study, unlike for 
Bancroft. In addition, as narrative, it was dependent on live experience–in–community, 
not on anthropological romance or individual aesthetic freedom like in modern history. 
Since the Stuart piece was a memoir, this argument also agrees with Godzich’s typology 
about the evolution of prose (3.1.3). 
3.3.3.1 Tucker’s rejection, Kennedy’s sympathy 
Corroborating the differing dynamics of history, I could not locate in–depth discussion 
about Bancroft in the South before the late–1840s.533 However, The Southern Literary 
Messenger had launched in Virginia the year Bancroft’s study came out. Illustrative of the 
different but overlapping criticism between the Jeffersonians and the Whigs, The 
Messenger became an extension of VHPS and, in format and model, imitative of the Tory 
Blackwood’s.534 On its pages appeared a critical review of Bancroft’s History by author 
and Judge Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, second cousin to George Tucker and half–brother 
to Randolph.
535
 Historians have generally focused on its ideological content.
536
 However, I 
claim such a reading is too hasty and equivocal, because it is not sensitive enough 
ontologically, conceptually or figurally. Critically for me, Tucker’s views about history 
had earlier pleased Jefferson in the former’s uncompleted history of Virginia.537  
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First, Tucker’s review is a synecdoche of the synthesis between the two impulses. His 
Tory Virginians are humanely chivalrous and as faithful to the king as seraph Abdiel in 
Paradise Lost to God and the servant in Sterne’s Sentimental Journey that are used as 
allegories.
538
 These positive, anthropological associations with chivalry emanate from 
Whigs Wirt and Kennedy: most Charleston critics had not made the connection. Tucker is 
overtly a strong critic of Romanticism, but still crosses swords with it dialectically.
539
 
Second, Tucker uses concrete spatial and parallel metaphors (“[Sterne’s] servant . . . 
advanced three paces . . . others found themselves drawn more closely toward [Charles 
I’s] exiled son”) against Bancroft’s abstract claims of Virginia having been roundhead in 
sympathy. Looking contemporary authorities for “traditions and histories that have come 
down on us” as Bancroft has done is narrow.540 Third, Tucker is alarmed that this new 
approach to history will “crush and obliterate” with its epistemology “every trace of what 
our ancestors were, and what we ourselves have been.” In other words, a) history of 
Virginia before Bancroft, b) the way society is now structured, c) its “hereditary 
prejudices and prepossessions,” d) the unique qualities of a Virginian as a royalist: the 
whole fabric is under threat. The underlying metaphysics of reason is of a wrong kind. 
Tucker argues, by close attention to the texts and philological erudition, the whole 
metaphysicality of freedom, independence and germ–the ground of modern history–is a 
sickness.
541
 A related inconvenience is internal and discursive. There are those who think 
toryism is arrogant, those who think it is undemocratic, and those who think, illogically 
enough, both.
542
 This exhibits the identity crisis to toryism Jackson launched and the 
existence of its countercurrent. Fourth, symbolical criticisms: Bancroft’s book proves that 
public records are essentially inadequate. Even Hening’s appreciated law history was 
made of such “tattered manuscripts” that “the loss of the whole or a part of any document 
is quite common.” Besides, collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society are 
suspectible of veracity.
543
 This view can be compared to Emerson’s to see how much the 
views about signs were at variance, though the southern one is not even a method. Fifth, 
most of Tucker’s criticisms are directed at the sign that evaporates presence: one cannot 
infer truth from written archival sources. A session act “is evidence enough of a new order 
of things, and yet it is not so very clear what that new order was.” Reality is not reducible 
to what is written in statutes or articles, and so Charles II continued to be the king of 
Virginia in practice. It is the exemplary moral ethos the king’s supporters had, not 
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chronological rewinding of time to Adam, that is more worthy in history. Political or 
emotional states of single individuals are irreducible to societal peace and institutional 
positions. History as political science and its syllogisms just are not adequate and subtle 
enough.
544
 This shows the more spatial and physical way southerners went about history 
and existence that preceded modern history. Sixth, Bancroft becomes another instance of 
modern history’s misrepresenting. Tucker gives Robertson the moderate Scot most 
recognition of them. Bancroft purposively ignores written evidence, contrary to what he 
claims. One such misstep would not be so bad, but his mistreatment of the sources is 
connected with this strange metaphysics, his “drift” to “liberalise” Virginia. Something is 
“fishy”–to use a modern phrase–here:545 
What is the meaning of this strange attempt to pervert the truth of history, and to represent 
Virginia as being as far gone in devotion to the parliament as Massachusetts herself? Why 
does it come to us, sweetened with the language of panegyric, from those who love us not, 
and who habitually scoff at and deride us? 
ibid., 591.       
The confusion and suspicion before the German apparatus is audible, as is the animosity 
felt at northern domination, to which is connected historial and ironic symbolist attitudes. 
Similar to Nietzsche’s philology, it is not a philosophy in a modern sense.546 Tucker 
makes this more explicit in what follows:  
Is it intended to dispose us to acquiesce in the new notion, “that the people of the colonies, 
all together, formed one body politic before the revolution?” Against this proposition we 
feel bound to protest. We hold ourselves prepared to maintain the negative against all 
comers and goers, with tongue and pen; and to resist the practical results, if need be, with 
stronger weapons. 
Tucker. “A History of the United States,” 591. 
Here, the clash is almost at its most complete. Neither Virginian toryism, nor liberty, is a 
question of discourse that modern history presupposed. There is no identity conflict from 
Charles II to the present. Metaphysical speculations on liberalism or popular democracy 
simply are no questions to be considered in history. For Tucker, in other words, historical 
identity is not derived from Universalhistorie, or from the underlying anthropological 
principle of unity.
547
 Therefore, it was perhaps even less amenable to the Yankee 
radicalizations (chapter 2) Bancroft and Emerson built on. Seventh, Tucker finishes his 
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critique by connecting these speculations to a general criticism of Bancroft’s romantic 
style exactly as Poe, Legaré and others had argued. Bancroft’s style is “proud,” and 
Tucker is aware by such description he has condemned the historian. I think the adjective 
points to, at least, two sources: Milton and Cicero. For both authors, if on different levels, 
pride was hybris, arrogance. Tucker’s reaction resembles the resolve of Abdiel and his 
views on pride.
548
 Like the others had maintained: “An ambitious style is certainly not the 
style of history.” Painstaking erudition has been sacrificed for ornament, and the tone 
itself is puzzlingly distrustful, using a lot of declamation, antithesis and epigram. This, 
once more, suggests the very different way of looking at historical language. Tucker 
concludes: 
If this is the way to write history, we fear we shall have to leave our northern neighbors to 
tell the story their own way . . . Let them write our books, and they become our masters. 
But we cannot help ourselves. We cannot contend with those who can write history in this 
style. Our only defence is not to read. A more effectual security would be, not to buy. In 
that case they would not write; and we should not only avoid being led into error, but 
might escape the injury of being misrepresented to others. But Mr. Bancroft’s book is in 
print, and we must abide the mortification of having all who may read it, think of our 
ancestors as he has represented them. We have comfort in believing that they will not be 
very numerous.   
Tucker. “A History of the United States,” 591. 
This shows the agony felt about history as discourse and the struggle, not dialectical but 
rather fairly asymmetric, against northern power structures, the incommensurability of 
history as figure, metaphysics and discourse between the sections. Bancroft’s History 
seems wrong on many levels. To my knowledge no intellectual in the South praised the 
work at this time. 
A year later, in his novel The Partisan Leader (1836), Tucker would return to his 
satirical and ironically symbolic criticism of modern history and Romanticism. The book’s 
emplotment of history–southern partisan group waging a civil war in America in the 
future–was scandalous at the time and tragic in retrospect. Given the widespread character 
of romance as history, it seems a protest. Again the protestation is couched in philosophy. 
In a clever allegory, Tucker compares the romantic Arthur who only looks for the grand 
view to “an epicure about to feast on turtle, who will not taste a biscuit beforehand lest he 
should spoil his dinner” and keeps on ascending a hill, never looking back: reference to 
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Plato and idealism seems obvious. His companion Schwartz, in contrast, continuously 
looks back and stops to chat away and seems indifferent to the scenery. This attitude 
seems to resemble Cicero’s critique of Epicureanism. Tucker comments: “Arthur was 
vexed to see such indifference, and wondered whether this was the effect of use, or of the 
total absence of a faculty of which poets so much delight to speak.” At the summit, while 
Arthur is in extasy about the view, forgetting his difference to his companion, Schwartz 
cannot “see anything at all rightly” but “[i]n the spring of the year, when you cannot see 
the cabins for the shaders, and the corn, and oats, and meadow is all of a color, it looks 
mightily like a little green snake.” This seems to echo the physicality and concreteness, 
economy of metonymy rather than metaphor, of southerners that has little philosophical in 
a modern sense about it. Same here: Down below “there is something there, to be sure, but 
what it is, I am sartain I could never tell, if I did not know. And as to the distance I hear 
some folks talk about—why the farther you look, the less you see, that's all; until you get 
away yonder, t’other side of nowhere; and then you see just nothing at all.” It is pointless 
to speculate using romantic or idealistic language, death lies that way: far better to see 
personally. The generalized language is death.
549
 In another ironic moment, Arthur 
disparages Schwartz that his eyes are bad when in the next moment Arthur himself cannot 
see the road except as connected to the mountain. Schwartz needs to lend him his rifle 
sights so he can see more clearly. Finally Arthur is able to “correct his preconceptions by 
the testimony of his own senses.”550 This is surprisingly Heideggerian and modernist. For 
Heidegger, we recall, things present–at–hand were ontologically different than things on 
display. The path–another of Heidegger’s favorites–is something very different from a 
climb to the summit. In short, the conditions for knowledge are at variance. Tucker’s 
comments give credence to the communality in Virginia different from that of a romantic 
aesthete or a modern “rational” philosopher, more akin to the ancients and the Middle 
Ages but modern in terms of irony.
551
 Romanticism in/as history is simultaneously 
affirmed and denied in modernist ways that suggests the condition of the symbolic and 
history as figural. The rhetorical space of history is made visible, and there is very little 
Presbyterian SAE sternness about it. There is the WAE interest into its causes, but also the 
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skeptical subtlety not to have faith in them.
552
 Tragically, northerners missed the trees for 
the forest and referred to the book on the eve of the war as “A Key to the Disunion 
Conspiracy.” Things can hardly get more tragic in terms of figuration. To sum up, Tucker 
is WW. 
Kennedy, in contrast, was SW and giving in to Bancroft and Emerson: in Horse–Shoe 
Robinson (1835), set somewhere between Virginia and the Carolinas at the time of the 
Revolution, he has cut from satire and play and sharpened his Tory criticism from 
Swallow Barn. Unlike in Tucker, one finds such sobering remarks as: “History tells of 
many a rebound from despondency, so sudden and unreckoned, that the wisest men could 
see in it no other spring than the decree of God.”553 The Emersonian mixture of history 
with philosophy and religion is there. He attempts “to furnish a picture, and embody the 
feelings . . . during the progress of the American War of Independence”: history is 
teleological painting driven by feelings as text and a part of Universalhistorie. The war’s 
incidents were frequently “the most picturesque and romantic.” Kennedy has fallen prey to 
Bancroft’s style. Personal, that is individual, adventures have been overlooked, and these 
have become “the lawful property of our story–telling craft.”554 The subtlety of Wirt is 
much lacking, but history is serious: Kennedy begins with geography like Montesquieu 
and Bancroft.
555
 George Washington is “written down by some future nation”–the word 
nation is emphasized; history’s pages are the “brightest”and the revolutionary actors–
heroes who “worked out a nation’s redemption”–are remembered by far–off posterity as of 
yesterday. Just as in Emerson, parallels to Pauline tribulations of Christianity and the early 
Christian church are echoed. The nation “was rejoiced to hear the brilliant passages of 
arms” of the heroes. It is a shame America lacks ballads about them.556 Such 
anthropologism and Neoplatonism thus combine, as in Emerson, with American history, 
forming a seamless whole or structure, a signification of identity.  
Kennedy is a transitional figure, because for him, history is now both a metaphysical 
structure of light and an individual event.
557
 In addition, he uses history and chronicle 
haphazardly as if to make the distinction trivial and, thus, the associated epistemological 
problem moot.
558
 Such carelessness in use of words is another Emersonian trait and in a 
sharp opposition to the southern philologists. The combination of romance, SAE, 
anthropologism and religion is authentic history.
559
 Though the narrating is conscious, 
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unlike in Tucker, there is not a trace of irony about the telling of history. Translatedness is 
not a concern.
560
 
The first edition was in one volume, and the second that appeared in the same year, in 
two. The first edition did not have the accentuating subtitle: A Tale of the Tory 
Ascendancy. The second edition includes the motto “I say the tale as ‘twas said to me” 
from “Lay of the Last Minstrel,” a poem by Scott.561 This would suggest Kennedy was 
securely anchored in the romance tradition that did not conflict with Bancroft’s history. It 
was much different from ancient histories Kennedy continued to ridicule that pushes him 
close to SAE: the intellect who read books for inquiry without utilitarian use, even when 
they are not bragging about it, are Tory sympathizers, enemies to American history. This 
is made explicit later in the story. Such a reader, like Philip Lindsay, “pores over” the 
ancients’ “secrets,” “obsolete subtleties,” “speculations of an abstract age.” Antiquity 
intellectuals were “eccentric,” their problems “wondrous,” Plato had “reveries,” the 
coryphaei were aberrant (Kennedy is either heavily satirical or revealing his lack of 
knowledge by implying there was a school of “Coryphӕans”), Pythagoras had to do with 
“imagination” and “land of visions,” Epicurus was a wanderer. This “knowledge” is then 
put side by side with gnostics (they “had their attractions for him”), judicial astrology and 
its “wild phantasmagoria,” “apparatus of conjurations,” “charms and invocations,” 
“hallucinations” and “ancient Pythia and modern witchcraft.” Kennedy assures such 
knowledge of the ancients, these “cabalistic studies,” is nothing–mumbo–jumbo in today’s 
phrase–and only incites “the germ”–Bancroft and Montesquieu again–of superstition. It 
stands opposed to reason, Americanized Universalhistorie’s reason, as “pernicious and 
false philosophy.”562 This stinging anti–intellectualism is surely more Jackson than Whig 
in style, but it is hard to say whether Kennedy is serious and lacks the personal interest or 
ability to distinguish between different kinds of knowledge, or if he is consciously 
lumping all intellectual pursuit to anti–Americanism. I incline toward the former option. 
For example, Kennedy collapses Nature fully to Civilization: to him, even Tory Philip is a 
German romantic (romantic “scenery,” fresh “soil,” healthy “climate”). Philip’s wife 
exercised “refined art with advantage over nature” in the interior decorations while “the 
great western wilderness smiled with the contentment of a refined and polished 
civilization, which no after–day in the history of this [American] empire has yet surpassed, 
perhaps not equaled.”563 Even Philip believes American political leadership in the 
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Revolution was anti–royalist just like the roundheads were in the English Civil War, while 
his even more royalist companion insists history must be read aright.
564
 Since the purists 
of historiography were SAE Evangelicals, not toryists, Kennedy is mixing attitudes very 
boldly, resembling Emerson’s style.  
A bit surprisingly at first, the work was praised in the Messenger, suggesting the 
German thinking about history had become more prevalent in Virginia by this time. The 
reviewer mentions “one proper whole” of a narrative connected by “connecting chain” the 
romantic credo. The reviewer prefers novels like Horse–Shoe that amuse throughout like 
Schiller’s play. “We enter at once into the spirit and meaning of the author–we are 
introduced at once to the prominent characters–and we go with them at once, heart and 
hand, in the various and spirit–stirring adventures which befall them.” No ambiguity here 
about idealistic spirit, humanitarian anthropology, and figuration. Kennedy’s mix also 
worked stylistically: “We have called the style of Mr. K. a style simple and forcible, and 
we have no hesitation in calling it, at the same time, richly figurative and poetical.”  
Besides, Kennedy has morals, thus nullifying the ambiguity about history and morality. 
The only problem is punctuation.  
However, this review was written by WW Poe.
565
 Why would Poe write a glorifying 
review about a novel so unlike his own aesthetic? The answer may not lie in aesthetic 
kinship with Kennedy. Rather, Poe probably felt lifelong personal gratitude to Kennedy 
for practically having saved his life from absolute poverty only a few months before. 
Further, Kennedy had acted one of the judges who awarded Poe’s “Lionizing”–that, 
ironically, satirized Coleridge, one of Kennedy’s favorites in the piece–the main prize in 
1833. Poe was well aware of Kennedy’s social thinking at the time and could manipulate 
it to his ends in language.
566
  
Poe’s glowing review was perhaps even a well–hidden parody. Poe satirises 
rationalism, Neoplatonism, utilitarianism and middle class German Romanticism in 
“Lionizing”. In a revised version, published only in 1845, Poe has added a criticism about 
the quest for originality and changed the title into “Some Passages in the Life of a Lion.”  
Possibly the piece, written sometime before the contest, was inspired by seal of a lion that 
Kennedy used in his letters. It had a motto Poe interpreted as “il parle par tout*” or “il 
parle partout” [he speaks for all,* he speaks everywhere].567 Since Kennedy was radically 
wealthier than Poe, a utilitarian enemy of classicism, and a fine specimen of German 
                                                 
564
 ibid., 162-63. 
565
 Anonymous [Poe], “[Review:] Horse–Shoe Robinson,” Southern Literary Messenger 1 
(1835): 522-24, citations on 523, emphasis added and original, 524. That Poe is the author is 
maintained at http://www.eapoe.org/works/criticsm/slm35k01.htm, accessed September 13, 2013. 
566
 Edgar A. Poe to John P. Kennedy. ca. November 19, 1834 and note; Edgar A. Poe to John P. 
Kennedy, December 19, 1834; Edgar A. Poe to John P. Kennedy, March 15, 1835; Edgar A. Poe to 
John P. Kennedy, March 15, 1835 and note, in Ostrom et al., Edgar Allan Poe, 1, 78-83. For 
Kennedy and Coleridge, see Kennedy, Horse–Shoe Robinson, 129. Apparently, Kennedy read both 
Coleridge and Scott the New England way. 
567
 For the seal, see Edgar A. Poe to John P. Kennedy, February 11, 1836, in Ostrom et al., 
Edgar Allan Poe, 1, 126 and note. 
  
 
 
140 
middle class Romanticism Poe and many other southern intellects were wary of, Poe who 
loved language puzzles was perhaps alluding to Kennedy as the artist and protagonist.
568
 
In the review, Poe calls Horse–Shoe Robinson a character “fully entitled to the character 
of ‘an original.’ He is the life and soul of the drama–the bone and sinew of the book–its 
very breath–its every thing which gives it strength, substance, and vitality.”569 Given how 
Poe felt about the signifier and moralizing, pronouncements like this, though echoing a 
lion, should be taken with a grain of salt. They indicate Poe’s similarity to Derrida as well. 
3.3.4 The first “general history” of Virginia 
At the same time, in 1835, there appeared the first more “general” history of Virginia 
since Jefferson’s more than half a century earlier. Its gazetteer part was done by Joseph 
Martin, while William H. Brockenbrough wrote its historical prose part and was the 
editor. Martin is obscure to posterity, but probably he had sympathies with SAE 
Evangelicalism, since the only other publication by him I am aware of was a reprint of 
nonconformist Philip Doddridge’s Sermons to Young Persons from the 1730s. It vacillated 
about the imperative for plain, rigorous language and style. Brockenbrough was a 
distinguished lawyer and a future Democrat in Florida, where he moved soon after. I 
seriously doubt Democrats–Bancroft’s party–were much welcomed in Virginia’s historical 
scene at the time. His great–uncle was William Brockenbrough, one of the key organizers 
of Jefferson’s university. The younger Brockenbrough studied law, and his father was 
architect and proctor. Brockenbrough was not mentioned.
570
 Dedicated to VHPS, the work 
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was an interesting conglomeration:
571
 a revised edition of a travelbook by Martin that 
promised a “Comprehensive Description of Virginia” and came out in 1830. Now history 
was a supplement.
572
   
The function of a gazette in general and especially the relationship between a gazette 
and a history remain little studied areas in the English language.
573
 Gazettes in America 
more broadly were applied to lure people to the West, situated close to the romance 
tradition
574
 and were therefore very utilitarian. Gazette was by now an archaic form of 
historical representing, and Martin was innocent of history’s theoretical concerns. As Belo 
insists, such hybridity is “intrinsically inhabited by a tension between both forms.”575 The 
work’s vacillation between a gazetteer and a history refers to a time before Addison, to the 
late–17th century. History was ipso facto a–figural because, since history was auxiliary 
science at the time, skepticism about it was fairly low (chapters 5, 6). Voltaire had 
dichotomized between histories as syntheses and gazettes as compendiums. He was 
unhappy with gazettes, because they refrained from painting the minds of nations and 
substituted to this task a flood of facts. De Mably, his contemporary, saw the task of the 
gazetteer, in contrast to historian, as overpleasing the public: they wanted nothing more 
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than to be complacent public servants, refined entertainers with a dull litany of facts.
576
 
Ironically, even Voltaire’s–a prototype historian of new philosophy against the ancients 
and philology–approach was very far from linguistic and erudite.577 So methodologically, 
Martin is winding back the clock to a time when gazettes were read and produced bona 
fide as histories, i.e., roughly before Voltaire, as the core of the work. This arguably 
devolves to Fontenelle’s application of Descartes and natural science to history, with only 
modifications as to comparison as method
578
 familiar to the Yankees (chapter 2). It 
completely sidesteps the argument between skepticism and romance about history. Still, it 
is not in conflict with his genre choice. To the contrary, Cassirer has shown the complicity 
between Voltaire and Fontenelle. For both, the terminus point is the encyclopaedists’ trust 
in progress of culture. This resulted from the impact increases in refined manners and 
urban knowledge will make on morality. The public sphere became a self–serving agent or 
“intrasociety” of salon of political, theoretical, ethical and aesthetical ideals.579  
However, here the comparisons break down like in the incoherence of VHPS. Despite 
Cushing, VHPS still clung to an aristocratic–humanistic–and not bourgeois–public sphere. 
Martin refers reverently to “their cynical Lordships” whose name he meekly asks for 
protection and “venture[s] to ask the protection of [their] countenance.” To this nobleman 
jargon is juxtaposed the need for consorted historical collaboration, but no mention is 
made of any societies. Tone is exceedingly reverential, yet fully serious.
580
 The 
Virginians’ work abstains from rupturing the aristocratic–humanistic fabric by 
subjectivism, let alone by presenting a contesting philosophy of history by way of 
Bancroft. Bancroftian romantic metaphysical proclamations are kept to a minimum.
581
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By comparison, the format of a gazette and the status of a gazetteer were “not 
considered a source of social pre–eminence and authorship in the royal ‘Republic of 
Letters’” of Portugal. José Freire de Monterroyo Mascarenhas, editor of a Portuguese 
gazette in the early–1700s, appealed to the utility of his work as a justification for his 
being busy with it but maintained in his application for the institution that he was, 
nevertheless, an erudite historian. However, he was denied access to the new powerful 
academy of direct royal connections of eminent men, probably for the reason he was a 
mere gazetteer. Self–denial was common among periodical editors because of lower 
prestige they had to a book writer.
582
 Use became the justification for publication as well 
as the criterion according to which material was sorted.
583
  
The biggest discrepancies deal with genre, epistemology and semiotics that parallel the 
conflicting status of history and VHPS. The gazetteers saw their products as histories and 
Monterroyo thought of himself as good a historian as the elite. A book of history was the 
lower–ranked gazetteer’s model in the 1600s.584 By contrast, Martin has no pretensions to 
be a historian–contrary to the gazettes, the word “history” only appears at the end of the 
baroquian title: . . . To which is Added a History of Virginia from Its First Settlement to the 
Year 1754. With an Abstract of the Principal Events from that Period to the Independence 
of Virginia, Written Expressly for the Work. He emphasizes deeply the imperfections of 
his work as history.
585
 In addition, he claims to be almost penniless as a result of research 
of two years.
586
 Martin’s history was a “hasty composition which is called rather from its 
length than its character, a History of Virginia,” “hasty sketch . . . infinitely too humble for 
criticism” . . . “hasty composition of little more than a fortnight”  . . . “his hasty sketch 
was not written with the expectation of meeting with approbation as a philosophic treatise 
upon the history of Virginia.”587  Martin thus reverses course from Monterroyo: his work 
is more a gazette than history, and he is no historian. Interestingly, distance from the elite 
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is greater than in royalist Portugal a century earlier, since Martin would never have the 
audacity to think of himself a VHPS member, one of the “hawks.”588  
Epistemologically, the book is a curious mix: on one hand, there is the influence of 
Fontenelle, the Yankee preference: “it is believed that very few of [the typographical 
errors] effect the sense, and still fewer falsify statements of fact.” It “describe[s] Virginia 
as it exists at the present day.” “The system” is complete: it “present[s] to the mind each 
separate portion of country at once, in a connected view, so that the reader at a distance 
might form as good an idea of the state of improvement in each county, as if he were on 
the spot.”589 The work operated like the mind and the stereo vision of the eyes: first the 
general part, then the east and the west simultaneously.  But Martin incongruously mixes 
to this absolute stereo vision “hope of presenting a succinct and faithful narrative.” “[I]f 
on any subject, all is not said which might have been said, or all which is said is not true, 
he at least feels sure that he has respectable authority for every word he utters, and that he 
believes all to be true.”590 He thus falls back on the school of Christian Thomasius, whose 
heyday was at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. It insisted on simple good faith on 
tradition in history without any skepticism.
591
  
Gazetteers were often in a hurry resulting in delay and thus made less ideal 
historians.
592
 Similarly, Martin is very specific about his hurry.
593
 Interestingly, he 
connects his hurried state to the a–figural state of the narrative.  The author could not “pay 
any attention whatever to his language or style, or to digress upon the many topics which 
so invitingly offered, or turn his eyes for a moment to other colonies or countries. He was 
compelled to proceed with the single isolated narrative of Virginia history.”594 This is 
another old–school sidestep from the aporias of ironic symbolism, romance narrative and 
the immediacy of the ancients. Still, the author insists no less than five times that the work 
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will be received well, especially by travelers, businessmen and literary men.
595
 However, 
none of this was directed to VHPS. In sum, Martin is a stand–in for confusion between 
SW and WW: his position is irrelevant as a criticism of history. Its form and content have 
a stronger pull to SW than WW. But he lacks even the rudiments of perceiving history as a 
skeptical enterprise and thus the apparatus of a bourgeois dynamic. He seldom reaches 
beyond Addison in radicalism.
596
  
Brockenbrough, for his part, is even far more cautious epistemologically, but more 
figurative. Though he rises Virginia to the level of civilization like Bancroft boldly did 
with America, the cosmopolitan historian’s irony takes over. Instead of visionary idealism, 
it is mixed with poetics. Brockenbrough knows “our feeble wing” cannot be allured “to 
essay a flight so daring as would be necessary to survey the broad field which now 
expands before us.” “We leave it rich, tempting and beautiful as it is, to be painted by 
some master whose skill will enable him to exhibit the grandeur and symmetry of the 
whole, and yet present upon the same canvass a detail of each separate beauty.” Indeed: 
“For ourselves, we cannot be so barbarous as to disfigure so magnificent a subject by 
daubing it over with the same wretched colors, which we have laid on the preceding piece, 
in such extreme haste that we fear it will be difficult to distinguish the characters or 
design.” The outline is very general and brief and not true.597 This is romantically 
informed but author–abnegating and thus differs from Bancroft. 
The book made no waves. The Messenger took months to even review it. Poe mentions 
the public has been indifferent to the work and that, unlike in many other civilized 
countries, there is no public sphere in Virginia. Yet, Poe wishes well to the brave effort 
and seems to condone its powerful utilitarianism. It is invaluable even “indeed to the 
general reader.”598 Such unrestrained backing of middle class utilitarianism may seem 
strange. However, it is possible Poe, now the editor, saw the theoretical harmlessness of 
the book as a performance. Gazettes were seen at this time in the South as easy points of 
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access to bourgeois public sphere of aesthetic pleasure,
599
 but such aims were of northern 
origin. Perhaps Poe was feeling touchy about bourgeois pursuits because of lawyer Lucian 
Minor’s sarcastic “Liberian Literature,” published in the same volume. Minor implied 
civilized debating societies and literary criticism, recently constructed by the American 
colonizers of blacks (chapter 5), were possible even in Africa. A literary culture 
“necessarily implies” “comforts, virtues, and pleasures” that form an absolute borderline 
between civilized and savage.
600
 Minor was no historist, nor ironist. Instead, he joined the 
Bancroftian Universalhistorie and was heavily middle class and progressive SW.
601
 Since 
Minor strongly endorsed northern cultural politics, the essay may have been interpreted as 
a burlesque on southern lack of such discourse. Poe censored it heavily without consulting 
Minor that suggests the two had different views about discourse.
602
 Poe apparently never 
corresponded with Minor on his own accord.
603
 
3.3.4.1  Cultural–poetic differences about history in the late–1830s 
Soon afterwards in the famed “The American Scholar” essay, Emerson proclaimed–
understandably from the rationalist point–that history had always been a Cartesian natural 
science and comparable to it. History’s conclusions must be preserved and communicated, 
and its object was individual experience and popular culture that must be focused on by 
such a method.
604
 But in the South, WW skepticism continued. In 1837, the Messenger 
                                                 
599
 See for example Daniel Kimball Whitaker, “Condition and Prospects of American 
Literature,” SLJMM 1 (1835a): 2. 
600
 Minor, “Liberian Literature,” Southern Literary Messenger 2 (1836a): 158-59, citation on 
158. 
601
 Minor admired New England’s social policies and had connections to its influential members. 
See for example A Virginian [Minor], “Letters from New England–No. I,” Southern Literary 
Messenger 1 (1834): 86; Edgar A. Poe to Lucian Minor, March 10, 1836, in Ostrom et al., Edgar 
Allan Poe, 1, 129-30.  Minor’s Universalhistorie sympathies are revealed, for instance, in his 
appealing to a “universal practice of nations,” a construct Poe questions. Minor, ”Chief Justice 
Marshall,” 186, emphasis original and note. For a particularly middle class SW literary theorist 
around this period, see Anonymous, “[Review:] Dr. Bird’s New Novel,” Southern Literary 
Messenger 5 (1839): 420-29. 
602
 Edgar A. Poe to Lucian Minor, February 5, 1836, in Ostrom et al., Edgar Allan Poe, 1, 122-
23. 
603
 ibid., 241 note. 
604
 “[S]ince the dawn of history, there has been a constant accumulation and classifying of facts. 
But what is classification but the perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, 
but have a law which is also a law of the human mind? The astronomer discovers that geometry, a 
pure abstraction of the human mind, is the measure of planetary motion. The chemist finds 
proportions and intelligible method throughout matter; and science is nothing but the finding of 
analogy, identity, in the most remote parts. The ambitious soul sits down before each refractory fact; 
one after another, reduces all strange constitutions, all new powers, to their class and their law” . . . 
  
 
 
147 
quoted the views of French lawyer and politician Pierre–Franҫois Réal that confirm 
ancient history, though only a collection of anecdotes, is superior both to modern history 
manifest in philosophy, and romantic  narrative based on philosophy. All modern history 
is discursive, and all can be only coherently true. Things get even worse when a historian 
is dishonest, because to the dishonest, truth does not bend according to logic, it is thrown 
out “to make room for lies.”  As in F. Schlegel, the anecdotal, fragmentary history is the 
truest. Such histories are not causal: they are free from narrative romance form, and thus 
free from logic. Being isolated, they are more easily verifiable.
605
 Simms likewise 
continued criticizing romance symbolically in his border romances like Richard Hurdis 
(1838). Such narratives are incoherent instead of dialectic: Good and evil, civilization and 
nature, continue to co–exist. What is lacking is the bourgeois and capitalist individual vs. 
civilization scheme where nature is a resource for aesthetics, progress or Puritan manifest 
destiny. While Emerson was demanding from history individual mystic gnostic experience 
he identifies with “the common” and natural scientific presenting, Simms held on to the 
metonymic communal pattern even in the frontier.
606
 As Genovese has convincingly 
argued, southern cultural theory was free from the capitalist/romantic trope of an 
individual alienated.
607
 Unlike in novel liberal theories, existence was not reducible to the 
individual. But social relations were not abstract or discursively structural either. 
Similarly, from lack of emphasis on the individual did not follow socialism, but a more 
aristocratic individuality based on a metonymic whole, humanism and Christianity.  Not 
so in the North: Longfellow, who had criticized Poe as early as 1832, consciously 
abandoned Byron by 1839. New England poetry was turning Heaven, morals and 
historical–national progress as a theory of the maturity of man into metaphors.608 
Longfellow’s poetic prescription to be moral, take one’s time to study the rules wisely and 
listen to all ages and all people mixes democracy, anthropologism, Universalhistorie and 
Plato. Like Burckhardt, Poe had claimed the time of myth was irreplaceably behind in the 
age of science, but Longfellow proclaimed poetry progresses with history.
609
     
                                                                                                                                                   
“History and exact science he must learn by laborious reading.” Emerson, “The American Scholar,” 
accessed February 24, 2009, http://www.emersoncentral.com/amscholar.htm; Watkins “’Philosophy 
is the Only True Historian,’” 27. Ironically, Emerson’s proclamation has been hailed as America’s 
“Intellectual Declaration of Independence,” by the revered Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
605
 Anonymous [Pierre–Franҫois Réal] ”Thoughts on the Manner of Writing History,” trans. ?, 
repub. in Southern Literary Messenger 3 (1837): 156-57, citation on 156. 
606
 For Simms, see Nakamura, Visions of Order in William Gilmore Simms, 106-7. 
607
 Genovese, Southern Front, 66-67. The same was found in Simms. Nakamura, Visions of Order 
in William Gilmore Simms, 42. 
608
 Hovey, “Critical Provincialism,” 342, 344-46. 
609
 ibid., 346-47. For Burckhardt on myth, see Joseph Mali, Mythistory: The Making of a 
Modern Historiography (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 107-108, 121-28. 
  
 
 
148 
3.3.5 Prescott and his poetic and philosophical differences to southerners 
Like Bancroft, Prescott began by writing essays, reviews and articles. Of those published 
in the middle of the Civil War, all except one appeared in the North American Review.
610
 
He had trouble with eyesight.
611
  
In his first essay, Prescott embarks on a rigid search for authorial intention, 
complaining about the mass of poetry in the way. He declares Turpin’s chronicle is a 
“lying” one full of “ridiculous eccentricities.” Sacred topics cannot be ridiculed, yet this 
occurs even in supposedly moral works such as “the solemn deformities” of ancient 
French and English drama. Purci’s epic is a fraud and, though pious, “tainted with the 
same indecent familiarities.” Indecency is a bad thing and belongs not to modernity. 
Through parallelism, Prescott claims Byron is a modern representative of such disgusting 
tropics. He moralises Machiavelli on too frivolous pastime pursuits the latter failed to 
notice in him but did in others. English fiction and poetry serve utilitarian purposes of 
practical and religious truth as romance and metaphor. Most of Italian writing is not such: 
no useful information, no practical truth, no moral truth, no just portraits of character, no 
sound ethics, no wise philosophy. Some sonnets and canzone are “animated by an efficient 
spirit of religion or patriotism; but too frequently they are of a purely amatory nature, the 
unsubstantial though brilliant exhalations of a heated fancy.” “Our position” about this is 
just. Aesthetic sensibility to the beautiful has led Italians astray “from the substantial and 
the useful.” Rhetoric in history, “in this practical age,” is only used by an Italian for effect 
that misguides. Only recently, thanks to English literature, have Italians thankfully 
become more philosophical and grave. History is fully separate from fiction and contains 
truth, while fiction is the sphere of the imagination.  Among ancient historians, Tacitus is 
the most sententious.
612
 
Though “foundational” of Prescott’s textual career, strangely enough, only one recent 
scholar has paid attention to this piece to my knowledge.
613
 Already very early, in 1822 
before he had published anything of note, Prescott had been putting much emphasis on 
German theorists for several years. History was another point of focus. Disdain of Italy–a 
position in diametric contrast to Jefferson–closely follows Hegel’s argument, supplied by 
nationalist bass notes from Crévecoeur.
614
 No trace of the Charleston critics’ more subtle 
and sympathetic ponderings remains as to the status of medieval chronicles. Prescott 
                                                 
610
 William H. Prescott, preface to Biographical and Critical Miscellanies, by William H. 
Prescott, New ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1864), n.p. 
611
 “William H. Prescott,” last modified February 18, 2015, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_H._Prescott. 
612
 Prescott, “Italian Narrative Poetry,” repr. in Biographical and Critical Miscellanies, 423-24, 
430, 479-81, 482-83, 424, 481, citations on 423, 424, 480-81, 482. 
613
 K. P. Van Anglen, ”Before Longfellow: Dante and the Polarisation of New England,” Dante 
Studies 119 (2001): 155-86. 
614
 George Ticknor, ed., Life of William H. Prescott, Illustrated Cabinet Ed. (New York: Merrill 
and Baker, 1863), 64-65; Gerbi, Dispute of the New World, 430-431; de Crévecoeur, Letters from an 
American Farmer, “Letter I,” 6-8. 
  
 
 
149 
brazenly, if not arrogantly, looks at the Italian world through his interpretations of 
Madame de Staël’s German interpretations he refers to. That is, he knows before he 
knows. The Schillerian aesthetic divide is in place. The difference between the more 
nuanced, classicist, ironic and symbolic southerners is profound. Further, Prescott’s 
conduct is liable for ethical criticism in a metaphysical sense, because he refuses to 
accommodate Italian culture except for ethereal beauty, or the Middle Ages in other forms 
than the liberal and capitalist reason–understanding divide. Rapaport’s reading of 
Derrida’s “On an Apocalyptic Tone,” though discussing Christian eschatology, is 
illuminating in this context. Using irony, it names mystics those who believe in a neutral, 
objective and rational tone “since they unthoughtfully compress and focus textual effects 
which, in fact, cannot be easily disentangled from a metaphysical and theological contest 
of intuitions, postures, and styles.” The purity of modernity and history touted by Prescott 
are a problem, because unlike for southerners, translation is of no concern. Philosopher-
theologian Emmanuel Levinas notes language offers a respite for being and history. This 
is exactly contrary to Prescott, who thinks Italian tuneful language is insubstantial, 
deformed and “in heat” in contrast to the purity, decent and useful language of English. 
Derrida radicalizes Levinas: even tonal resonance is non–immediate, and the bundle of the 
tone is not homogenous or harmonious. Tonalities in the bundle “exist only in proximity 
to one another, a proximity which reveals itself as other, as from an other place.” An 
apocalyptic tone cannot be known or calculated in advance. Apart from its blendedness, 
noisiness and dissonance are its second characteristic. For Prescott, dis–sonance is shelved 
away as ethereal and immoral beauty in the apparatus of mind run by reason. It enforces a 
univocal tone. For Derrida, the question is how the detection of the “bundle–ness” of voice 
is a threat for reasoned voice’s metaphysics and thus reaches, in a condition of a man’s 
and philosophy’s end, from beyond epistemology and history. This recognition “takes 
place outside, beyond or exterior” to man as a historical man on a timeline of past 
knowledge and future foreknowledge.
615
 As with southerners, such an existence knows 
itself beyond metaphor and romance and thus deconstructs history in/as temporality. It is 
an outside discourse many southern theorists glimpsed but Prescott missed.  
Another southern resource–the classicist freedom and openness outside Plato’s 
transcendence and especially Neoplatonism (chapter 2)–also vanishes. Greek/pagan vision 
and visibility involve distance, while dazzling light involves presence, tactility, 
immediacy, a primary belonging to Other that goes beyond theory, as in case of Emerson. 
All certainty was visibility–based for Greeks, and for many southerners. But for Prescott, 
hearing comes first, and a correct hearing at that. Hearing predetermines, puts into 
question or surpasses, seeing for Judaism and Christianity.
616
 Ironically, Prescott 
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concludes in his next published essay that English language gives most freedom for 
“entering into the spirit of foreign letters.”617  
About the same time, 1825, Prescott shows knowledge of Bancroft’s fresh translation 
of Heeren. In a letter, he has already inserted the tropes of Universalhistorie into place. 
His hatred for Italian history continued: its antiquities were “barren” and “latent.” What he 
wanted was “to embrace the gift of the Spanish subject, without involving myself in the 
unwieldy, barbarous records of a thousand years.” This was a very presentist approach to 
history. His topics could include “reigns,” “Constitutions,” “exploits,” “ discovery,” 
“policy,” his epistemological concerns “causes” and his genre “romance as well as 
history.” Resorting to Bancroft’s Heeren, Prescott maintains the age of Ferdinand 
“contain[ed] the germs of the modern system of European politics.” Further, “the three 
sovereigns . . . were important engines in overturning the old system.” He noted in 1847: 
“This was the first germ of my conception of Ferdinand and Isabella.”618 Here we have 
another American romantic Heeren. Not too much erudition or philology, rhetoric or 
figural analysis: what count are “the gift” and “the germ,” political science that helps 
history be a science.  
Accordingly, history is a science for him in his review of Irving’s Conquest of 
Granada in 1829.
619
 This work was yet another romance history posing as true history.
620
 
Prescott boldly declares ancient historians were mere amusers who “filled their pictures 
with dazzling and seductive images,” they seldom reflected–apparently, idealist–liberal 
philosophy is now a must–and “bestowed infinite pains on the costume, the style of their 
history, and, in fine, made everything subordinate to the main purpose of conveying an 
elegant and interesting narrative.” Herodotus, Livy, early chroniclers all were such. 
Prescott mixes to this the Universalhistorie trope of infancy–maturity of nationhood. 
Usefulness is bound to Christianity without question, and the poetic is strictly within its 
separate sphere. Historians have “theorems” and probability, a victory for philosophy 
more than a loss for poetry. Utilitarian science is possible only now, science of 
government, political science and education. 16th century historians like Mariana were 
“most incompetent chroniclers” because not cosmopolitans, and wrongly educated. Their 
narratives are useless, because they are distorted by prejudice and credulity unlike Italian 
renaissance historians who were public men and eyewitnesses. Of the moderns, Voltaire 
was not a good historian: though he advocated freedom from prejudice, he was skeptical 
and implied chance controlled the world. Voltaire’s new revolution in historical presenting 
is artificial, but it helps the expeditious reader “to arrive more expeditiously at the results, 
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for which alone history is valuable” while the Voltairean model gave more power to the 
historian as to certainty and facility. Prescott applauds Montesquieu precisely because he 
left history, i.e., facts, out for theorems that can only serve as ingredients for its “spirit,” 
though the results of this method turned out questionable and politically charged 
hypotheses. He finally discourages skepticism he finds in Gibbon–otherwise a good 
narrative historian free from theorems, apart from his rhetoric and anti–Puritan views. One 
needs a sympathetic hero for history that gets approached with warmth as fits a Christian–
the American desideratum.
621
 Again with rich unconscious irony, he speaks of 
“independence” in history and “sap and vitality,” ignoring his own desire to gather only 
the fruits he likes and as he likes them.
622
  
This essay was influential among southern thinkers of and writers about history as well 
(chapters 4, 5, 6). However, it is anachronistically romantic and lacks sophistication in 
comparison to other southern views. Prescott reduces history and its relationship with 
other arts to his version of Romanticism. Further, besides his prescription history matters 
only for its useful results, Prescott seems fully ignorant of the philosophical difference 
between cosmopolitan history and Universalhistorie. As O’Brien counters, rhetoric was 
not antithetical in the former, but “a discursive adjunct to the construction of narrative.”623 
Prescott mixes cosmopolitan history and Universalhistorie, a category mistake in this 
sense, and argues against politicized history while openly supporting liberalized history, a 
contradiction. Such “philosophical history” would take into account “system adopted  . . . 
for the administration of . . . colonies,” “regulation of trade,” “moral and political 
consequences of the discovery of America,” “genius, social institutions, and civil polity.” 
In Prescott’s dichotomy, narrative history as a harmonious romance is different from a 
philosophical history of theorems.
624
 His reasoning resembles more Bancroft’s take on 
Hegel than the cosmopolitans because of his liberal–Christian apriorism. These Yankees 
insist on meaning that is necessarily within a postulated metaphysical and paradigmatic 
process of history that Niebuhr, Kant, most historists and the cosmopolitans lacked.
625
 If 
Bancroft’s approach was narrow to southerners, Prescott’s seems even more so in this 
setting. For Prescott, romance history is already one big canvas, only in need of revival of 
the colours–a notable difference to Simms’s Faber. But he treats romance history 
condescendingly, a contention he would later radicalize as I explore below.
626
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Late in 1837, Prescott published his History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. At 
the outset, he proclaims the value of history is dependent on its materials. We encounter 
Fontenelle’s rigor: “I have endeavored to present [the reader] with such an account of the 
state of affairs, both before the accession, and at the demise of the Catholic sovereigns, as 
might afford him the best points of view for surveying the entire results of their reign.” 
And later: “The present and the following chapter will embrace the mental progress of the 
kingdom . . . in order to exhibit as far as possible its entire results, at a single glance, to the 
eye of the reader.” Like Wirt, he confesses only after the event could he understand the 
difficulty of his goal and, like Martin, is fully conscious of his indadequacies. But instead 
of simple good faith in his sources as in Martin, he at least is exempt from party spirit or 
nationalism–a dubious claim–as he confesses being honest and in sympathy with the 
principal actors.  
The Bostonians’ (chapter 2) and Heeren’s clear dichotomy between civilized and 
barbaric in history is again in place: in the problem with his sight, the process with the 
work had become irksome for him and his assistant, at least “till my ear accommodated to 
foreign sounds, and an antiquated, oftentimes barbarous phraseology, when my progress 
became sensible, and I was cheered with the prospect of success.” Similarly, the 
manuscripts contained “doubtful orthography and defiance of all punctuation.” Even after 
the publishing of the book, he refers to it as “a work filled with facts dug out of barbarous 
and obsoelete idioms.” With further richly unconscious irony, he quotes Johnson that loss 
of sight in historical research compels one to seek for more skilful and attentive help than 
it is usually possible to obtain. The irony, bordering on hypocrisy, is that Prescott’s own 
attitude seems not very respectful despite such necessary help: the tonal and semiotic 
biases linger beside the metaphysical bias. Yet, the worst thing would have been if 
blindness had led him on to a path to literature and aesthetics. Thus, Prescott seems 
sincerely to think his work is free from poetics despite lack of sight, i.e., lack of 
empiricism. This judgment is stronger than Heeren’s commitment, resembling positivism 
in its hostility to metaphysics. Paradoxically, almost in the next sentence we read how on 
this path God finally had restored his eyes sufficiently for him to conduct his studies more 
effectively. As in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740), Prescott believes his tortuous 
journey is awarded with added truth against criticism. This already is deeply metaphysical 
and betrays his deep confusion with the philosophes and Heeren: Diderot’s Jack the 
Fatalist was one representative that showed one cannot seriously have the cake and eat it 
too in a mechanist–naturalistic human thought Prescott’s epistemic ideal pertains to.627 
But as a result of his catachretic confusion between cosmopolitan history and 
Universalhistorie, he still insists official documents “we are accustomed to regard as the 
surest foundations of history.” Emerson’s message had got him. To be sure, in this 
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instance there is serious and quite astute and honest skepticism about constructing a 
historical narrative.
628
 But Prescott simply refuses to draw skeptical conclusions from it: 
we can still “receive with full confidence” private contemporary correspondence “which, 
from its very nature, is exempt from most of the restraints and affectations incident more 
or less to every work destined for the public eye.” These messages “come like the voice of 
departed years” and when they are linked to authorial personal observation, their value is 
inestimable: instead of showing simply the result, “they lay open the internal workings of 
the machinery” so we “enter into” the minds of the writers. The only problem is 
interruptions in the causal link, but this only happens when not “designed” for historical 
uses.
629
 This analogy comes almost straight from Fontenelle.
630
 But now added is 
neoplatonic metaphysics that emanate probably from Transcendentalism: despite 
interruptions, the sources “shed so strong a light as materially to aid us in groping our way 
through the darker and more perplexed passages of the story.”631 Like in Emerson’s 
relation to Neoplatonism, light engulfs the being of the sources. We can perceive an 
analogy with his assistant: though he insists on aid, the sources are transformed and 
reduced–without a problem or respect to their difference–to aid his own ends. History as 
political science for Prescott is akin to the 17th century natural science: both are 
epistemologically grounded in Descartes. For example, he speaks of the necessity of 
“completing the view” to “show [the administration’s] operation on the intellectual culture 
of the nation” that constitutes “a principal end of all government [and] should never be 
altogether divorced from any history” and uses a lot of empirical terms such as survey and 
“map of history.”632 Prescott valorizes causality (“circumstances which immediately led to 
these results”), “germ” and especially “institutions”–it appears in the singular or in the 
plural almost 80 times–and history is capitalized in reference to his own work.633 In sum, 
he follows the footsteps of Heeren and cohesively connects history, science, liberalism, 
Christian morals, government and the state. To this Prescott then tries to fit his demand for 
voice on his terms, for his own ends, to give credence for his quasi–Hegelian metaphysics.  
The Christian–civilized–liberal judging continued: for instance, the literary world of 
John II was “an elegant culture,” conducted “on more scientific principles than had been 
hitherto known.” However, accidential outpourings of fine sentiment in its products–done 
without any design–were dearly purchased “in the more extended pieces, at the expense of 
such a crude mass of grotesque and undigested verse, as shows an entire ignorance of the 
principles of the art.” The late–15th century was a “miserable medley of hypocrisy and 
superstition,” a corrupt age of European courts whose politics were so characterised.634 In 
addition, Prescott may be the first American historian to dichotomise between history, or 
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his catachretic construction of it, and romance. It is the former “philosophical spirit” that 
gives life to such a history as his.
635
 However, even about this he is internally inconsistent: 
history can only be Cartesian knowledge of what is “natural and obvious” in humans who 
follow natural laws and have principles grounded in nature. But, it must not be 
philosophical, because romance lies that way.
636 
 His rhetoric about minds, machineries, 
complete view, or his focus on political science, correct voice and Christian liberalism 
now have nothing philosophical about them. Though admitting Universalhistorie can be 
joined using historical fiction and romance, these have only added to confusion and error. 
Ironically, he contradicts himself even here: he insists fiction writers represent “shining 
qualities” and “dazzling” descriptions of Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordova [sic!] but seems 
blind to his own neoplatonic metaphors. He anachronistically praises Córdoba, whose 
character “might be said to have been formed after a riper period of civilization than the 
age of chivalry” because he “had none of the nonsense of that age,–its fanciful vagaries, 
reckless adventure, and wild romantic gallantry”: Córdoba was prudent, cool, had steady 
purposiveness and intimate knowledge of men. Chivalry was about cruelty and 
licentiousness. Prescott hoists up Córdoba’s prudent sexual morals as a virtue as if brought 
by a time machine from New England to the 16th century and gathered around him the 
most “enlightened and virtuous” friends in the community. Thus, the New England 
preference for character instead of chivalry in the form of letters is effortlessly stamped on 
Córdoba and filled with New England content.
637
 In addition, Prescott loves to moralize 
and politicize about history heavily without a problem.
638
 Yet, “history has no warrant to 
tamper with right and wrong, or to brighten the character of its favorites by diminishing 
one shade of the abhorrence which attaches to their vices. They should be rather held up in 
their true deformity, as the more conspicuous from the very greatness with which they are 
associated.” Prescott believes, like Fontenelle, his account is the true one while holding, 
incongruously enough, that history is discursive.
639
 Otherwise it would be hard to explain 
this. 
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3.3.5.1 The southern reception 
Prescott’s history was a stunning success. The North American Review spent no less than 
ninety pages on it at its publishing. According to Prescott himself, it received 
unconditional praise at home and abroad.
640
 However, not a single copy of the first edition 
was shipped to the South–the Other from “home”–“the publishers not choosing to strip the 
market while they can find such demand here [in New England].” Prescott doubted the 
book would get as warm a welcome in the South.
641
  
The attention paid to the book in the South was lukewarm at best. In the Messenger a 
very short review by Thomas W. White, who had replaced Poe as editor, appeared soon 
after the second edition came out. Interestingly, it was practically silent about the work’s 
pros and cons as history or as literature. It promised a more complete review that 
apparently never appeared.
642
 Full quiet lasted year and a half in the Messenger and should 
be listened to. To me, the silence tells of the differences southerners continued to have 
about history. It was broken by a northerner very briefly in a criticism of Boston letters 
Prescott was exempt from, mixed with nationalism about the rise and progress of 
American letters.
643
  
Only in 1841, more than three years later, came more words of praise. However, even 
this was mainly in the form of a single individual, Severn Teackle Wallis, a noted Spain 
specialist in Maryland and a good acquaintance to fellow–Whigs Wirt and Kennedy.644 
The context of the praise is very interesting as to criticism of history. Wallis roundly 
criticized the distortions of the cottage industry of romance around Spain and Spanish 
culture in American letters and history.
645
 This industry was pretty much the creation of 
respected northern authors and poets and a New England creature, with Ticknor leading 
the way.
646
 But neither did he subscribe to the condemnation of Spain that was modish in 
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New England education.
647
 More SW than WW, Wallis accepted Prescott’s philosophy of 
history by praising it as “those glorious events, which gave a new world . . . to civilization 
and freedom.”648 However, Wallis exhibits strong influences of WW that suggest it had 
spread to WAE: the focus was not on the Montesquieu–type of history any longer, but on 
discursive source criticism of history. Though insisting on the nationalism of American 
letters Prescott furthered, Wallis also practiced alert metahistorical functional–rhetoric 
criticism of Irving that, he claims, was totally unheard of in the northern media and 
northern institutions such as education. Wallis contends Irving was actually only 
allegorizing the much more industrious work of Spanish historian Martín Fernández de 
Navarrete without giving the latter adequate recognition. This “leads the mind of the 
American reader, to a notion of independence and originality which do not exist.” As a 
text critic, he comes to the side of the ironic symbolists by chiding northern educators for 
simply believing in what is written and romancing the rest. Such “ardor of State 
enthusiasm” that was uncritical and “resorted to imagination for facts” leaves out the 
erudition of philological literary criticism. In addition to “circulars, newspapers, and 
legislative reports,” even Bancroft, who should by profession know better, joins the 
distortions.
649
 Wallis also criticizes the North American Review’s and the American 
Quarterly’s depiction of Spanish history and historians.650  
This indicates the southern upholding of Kantian ethos and Nietzschean praxis in 
history that was at odds with the new Yankee take on Universalhistorie.
651
 Indicative of 
Wallis’s aversion of German Romanticism is the less spatial metaphor of sculpting instead 
of painting about history.
652
 The greatest difference to Nietzsche is in Wallis’s idealistic 
hope that America could be free from such muddied European waters. This showed his 
Whig WAE roots still lingered.
653
 However, he becomes more pessimistic about this in the 
second article, entertaining the possibility, close to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, that the 
whole–especially northern and romantic–“liberal spirit” is fallacious. He finally backs 
away from this in ways comparable to European critics of modernity. Wallis even predates 
Charles Beard almost a century in his pessimistic remarks about commerce as a value in 
American history.
654
 Prescott’s effort is just since besides being a resource to American 
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nationalism, he gives credit to Navarrete and is a more critical historical scholar than the 
romancers, the masses and the institutions that follow the depictions.
655
  
A shame Wallis apparently had only stopped at rigorous methodology and not read 
close into Prescott’s covert questionable ethics considering Spain. For instance, while 
Prescott had fully discredited Mariana’s history, Wallis enthused it was “conceded by all 
the world to be a classic,” a “full history.”656 Important for me is Wallis’s ontological 
astuteness and institutional critique that “knowledge” in a romantic mode may turn out to 
be unethical though posing as educational and moral.
657
  Like Simms, Wallis reminds that 
“[e]very nation, like every individual, has its moments of elevation and depression, of trial 
and weakness and sin.” Wallis points out generalizing out of negative stereotypes must be 
avoided in education. It already had been common in America at least since Goodrich the 
moralist whose “pictorial geography” and its utilitarian valorisation–the pinnacle of the 
alliance of SAE and romance in education–is quoted as a prime example.658 He notes 
besides the conflation of literature to civilization, Emerson’s brother Joseph meddled in 
such racist depictions of history in education.
659
 Noah Webster’s friend Jedediah Morse 
had already established this about Spain.
660
 Emerson’s older brother William was a 
Göttingen graduate who had studied under Johann Blumenbach,
661
 the major advocate of 
racism. Wallis also condemns the hypocrisy of religion in New England against Native 
Americans and their cruel treatment.
662
 He shows an equal perception to Simms in his 
strong criticism of the American romance of the frontier as being illusory.
663
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The role of Spain as a socially dialectical antithesis of history to America was 
inaugurated by Prescott as a topos. Its power was formidable: it was philosophically 
perpetuated, astonishingly, more than a century, to the late–1960s, by the Yankees and the 
establishment of historical profession,
664
 illuminating the extent of critical dearth as to its 
“foundations.” It is important to observe a difference to this philosophy of history having 
existed in the South.  
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4. Beginnings of erosion of southern difference about 
history and historiography: discussion in Virginia, 1838–
1844 
In this chapter, my focus is on Virginia’s historical discussion around 1840. Compared to 
the others, the chapter is shorter in length. The motive is to better highlight a series of 
dramatic contrasts.  
The first contrast is across New England and the South at levels of institutions and 
poetics that pertained to history, philosophy and poetics. In the first locale, the German 
renaissance continued to increase in strength, because it was compatible with SAE. What 
was new was the application of this dyad to institutions, social ontology, and poetics. In 
the South, this turn to Idealism was much less appreciated for a long time. To the contrary, 
as I shall examine, it was rebuked–at least as social ontology and poetics–by undermining 
modern philosophy and northern moralism itself. The pressing issue was slavery, but the 
underlying philosophical issue was the weight German Idealism added to the rationalist–
scientific–religious cocktail about history and society: it pushed these folks, previously 
sympathetic to SAE, away.   
The second contrast is within Virginia: on the one hand, German philosophy had still 
penetrated the place very little. I shall pause to examine more a Virginia graduate, 
educator George E. Dabney about history as an example. Even internationally, Dabney’s 
views were alien to the historical scene by this time, but they demonstrate how historiality 
practiced at the university (chapter 2) was carried into historiography. Noteworthy is how 
Dabney entrusts women to deal with history better, a scandalous estimate in the bourgeois 
and Victorian world order. Philosophically, it reaches out to Nietzsche and Derrida. But on 
the other hand, the marriage of history and German romantic theory entered the discussion 
as well. This was a result of one individual–in ethos and life, far more northern and 
cosmopolitan– Jane Tayloe Lomax. It was the ironically obscure Lomax–female writer, 
musician and poet in oblivion, and at birth a Virginian–who youthfully introduced in more 
depth the new, up–to–date romantic philosophy of history to the southern discussion 
(chapter 6). Interestingly, Lomax’s poetics represent vertigo about her changes of place. 
For this reason as well, she is an illustrative figure to examine.  
A third question, between these two antithetical forces, emerges when I examine 
Dabney in context of contemporary U.S. history. On the one hand, the philosophical and 
poetic differences about history are nationally striking. On the other hand, the difference 
to VHPS about history (chapter 3) is discussed. VHPS began to exert a strong pull for 
other folks toward northern–German historical theory and cosmopolitan history as an 
imperialist discourse (chapters 2, 5). 
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4.1 History as educator and the overlap of social ontology and 
poetics compared  
As we saw, Federalist emphasis in the field of education and its language theories were 
not in conflict with SAE, American historiography, American romance, or 
Transcendentalism that combined to produce a solid “American way” to look at history. 
As Bancroft had demonstrated, being a Democrat was also not objectionable (chapter 3). 
Thus Callcott is able to pronounce that after the mid–1820s when Bancroft and his liberal–
democratic ideals first emerged, history in education–I would insist northern education–
was first and foremost “to buttress certain accepted truths.” More specifically, this history 
was grounded in ideals, the Gnosticism especially the Virginia critics questioned (chapter 
2). History was “to reveal and prove such ideals as morality, God, progress, American 
superiority and democracy–absolute truths which men believed in beyond the shadow of a 
pragmatic doubt, principles around which they could safely and deliberately arrange the 
facts of history.”665 In the number of history books published for education, the preference 
of American history over any other history, especially ancient history, peaked in the 1830s 
and after this, books on modern history increased at least 600 % in the 1840s. The rise of 
nationalistic historiography was done at the expense of the classical world in the 1830s, 
but the situation was restored to roughly equal attention in the 1840s and 1850s.
666
 As 
romance had taught, that virtue would triumph over vice was a certainty. History would 
only illustrate this with facts chosen for the worthy purpose. All the other facts would be 
cast aside, and probably were not facts in any case. In accordance with northern literary 
criticism (chapter 2), history was not about mulling over it critically, but instead about 
developing character. “And by fortifying in all men the ideals which society accepted to 
be right and good, thereby all society would be elevated.”667 
To this theory, SAE linked conveniently: encouraged by the revisionist interpretations 
of the Declaration Bancroft had helped popularize, northern SAE grounded egalitarian 
social policies in reason as a mixture of rationalism and idealism.
668
 Finally, the aesthetic 
aspect of history was about rational amusement.
669
 In education, this evangelical side was 
now softened and linked to romantic “natural” desire to fill a civilized individual student 
up with warm, elevating, wise knowledge. As German Idealism had had it, everyone 
naturally approached history philosophically and, indeed, to know and think along these 
lines was now an a priori necessity. Wise melancholy about life was its end product.
670
 
Curiously, the German side of such cultural poetics in relation to history has not been 
researched although idealist thought and art was dynamic, optimistic and collective–
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Hegelian key themes
671–in the North. In addition, it had a decisive impact on the South. 
The Genoveses maintain southerners were aware of the dubious German connection 
among the transcendentalists and the group’s insufficient knowledge of it. A noted 
southern scholarly publication, the Southern Quarterly Review (6.2.2), even actively 
censored philosophically idealist articles in the 1840s and 1850s.
672
 The historical aspect–
the most related one for me–has, still, been ignored.  
Hegel’s power grew in the North in the 1840s. A full–scale Hegelian Idealism 
launched in Pennsylvania education circles from 1840, became positively received at 
Yale, and received well by intellectual Orestes Brownson, the foremost Kant scholar 
among the transcendentalists.
673
 Ironically, any historical criticism in the North was 
conducted only within this framework. Despite Prescott, New England was still not ready 
for even such a discursive approach in 1842. For Parker for instance, early church history 
was a romance: a confirmation of specific truths he already knew a priori.
674
 In other 
words, SAE precluded a need for a discursive history. But, as I argued (chapters 2, 3), 
Neoplatonism was not outside history for Emerson for example, nor was history outside 
Neoplatonism in Bancroft and Prescott. Rather, it combined with Idealism. In the mid–
1840s Emerson explicitly hooked up Hegel with Proclus, the major neoplatonic source for 
the group (chapter 2), on the one hand, and the theory of evolution as history already 
familiar to Bancroft and great many New Englanders, on the other hand, to underpin a 
dialectic of history. Thus, I disagree with Wellek that Emerson thought Hegel was 
contained in Germany.
675
 Pochmann counters the Idealism–evolution dyad was also found 
in New York in 1848 in a book by scientist J. B. Stallo. The book made Emerson dwell 
even more in German philosophy, especially Friedrich von Schelling and Hegel, going 
beyond Coleridge and lured by the prevailing Zeitgeist. By decade’s end, Emerson 
engaged Hegel seriously through Schelling. The transcendentalist magazine The Dial even 
had a correspondent of sorts in Germany by 1842.
676
 
Stallo was a part of Cincinnati group of Hegelians, a colony of Hegel enthusiasts in 
Ohio.
677
 Though this group may have been the first coherent–but often overlooked–
Hegelian group in America,
678
 the influx of Idealism was not confined to it. Parker 
                                                 
671
 Ernst Gombrich, “’The Father of Art–History’: On the Influence of Hegel,” in The Symbolic 
Order: A Contemporary Reader On The Arts Debate, ed. Peter Abbs (Taylor & Francis e–Library, 
2005), 86. 
672
 Fox–Genovese and Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class, 574 and note 19. 
673
 The first Hegelian work appeared in Pennsylvania in 1841. Clemmer, “Historical 
Transcendentalism in Pennsylvania,” 583-87; Wellek, “Minor Transcendentalists and German 
Philosophy,” 659. On Brownson, see ibid., 673, passim. 
674
 Clemmer, “Historical Transcendentalism in Pennsylvania,” 589. 
675
 Wellek, “Emerson and German Philosophy,” 56-58. 
676
 Pochmann, German Culture in America, 194-95, 199, 197. 
677
 CO2, 1053. 
678
 Loyd David Easton, Hegel’s First American Followers: The Ohio Hegelians: John B Stallo, 
Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, and August Willich, with Key Writings (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1966). 
  
 
 
162 
continued to be interested in German thinking and misread Kant by way of Marsh and 
Emerson that reason is superior to understanding and a primordial gateway to revealed 
religion. Even Brownson refused to go beyond Carlyle’s interpretation. Idealism still had a 
great effect on him: Brownson converted to Catholicism in 1844.
679
 As I will explore 
(chapters 5, 6), Catholic faith was an additional entry point of Idealism as history in 
America. Hedge’s translations of Schelling’s German lecture680 and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte
681
 appeared in The Dial at the period as well.  
For example philosopher Theodor W. Adorno claims Hegel’s relevance cannot just be 
shelved away. Rather, it needs to be met head–on as a vast interconnecting totality of 
commitments about bourgeois society’s fundamental contradictories as a universal and 
dynamic principle that, unlike in Kant and Niebuhr for example, was at work in and as 
history. Hegel’s diagnosis turned the tables on southern society’s preference for 
metonymy, rank and dynamic communal–bodily but still un–idealized presence by 
elevating the discontinuity of every individuated part necessarily “aboard” one big 
reflection.
682
 Further, both the transcendentalists (chapter 3)
683
 and Hegel were very 
concerned about truth as a Platonic totality so that every subject got its identity 
deductively from the absolute.
684
 An organicist, “philosophized” society in which every–
one is theoretically mutually identical both within themselves and with each other–but 
where the “unreconcilable violence” of such thinking in practice is quietly tucked away–is 
what southerners certainly refused in history, philosophy and semiotics. But such a society 
is one that has, ironically from their viewpoint, prevailed as a bourgeois and (post)statist 
system Hegel foresaw, largely due to liberalism.  
The South was not a society reducible to ideology and discourse, because these, 
Adorno maintains, entail a “philosophized” society685 where A and B are de–ontologized 
or, in history, de–historialised, to the “same level” of thought and History. As we recall, 
especially historiality was far from a romantic conception of history as a totality of 
interrelated parts. In historiality, the parts are not unified as history: there is no scientific 
method, nor philosophy, to ground the logic of development. Rather, spatial linearisations 
are fictions of a logos–driven–I would add pantheist–Christian–process.686 Thus, if 
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southernerns were wary about modern history that had SAE as extreme manifestation 
(chapter 2), historiality is related to southern historiography as scientific rhetoric of 
spatiality that has corresponding shifts and conflict in semiotics, aesthetics and 
philosophy. 
Poetically, this represents a slide away both from Byronic tragic existence and more 
vulgar social existence that, critically for me, still flourished in the South in ways that are 
comparable to antidemocratic polemic of poet Alexander Pope.
687
 The aim was now more 
refined, urban and moral reductionism to reason. In other words, the march of mind 
(chapter 2) as the transition from concrete and dynamic communal–libertarian presence to 
more roundabout and abstract way of social thinking was for southerners more 
problematic and tragic than northerners and leading western thought.  
This change was noted even at Yale. In a discussion between “Pulito,” “Nescio” and 
“Tristo,” Pulito makes a distinction between moralizing poetics and tragic poetics in 
reactions of two brothers to their mother’s death. The first brother who has kept on the 
path of “moral rectitude” draws comfort from his meekness and has a metaphorical belief 
comparable to Cowper that he may yet reunite with his mother and recuperate the loss. 
The second, who has been constantly “making wider and wider deviations” from this path, 
undergoes a melancholy of remorse that has no such hope, only pain and tragedy. To him, 
memory protracts, it does not alleviate. Suckling and Byron are the poets who express his 
feelings. Nescio points out Byron’s poetic powers are gone, because he is not moral. 
Tristo corrects him and tells that immorality is not incompatible with poetic intellect. To 
the contrary, “a pure and unsophisticated character was essential to the enjoyment of this 
faculty in one’s self, or as displayed by others.” Nescio observes Tristo has “a higher idea 
of the value and interest and influence of poetry than is current now.” So, not only has 
tragic poetics almost vanished in the North, Nescio even ends up supporting a utilitarian, 
audience–oriented “everyday” reading of poetics. Such reading would be popular among 
the masses and would reject both Romanticism and tragedy instead of didactic, masses–
oriented marketplace.
688
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In terms of language theory and figuration, even the northern minority outside 
Emerson’s “realistic mysticism” included just this bias toward morality. Alexander Bryan 
Johnson was a New Yorker willing to modify Emerson’s account. He explicitly worried 
that language is threatening to suck life out of things as a result of Emerson’s sterility 
regarding the signifier–signified relation. Reversing Emerson’s “ultraformalism,” Johnson 
held that physical existence is far greater and more truthful than signs and, reminiscent of 
Saussure and modernism, even held that signs configure a sort of formal prisonhouse 
where signifier and signified could never join. However, he was unwilling to follow this 
discovery to the end: instead, he grounded Scripture in the positive or at least affirmative 
feeling in the mind for example the word “God” generated. This feeling would then unite, 
as in conventional metaphor, “God” with truth. It was the same with other words.689 I 
would call this “positive Lockeanism” about language, since it locates truth in the 
empirical mind without settling on Humean skepticism. In contrast, many, if not most, 
southerners had accepted Hume for decades on the irreconciliability between language and 
mind (chapter 2). 
Despite their strictness about history in the person of King by 1843
690
 that still was not 
hostile to humanism, more to the contrary, southern SAE representatives protested against 
northern reason–guided social policy on ontological and ethical grounds. They included 
powerful South Carolina theologian–philosopher James Henley Thornwell. Strikingly, like 
Heidegger, Thornwell undermined the basis of modern philosophy on Aristotelian 
grounds. Cartesian, empiricist and German idealist philosophies all fared poorly compared 
to Aristotle. Modern speculation is a reduction to consciousness. It confounds “thought 
with existence, reality with knowledge” where “the laws of thought [are made] the 
regulative and constitutive principles of being.” Closely paralleling Heidegger, Thornwell 
argues human Being (person in his vocabulary), like God, is irreducible to thinking and 
representation. Thornwell goes further than Heidegger towards Kant: substance and force 
(power in his vocabulary) are similarly irreducible. Thornwell maintains that there is an 
absolute difference between separate Beings that is analogous to the difference between 
Being and God.
691
 He explains: 
There is the subject knowing, and the object known. A man believes his own existence 
only in believing the existence of somewhat that is distinct from himself. He affirms his 
personality in contrast with another and a different reality . . . An absolute Being [i.e., the 
Hegelian Absolute] cannot be a person. The God of Pantheism cannot say, " I will " or " I 
know"—and the notion of such a being ever reaching the stage of what the absolute 
philosophers call self–consciousness is a flagrant contradiction in terms. When subject and 
object are identified, there can be no consciousness, no knowledge. When they are carried 
up to indifference, the result is personal extinction.  
ibid., 495, 496. 
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Being is different from just any individuality: will, conscience and intelligence distinguish 
Being from other individualities of nature, such as trees and animals. Resembling 
Heidegger, Thornwell thinks proper morals and property grounded in morality are 
uniquely what belong to one, but cannot be reduced to will. Rather, equilibrium between 
will, intelligence and responsibility must be kept and cannot be analytically separated 
within Being.
692
 In sum, Thornwell not only rejected the organicist metaphysics that 
underpinned modern history and Idealism–theologically, it was pantheist to him–he also 
questioned individuality that manifests as free rational mind that modern philosophy 
presupposed. 
I believe the vast majority of historians have taken the side of reason as northern SAE 
had it in the debate, because such an interpretation of reason is on the side of antislavery 
social policy. However, as I have argued, the question is not quite that simple
693
 in a 
critical and figural historical analysis in the southern context. Though reason and 
knowledge appear to be universal necessities for morality, indeed for thinking in context 
of history after Hegel, such a priori stand fails to address actors, groups, functions of 
societies and relations that somehow contest this metaphysics. Elements in southern 
societies in Virginia and South Carolina had a very different dynamic of communication 
and history that still, as of yet, has not been greatly investigated. This is one such instance. 
Southerners, at least in Virginia, were still much more preoccupied with Byronic tragedy 
and simplicity of mind that did not seamlessly connect with urban bourgeois 
sophistication. This protean, almost Nietzschean existence has not been followed up. 
Many southerners joined poet John Suckling’s lines the Yale dialogue quotes: “Our sins, 
like to our shadows / When our day is in its glory, scarce appeared: Towards our evening 
how great and monstrous / They are!”694 
4.2 Views about history in Virginia around 1840: General 
As a whole, WW still continued to hold German Romanticism relatively at bay about 
history in Virginia. No work based on, or notably inspired by, even neohumanism 
appeared on the pages of the Messenger by a southern male writer who lived in the South 
at this period.  
Anonymous reported late in 1838 that Virginia still did not appreciate romance or 
romantic literature. Politics, in accordance with the classical republican model, continued 
paramount. The writer is aware that such literature is considered too feminine. “The object 
of belles–lettres, however, is not to reduce strong sense, but to give it the amount of polish 
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which it may be able to sustain, and to adapt the style of mental execution to that field of 
intellect” called the political arena. Thus, romance was something that diluted force–
presumably including corporeal force–that the ancients and Machiavelli upheld (chapter 
2). The writer complains Virginians approach literature in the manner of cosmopolitan 
history (chapter 3)–as a mixture of science and rhetoric–and thus with skepticism. The 
author regrets that they did not care for romancing about history by way of Irving and, 
unlike him, had put no privilege on the precious original historical sources. The writer 
notes the continued strong English influence across Virginia’s culture, “and this is the 
more to be wondered at, when we recollect that republican views of government have 
been universal.” Interestingly the author confuses utilitarianism with republicanism, which 
would suggest a disconnection from the classics.
695
  
A year later “C. C.” noted there was no American hero worship in Virginia through 
romance, the key ingredient in northern histories and endorsed by the more professional 
ones (chapter 3). Though appreciating Europe, Virginians simply did not reflect on their 
own history. Thus, “in the excitements of the present, we forget the lessons of the past.” 
Though the context C. C. refers to is politics, such living in the present was something else 
from refined, urban and morally conscientious both the bourgeoisie and religion 
advocated. C. C. champions precisely what Nietzsche, the ancients, Legaré and Poe in 
their different ways cautioned against: fleeing to the ideal, becoming more “warm,” 
bourgeois and romantic: “let us quit the arena of strife and repair to the sequestered haunt 
of the muses; let us fly the poisoned chalice of rancor and animosity and hatred, and taste 
that purer banquet of nectar and ambrosia that lies neglected around us.” Yet, ironically 
enough, C. C.’s own approach to history is a mixture of rhetoric and natural history. This 
he suffuses with Swift–like mixtures of popular and refined language and, following a 
topos of Weems’s (chapter 2), an approving quotation from Scottish poet Tobias 
Smollett.
696
 C. C. notes the English and aristocratic tendencies prevail in Virginia, though 
the latter is on the decline due to republican liberty, and still disapproves romance writing 
(“the press teems with myriads of ephemeral fictions”), comparing it to bubbles. To this 
he juxtaposes a half–mocking worry about Virginia’s mouldering historical documents. 
Making an explicit reference to the decadence of Virginia’s religious state, C. C. states 
Virginia lacks a “religious care” to its past that could, and perhaps should, be altered by 
changing the historical attitude. However, his own essay is richly ironic since its title “The 
History of Virginia” is a supposedly grave, solemn topic while his figurations about it are 
satirical, even sarcastic, laughing even at Sir Francis Bacon, a revered figure in Scottish 
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Philosophy. In addition, like Wallis and Simms (chapters 2, 3), C. C. notes with irony the 
fate of the Native Americans. There is no American romance about them.
697
 The identity 
of C. C. likely was historian Charles Campbell of Virginia.
698
 Campbell was to be a major 
pioneer in Virginia historiography from mid–to late–1840s, but in this study I cannot 
discuss the historical views he by then had adopted. 
As a more Nietzschean example of WW, “C.” in 1840 reiterates the claim, made by 
Legaré and George Tucker among others, that even the most basic historical facts are not 
reliable, if taken as axioms. Though recommending Tacitus, Plutarch, Hume and 
Robertson, C. observes even they “have not always been ready to pluck the hoary beard of 
time–honored error.” What is needed is a strict philological and genealogical approach, 
reminiscent of Niebuhr and Nietzsche, where there is no romance about history, because 
romance only brings with it ironic skepticism about history “which is apt to follow, when 
we see the rank weeds of exaggeration and obvious error growing luxuriantly in the fair 
fields of history, unmolested by the hand of the philosophic historian.” Obliquely 
criticizing Prescott, C. notes how humanitarian, political and religious coloring, like a 
stricture placed on reality, affects historical truth for the worse, because it wishes to hide 
away, due to romantic and literary impulses, barbarity and coldness. Thus, similar to 
Nietzsche, C. combines severity of reasoning that is “approaching the precision of 
mathematical demonstration” with tragic poetics to get rid of the muck of Romanticism in 
history.
699
 C. would perhaps have, aesthetically and existentially, agreed with Heidegger 
the essence of nihilism is its inability to think the nihil.
700
 In the nihil, human reality 
overflows narrative, language, identity, group, concept, temporally linear logic, causality 
and explanation. Such a messy condition of reality has been noticed only relatively 
recently by American historians and is not popular.
701
  
4.3 George E. Dabney and gendered southern semiotics of 
history  
Educator George E. Dabney, University of Virginia alumni and thus a trained classicist 
and philological critic,
702
 reveals the general aversion of Virginians, especially among the 
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youth according to him, to reading historical narratives. He detected this in 1840 in a 
fictive series of Revolution–era letters. “With the hope of exciting some little attention to 
our [Virginia’s] history, I commenced these letters.”703 Dabney’s argument would 
corroborate and illuminate my semiotic view about southerners and historiography.  
Dabney, WW, is aware that a narrative history dabbles with philosophy, and that is 
what he wants to avoid. The letter format, spiced with interesting anecdotes, tales and such 
“as a sort of under–current . . . to keep up the interest of the reader,” would be more 
interesting than a “tedious” and philosophical history. Dabney contends history is “made 
up” of such illustrative figurations that were different from incidents in real life: he does 
not take historical descriptions themselves as true. As an example of his training, Dabney 
treats historism with the classics and Scottish philosophy: the made–up illustrations “in 
every instance” picture “either those features of character which are common to all men of 
all ages . . . or else, such as from the circumstances and conduct . . . might have been 
presumed to have been peculiar [to colonial–era Virginians].”704 The fictive letters were 
supposedly free translations from French to avoid an uninteresting style. But Dabney also 
mentions that French was used, since public discussion during the Revolution did not 
allow speech “with perfect freedom of passing events, and the conduct of men in power,” 
which indicates the southern absence of a bourgeois public sphere. Strikingly, Dabney 
here seems to anticipate even Walter Benjamin’s refined analysis about semiotics and how 
books and the sign detract from storytelling.
705
  
To ensure a natural, spontaneous descendent into “inconsiderable particulars” of 
narrative–“and without that it is impossible to render any narrative interesting,” he decided 
the recipient of the letters was a sister, not a father or brother. Women, “continually 
engaged as they are about the petty concerns of domestic management, and excluded from 
all the more important business of the world, or for some other reason, which, bachelor as 
I am, I will not take upon me to determine, take a deep interest in little matters, such as 
men will hardly listen to.” This once again shows the fairly skeptical and jaded attitude 
towards historical narrative, but there is a particular interest paid to historical figuration as 
feminine, rhetorical and artistic as well. With irony, Dabney claims women are perhaps 
the best narrative historians, because they could better avoid the tediousness and 
philosophy associated with it. The realization was a remarkably romantic one. But it is 
also modernist, because there is no faith in romantic or philosophical history. The irony 
continues when Dabney notes there were almost no “authentic facts, which might serve as 
foundations for the tales,” and so the (Schillerian, romantic) separate sphere of the 
imagination from history was in fact ultimately impossible to maintain in practice: “When 
I would commence a tale, and become interested in it, history would for a time be almost 
forgotten; or when I directed my attention to the historic part, my story would ‘fall into a 
decline’, and before I was aware of it, would be so far gone as to be beyond my medico–
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literary skill.” He decided to abandon the writing of the letters after a few had been 
written.
706
  
The rhetoric and symbolic emplotment elements of narrative history are something 
resembling medicine. “Falling into a decline” was an expression used when a condition of 
a patient took a turn for the worse.
707
 “Medico–literary” is a wholly new coinage and 
remarkable in context of history for that. It testifies to the level of sophistication and 
exquisiteness of the Jeffersonian “school” about the history–language relation that was 
modernist and highly advanced especially in comparison with the North.  
The connection of historical narrative as something feminine that acts like a physician 
is a fascinating trope from literary and semiotic points of view. In Spanish and British 
drama in the 16th and early–17th centuries, physicians would often act as bridges between 
desire and its object. Beecher states this motif derived from ancient authors such as 
Plutarch, Appian and Valerius Maximus. It is the physician who helps divert the lovesick 
and tragic patient–whose sickness was often literally deadly, physically symptomatic and 
existentially introvert–from self–destruction towards acknowledgement of the causes and 
unification between desire and desired. This entailed co–operation with the physician from 
all. The tragic party could be either male or female. At times, for example in John 
Fletcher’s Monsieur Thomas (1639), simple female presence simultaneously serves as a 
detector of and cause for mortal lovesickness, alleviated by her physical and mental 
satisfaction of the male patient. Women seldom function as subjects or the physicians, and 
more commonly either as objects of the tragic male sufferer, objects of the physician’s 
strategies and mind–play, or as force fields for male interests. However, sometimes the 
plot became more dialectic: lovesickness was not beyond cynical parody in James 
Shirley’s The Witty Fair One (1628), in which the doctor does not play the role of a 
curative bridge. For Shirley, lovesickness always contains an element of trickery. In the 
play, two men decide between themselves to trick a woman by feigning a patient and a 
doctor. The “doctor” gives to the woman the traditional council that sexual satisfaction of 
the patient would cure him. The woman, however, discovers this, and pulls off trickery of 
her own.
708
 This parodying undermines the simple romantic desire–fulfillment dyad. A 
fourth alternative according to Beecher was for a woman to trade Christian honor for 
unification with the man in the name of curative medicine in Philip Massinger (and 
Thomas Dekker’s) The Virgin Martyr (1622). The authors juxtapose metaphysically 
Christian “continence” in the desired female Dorothea and Roman “power to command” 
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in the desirer male, fatally sick Antonius. The physicians again advise coitus, but Antonius 
refuses for reasons of honour, and the couple is united in Christian afterlife.
709
  
Dabney’s claim women are more attuned to the role of history’s physicians is striking. 
By the 1790s, the Yankee SAE cultural pioneers had considered that the southern climate–
thus southern society–subverted the rule of the masculine they held universal, basing their 
conclusions on natural history.
710
 In case of Britain, the field of a general practitioner was 
a “middle–class disease” because of its androgynous pragmatics as somewhere between 
the female home and the male work place. It was among the last fields to separate into 
work and home.
711
 Fascinatingly, Dabney departs from such an integral component of 
consolidated bourgeois male power created by enlightened liberal discourse that 
articulated virtue not to the nobility but in the home guarded by women. Marylander 
Kennedy aside, Victorian attitudes were still a minority among southern views about 
history. Henry Nott had even evoked metaphorology about women that are antithetical of 
the home guardian image as “the site of willful sexuality and bodily appetite” that were 
found in Swift and Pope among others (chapter 3).
712
 Dabney’s intensely secular 
intellectual background (chapter 2) is another possible source for the departure. This 
further shows the southern warinesses about and differences from liberal discourse, 
including Romanticism. Indeed, if Kerber is correct that in America, women behaving 
deferentially in the home was one manifestation of the self in relation to the state,
713
 this is 
one more indication that, though republicans and deferential, southerners were still not 
fully immersed in the new conception of the state as primary in relation to the self, as the 
metaphysics of modern history presupposed. 
Dabney may implicitly comment tragic poetics a physician traditionally administered 
to in rhetorical ways that, in a modernist fashion, contest the liberal nostrums. Since 
(romantic) historical narrative is based on such female attributes, its status as knowledge is 
flimsy, but for Dabney, this is not necessarily a negative aspect of it. Strict division into 
fact and fiction is impossible in historical practice, if history is to be engaging. 
Conversely, metaphor as simple and curative–the grave aesthetic approach in the North 
that saw it as subservient to the true and useful–is not accepted as given. Further, the 
semiotic status of such narrative as medicine contains important ontological claims in 
regard to southern semiotics and cultural dynamic (chapters 2, 3). The format of translated 
letters that simply end–instead of a book or a philosophical synthesis–indicates the 
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existence of Renaissance semiotics of presence where phonetics is important. What 
Derrida calls “practical methods of information retrieval” are still fairly undeveloped in 
such oral–based culture. In terms of form, such translation “could remain spoken in its 
integrity.”714 The unwilling or simply disinterested attitudes Wirt encountered towards 
conserving spoken language even when uttered by Henry (chapter 2) is not ignorance, nor 
anything intrinsically reprehensible. Rather, it evinces a philosophical difference about 
language and knowledge that includes history. It should be respected, but has not to my 
knowledge previously. 
Dabney’s translated and discontinued letters as format of history are not a delimiting of 
space and time by philosophy or religion. To impose laws on such figurations is a self–
limiting and even unethical act.
715
 Again, although presence is valued, it is not 
romanticized as sign (chapter 2). In other words, there is no debasing writing at the cost of 
valuing presence as an end in itself. To the contrary, presence as writing is preferable, but 
it is not eo ipso necessarily the truth, nor in any dyadic metaphysical tension. According to 
Derrida, “traditional” translation goes from the mind to the voice and then to the sign. It 
can shortcut the second stage (the voice) because correspondent with the first.
716
 As we 
have seen, at least many educated southerners treated this second phase as a rhetorical 
problem but, importantly, not as a metaphysical problem of presence and authenticity 
(chapters 2, 3). Instead, Dabney treats it rhetorically and perhaps theatrically as engineered 
medicine. This indicates WW was very critical about reason–guided history and existence.  
Finally, Dabney’s approach pertains to the “paganism” in the WW outlook (chapter 2): 
non–condemnation of writing is partly a criticism of rationalism and Christian theology 
over the more “pagan” empirical senses and sensuality, because writing is not grounded in 
non–problematic ideality of mind, God, or Plato’s soul in Phaedrus. To the contrary, the 
exposure of an interesting historical narrative as medicine is a functional exposure of it as 
literary, as “mere” metaphor. This is an ironic realization, but not a condemning one. 
Instead of seeing writing as secondary to these groundings as a sort of fallen, artificial, 
spatial and sensual deviation that is capable of being only derivatively literal, writing in 
Dabney at least holds its own in the context of history.
717
 But romantic ideology (in its 
bourgeois or socialist guises), Cartesian philosophy, Christianity and natural law 
philosophy all disagreed, because they either affirmed or hankered after presence as some 
such ground.
718
 Wirt was a pioneer of such hankering–after, but Rousseau was perhaps its 
Western pioneer. The idea of a book, in both sacred and secular senses, is a concrete 
manifestation of such valorized presence as totality, which turns reality external to it into 
ideality. As Derrida puts it: “The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural 
totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the encyclopedic protection of 
theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing, against its aphoristic 
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energy, and . . . against difference in general.”719 This “aphoristic energy” was a positive 
thing for Dabney and the Jeffersonian outlook, and differentiality was a southern cultural–
poetic characteristic as well. “Aphoristic energy” was more broadly a southern “thing” in 
its preference for the sensual, the bodily, the individual–in–community and the passionate 
in contrast to the Word, the mind, and thus the book (chapter 2). Northern travelers often 
marveled at the scarcity of books in southern homes that confirmed to them that 
southerners were stunted intellectually.
720
 However, this argument is far too simplistic and 
even unethical as for instance Derrida’s work has shown. Scholarship has not paid any 
attention to the issue though. It is a critical, in a semiotic–metaphysical sense, about how 
southerners felt about the book and the Word and therefore, the world and history. 
In addition, Dabney seems to appreciate positively this ambivalence women and 
history share as medicine. Writing as beneficial medicine (pharmakon) is at odds with 
Plato because of its chameleon qualities (chapter 2). In Derrida’s definition, pharmakon, 
whose status varies, is “the prior medium in which differentiation in general is produced, 
along with the opposition between the eidos [form, idea] and its other.” It is not a 
transcendental, but it is analogous to it, though not bound to the soul. In my context, 
Dabney’s argument would thus again point to at least implicit knowledge of Kant (chapter 
2). Pharmakon “belongs neither simply to the sensible nor simply to the intelligible, 
neither simply to passivity nor simply to activity.” Derrida claims Plato only detected this 
quality as existing as an enclave of opposition within virtue, not as virtue and its opposite. 
Pharmakon has no being, because it has no substance and is unpredictable, always capable 
of change. Therefore, it is dis–graced as philosophy “as a philter of forgetfulness.” This 
medium as double participation “refers back to a same that is not the identical.” It is a 
common element in any possible dissociation or difference. In writing as medicine, it is 
not yet ideal and, therefore, it precedes all binarity, such as “soul/body, good/evil, 
inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing, etc.” As play and movement, it is 
needed before any dialectic or any foundation: it precedes them as difference–production 
but is not itself “pure,” because it, too, exists in non–pointillist time. This medium is “a 
bottomless fund,” it “keeps itself forever in reserve even though it has no fundamental 
profundity nor ultimate locality.”721 Consequently, women as history’s medicine may be a 
dance–step back from a philosophical history they are able to do. By its means, the split 
differentiality of all concepts, identical only in what makes them differ, is hinted at.
722
 
This realization is quite sophisticated. If Dabney’s attitudes had been Victorian, women 
would simply be considered pure and moral and have a fixed place. However, at least in 
context of history, women are far more amorphous and dynamic and what is more, they 
are these in a positive sense. One has to go to Nietzsche to find a similar appreciation of 
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such existence as a value in tension with religion, philosophy and, ultimately, the book. To 
it, idealist dialectic is always poor.  
Dabney ends his analysis in a seemingly more conservative tone. Historical fiction 
must not falsely represent real personages or events. However, he refers to “authentic 
history” which, besides Scott and Kant (chapter 2), devolves into Samuel Johnson.723 
Johnson clearly separated between reality and its description, including philosophy 
associated with description. A contemporary southern reviewer claims that for Johnson, 
history was either tradition or (humanist) personal knowledge and that he had doubts 
about Addison’s bourgeois output.724 Dabney criticizes even the romance element of Scott 
of this error: heroes need to be praised as wholesome individuals. This remark is 
accompanied by perceptive criticism about point of view used in novels: all individuals 
should tell their own tales from their own empirical co–incidences, their seeing, hearing 
and feeling, and their own knowledge. This is the most natural point of view, unlike that 
of a Deity or omniscient narrator. It is violence against nature to proceed beyond this 
particularity. Still, ironically, it gets commonly done. Though Dabney makes no mention 
of history here, it is no stretch to interpret that narrative history that goes beyond the 
historial (chapter 2) is problematic as knowledge. Taking romance as truth is strange to 
him, not attributable to habit alone.
725
 In tune with WW, this is a fairly Nietzschean 
argument, because it questions the primacy of the sign as an idea, revelation or identity 
instead of singular, natural(istic) and haphazard events.
726
 It rejects, or perhaps simply is 
unaware of, the organicist metaphysics of modern history. What Dallmayer’s analysis of 
philosopher Hans–Georg Gadamer’s ontology calls “a shift from contingent phenomena to 
true being or the truth of being”727 has not yet, happily from the viewpoint of criticism of 
Idealism, taken place.  
4.3.1 Dabney in context and the northern–tinted arguments of VHPS  
Such attitudes to history were getting rare in the West by this time. Pressures at odds with 
WW mounted within the U.S. as well. The attempt at a crude dialectic philosophy of 
history of Virginia vs. Massachusetts by politician Daniel Webster late in 1843 was 
rhetorically and with relish undermined by a southern critic. The writer used pointedly 
New England’s “own” arguments by Bancroft in the process. Webster’s implication that 
wealth enabled Virginian civility–a return to Marshall’s and Tocqueville’s condemnation 
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of its greedy origins (chapter 2)–is also questioned. I shall return to my explanation why 
(chapters 5, 6).
728
  
Late in 1840, Fisher wrote from New York that gallery of historical paintings open for 
all, about which there would then be discussion and philosophical reflection, would be 
preferable to historical reading. “The leading events” represented visually would be much 
better as a basis for learned discourse than a book. The paintings  
would aid the recollection, and often convey ideas more clearly than words could do; and 
the constant incentive they would offer would tend to make those acquainted with history 
who had merely read it, and those familiar who were merely acquainted. The philosophic 
reflections; the comparison of one time with another, and all times with our own; the 
application to the purposes of life, which make history valuable; –these would be educed; 
and the young would acquire such a pleasing foretaste and general idea as would allure 
them to the study, so prepared that the usual barrenness would no longer be complained of. 
J. K. Fisher, “Culture of the Fine Arts,” Southern Literary Messenger 6 (1840): 845, emphasis 
original.   
This is a remarkably different contrast to Dabney. Though both authors grapple with 
making history interesting to audiences, Fisher’s solution departs from Dabney’s in many 
and quite profound ways. Firstly, he argues visual paintings are better at conserving 
memory than writing. This is because visual paintings have presence while writing has 
not. The composition of paintings is ideas, and ideas are much stronger–scientific in the 
North–and therefore preferable to writing, because they are clearer about meaning than 
words. Surrounded by paintings as visual representation, ideas/scientific knowledge about 
history would bombard the visitors and propel them to constant rational debate about 
history. In other words, Fisher looks at history from a romantic point of view that is 
grafted on the Yankee science bias about it. Secondly, paintings would function as 
organicist and anthropological contact with history. No reading or text could do such a 
thing. Historical painting would become a sort of portal or link to attain co–presence with 
another world, another people, another time. Familiarity would emerge: identity in a 
single flow of time under one gigantic History. This position closely resembles that of 
Bancroft and Emerson’s take on Universalhistorie (chapter 3). Thirdly, this bombardment 
would give cause to be philosophical about history, and thus garner from history ideas–not 
words–for utilitarian use for life’s purposes. Fisher follows Prescott in this Hegelian 
argument: this centripetal nucleus, as process, is the only reason why history matters, and 
this nucleus is universal, reason–guided and dialectic. Its only relevant question is “what is 
in it for society as progress?” Fourthly, ideas as paintings have almost axiomatic value 
from which to deduce attitudes. Fisher’s word “educe” equalizes evoking, a rigorous fact–
based operation, and education.
729
 “Pleasing foretaste” and “general idea” are the same. 
                                                 
728
 Anonymous, “Mr. Webster’s Bunker Hill Oration (concl.),” Southern Literary Messenger 10 
(1844): 25, 26. 
729
 http://etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=educe&searchmode=none, 
accessed November 13, 2013. 
  
 
 
175 
There is only one entry–point to history as general idea, and that is through pleasure which 
functions as an instrument directed towards it, not as an end–a comparable difference 
found in Kant’s aesthetics (chapter 5) and Hegel’s to F. Schlegel (chapter 3). History is 
not about tasting different foods, but instead moving, using good taste, to more rigorous 
and epistemologically true ideas. Thus, Romanticism about history is made to serve 
education, a northern theme. In addition, romantic representations themselves are non–
problematic: they are virtually indistinguishable from reality: “Dream, for a moment, of 
the temples of Egypt, restored by learned architects, and represented on canvas by 
excellent painters; and let them be peopled with their ancient occupants!”730 Further, 
relevant is the notion that history should be a part of (bourgeois) public sphere spatially, 
functionally and aesthetically. Refined, urban but, on the face of it, democratic, the gallery 
would have a trickle–down effect on the vulgar masses: “It would have the happiest effect 
on the manners of the less favoured portion, to be in the way of observing the educated 
and the refined.”731  
Even Virginia was by no means immune to such demands. Early in 1841, the governor 
of Virginia, Thomas W. Gilmer, approached the Messenger urgently with an open letter to 
preserve Virginia’s colonial history. Colonial history is “a subject of much interest to 
Virginians, and indeed to the people of our country generally” for the reason that “the 
early annals of Virginia constitute an important, and, I regret to add, a neglected portion of 
American history.” He concludes with slight desperation: “Can you suggest no means, my 
dear sir, by which the records and traditions of this ‘ancient commonwealth,’ which time 
has spared, either on this or the other side of the Atlantic, can be preserved? What has 
become of the ‘Historical and Philosophical Society of Virginia’?”732 The cognitive 
dissonance is obvious, because Gilmer insists history is important to every American 
irrespective of region but, simultaneously, he is aware that Virginians still pay little 
attention to historical records, to history “in general.”  
Here the two approaches to history clash, one represented by WW, classicists and 
common folk, the other by northerners, the SAE and SW clusters and Democrats. Gilmer 
had been no friend of Jackson,
733
 but his historical views are fairly northern as I will 
elaborate. The crux is that presence was not problematic to WW. Therefore, they had little 
faith in conjuring the past back as metaphoric figuration or desire as basis for identity. 
Idealism, pantheism or God in and about history was not their history. They were hesitant 
to engage history in so unreflective and uncritical a manner as northern romance history 
did. Even VHPS had practically ceased its activities by this time. The whole organization–
centered approach to history, comparable to structure and system, was simply alien to 
many. 
 In reply, the editor White, who balanced between SW and WW, acknowledges that 
“such an association [as VHPS] cannot exist long, unless a sufficient number of its 
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members are zealously and perseveringly devoted to its success.” He lashed out that it is 
shameful that literary and scientific organizations have not taken root in Virginia, in other 
words, that there still is no public sphere. What Virginians need is philosophy to find out 
why. As for causes, he offers climate, education and, revealingly for my argument, “the 
superior allurements of social enjoyments” as well as heated political debating. These may 
have “exerted a powerful agency in creating a distaste for the quiet and unobtrusive 
pleasures of literature,” a condition that should change.734 As I have argued (chapters 2, 3), 
there was a huge experiential difference between seeing and hearing about history. The 
way of the book or the Word was simply metaphysically marginal in the region even in 
the early–1840s. Ideal(ist) or rational mental culture of discourse, even such discourse 
about culture, was undeveloped. 
Gilmer had been spurred to action by a letter addressed to him all the way from 
Missouri by co–historian William G. Minor, also published. Minor had migrated from 
Virginia to Jefferson City some time before.
735
 Minor was an army colonel at least by 
1842 and an active member of the Episcopalian Church as one of the first vestrymen and 
founders of the second Episcopalian church in Missouri around the time.
736
 Like Cushing 
and historian Thomas Roderick Dew (chapter 5), Minor probably was a member of the 
church when he had close ties to VHPS, delivering a presentation there in 1835.
737
 As we 
will discover, the Episcopalian faith had strong influence for historical discussion in 
Virginia for its size and popularity.  
Minor was almost as far from WW as possible in his intellectual makeup, a trend 
found in some other Episcopalians as well but seldom in such radical forms of criticism. 
The Genoveses contend southern Episcopalians included some of the most eminent 
American liberal theologians of the century who were very receptive to German theology 
and had sympathies for the transcendentalists.
738
 This is critical for me, because such 
liberal theology had its epistemic and semiotic roots in Locke, the very opposite of 
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figurality, rhetoric, irony, symbolism and similar concerns about history.
739
 In thi 
“liberalized” Episcopalians shared much in common with the Unitarians, which reflects 
the comparative difference the reception of Locke made for previous Episcopalians like 
Jefferson about history and language. 
Perhaps Minor had grown disgusted with Virginia, because his intellectual and figural 
positions about history were quite polemic. For Minor, similar to Emerson, the archives 
had had the truth as “singularly comprehensive and full of detail” before the British 
cruelly destroyed significant parts of them. What bothered Minor was that Virginians did 
not care. Virginia was “content to catch a feeble gleam of her early glories, from the 
uncertain narratives of tradition, the compilations of ignorance, and the probabilities of 
conjecture.” Virginia lacked public spirit as much now as a century ago. Sadly, there are 
virtually no books of history about Virginia, and Robertson’s history, with its Tory loyalty 
to the crown, contained little more than “lofty declamation and false panegyric” about 
supposed loyalty to pathetic British kings–a view precisely contrary to WW Tucker 
(chapter 2). Lamentably, “scattered fragments,” “imperfect and mutilated,” of Virginia’s 
history lay uncollected. In one of his most German phrases, Minor claims: “Tradition itself 
has lost the memory of the spirit–stirring legends of our fatherland.” As a result, “[t]he 
darkness of the darkest age of literature broods over the antiquities of Virginia; and there 
is not pride enough among her sons to stretch forth their hands to save one jewel from the 
mouldering touch of Time.”740 Minor hopes for a “spirit” among Virginians that “fondly 
cherishes every memorial of her greatness” that are found in the archives. A “thrilling and 
glorious” history waits collecting. The pagan Greece and Rome are inferior examples of 
heroism in comparison to homemade heroes.
741
  
Obviously, memory has now become what in Derrida’s analysis was presence in an 
“ontotheological” sense, a mix of idealism and Christianity where writing can, and must, 
do the job of presence. But added to it is neoplatonic rhetoric, conventional in the North, 
of an absolute chasm that exists between Light and Dark, and the northern quest for 
American hero. We again find the painting metaphor as well. Adam Smith had been even 
for Kennedy–the most anti–WW historical commentator in the Virginia scene up to this 
time–an imaginative historian, though he had wished Smith be praised more for his public 
spirit.
742
 For Minor, upping the ante, Smith had had “a more vigorous and accurate hand” 
in painting the colony’s history than his successor William Stith. Stith only filled in what 
was already visible.
743
 The pictorial metaphor is very radical, because it advocates 
(historicist) continuity of History. In other words, it is not a question of two separate 
undertakings as with Kennedy. Instead, at issue was a foundational historical truth Smith 
had laid down epistemologically and Stith had proceeded to aesthetically colour as inferior 
fill–in work. Minor radicalizes Kennedy elsewhere: Kennedy’s anti–toryism that still 
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contained some satire (chapter 3) is now trumpeted as a serious historical truth: freedom 
from Britain is a “holy cause”: to sympathise with the crown degeneracy and slavery. That 
cannot be the case in Virginia though some claim so–and this is probably a barb towards 
Tucker (chapter 3).
744
  
The painting trope is also interesting because Prescott had earlier spoken of Cooper 
mildly critically using the very same trope.
745
 I argue this is no accident. To the contrary, 
Minor sympathized with Prescott the Hegelian, so great are the parallels between the two. 
Disconcerting is Minor’s throwing two very different historiographical genres, with all 
that entails, Stith’s and Cooper’s, into the same dustbin. This strategy of gross 
simplification is likewise reminiscent of Prescott, who took it further. There is a mining 
metaphor–not sculpting–related to Hening’s deeply respected law history as well. 
Hening’s work was “full of rich and unworked ore; and the materials from which pages of 
the most intense interest might be elaborated.”746 Notable is the change from WW 
sculpture: paralleling Prescott, the “virginal” material is only to be mastered and 
exhausted as technē for present use without Aristotelian phronetic concerns.747 “The most 
intense interest” sounds transcendentalist. In addition, reminiscent of New England views 
is Minor’s praise for Hening as antiquarian historian. He goes so far as to assert the 
antiquarian paradigm–the reigning one in organizations, and of northern origin (chapter 
3)–has to be the future basis of Virginia’s history as “the light which is to guide” “through 
the imperfect and mutilated records.”748 I will return to antiquarianism in the South later 
(chapters 5, 6). In terms of historical criticism, there was great difference between 
antiquarian history and WW (chapter 3). The trope of guiding light derives from Prescott, 
as does what constitutes history for Minor: “morals, population, religion, wars, trade, 
industry, enterprise, and the rise and establishment of [Virginia’s] political institutions.”749 
Critically for me, this list follows what Prescott meant by philosophical history as a 
catachresis of cosmopolitan history (chapter 3). Let us recall Prescott’s study was 
practically silenced in the Messenger at this period. Likewise striking is Minor’s praise for 
Bancroft he connects with sympathy for Bacon’s Rebellion in the 17th century against the 
crown. Bacon had not been seen a hero before Bancroft who epistemologically set the 
record straight.
750
  
Minor would go on to act as one of the founders of Missouri Historical Society in 1844 
that named, among others, Jackson, Bancroft, powerful Unitarian historian and educator 
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Jared Sparks and the cosmopolite Simms honorary members.
751
 In addition to this role, 
Minor was apparently very close to Thomas Reynolds, a Democrat governor of Missouri 
whose parents had migrated from Virginia in 1791.
752
 Like Brockenbrough (chapter 3), 
Minor had strong Democratic sympathies in comparison to his intellectual context, an 
interest in history, and a desire or fate to migrate away from Virginia. 
Gilmer was a VHPS member as well, delivering a speech there in 1837.
753
 Resembling 
the argument of Dew (chapter 5), the tone of this essay is quite non–skeptical about 
history for its time and context. As in Minor and Dew, Gilmer’s argumentation has some 
significant parallels with Prescott. For instance, the ancient historians were simple 
adventure chroniclers and no good by comparison to the modern times. What now counts 
as history is something far wider in scope. Remarkably, Gilmer also perpetuates Prescott’s 
misunderstanding of cosmopolitan history: according to him, the new philosophical 
element about history with its natural causal links only makes history more precise than 
ever. This enlightened history “investigates and establishes truth [and] discriminates justly 
between transient prejudice of an hour and the enduring sentiment of the ages.” This 
procedure, beacon–like, establishes truth using “unfettered and enlightened spirit of 
inquiry.”754 Thus, the notion flies in the face of the heterologies (chapter 2).755 Further, to 
Gilmer, history is all about utility, a New England theme dear to Minor. This new history 
ushers in a utilitarianism that touches every member of society so that they are worth its 
record for the country and its remembrance by posterity. As in Prescott and Hegel, what 
counts in history is the future and the process. Not Antiquity that–like for the northern 
Federalist classicists (chapter 2)–instructs through a mirror. Similar to Emerson, history is 
all about public virtue, and posterity hears the voice of history rightly. Then “history 
comes like the beam of a bright sun to dispel the cloud, and to record its verdict on the 
adamant of eternal truth.”756 History as mirror is ultimately impartial and its vision shines 
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clear and keen without getting blind, interestingly enough. America luckily has no history 
and no Antiquity, unlike Europe–this echoes the Massachusetts men Parker and Daniel 
Webster.
757
 Gilmer contends, like Emerson and Bancroft, the little history there was in 
America is immortal and “our race” establishes its exemplary truths.758 His style is 
probably informed by Emerson.
759
 Dew advocated a history where the merchants were the 
pioneers of a new cosmopolitan culture (chapter 5), and the same argument is found in 
Gilmer.
760
  
Besides language, another important difference to European cosmopolitanism is the 
inclusion of Christianity, by way of SAE. Gilmer is, thus, in proximity of Speece, Rice 
(chapter 2) and Rice’s contributors who, resembling Prescott epistemologically, wanted to 
be cosmopolitans about history in a way that Christianity supplants skepticism.
761
 In other 
words, Christianity needs to ground public morality and improvement: unlike in 
Machiavelli (chapter 2), there is no ambiguity involved.
762
 Ironically, while even “L.” in 
Rice’s paper had rightly spotted the discrepancy between cosmopolitan history and 
religion, there is no trace of the contradiction in Gilmer in his radicalization of Prescott. 
Gilmer explicitly attacks the more Machiavellian virtue prevalent in Virginia in a fairly 
radical–almost Emersonian–way. He renounces the concrete, physical existence–the 
entrenched southern sphere of freedom and liberty–as narrow and bordered. To the 
contrary, man’s afterlife in Paradise that gets ignored in such existence now becomes a 
necessity for true freedom. Lest readers forget, the controlling influence of this ideal 
afterworld extends to this one as well. It even allows man to escape time, Gilmer attests. 
The argument is not far from the northern tendency to bash the empirical world (chapters 
2, 3). Important for me in the context of Dew, this argument includes an ontological claim 
that favors Civilization founded on Christianity instead of more savage, “beastly” 
existence, and it refers to history as a book.
763
 These were uncritical arguments given the 
precarious status of Evangelical and New England history and metaphysics in Virginia.  
In more downtoned rhetoric, Gilmer had to keep arguing for his case in 1844, because 
even at this time, few Virginians cared about preservation of history or about the idea of 
history as cloistered hard work done alone. Gilmer singles out the Jeffersonian tradition as 
the enemy of “real” history: “this condition of things is so eloquently appealing to her 
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rulers.” However, money was not the only obstacle to change, even in the legislature.764 
Though lacking in specifics, Gilmer thus implies that the cause of the difference was 
irreducible to the conventional–Marshall, Daniel Webster, Tocqueville–explanation of 
greedy economics. 
4.4 Jane Tayloe Lomax, the pioneer of romantic history in 
Virginia 
The only partial exception at this period to rejecting more explicitly German theories 
about history in Virginia is Jane Tayloe Lomax (1821–1847). Inexcusably, Lomax is 
practically totally forgotten today. I could find only one mention of her name by 
historians. She was a talented poet, essayist, linguist and musician. Partial, because she 
was married to the son of the Governor of Ohio in 1843 and apparently lived there after 
first living in Watertown, Massachusetts, in 1840 and Washington, D.C. in 1842.
765
 
Lomax possibly predates northerner Margaret Fuller as a pioneering female public thinker 
in America. 
At first glance, Lomax was the epitome of romantic genius. At an early age, her mind 
was very sensitive to complex literary and philosophical arguments: before she was 
twenty, she wrote an elegiac poem about Korinna that included a French motto cited from 
Madame de Staël’s influential “Corinne.”766 So early on, Lomax knew French and about 
the ancients, but not in a vacuum.
767
 The female elegiac genre was engaged in softening 
the public sphere with bourgeois ideology of sympathy. Sympathy functioned as an 
unbalancing of egotism and as a binding together of nations and society. The female 
elegiac genre was about loss and consolatory echo.
768
  
Nevertheless, as another indication of the difference in public sphere from the 
bourgeoisie in Virginia (chapters 2, 3), tragic poetics continues to predominate in Lomax’s 
poem, contrary to sentimentality. As in Poe’s aesthetics, there is no anthropological, 
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idealist–romantic arena of discourse involving necessarily at least two. The closest to this 
novelty is the opening of the fifth stanza that reads: “I go, my friends! but let fond dreams 
of me, / And what I have been, be around ye still;” but she almost immediately insists: 
“Fain would I grant the final strain ye crave, / Fain would I leave an echo still to be.”769 
That is, Lomax stresses that phonetic echo and historial life are absolutely gone. Death is 
not annulled, like contemporary European and northern theories insisted. Dreams are an 
innumerably weaker consolation to flesh–and–blood be–ing and sound, not their 
substitute. Cohen has explored this aesthetic side of historiality as opposed to conventional 
(and thus modern) historical existence that relies on the substitute.
770
 Recurrence (“fond 
dreams . . . around ye”) is about deferral: “[n]o event begins or ends–what comes again is 
already a part of the future of what is deferred.” This trace is “soaked in the rhetoric of 
paradox, the nonorigin of an origin, the existence of the nonexistent.”771 In other words, 
temporality is a paradoxical heterological production rather than sublimation of the body 
into an idea along a singular temporal continuity and collective–discursive unity, like in 
romantic, and particularly Hegelian, theory. Historiality brings out “this differential 
element in all systems of sense.” It has to do with sclerosis, not some universal 
teleology.
772
 In sum, southerners, at least in Virginia, still were not aesthetically situated to 
modern history even in the early–1840s.  
Further, Lomax, like her precursor, New Yorker Elizabeth F. Ellet, does not rashly 
jump to Schiller’s neohumanism.773 Ellet offers a thorough comparison and contrast 
between “cold and classic simplicity” of Alfieri, or tragic poetics, and “energy of 
expression and warmth of action” of Schiller, or moralizing poetics.774 Unsurprisingly 
given she hailed from the North, Ellet prefers Schiller.
775
 But Lomax is a sharp critic of 
Romanticism: she is willing to read even de Staël through French tragedy, while 
acknowledging that de Staël fails to excel in it. That is, like Poe and Beverley Tucker, she 
seems to dialectically and critically engage Romanticism through her specific context that 
had more of an appreciation for tragedy.
776
 This, in turn, would corroborate the possibility 
of a prevalent “cool” reading of Scott in the South (chapter 2). Moralizing poetics 
presupposed the victory of Romanticism in senses of philosophy and poesy. However, in 
the South, the situation was more complex, because it is arguably misleading to reduce 
southern sensibilities to German neohumanism or even the essentially bourgeois and 
capitalist British neoclassical era (chapters 2, 3).  
In an earlier Schiller article that was apparently the first public in–depth engagement 
with neohumanism in Virginia, however, Lomax, then living in Massachusetts, has taken 
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steps beyond the tragic.
777
 She explicitly endorses romance history as proper history, and 
applies this aesthetic to Schiller: “we grasp his hand with the friendly warmth of 
intellectual kindred” where “the lofty, unshackled intercourse of mind connects us in one 
sacred brotherhood.” But she also seems conscious that a selling point of Schiller to 
Virginians is to dissociate him from Transcendentalism, affectation and cloudedness. 
Lomax spots the different dynamic of the public sphere in Germany.
778
 She endorses 
Schiller’s effect on history:779  
He touches the canvas on which history had sketched the rough outline of events; and the 
picture, before so vague and dim, becomes instinct with the majesty of life. The star–light 
of imagination lends its luster; the dull scene changes to living record; and though it depict 
circumstances far gone, they flit before us like the deeds of yesterday, bringing silent 
appeals to our sympathies, bearing eloquent but voiceless memorials from times and 
people long past away. The prominent actors in that mental portraiture live in our 
memories, with the friends we had known in youth as companions, holding a claim on our 
gratitude for happy moments bestowed, and pleasant associations awakened. 
ibid., 162-63. 
Thus, Lomax in effect is a southern pioneer in advocating a full–scale idealistic and 
romantic, warm, anthropological, discursive and emotional approach to history the (male) 
WW had previously rejected and even she had poetically doubted. But she does this in 
rhetorically skilful ways. Schiller represents an alternative to stereotypical (northern) 
romancers that was completely free from egoism and fame–seeking, while being tireless in 
work ethic and fully moral. Schiller represents a philosophical mind that is regrettably 
often missing from those who are “too dependent on excitement.” “Intellectual superiority, 
from the very character of its being, is isolated. The man of genius rarely meets the 
appreciating friendship he is so willing to bestow. To be perfectly successful in his 
exhortions, he must abandon the common and distracting enjoyments around him, and let 
his soul turn inward upon itself.”780 This saint–like individualism that comes straight from 
Rousseau was a categorical heterodoxy to the thinking and social existence then prevalent 
in Virginia and elsewhere in the South.  
Lomax increases her preference for such aesthetics–as–history in a later article, where 
she obviously looks at Pierre Corneille through Schiller. The major difference between 
them is that for the former, drama functions as a metonymical “spirit of a nation” and as 
an allegory on society, rather than naive individual genius. Lomax is concerned about 
audiences at the level of the nation: they are “prone to exaggerated feeling, and 
particularly susceptible to the charms of sentiment,” and the emotionally responsive, 
religious quality of a people’s sympathies.781 Accompanying this are Longfellow–like 
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(chapter 2) observations about first wisely studying, democratically, the minds of others 
before embarking on poetics. Respect needs to be paid to form and regularity as guides 
and superintendents on the way to maturity and perfection in drama. There is also SW 
rhetoric about Corneille improving his country.
782
 For Lomax, informed of Schiller and 
northern preferences, poetic existence is in its separate “immortal” sphere, but not for 
every poet.
783
 
In sum,  Lomax is a borderline case of negotiating the place of aesthetics vs. history 
and reality. Gone is her previous irony about dreams as memories. Now, more in tune with 
Romanticism, most writers and all poets have their unique style.
784
 From a more 
cosmopolite view, and maybe as a result of personal transition, Lomax deviated from local 
WW dominance about history, but in terms of audiences she made little immediate change 
in Virginia, unlike in South Carolina (chapter 6). 
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5. Thomas Roderick Dew as a producer of southern 
historical identity: mixtures, distortions, idealities 
5.1 Dew in context: extensions and convergences of Yankee 
imperialism 
In the early–1840s, Dew put together his posthumously published lecture notes on history. 
Professor of Civil Law at the institution in 1827 only at twenty–five and president in 1836, 
Dew was the most influential social philosopher in Virginia and had “near monopoly on 
instruction.”785 His history teaching, delivered once a week and commencing in 1827, 
went against the wishes of the former president, intellectual Thomas Cooper, a staunch 
British materialist. The prestigious but, interestingly, until the mid–1830s thinly attended 
institution was fairly secular, having earlier abolished chairs of divinity and instituted 
modern language study by Jefferson and Episcopalian reverend James Madison. WW 
Beverley Tucker became his colleague in 1835.
786
 As I shall elaborate however (chapter 
6), besides differences withTucker, Dew was a very different creature from the more 
Jeffersonian Cooper on history.  
But in addition, only when thirty, Dew published a noted apology on slavery in 1832. I 
shall focus on these texts later. My present argument is to canvass Dew’s intellectual 
background. Specifically, I shall argue that Dew took up a far more energetic 
interpretation of the Episcopalian faith than was the norm in Virginia. He followed in the 
footsteps of William H. Wilmer, and thereby greatly increased the influence of 
Episcopalian poetics and politics of culture. As social philosophy, it was in conflict with 
Jefferson because of a different interpretation of Locke that had consequences for 
semiotics and history (chapter 2). Thus, Dew in effect became an outpost for SAE in 
Virginia. Like the northern historians, he would incorporate German Idealism into the 
structure as well. 
As in the cases of Wirt and Kennedy (chapters 2, 3), different approaches to Virginia 
history came from Maryland: Dew’s father was born there.787 But in addition, in terms of 
discourse, an important but to my knowledge unstudied change had taken place at the 
institution in 1826. Episcopalian William H. Wilmer, originally from Maryland, assumed 
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presidency and Dew was already a faculty member.
788
 Judging by a contemporary 
reaction, this introduction of religion into intellectual leadership was not welcomed by all 
the students, which could be one reason for the thin attendance. It dropped as low as 
eighteen in 1833, while Jefferson’s university had enjoyed well over 100 students.789 But a 
second reason could be that the Episcopalian Church, traditionally the representative of 
Anglican Church in Virginia and America, had been almost abolished in 1785 when 
Virginia legislature had decided to repeal its legal establishment and give its lands and 
property, except the incumbents’ private estates and church buildings, to charity for the 
poor.
790
 This was no dramatic event. Indeed, in strong contrast to New England, the 
church not only had overwhelmingly supported American independence from Britain, its 
clergy in Virginia had been almost as deistic as the Virginian revolutionaries.
791
 Despite 
fine outer appearances, both pastors and their congregation were simply not interested in 
religion or a religious way of life. Even in the late–1840s, Virginia “abounded in 
temptations to doubtful pleasure, and her churchmen of the colonial period did much to 
cultivate this taste.”792  
In the first measure to revive the church that already began the same year, reverend 
Madison of William and Mary was the key organizer. Importantly for me, the idea behind 
the revival closely resembled SAE: an enlightened and rational society that would use 
religion as a resource for morality.
793
 Critically, though, reception was very weak. Any 
more significant sign of a revival would have to wait until the mid–1810s when the 
revivalist Presbyterians became active (chapter 2). By the mid–1830s, though only a fifth 
of the Presbyterians in popularity, or roughly 0.2 percent of the Virginia population in 
communicants, Virginia’s Episcopalian Church was “distinguished by numerous and 
wealthy members, and by a pious and intelligent clergy.”794 Thus, the church had strongly 
elitist tendencies.  
Wilmer’s Maryland roots were very energetically Episcopalian.795 Thus he was 
different from the far more secular Virginia ethos where he had moved in 1812, 
interestingly, around the revival.
796
 Key point for me is this Episcopalian appeal to reason 
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was not in conflict with SAE but to the contrary, found additional support from Germany 
at least in cases of Dew and also the German–pioneering Harrison as a representative of 
Clay’s ultra–Whig interests.797 The common nominator was the compatibility of Locke 
with Universalhistorie. This is decisive, because SAE–and thus Lockeanism–was not by 
all means everywhere accepted in the South in history (chapter 2), which, as a corollary, 
made the German tweaks to SAE (chapters 2, 3) difficult for all southerners, but 
particularly for Virginians.  
Besides Wilmer, Dew strengthened “whiggery” in Virginia as I will explore. In 
Wilmer’s case, this happened because of his involvement as one of the signers of the 
constitution of the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1816.
798
 This society was 
nation–wide and its “goal was to send freed blacks to Africa.”799 But besides the Lockean 
view of rationality, from Locke derived the concept of citizenry as ACS saw it. Lockean 
“state of nature is normatively regulated by traditional (altruistic, nonprudential) natural 
law. It is a moralized state of nature in which private property and money exist, virtually 
civil.” Its citizenry extended only to whites, because only they were rational enough for 
the status, as well as laborious and industrious enough. The rationality non–whites lacked 
was an argument for enslavement and lack of their citizenship.
800
 Accordingly, ACS was 
an organization formed by “citizens” in this Lockean sense. Its powerful early supporters 
in Virginia were Whigs such as war veteran, politician and lawyer Charles Fenton 
Mercer.
801
 Incidentally, Mercer was also strongly Lockean. Krumpelmann claims also 
Marshall and Harrison were members.
802
 Thanks to SAE and Locke reading, they blended 
in ACS effortlessly with such figures as New Haven, Connecticut mayor David Daggett. 
Daggett was one of the local opponents to a black school. After Nat Turner’s bloody slave 
rebellion in Virginia, the opposing frame was arrived at when phrenological testimony, 
among others, had showed the black character incapable of citizenship. Thus 
unsurprisingly, Daggett was able to quote Noah Webster–another northern combiner of 
reason and religion (chapter 2)–a citizen was defined in America “as someone who could 
vote and own property.”803 Based on Locke, Federalist ACS denied blacks of citizenship. 
This same reasoning by Daggett was appealed to in the much more famous Dred Scott 
case in 1857 by Judge Roger Taney.
804
  
                                                 
797
 Krumpelmann, Southern Scholars in Goethe’s Germany, 67-68. 
798
 Henry Noble Sherwood, ”The Formation of the American Colonization Society,” The Journal 
of Negro History 2 (1917): 227n54; CO2, 784, 802. 
799
 Anne Farrow, Joel Lang, and Jennifer Frank, Complicity: How the North Prolonged, 
Promoted, and Profited from Slavery (New York: Ballantine, 2005), 155. 
800
 Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 67-68, 
citation on 67. 
801
 Sherwood, ”Formation of the American Colonization Society,” 226, 211-12. 
802
 Krumpelmann, Southern Scholars in Goethe’s Germany, 67-68. 
803
 Farrow et al., Complicity, 159-62, citation on 162. 
804
 ibid., 162. 
  
 
 
188 
The work of ACS was reported overseas in the Bulletins of the Geographical Society 
of Paris.
805
 These bulletins actually served an inherently ideological goal of French 
imperialism and trade by means of land expansion, subscription to racial hierarchy, and 
dwelling in phrenology, facial angles and crania.
806
 The relevance of imperialist tactics 
within American history thus fastens into a transatlantic alliance founded by Crèvecoeur as 
trope (chapters 2, 3). This alliance was between hegemonic capitalist interests and natural 
science ideal about society, including its people, and progress. History was only derivative 
as natural science and/or God–grounded. Just as importantly, ACS could incorporate 
Universalhistorie and Idealism. Specifically, Göttingen as a combination of racism, 
statism and social science acted as the linchpin for key American theorists of history. The 
usage of Locke for racist ends in history and cultural politics in New England has rarely 
been noted even though all the classicists, several New Englanders and even Bancroft 
adhered to such progressive race theories as history (chapters 2, 3). Therefore, Dew, 
Harrison–instrumental as organizer of Historical Society of Louisiana in New Orleans in 
1835 and a willing exile from the uncouth Virginia
807–and Marshall were southern 
versions of imperialism as history in accord with SAE.  
The important point is that all southern opinion about history was not behind. 
Jefferson’s different reading of Locke implicated history, and southerners were less 
enthusiastic about progress based on race hierarchy (chapter 2). Further, according to 
Simpson, Jefferson even flashed disagreement with the Lockean theory of citizenship 
ACS was founded on regarding slaves.
808
 Therefore, their semiotics and philosophy about 
history was far from identical with it. A counter–example outside Virginia would be 
southerner Samuel Cartwright who had no trouble reconciling SAE and race theory. 
However, this was a rarity position in the South about history at least until the mid–1840s. 
It is explainable with Cartwright’s exposure to the northern classicist Rush as well as 
Pennsylvania–educated Charles Caldwell–a professor of Natural History active in the 
1810s–from whom Cartwright apparently learned about phrenology.  
Natural history was the preferred approach into history by northern physicians. It fit a 
natural scientific philosophy of history that was founded on race hierarchy, rationalism 
and religion, in other words, SAE (chapter 2). Thus I disagree with Smith that Rush only 
inadvertently perpetuated race theories, since his historical metaphysics was intrinsically 
racially hierarchical. That racism as everyday prejudice dominated more the North than 
the South is even asserted by an otherwise unsympathetic Tocqueville:  he carefully 
distinguishes between equality as Lockean contract, or discursive, and inequality as 
natural, or non–discursive. He implies only the former is relevant in America. Though 
admitting this is not so in the South, he (again) makes the function of slavery in the South 
a misfit category compared to the standardized Lockean citizenship theory both northern 
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SAE and ACS subscribed to. The theory, thus, marshaled further support from Germany 
and France.
809
  
Despite Jefferson and possibly others, hierarchic racism about history was to increase 
its strength in Virginia as well because of: 1. The institutionally dominating SW opinion 
about history by 1831 (chapters 3, 4) headed by the Episcopalian elites. 2. Virginia slave 
rebellion in 1831–soon after which Dew’s college turned a corner. I argue the rebellion 
was a major incentive to flock to Dew and thus to all he stood for. Although exposed to 
Wilmer for only a year, my claim is Dew had become much influenced by his views, 
fulfilling the previous–until then relatively ignored–desires of the reverend Madison. Due 
to the different views of Jefferson and Madison, William and Mary became a sort of 
symbolic watershed on southern cultural opinion about history.
810
  
5.2 Dew and southern history: “The Review”  
In this section, I shall examine Dew’s apology for slavery from 1832. My argument is, 
Dew exhaustively tries to bring slavery as social philosophy to the same level as discourse 
about modern history. However, in the course of the undertaking, he departs from Virginia 
society’s conventions regarding history and the sign in historically and philosophically 
unethical ways that render his attempt a profoundly confused and metaphysically 
stagnating hodgepodge defense. Thus, I would not treat Dew as a representative of 
Virginia views on culture poetics. Rather, I see the report as a terminus point of slavery as 
discourse that serves as grounded defense and obscures competing cultural–poetic views, 
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especially those in tension regarding modern history and its philosophical presuppositions 
(chapter 2). 
Before the lecture–book, Dew was most famous for his review of the 1831–1832 
debate about abolishing slavery in Virginia commissioned by John Floyd, Virginia’s 
governor.
811
 Floyd was the first Vice–President of VHPS, second only to Marshall in 
hierarchy. Holmes implies Dew had become Episcopalian by then.
812
 The difficulty of 
pigeonholing Dew’s output O’Brien has noted813 is evident: he discourses almost every 
branch of major tradition available, and even cites J. S. Mill with approval!
814
 Of the 
European history models, the text is a very eclectic mix of cosmopolitan history, mostly 
Scottish, and Universalhistorie. At first glance, it is theoretically very social scientific for 
its time and place given that its audience was Virginians.
815
 Importantly for me, the review 
is silent about historical language and the questions of truth. Focus is social scientific 
more than historical: observations concerning truth derive mainly from anthropology, 
economics, law studies and political science.
816
 The favorite authority, especially in the 
anthropological elements, is Scot Robertson.
817
 Style is rigid or un–romantic: for example, 
Dew uses the analogy of mathematic precision in reasoning and cites a speech by Tory 
politician George Canning, where a freed slave is compared to “a creature resembling the 
splendid fiction of a recent romance . . . in the infancy of his uninstructed reason,” 
meaning Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818).818 There was nothing extravagant about 
being enlightened and proslavery.
819
  
But the similarities to this branch of history stop here, the matter is more complex. 
Firstly, in contrast to cosmopolitan history, language is pretty much without any 
playfulness, colour, satire, tragedy, or irony several southerners knew about. Dew is much 
more concerned with ideas than with words, philology or metaphysical speculation. There 
are four explicit references to rhetoric, but they do not dominate. Only two refer to spoken 
instead of written or documentary language.
820
 Political speeches are quoted about a dozen 
different times, but several of them instrumentally, at face value, in connection with hard 
data that supports Dew’s position.821 Thus, oratory for history is still present, but much 
subdued by a more scientific and true approach, close to SAE (chapter 2). This confusion 
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of different genres would elucidate the similar confusion in Prescott between 
cosmopolitan history and Universalhistorie. At the time, Prescott was busy writing his 
history. Amidst the silence in the Messenger (chapter 3), Dew awarded Prescott with 
honorary doctorate of laws in 1841 for his first history, so the men were probably not 
distant.
822
 Thus, besides Minor and Gilmer, Dew was both Episcopalian and sympathetic 
to Prescott’s idealist take on history that ignored WW.  
Secondly, I would disagree with O’Brien that although Dew knew about Germans such 
as F. Schlegel, Niebuhr and Heeren, he only scantily absorbed German thinking.
823
 To the 
contrary, I argue a deep engagement with the Germans would illuminate his departures 
from cosmopolitan history in four ways.  
1. Dew was informed of the northern ethnically hierarchical progress theory and of its 
endorsement by Göttingen’s Heeren as the basis for scientific history qua political science 
Bancroft had subscribed to and popularised (chapters 2, 3).
824
 Reminiscent of Jefferson 
and Voltaire, Dew’s begins from a taxonomic and irreligious approach to slaves, to which 
he combines a natural scientific bias when he refers to “human species” and, like George 
Tucker (chapter 2), Malthus.
825
 Natural scientific rigor was nothing out of the ordinary in 
the U.S. But unlike the cosmopolitans, Jefferson and Tucker, Dew proceeds from this 
premise to talk about hierarchical racial civilisation theory more in tune with Heeren and 
respected northerners.
826
 2. Dew quotes from Wilhelm von Humboldt, the chief German 
historical and cultural revolutionary, to support his proslavery thesis.
827
 3. What presses 
Dew close to Heeren’s Universalhistorie is his strong concern with Christianity, and his 
linkage between hierarchical civilization and Christianity.
828
 Outside Wirt, Dew even 
advocates a romantic approach to love in historical theory, ahead of his context.
829
 This 
would separate him from the Jefferson school of opinion and cosmopolitans, and propel 
him toward Universalhistorie (chapter 3). Thus the Episcopalian synthesis of reason and 
religion, northern hierarchical theory of ethnicities, northern SAE as culture/power politic, 
and Universalhistorie are all incorporated. 4. Given the text “was intended for an internal 
Virginia audience, to (re)unify the state behind racial slavery in the wake of an 
unprecedented, and very divisive, debate over the future of the institution in the state,” the 
most interesting observations about Dew’s German dimension are perhaps philosophical, 
more specifically, dialectic.
830
 There have been speculations that Dew visited and studied 
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in Germany.
831
 O’Brien dismisses this, since Dew “could not speak or read the 
language.”832 However, the pull of Dew towards Germany only increased in his lecture 
notes (5.3). What is common in figural and metaphysical senses between Dew and Hegel 
in the present piece are two things: the desire for completeness and dialecticism.  
Dew’s work was received as a totality, something beyond discourse, by great many 
southern readers and audiences. It had “cogency and coherence never previously attained,” 
it was “[w]idely circulated throughout the South . . . repeatedly quoted and paraphrased by 
the Southern press,” “widely read,” and “reprinted several times” so that, in practice it 
seemed “nothing more needed to be said about the issue.”833 It was a complete body, a 
complete corpus, a ground plan. But, it functioned as something shared and something that 
unites as well. For Episcopalians, Holy Communion was massively important. As Wilmer, 
Dew’s spiritual predecessor, had declared in his posthumously published manual whose 
great hope was to cherish the unity of spirit beside that of faith, Eucharist was
834
  
a duty incumbent on every soul that professed faith in Christ Jesus, and sought for 
salvation through his blood alone. And the great High Priest of our profession has showed 
by more than ordinary influences of his blessed Spirit on the souls of the faithful, that they 
had not mistaken his meaning, nor believed in vain; while by eating of that bread and 
drinking of that cup, they endeavoured to shew forth his death, and realize its benefits.     
ibid., 128. 
In other words, the communion as shared eating set by Jesus united souls with spirit, faith 
and knowledge about the right meaning. In its German aspects, I claim Dew’s work 
symbolized the Last Supper as “an objective form of love,” an observation similar to 
Hegel.
835
 In Dew, the love element the communion symbolizes is present as the southern 
zeal for liberty in the Revolution the Episcopalians had endorsed. It brought with it “the 
perfect spirit of equality so prevalent among the whites of all the slave holding states.” 
Because the low and menial chores are done by slaves, there is no need for distinction and 
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separation, no need for individualism especially in a competitive sense.
836
 Thus, besides 
harboring a romantic theory of love, Dew echoes Hegel’s definition of love as: “He 
(is/are) you.”837 The place for (Jefferson’s) language in such love exists as food taken in as 
objective, true form.
838
 To be sure, Hegel distinguishes between concrete bread and wine 
and signs.
839
 However, such a distinction is less relevant in my context, for two reasons. 
First, the metaphor of knowledge as food popularized by Francis Bacon and utilized by 
Wirt (chapter 2) and Dew himself later was probably known to Dew, his audiences, even 
both.
840
 Second, Dew, departing from Jefferson and even Hegel, is not critically concerned 
about the status of language or signs. Therefore, he can jump to the concern with 
community. Thus, Hegel’s conclusion that only the usage of the finite realm of the sign 
can find a community is shared by Dew.
841
 The function of form or the sign was, thus, 
extremely different from historiality and WW. 
It is precisely the lack of criticism about the sign as form that helps Dew reconcile 
between love, God, and his study. Southern readers, his equal brothers, partook in Dew’s 
work, and thus found nourishment in (its) spirit. Beyond finite signifiers, once they are 
consumed, emerges “a subjective unity–which, in fact, constitutes community,”842 a 
subjection of variegated reality to a grid as it were. Accordingly, after Dew had died in 
Paris in 1846, Bryan is able to declare almost a century later, “the real cause of our 
meeting is not the death but the life of him whom we honor; for it is not the dreadful 
finality of death that President Dew’s name and memory speak, but of life piled on 
life.”843 Dew was “above and before all,” forever lying “around us,” a miracle, a spiritual 
force, an unconquerable spirit upon a plastic world who/that made William and Mary 
indestructible.
844
 An interesting metaphysical and aesthetic comparison between such 
religious feeling as interplay Peter the stone/William and Mary vs. pagan sculpture–the 
WW medium about history–would go beyond this chapter.845 I only contend to note a 
difference between them.  
                                                 
836
 Dew, Review, 112. 
837
 Barnett, “Eating My God,” 137. 
838
 ibid., 137-38.  
839
 ibid., 138. 
840
 ”Some books are to be tasted. others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and 
digested. That is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and 
some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention.” Francis Bacon, “Of Studies,” in 
Bacon’s Essays, Volume II, eds. J. W. Hales and C. S. Jerram, The London Series of English 
Classics, 7th ed. (London: Longman’s, Green, & Co., 1886), 73. 
841
 Barnett, “Eating My God,” 139. 
842
 ibid., 140. 
843
 Bryan, Thomas Roderick Dew, 3. 
844
 ibid., 13. 
845
 For Derrida and eating in this Hegelian–sacral sense, see Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. 
Leavey and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 65-73, and for some 
suggestive remarks about the difference concerning stone, ibid., 70-73. 
  
 
 
194 
O’Brien has rightly noted that cult historian W. J. Cash’s analysis of the prewar South 
is intellectually poor and resembles Fichte.
846
 Having said that, I think this dimension of 
this famous work and its effects as absolute truth and unity in southern hearts and 
communities are German idealist. Deconstruction, in contrast, respects “that which cannot 
be eaten . . . that in a text which cannot be assimilated.” Derrida reminds “[t]here is always 
a remainder that cannot be read, that must remain alien. This residue can never be 
interrogated as the same, but must be constantly sought out anew, and must continue to be 
written.”847  
However, even this cannot exhaust the text. Incongruously, the rational subject of the 
dialectic comes not from Hegel but from Locke.
848
 Dew argues explicitly–like WAE Wirt 
(chapter 2)–in Lockean terms for rational liberty of industry, end for idleness or 
licentiousness, and for productive labor and self–government, and against temptations 
such as crime, alcohol and debt. He also treats private property axiomatic. The difference 
to Wirt is Dew’s SW de–emphasis on rhetoric in communication and figuration, and 
strong belief in causality,
849
 i.e., history closer to the Yankees. Dew implies slavery for 
southerners was not a historically contingent, discursive, institution before Turner.
850
 This 
again indicates the lack of (liberal, bourgeois, urban, individualistic, refined) public sphere 
and modern history. I conjecture that was novel to great many Virginians and historical 
theorists. 
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But there are also notable intellectual discrepancies within Dew’s position, a price he 
has to pay as a great devourer and synthesizer of knowledge as stomach cramps. Dew’s 
argument is philosophically and ethically far inferior to that of Thornwell and the critics of 
reason. He fails to criticize reason but, to the contrary, tries to reconcile three kinds of 
liberal theories of reason–the prevailing ethnical chauvinism of the North and, to an 
extent, France, northern SAE history and its revamped German form, and Locke–with 
southern social philosophy. He ignores that outside SW, it was not founded on reason in 
these senses (chapter 2). The closest point of contact was Scottish Philosophy, but I doubt 
Robertson or many of his southern readers subscribed to such non–moderate and 
revamped take on religion. Dew’s position is oxymoronic, because he simultaneously 
endorses the Lockean theory that highlights the individual, and the Fichtean–Hegelian 
theory that dilutes the individual. As a political philosopher, he tries to be a classical 
republican via modern liberalism and approach modern liberalism through Christian 
faith.
851
 Dew, unlike Thornwell, inadvertently gives weapons to his opponents by 
endorsing the ontological argument of the liberals that the basic instinct of slaves is war of 
all against all and, even in whites, individual competition. Thornwell and later his 
European colleague Levinas, the consciousness of Derrida, rejected this. Locke, Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Hegel and Tocqueville endorsed it.
852
 Thereby, Dew took a decisive step 
towards a much more democratic and more modern notion about citizenship than was 
found in many areas of the South concerning the relationship between slaves and masters. 
Aesthetically, by reasoning slavery is mercy in comparison to death, he rejects moralizing 
poetics of (bourgeois) anthropologism and Romanticism (chapter 4). At the same time, he 
celebrates Christian love by way of (bourgeois) Universalhistorie and northern opinion.
853
 
He thereby extrapolates southern thinking and existence from the current historical 
theories by pretty much excluding heterological approaches to them and WW.  
Though Dew has eaten a bellyful, there are traces of the modes of thinking and 
existence that are far more archaic than the fine courses served. On a figural level, we can 
detect them in at least three instances. First, to support his proslavery thesis, Dew hoists 
up Rousseau to a place of a just observer of a slave’s violent nature on par with Locke.854 
However, of the southern intellectuals, apparently only Wirt in his Henry biography 
(chapter 2) had previously sympathised with Rousseau: as a general rule, Rousseau was a 
very unpopular figure in the South.
855
 Rousseau’s “position” was greatly different from a 
proslavery one, but decisive in modern history. Second is the appeal to Humboldt, another 
giant of modern history, to support a proslavery position. However, Humboldt’s historical 
outlook and political thought Dew cites were completely at odds with slavery and 
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Locke.
856
 A third, perhaps most revealing, instance is the lifting of Canning out of context 
as another supporter of Dew’s thesis: however, in Canning’s debate, “the question was not 
should the slave population be liberated, but how should liberation be implemented.”857 
Dew thus distorts Canning’s “position” to echo his own discursively archaic one. In Brion 
Davis’s reading, Dew’s slavery position devolves into “pre–Hobbesian” 16th and 17th 
centuries since already Hobbes had “swept away traditional distinctions based on natural 
merit and assigned status, and thus, undermined both the classical and Christian 
justifications for unquestioned dominion.”858 Dew did not follow him.  
How is this possible? As I have argued, southern semiotic and historical world had 
elements predating modern history, with no public sphere in a sense that would be 
functionally or metaphysically recognizable as modern. Since Dew’s closest local 
intellectual ally was Wirt, Dew’s views were among the most modern his context could 
functionally offer. Thus, if the most advanced theorist on slavery resides in attitudes about 
slavery that were found around the time of the English Civil War in the 1600s, it is 
plausible the institution was conceived very differently in comparison to modern history.  
Dew thus, quite literally, frames his argument to appear discursively courant. That is, 
in addition to the spiritual side, there is ipso facto a strategically obscuring side to his 
argument. Derrida has explored the workings of such framing most thoroughly in Kant’s 
aesthetics as deconstruction of aesthetics.
859
 Historians and materialists have neglected 
these insights though they enable culture criticism. The value of them is in their ability to 
reach beyond ideology to ontology to examine “the material and historical forces that are 
continually transforming representational practices and aesthetic experience.” Derrida 
examines critically the inverse ratio between (historial) ontology of the body and de–
ontologized (idealist) history of the mind. It can be extended to understand “how 
assertions of the autonomy and universality of the aesthetic become ever more strident as 
representational practices become increasingly dominated by patterns of consumption and 
exchange governed by the logic of commodities and the emergence of a mass public.”860 
The relevance of Derrida’s argument for me at present is in avoidance of material, ideal, 
and ideal–historical reductionism instead of ontological concerns and in its performative 
critique of the public sphere. Given the anomalous situation of southerners to these, it can 
be used as a tool to deconstruct the framing. But interestingly, such a framing in Dew 
operates more as a chiasm in comparison to Kant: in Dew, it is less a question of encasing 
southerners from discourse, away from history, economics and politics, and more a 
question of establishing southern slavery–mapping it as culture–as an integral part of that 
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very discourse, selling the South out, sealing the deal. Critically though, ontological 
critique is still valid in the performance.  
The above three figurations act “as a supplement from the lack–a certain ‘internal’ 
indetermination” in the very thing framed.861 Southern culture is incoherent, lacks 
coherence, and thus lacks form. Repose, security and confidence, the equilibrium between 
reason and imagination, had for a time been destroyed by Turner.
862
 Dew’s work sought to 
put matters to rest by applying the formalist ontologiy of modern history. Framing 
functions as a sort of sign–posting that arrests this lack, regulates the content by hiding but 
by revealing it as lack as well. What is within is an idealistic unity which, by definition, 
simultaneously lacks and needs frames.
863
 Because the interior is grounded in form, it is 
grounded in a) God as formality, purity, propriety and inside against materiality, impurity, 
impropriety, outside (Kant’s aesthetics and Dew’s communion), b) reason (Enlightenment, 
Idealism), and c) philosophy of history. These try to hide the framing is a framing. It seals 
off by formal control, but also walls up. The point of Derrida’s deconstruction is this 
framing is inseparable from the interior as a more haphazard figurative production, rather 
than some inherent mechanical or teleological law or harmony in a formal sense. A 
consequence of this insight is “a certain repeated dislocation, a regulated, irrepressible 
dislocation, which makes the frame in general crack, undoes it at the corners in its quioins 
and joints, turns its internal limit into an external limit, takes its thickness into account, 
makes us see the picture from the side of the canvas or the wood, etc.”864 That is, Dew’s 
framing was a violent operation ontologically. Its seeing as violence is itself violent, not as 
annihilation but as ethics.  
In Kant, this ontological violence meant repression of enjoyment (Genuss), “the art of 
conversation, jest, laughter, gaiety, simple–minded entertainment, irresponsible gossip 
around the table, the art of serving, the management of music during the meal, party 
games, etc.” that “involves an empirical sensibility, includes a kernel of incommunicable 
sensation.”865 Enjoyment was ontologically reprehensible, because it was about the senses 
with which to consume in actuality without ideality.
866
 Instead, Kant preferred pleasure 
(Lust) that has no such non–purposive, non–refined function. Pleasure is production free 
for itself, art for art’s sake, and simultaneously a part of the social whole as 
communication and mental culture. It is social and universally communicable, something 
that only goes on in the mind of a free individual as intersubjectively shared reflection.
867
 
It is not to be found in contingent sense perceptions that only eat and drink, but in the 
feeling for the beautiful in nature, not in the too scheming oratory or rhetoric, but in 
poetry.
868
 This latter preference is close to Blair southerners had incorporated (chapter 2), 
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which makes Kant a romantic aesthetically. But the distinctive point is that up to now, 
southerners had not underplayed enjoyment, because they had not made such a (modern, 
capitalist) dichotomy between the two. But Kant’s position was not only followed by Dew 
in an existential sense, it also was strongly reminiscent of Fisher (chapter 4) and shared 
by, for example, New Englander Rowland Gibson Hazard.  
Hazard’s treatise on language, published in 1836, was much admired by Unitarian 
Channing and transcendentalist Massachusetts educator Elizabeth Palmer Peabody. In his 
version of attack on the Lockean theory of language, Hazard distinguished between 
persuasion that was only narration or abstraction, and conviction, the language of ideality 
and religion. Conviction was superior of the two, because it was grounded in ideals that 
were eternal. It both nurtured and enabled faith as a communion with omniscience. This 
enabled, similar to Emerson, the poet to emerge as a liberator.
869
 Apparently, Hazard 
shared with Kant the negative aspect of rhetoric. This had ontological implications that, I 
claim, bear on southerners negatively.  
Although Dew did not fully dispense with enjoyment, the usual but little researched 
way of communal existing in Virginia and South Carolina (chapter 2), his idealism and 
framing nevertheless took steps towards that direction as figural operations. It shows, for 
example, when he talks about romantic love but grants that men have “harsher tempers 
and more restless propensities . . . that savage and brutal feeling” female love as reflection 
and cultivation then smoothens. Dew, closely following neohumanism (chapter 2), extends 
such a romance as having existed already in Antiquity.
870
 Thus he renders the critical, 
ironic, more humanistic and more secular WW take on romance irrelevant for his idealist–
bourgeois discussion. Similarly, though he grants eating–one of the non–reflective modes 
of existing Kant disliked but southerners enjoyed as sensuality–is a sign of hard work and 
prosperity in a Lockean sense, he still spends considerable amount of energy in a 
discussion that connects eating with savage, un–civilized society.871 Thus he petrifies, 
materially pre–empts and rhetorically obscures these dimensions of southern existence. 
Wirt had begun the flirting with Romanticism in his Letters (chapter 2). In them, the 
anonymous condition of the speaker made a similar move towards discourse and, thereby, 
away from bodily presence. As Derrida notes in case of Rousseau’s similar strategy, “the 
operation that substitutes writing for speech also replaces presence by value: to the I am or 
to the I am present thus sacrificed, a what I am or a what I am worth is preferred . . . I 
renounce my present life, my present and concrete existence in order to make myself 
known in the ideality of truth and value.”872 But since Dew rejects rhetoric as a problem at 
least in public, he goes much farther toward idealist history than WAE Wirt did.  
In sum, though the “Review” is a very important pioneering piece of southern cultural 
historical discourse, we have to remember its multidimensional character, its function, and 
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the figural and metaphysical, not just the ideological, sides, as well as the context of the 
author. 
5.3 Dew and southern history: “The Digest” 
In this section, I shall examine Dew’s lecture notes on history. First, I shall attempt to 
contextualize them as history. I shall claim the notes represent another paradox compared 
to European models about history. Further, their episteme is anomalous. Their anomalous 
character is in that they embrace a cosmopolitan theory of society that little existed in 
contemporary Virginia. A second anomaly is there is so little American nationalism about 
the work although the 1830s was the boom decade of nationalism (chapter 4). Next, I shall 
isolate the German aspects of the work that are quite strong as well. Importantly, Dew 
strongly sides with the Germans and northern historians rather than the language–oriented 
southern tradition. Regarding the Germans this shows in two ways: the mixture of German 
Idealism and Catholic revival Dew strongly endorsed and the Whiggery Dew likewise 
endorsed that ignored all criticism about liberalism as history many other southerners, 
especially Virginians, knew about. Dew is strongly a northern–German creature about 
history in comparison to his peers in terms of historical figuration and philosophy. This 
presents a great leap from what had been, at most, historism (chapters 2, 3, 4) to far more 
historicist, idealist and social scientific notions that ultimately tie Dew up with SAE and 
transcendentalist arguments. In practice, Dew badly distorts his own sources to constuct 
such metaphysics of history. I shall end by considering what such distorting entailed for 
southern political philosophy. Especially, I shall look at how Dew deals with Sparta and 
Athens compared to Jefferson and political discourse he endorsed, and how Dew wraps 
around the ancients his Federalist and modern history biases by producing history as 
politics filtered through Federalist distortions. 
5.3.1 Locating “The Digest” 
In addition to the “Review,” Dew was a pioneer as a philosopher of history. He stated “on 
more than one occasion that he confined himself mainly to the philosophy of history.”873 
Naturally, I cannot cover the whole book. Instead I will restrict myself to an analysis of 
some of its figural, metaphysical and discursive elements. These notes were widely 
influential as well: in their book form, they were perhaps the most thorough analysis of 
history in America at least until the late–1840s and in print even in the 1890s.874 
Washington states in the 1853 preface that historical compendia were getting obsolete, but 
neither is the purpose of the work originality, and especially modern history books were 
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lacking in southern education.
875
 This would indicate the continued preference of the 
classics and the possibility that the boom for modern history in the 1840s Callcott reported 
(chapter 4) had affected the South less. On the one hand, a stated wariness about romantic 
originality and an unwillingness to take Voltaire’s step and just reject the compendium 
format by opting to modify it from within attest to a lingering reluctance to adopt the 
novel and romance format for history (chapter 3). Elsewhere, this had become the norm 
decades before. But on the other hand, the book’s interests, a digest containing laws, 
customs, manners, institutions, and civilization of ancient and modern nations, are clearly 
within the boundaries of cosmopolitan history (chapter 3) and in this respect present a 
continuum to the “Review.”876 O’Brien has noted this guardedness about Romanticism.877 
More particularly, I would characterize the work as having the cosmopolitan ideal 
embodied in the work of Franklin, Voltaire and Hume and subscribed to by Crèvecoeur 
(chapter 3). Dew shared many characteristics with this group, such as a powerful emphasis 
on economic individualism and a strongly bourgeois ethos. Voltaire and Hume saw the 
merchant as the cosmopolitan.
878
 But interesting for my purposes is also the almost equal 
attention paid to the ancients and the moderns.
879
 This is something internationally 
peculiar for the time, because neither cosmopolitan history nor German historians went to 
such great lengths in maintaining so close equilibrium between the two. French 
cosmopolitan historians, though versed with the classics, were “transparently pleased” at 
having overcome the ancients.
880
 Neither was there similar equilibrium across the channel 
in Hume, Gibbon or Robertson, the first and third focusing on modern history, the second 
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on Rome.
881
 Dew cites Voltaire the most of the French historians, and Hume is his most 
used author with more than fifty mentions or citations. Dew’s preference for Hume 
parallels that of his northern–born predecessor, Episcopalian Reverend Reuel Keith of 
Vermont and later Columbia, who had used Hume in his history lectures between 1821 
and 1822 after which they had been discontinued.
882
 My point is, so direct an application 
of Hume to attain a cosmopolitan ideal had not been presented in Virginia historiography 
previously, though he was a familiar author about political and social discourse and 
skepticism (chapter 2). Therefore, the work contained a serious update of the public 
sphere (5.3.4), because Hume had not subverted its more ancient dynamic (chapter 2). 
However, such application ironically represents a similar conundrum as the framing of the 
“Review.” In other words, how to reconcile such “ultramodern” individualism with 
southern society? 
5.3.2 Ties to Idealism and German philosophy of history 
No major enlightened historian in Göttingen or Berlin paid much simultaneous attention to 
the ancients and the moderns.
883
 On the German side at first glance, Dew seems to have 
made little headway beyond Humboldt and particularly Heeren, the source of Bancroft 
(chapter 3). However, Dew’s attachment to the Germans that extended to northern 
historians–unlike the critics in his context–is eminent.  
First, Heeren is a figure only second to Hume in popularity. Second, Dew draws 
comparatively heavily from classical philologist August Böckh (or Boeckh) who mentored 
Bancroft.
884
 Importantly for my purposes, in a notion that derived from Humboldt–another 
Dew favorite–Böckh extended theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “warm” 
hermeneutics to cover an entire culture, not just individual text.
885
 This exhibits the slow 
German turn to idealism, mysticism and subjectivism in philosophy, epistemology and 
aesthetics in relation to history. Böckh’s student Droysen was at the same time a student 
of Hegel. Droysen was perhaps the most Hegelian of this genealogy of German historians 
in the turn from philological investigations towards Idealism.
886
 As we have seen, 
northerners were also familiar with these trends, but beyond the comparatively different F. 
Schlegel, southerners remained more cautious (chapters 2, 3, 4). The case of Bancroft 
resembled that of Droysen: Bancroft was also a student of both Böckh and Hegel (chapter 
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3). These connections would illuminate my thesis about a stronger Hegelianism and a 
tendency to Idealism in the North. But they likewise suggest Dew is relatively isolated in 
historical thinking from his surroundings. Paradoxically, he nevertheless stands in an 
influential position. I will return to this question below.  
Third, Dew had strong interest in the originally German field of ethnography–he is 
among the first in the world to apply the word.
887
 This derives partly from Heeren, since 
Heeren combined a more anthropological approach to history with a hierarchical race 
theory that had already been endorsed in New England (chapters 2, 3).
888
 Fourth, what has 
gone unnoticed is the mysterious shorthand “W.” Dew appeals to “W.” plentifully, 48 
times in total, surpassed only by Hume and Heeren who between them are cited almost a 
hundred times. These “Ws” refer to three different but for my purposes illuminating 
scholars: German historian Wilhelm Wachsmuth, Irish expat cosmopolite, Roman 
Catholic Cardinal in England and ultimately the first archbishop of Westminster, Nicholas 
Wiseman
889
 and British clergyman, traveler and church historian George Waddington. 
Especially the two first connect Dew with Germany.  
Wachsmuth remains little researched figure especially in English language 
historiography or historical theory.
890
 Wachsmuth was among the pioneers who departed 
from seeing history as a mere auxiliary science attached to specific interests. These 
interests, we recall, were responses to more anti–Scholastic Pyrrhonism (chapter 2). They 
tried to evade skepticism about history, they were church historical in the Reformation 
controversies, and they covered, in their auxiliary function, law studies. Antiquarianism 
was the common nominator.
891
 I argue the antiquarian tradition treated history very 
conservatively but, following Momigliano, I claim the legal auxiliary approach to history 
could be pyrrhonist, not antiquarian, an important distinction for me (chapter 6).
892
 
Wachsmuth was a pioneer in cultural history as situated between antiquarianism and more 
anthropological approaches.
893
 Still, Wachsmuth was not yet a social historian of 
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Antiquity by way of Karl Otfried Müller who “aimed at no less than ‘the knowledge of 
man in antiquity’ and portrayed how the Greek state was shaped by demographic, 
environmental, military, commercial, political, artistic, and intellectual forces and was 
constantly in flux.”894 Müller criticized Wachsmuth for being too philological without 
historism conceived in this sense.
895
  
Given that Wachsmuth was not a very idealistic historian along the German continuum 
of history from philology to Hegel,
896
 it is strange that Dew–heavily immersed in Idealism 
as I shall explain–draws relatively heavily on Wachsmuth. His less theoretical Hellenische 
Altertumskunde had become available in English in 1837.  
Perhaps since Dew had more idealist sympathies, he returns to systematic distortion of 
intellectual positions that is revealing for my argument, this time more forcibly. First, he 
appeals to Wachsmuth as contending that Greek comedian Aristophanes harbored anti–
Spartan feelings.
897
 But the context in Wachsmuth concerns the changes for the worse 
among different classes of Athenian society after the onset of plague by offering a 
comparison of knights and laconists. Wachsmuth immediately adds: “Still, the upright and 
patriotic citizens, Kalokagathoi [members of the Spartan aristocracy], were not even yet 
wholly extinct.”898 In other words, Wachsmuth’s Aristophanes, contrary to what Dew 
claims, is not acerbic to Sparta.
899
 Second, after Spartans kill an Athenian herald just 
before the war between Athens and Sparta, Wachsmuth reports that the Athenians passed a 
decree that “breathed the most implacable hostility”. Dew tells the Athenians “of course” 
declared war.
900
 Dew leaves out Wachsmuth’s more sympathetic assessment that the 
Spartans were not normally like that and that the allies to Athens had also committed 
outrages.
901
 Third, Dew vilifies the Spartans further by leaving out their motives to 
enslave these allies, and he even leaves out the regret they felt afterwards for having done 
so.
902
 Fourth, he omits from Wachsmuth that Athenians executed Aeginetans, Scioneans 
and Melians and that Athenians plotted to massacre Mytileneans and ended up killing 
1,000 Spartan prisoners.
903
 Fifth, he ignores Wachsmuth’s disclaimer that the pardoning 
by Conon, an Athenian admiral, of a prestigious prisoner was “amongst the very rare 
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instances of humanity” and that he had fallen prisoner after he was exiled by Athenians, 
but does remember to include from Wachsmuth atrocities committed to the Athenians. 
Sixth, he omits the killing of Spartan ambassadors to Persia upon delivery to Athens by 
Athenians and misconduct of an Athenian military commander.
904
 Seventh, Dew omits the 
decrease of Athenian morals and increase of Athenian corruption.
905
  
As I will elaborate below, even Wachsmuth himself is not anti–Spartan, which 
indicates the intellectual differences between Dew and Wachsmuth I pointed out. I shall 
argue this partiality against Sparta by citing badly out of context is related to Dew’s own 
metaphysical framework as well. Save for two footnotes by formidable academic classicist 
and philosopher of history George Frederick Holmes (chapter 6) in 1850, Wachsmuth 
remained completely outside the pages of the Messenger.
906
 Almost all the references to 
Wachsmuth in the leading southern journals come from Holmes. 
Much more prevalent references in Dew are to Nicholas Wiseman. Possibly, Dew thus 
inadvertently helped establish creationism in the U.S. Wiseman was an extreme case of 
“how science and religion supported one another, [and how] new clerical ideas enable 
religion to base itself on science, and vice versa.”907 Wiseman’s personal history of 
attaining powerful positions young was remarkably similar to Dew’s. A Doctor of 
Divinity at twenty–two with special interest in the natural sciences and dogmatic and 
scholastic theology, supernumerary professor of Hebrew and Syro–Chaldaic at the 
Sapienza University of Rome at twenty–five, and Rector of the English College at twenty–
six, Wiseman hoped to bring England under Catholic unity once more. His high 
watermark as an intellectual were the Twelve Lectures on the Connexion between Science 
and Revealed Religion
908
 delivered in Rome in 1835 and published in two volumes in 
1836. These lectures were written while Wiseman’s plans for Catholic unity were in 
progress.
909
 However, Wiseman’s religious or metaphysical context was insular if not 
ostracized, because Catholics were pretty much outcasts in British society. Yet, Wiseman 
played a key role in reintroducing the Catholic faith to England.
910
 Similarly, I argue that 
Dew sought to metaphysically idealise and unify the Virginians’ and southerners’ thought 
about history. After all, it was nothing extraordinary: fellow Episcopalian Cushing had 
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operated the same way in his own rhetoric about history.
911
 In Dew, this metaphysical 
reorientation had been constructed around slavery as I explored above. Despite isolation, 
Dew’s, like Wiseman’s, vision began to gain more followers towards the mid–1830s.  
Importantly for me, Wiseman was much drawn to the connection between Idealism 
and Christianity found in several prominent Germans such as Ranke, the Schlegels and 
Novalis among others as a critique of Protestant reason. This critique, as Wiseman saw it, 
grafted reason onto culture as literature, philosophy and art, safely away from its pagan 
implications. A cultured reason represented a better and more fruitful alternative that 
included the important sphere of history.
912
 It was this turn southerners were having 
trouble with in history, seeing it pantheist and semiotically, metaphysically and politically 
problematic, but the turn was not in conflict with the liberal element in Dew and the 
northerners’ German reception (chapter 2). Such a notion of culture became a master 
concept under the aegis of which heterogeneous individuals had to submit. These 
differences had previously been seen either as spontaneous manifestations of the diversity 
of the human race or as part of a pre–ordained godly plan. But now, like plants in a 
garden, people were expected to healthily and tidily grow into a single unity of a nation as 
a result of both humanely and divinely appointed gardeners. Such “culture” had to do with 
autonomous and self–regulating nation–states historically and ideologically.913 Its 
implications reached to ontology and semiotics in history in conflicting ways in the 
southern context as I have attempted to point out: nationalism was not just about 
politics.
914
 This problem of culture would illuminate the prevalence in the South of greatly 
differing social theories and existence about history. 
Ironically in this sense, Wiseman’s hold on Dew was significant. To illustrate, we can 
look at the way Dew uses Wiseman. At first glance puzzling in Dew’s Wiseman citations 
is that the page numbers in the references are widely off the mark.
915
 In one instance, he 
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attributes things to Wiseman that considered together even cannot be located at all in 
him.
916
 But the more common discrepancies have to do with page numbers, not content. 
For example, Dew gives only a page of difference (from page 193 to page 194) to what is 
covered in a wholly different lecture (from page 306 to page 326). One possibility is a 
deliberate fraud, digestion of history in the belly where things get mixed up in any case as 
my grandmother used to say. However, a more likely but very intriguing explanation is 
suggested by Wiseman. In Rome, he had delivered the lectures during the Lent (Catholic 
Easter) of 1835 in much shortened form “to a large and select attendance in the apartments 
of His Eminence Cardinal Weld.” Wiseman had had to add to some sections and subtract 
from and simplify others, because his audience was unfamiliar with the topic. He made 
these changes in writing, but he never published the lectures in that form: that is why he 
came to England where another editing process awaited.
917
 He never delivered the lectures 
again in public before the publication. So, either Dew was present at the lectures in Rome, 
or Wiseman was gracious enough to copy by hand his own lecture notes to Dew or to 
Dew’s associate(s), which would prove Dew had very privileged contacts to Wiseman or 
his close associates. Still, though the room was packed and attended by select Europe’s 
elite, including Germans and some scholars,
918
 Wiseman’s most thorough biographer 
makes no mention of him ever copying his personal lecture notes–that ran into hundreds 
of pages–by hand for any purpose, nor is Dew anywhere mentioned. Given that the 
references by Dew to Wiseman are highly accurate, it seems unlikely they were furnished 
from Dew’s personal notes. A third possibility is some exclusive edition of these notes, 
but this would again point to Dew’s very select connection to Wiseman or his associate(s) 
since even Ward makes no mention of it. In this study, I have not had access to the Dew 
papers. In them, three “transcriptions” of letters exist that cover 1835 and 1836.919 
However, I assume they have already been investigated. In any case, the letters would 
have to be very long ones if they covered the lectures so thoroughly. For my purposes 
sufficient is to mark this considerable interest of Dew in Catholic English revival in/as his 
philosophy of history and its German dimension.  
That Wiseman was absorbed in German theories was no secret in the South among the 
few who knew about his work besides Dew. For instance Baptist scholar J. L. Reynolds 
who spent most of his intellectual energies in South Carolina pointed out Wiseman’s 
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heavily German tint.
920
 Importantly for me (chapter 6), Holmes knew about Wiseman’s 
scholarship as well.
921
 Striking is Dew’s remarkable appreciation of Wiseman. It is unique 
in southern context. No other scholar in Virginia or South Carolina appreciated the 
cardinal to this depth to my knowledge. Indeed, very few even mention him. The next 
follower of Wiseman was New England–born–and–educated fellow–Episcopalian Moses 
Ashley Curtis.
922
 Ironically in regard to creationism as well, even the marginal Josiah 
Nott, whose history ethos was among the most scientistic in the South,
923
 heavily 
criticized both Curtis, who preferred Wiseman to Nott, and Wiseman. Early on, Nott was 
puzzled that Curtis should appeal to Wiseman’s questionable scholarship. Nott would 
continue to criticize Wiseman in several articles.
924
 This perhaps gives some further idea 
how distant Wiseman, and by implication Dew, really were from southern mainstream 
since even Nott was marginal as a historical thinker. After a long gap, the next and pretty 
much the only other scholar who was even lukewarm to Wiseman in the major southern 
journals was proslavery Unitarian pastor Charles Manson Taggart. Taggart lived in 
Pennsylvania until his early twenties and finally came to Charleston after several years in 
the West. But Taggart’s praise was faint and more upset by criticism.925 Excluding a brief 
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mention by lawyer William Archer Cocke, a student of Dew, Wiseman stayed fully out of 
the pages of the Messenger.
926
 Nott had considered Wiseman outdated years before.  
Importantly, though, Taggart’s more extensive discussion indicates Wiseman’s 
idealism as liberalism was what loosely united Unitarians and Episcopalians. My point is 
despite Dew, aversion to German thought and its metaphysical and political commitment 
was still common in Virginia history. Applying these in linguistics through Wiseman, 
Dew followed the SAE transition from Locke to idealism–questionable as philosophy of 
history for great many southerners (chapters 2, 3)–as a link between ethnography and 
linguistics. The point was to confirm the Old Testament as the truth.
927
 According to this 
neoplatonic argument, natural science and linguistics confirmed the Bible and the 
existence of races originally in unity. However, since even SAE was questioned, the 
majority of southerners disagreed: the argument was lacking in skepticism (chapters 2, 3).  
Semiotically, this structure could easily accommodate the transcendentalist views 
about language that emerged among Boston educators at the time Dew was lecturing. 
They contended that “the seemingly fragmented nineteenth century had more unity to it 
than many had come to suppose.” With the help of such esoteric language education, it 
would be possible to return to pre–Babelian times when all could speak the same Christian 
language.
928
 Thus for instance Elizabeth Palmer Peabody had no trouble commending 
Wiseman in her post–Civil War publication related to education.929 Peabody was among 
the pioneers to mix, like Marsh and Emerson (chapter 3), German Idealism with 
Swedenborgian mysticism. By the mid–1830s, Peabody was expressing romantic views 
about poetry as primary after reading Johann Gottfried von Herder.
930
 The same argument 
was already found in Blair, Wirt had flashed it, and Kant had adopted it. But in Peabody’s 
case, the result was not irony or criticism regarding knowledge, like in the gentlemen. To 
the contrary, she had confidence in the subject’s ability to grasp this original unity as “the 
interaction of Reason with Nature,” that is, “the common origin of all men’s thoughts in 
nature’s reflection of the Oversoul.” This would pertain to brotherhood of man–expression 
familiar to Lomax (chapter 4) and borrowed by Curtis as well. It transcended politics
931
 as 
Neoplatonism, and the whole natural, dangerously pagan, dirty, immoral empirical–world 
many Virginians, nevertheless, still preferred. Peabody, like Emerson, considered 
transcendentalism a linguistically realist language, because it had re–attained the natural 
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unity as metaphor: the ladder of metaphor could be thrown away after climbing it.
932
 She 
adopted these views in practice in education that continued to prefer things over words 
which led to anti–empirical, anti–corporeal conclusions933 close to Emerson.  
This was absurd from a southern point of view. In all probability, close association of 
Dew with such a strongly Catholic revolutionary and controversial figure as Wiseman 
would have raised eyebrows or even caused a scandal, especially since the period 
witnessed a wildly anti–Catholic wave of literature.934 As a rule, southerners and southern 
planters stood opposed to the Catholic Church, even in their travels to the Continent, 
though they eschewed contact with northern churches in their travels to the North as 
well.
935
 Most Catholics–a small minority in America–were northerners, and Baltimore was 
their “Rome.” Their organizing in 1860 was seen by the majority as antithetical to 
nativism, which led to their increased self–consciousness of isolation. However, the 
church had its supporters, even in the South. The most relevant for me is Holmes, who 
focused solely on Catholic authors in the 1850s. Further, intellectual ties existed between 
Catholics and Protestants in the South.
936
  
Dew’s application of Wiseman in theories about history and language made Dew stand 
close to such strands of northern opinion. Dew thus sought to synthesize religion and 
philosophy with science and history. Holmes was wary of the mix, but at the same time 
tried to painstakingly reconcile German Idealism with religion in history (chapter 6).
937
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5.3.3 Embracing (papal) Idealism and SAE  
The third “W,” George Waddington, gets cited the most in the trio and is one of the most 
cited authors in the work. This is in the sharpest distinction to southern discussion in the 
journals, where Waddington is virtually non–existent.938 Not much scholarship exists on 
Waddington. He was a distinguished Trinity College, Cambridge scholar and Doctor of 
Divinity in Church of England, finishing as a Dean of Durham in 1840 and later becoming 
warden of the university,
939
 very prestigious and powerful offices in the church. To the 
critics of the church at this period, even the Roman Catholic Church was more 
reformed.
940
 The institution was extremely wealthy but corrupt. The divines 
overwhelmingly supported the British war effort in America, were the instigators of the 
French Revolution, supporters of slave trade and hostile to improvement in legislation.
941
 
At the time of Waddington, the church resembled the Roman Catholic Church at the 
height of its decadence before Luther. Durham was described by contemporaries very 
secluded and shadowy as if outside time and history, and its organization was very 
strongly hierarchical and luxurious even by English standards. Waddington refused to 
even encounter the poor on a topic of improvement he was forced to introduce, addressing 
the middle class instead: they knew more about them.
942
 But there was a Liberal side to 
Waddington politically. He was known for his liberal sympathies that were exceptional in 
his context and he was a pioneer in the return of a Liberal, or Whig, element to Durham.
943
 
For example, Trinity College considered character formation paramount in education. 
Soffer defines character in this context as “the successful assertion of rational will against 
every kind of vicissitude” very much centered on public life.944 Waddington probably 
approved this aim in its outlines. As we saw, this Victorian attitude was found in New 
England at the intersection of history and literature at least as early as the 1820s (chapter 
3).  
However, the important distinction from Yankees and Dew is that at least in his A 
History of the Church, from the Earliest Ages to the Reformation (1831) Waddington 
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refuses to blatantly mix politics with history into comic Whig liberalism. This was 
because he had close ties to the Oxford representatives of the German philology–historical 
critics of history such as bishop–historian Connop Thirlwall.945 Some of these Germans, 
such as Niebuhr, were less inclined towards Romanticism and Hegelian liberalism, 
distinction northerners and Dew missed but many southerners did not (chapters 2, 3). 
Thus, it is precisely the acuteness to language that separates Waddington from Dew.  
For a first example of this difference, Dew at the urging of the SW portion of VHPS 
published a lengthy article, originally a speech planned for delivery a year after Minor’s 
presentation, that explicitly linked federalism, nationalism, progress of literature and 
character formation.
946
 In other words, Dew shared the same SAE aim about education as 
was found in New England schoolbooks (chapter 2) and extended this principle to history 
and literature. Unlike even for Lomax (chapter 4), it was perfectly acceptable and even 
preferable for Dew for a literary culture to be about money, fame and utility.
947
 This claim 
seems very bold in his context. Appealing to Madame de Staël, Dew argues strongly 
against style and rhetoric–elements strongly entrenched in Virginia–since they were 
common in the France of Louis XIV: what these elements lacked was philosophy French 
philosophes provided. Romantic literature and mathematics are grounded in monarchy: by 
contrast, the philosophes were a prerequisite for “nobler and more useful” knowledge, 
“moral, mental, religious and political.”948 This category apparently included history. 
Around it, Dew attaches valorization for urban growth: cities give rise to American 
national literature that is sadly lacking as of yet. Because of urban environment, Dew 
implies, America is the best place in the world for these studies. Remotely echoing 
Kennedy, he argues the ancients are little more than a hindrance in the process and 
immoral.
949
  
Thus, like Prescott, Minor and Gilmer, even Dew draws the same erroneous 
conclusion the philosophes wrote epistemologically true language and that, as a corollary, 
a study embarking from such (misconceived) metaphysics would be what modernity is. In 
addition, he again argues, carelessly or strategically, out of context: de Staël discusses the 
philosophes as representatives of a more expansive and politically perceptive literary 
genre, not as a group possessed with a somehow more profound and serious 
epistemological truth. In addition, Dew leaves out de Staël’s appreciation of the Sun King 
regime in literature, her sociological analysis of an aristocratic society, and her semiotic 
reflections. These would have chimed better with the aspirations of many other leading 
southern historical theorists: indeed, de Staël encourages the emulation of the style of the 
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Louis XIV literature as a strategy to diffuse utilitarian works and philosophy.
950
 Departing 
from de Staël, Dew’s trope of monarchy that clips the wings of philosophy, science and 
progress of truth derives possibly from arch–Federalist Alexander Hamilton, Jefferson’s 
nemesis. At any rate, the argument is strikingly similar.
951
 In addition, the influence of the 
Prescott essay resurfaces. Prescott, in connection with 16th century history of Italy, had 
condemned all monastic communities as thinkers and historians for their seclusion.
952
 
Dew radicalizes this by extending it as a metaphor to cover entire societies. Whether he 
refers only to monasteries or alludes to other countries is open to interpretation, but the 
strategy closely followed SAE (chapter 2). He demolishes their philosophy in contrast to 
his which, ironically, is a catachresis.
953
 But here he is again unashamedly dishonest given 
his own favorites Wiseman and Waddington, hardly representatives of openness. Yet he 
dares claim the whole history is behind him in his assertions.
954
 Dew backs away from his 
previous assertion in the “Review” that the natural condition of man is war: this would not 
be true in America.
955
 Instead Dew valorizes utility as “a universal desire to be useful” in 
America to the whole mankind–transcendentalist–idealist language–and “an ornament to 
our country.”956 His argument, like Minor’s, resembles the New England custom where 
those unwilling or unable to adapt to the community and its competitive institutions were 
assigned to asylums, almshouses and penitentiaries to regain self–control and emerge as 
useful citizens again.
957
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For a second example that illuminates Dew’s idealism, Dew also distorts Waddington 
to suit his agenda. For instance, Waddington paints a far more critical picture of Pope 
Nicholas I in a case where a former queen pleaded him to punish her husband, one of 
Charlemagne’s descendants, for divorcing her.958 The decision the pope came to was not 
clear. Waddington treats the probable decision in favor of the queen cynically but adds it 
was to be expected since the Church only gave a tit for tat for Charlemagne’s exploitation 
of it for purposes of civil government.
959
 Dew, by contrast, uses the incident as first proof 
that the pope was fighting for the people, defender of the oppressed and on the side of 
justice and humanity since the feudal times were “of great violence and oppression.” Dew 
treats pope’s verdict as certain and, appealing to Waddington, adds that in it, the pope 
“was supported by people [sic], and the justice of the case.”960 Waddington’s treatment is 
far more nuanced and avoids the whiggish liberal moralizing typical of Bancroft and 
Prescott. Dew gives a second proof to support his pro–pope argument by claiming 
Waddington contends Nicholas acted right and was supported “by king, and the people” 
when he restored a bishop two councils had deposed.
961
 However, Waddington makes no 
such claim: to the contrary, Nicholas probably acted from self–interest, engaged in scare 
tactics, and used forgery to achieve his aims.
962
 As third proof, Dew appeals to 
Waddington to claim that Philip Augustus of France “was ready to execute the pope's 
sentence,” helping Pope Innocent III succeed.963 However, Waddington calls the pope a 
spiritual and blackmailing tyrant and points out it was he who forcibly put Philip to the 
English throne and Philip acted from ambitious motives. The pope even proclaimed a 
crusade against the former ruler John that was only averted thanks to John giving in to the 
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tyrant.
964
 Elsewhere, Dew claims the popes were “the most democratic potentates of 
Europe, and consequently their hold was strong on popular affection” as a great, non–
violent force across all men.
965
 This resembles his Eucharist argument, and comes very 
close to the Unitarian–transcendentalist one endorsed by Wiseman in its effusions of 
Idealism. Waddington makes no such claim.
966
 An interesting distortion occurs when Dew 
claims Waddington contends early monks’ favorite biblical excerpt valorized labour.967 
However, the context actually speaks against labour in the sense of that excerpt!
968
 Dew’s 
Lockean bias is strong here. He technically departs from Idealism, but in a way that was 
perfectly acceptable from a New England view (chapter 2). Critical for me is Dew’s 
filtering out the philologically critical elements in the German tradition towards Idealism, 
thus following the North and Transcendentalism (chapters 2, 3, 6). 
5.3.4 Implications for American political philosophy 
There is very little explicit nationalism in the work, the great contemporary (northern) 
theme. However, that Dew was very familiar with the first northern classicist historians 
and their connecting–contrary to Jefferson–classical scholarship, hierarchical ethnic theory 
and SAE history into one vast (Federalist) synthesis (chapter 2) is strengthened around this 
issue.  
First, Dew brings their favorite Locke and utilitarian Bentham side by side with Plato 
and Aristotle in greatness as philosophers against Asian culture.
969
 Heeren and Prescott 
had also disliked Asia, and utilitarian praise was something rare in the South. Second, 
Dew spends the greatest sustained discussion related to the United States comparing 
ancient oratory in court and politics with the U.S. This reveals a great deal about his 
approach to language–the problematic question for southern critics of history–and what it 
implied for politics. Dew makes several contrastive distinctions between the ancients and 
the U.S. that is often dealt together with Britain, Federalist style. These contrasts are done 
always to the advantage of the modern systems in America and Britain. Their proceedings 
in court are more rigorous, to the point, and more logical. This process of common law 
Dew calls “genius” and “beautiful science.” The function of oratory is much different 
today as well, thanks to the democratic and egalitarian effect of the printing press. Here 
Dew argues in the way of Franklin, another northern classicist favorite.
970
 This positive 
value judgment he bases on Voltaire. Franklin and Voltaire were good friends and their 
second intense meeting shortly before Voltaire’s death was widely noted in France and 
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hailed with joy by John Adams.
971
 Dew idolizes Franklin in his short, less than a page–
long coverage of the American Revolution, where Franklin covers half the space and is 
seen through the eyes of a French lady.
972
  
We must again be cautious about treating Dew as a synecdoche of southern historical 
thinking. In contrast to Dew’s unabashed praise for British common law, the Virginia 
school of Jefferson and James Madison (cousin to the reverend), John Taylor of Caroline, 
and lastly Calhoun who extended the Founders’–perhaps especially Jefferson’s–views to 
the 1830s and 1840s, expressed reservations.
973
 The differences in system of governance 
and distribution of information pertain to differing role for and status of language. Dew, 
following northern SAE and Unitarians, prefers the tried and true Lockean view to figural 
considerations, be they modern or ancient. In modern times, the orator is far more 
responsible. Not only internally in the de–rhetorical cogency and logic of his argument, 
but also externally to the editor and reviewer of the press, to the leaders of the opposing 
political party, and to the wise republican (Lockean) citizens he represents. Rhetoric is 
much inferior, an insubstantial tool for clever concealing of the true substance that will 
emerge in critical inspection of the address, conducted by these layers. Key metaphysical 
element in the difference is Newtonian time, which makes self–interest the most dominant 
principle.
974
 In the U.S., economics, the topic of political wrangling, is hard to be poetic 
about, but Dew explicitly rejects sarcasm and sneers about this. Economics is a good thing 
because  
our speaker must not neglect cents and quarters of cents, no matter how unfavorable to 
oratorical display. He is very sure that the great interests of this country will not be cheated 
out of their wealth, or reconciled to dangerous schemes of policy, by the mere jugglery of 
oratory. Thus substance is everything, ornament nothing. The modern science of political 
economy has of itself operated a powerful change in public speaking.   
ibid., 150. 
For my purposes, the interesting elements are the support granted to the press and the role 
of language over rhetoric. In this study, I cannot enter deeply into the first issue. Many 
republicans had become wealthy and virtually Federalist after the War of 1812. 
Jeffersonians such as Randolph and Calhoun protested against accountability to the voters 
and against a partisan press. Pasley states to Jefferson, parties in general were an anomaly, 
and Cheek mentions Calhoun thought parties distracted from less abstract pure 
republicanism or concrete libertarian freedom. However, as Pasley notes, press 
partisanship continued at grassroots level especially in Kentucky and New England. A 
shift in political culture away from physical and concrete politicking such as cudgeling, 
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shooting and dueling towards more urban printed words was positively welcomed in these 
places in the late–1810s. Similar sentiments among editors appeared in Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Missouri, New York and especially Connecticut.
975
 Nevertheless, in case of Henry, 
this transition into Federalism was not approved of by Jefferson. Weems had endorsed 
pure republicanism as well (chapter 2).
976
  
Failure to materialise reform speedily enough by northern Jeffersonians led in 
Pennsylvania press circles to promote Jackson for president over Calhoun. This fervor 
only increased among newspaper–politicians as the 1820s progressed. After attaining 
presidency, Jackson handsomely rewarded his press patronage. It continued in the fallout 
between Jackson and Vice–President Calhoun when a northern paper supplanted a pro–
Calhoun one with a pro–Jackson one. Indicative of the troubled relationship to such power 
of the printed word in Virginia were protestations against Jackson’s nepotism. Jackson 
launched a paradigm shift in American politics, where editors and the press became 
instrumental in the birth of masses–based two–party system in the 1830s.977 The new 
power of newspaper politicians signified considerable weakening in the previous more 
aristocratic, rhetorical and bodily presence culture
978
 in American politics.
979
 Dew’s 
applauding of this great phenomenological and semiotic change shows how far he was 
from Jefferson and Calhoun, and from the critics in South Carolina (chapter 3). 
Furthermore, it shows the difference between Jackson and the confused Jeffersonians in 
Virginia about print politics. The difference may have extended to the latter’s views about 
VHPS, because at least initially, it was based on history as printed, not as personally 
experienced and told. That is, not on the Renaissance way of oral communication that still 
lingered, particularly in Virginia (chapters 2, 3, 4).  
More metaphysically and figurally, Dew unsurprisingly agrees almost word for word 
with Heeren on the negative correlation between liberty and rhetoric in history, and the 
latter’s opinion on ancient Greek historiography without citing Heeren.980 Such “rhetoric 
of de–rhetoric” Dew championed chips away at the self, because the self is now different 
from personal life, still recognized by Dabney for example (chapter 4).
981
 Similar to his 
“Review” argument but now more openly, Dew proceeds to further a bourgeois public 
sphere in southern history began by Wirt (chapter 2). The functional hoc est corpus meum 
principle Dew had advocated earlier (5.2) is extended in a rational sense to “a utopian 
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universality that would allow people to transcend the given realities of their bodies and 
their status.” This rhetorical strategy is “a major source of domination,” because such a 
resource was unequally available. A simple exercising of reason was not enough to get it. 
Such self–abstraction was a differential resource, an act of self–conscious difference 
between the subject and his physical surroundings.
982
 It is not Dew’s body, or that of his 
fictive political orator’s, that is at issue. To the contrary, a particular body is now a 
humiliating positivity that confirms masculinity as the negative and the general. 
Ontologically, “[t]he bourgeois public sphere is a frame of reference in which it is 
supposed that all particularities have the same status as mere particularity.” Such bodies 
are universalizable.
983
 This would illuminate the powerful theoretical interest in female 
adoration as particularity in Wirt and Dew, especially the latter, compared to their context 
and theorists like Dabney (chapter 4).  
A revealing remark on such a transfer of corporeality–from white, propertied, literate 
male to the female–is offered by Dew when he refers to Autolycus in Xenophon’s 
Symposium that depicts a riotous banquet scene. After describing the details that praised 
the beauty of Autolycus, Dew remarks: “A modern could well understand all this if it had 
been a woman instead of a man, Autolyca instead of Autolycus.”984 Women could be 
marked and particular, not so men. Dew echoes a London critic’s complaint of Socrates’s 
ungentlemanly conduct in these scenes, but insists that his morals and philosophy were 
still good, something extractable regardless of the dubious corporeality.
985
  
In addition, “for purposes of burlesque,” Dew omits Aristophanes’s dining scene from 
scrutiny.
986
 This is curious, because he claims there is only one banquet scene depicted by 
Aristophanes that has survived, while there are such banquet–like scenes, or symposia, in 
several of his surviving plays.
987
 His silence should be heard, because many of the dinners 
have to do with abnormal states of the social order. For instance, in Knights, slaves instead 
of their owners are in charge, while in Ecclesiazusae, women occupy positions of power 
instead of men.
988
 Dew’s willingness to skip such plays indicates further his universalistic 
abstractionism. But in distinction from the cosmopolitans, it is suffused with continued 
unwillingness to be playful that in turn indicates his Catholic sympathies for order. The 
negative opinion about Aristophanes and associated valorization of Socrates may partly 
derive from Voltaire.
989
 Poe, for example, strongly disagreed with Voltaire’s 
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interpretation.
990
 Dew declines to morally condemn Greek comedy, comparing Xenophon 
side by side with Plato and contending that for the latter, the mind always came before the 
body while for the former they were on par.
991
 However, given the preference for 
Nietzsche–esque approach to history in Virginia and general hostility to Plato (chapter 2) 
it is interesting and illuminating to see Dew slightly siding with Plato against Xenophon in 
this context.
992
 Dew’s quasi–Victorian moralising about Aristophanes is a pioneering one 
in Virginia judging by the Messenger, which would support my thesis of the relatively 
secular and humanistic or “unreconstructed” approach to Antiquity in Virginia. Therefore, 
he is drawing southern culture further away from corporeality–what Warner names 
physical, theatrical, oratorical representation and presence–towards a “universal” public 
sphere.
993
 In Virginia’s historical discussion, Dew’s vision contended against the more 
powerful forces of WW, southern SAE now irreducible to its northern variant, and the 
classicists and common folk who were not SW, had no similar religious views, or lacked 
cosmopolitanism. It is plausible these clusters thought differently about slavery and 
women intellectually and metaphysically, because Aristophanes had not previously been a 
problematic author in the Messenger. The different body and individual as well as 
enjoyment/merry–making are for Dew questionable “ruffianism” and indecency especially 
in Xenophon.
994
 But such unrefined and sensual, more pagan social existence arguably 
still was the more common one in Virginia outside SAE and resembled the relationship 
the Scots had to Dew’s preferred English (chapter 2). 
Xenophon was “probably the most widely read and cited classical political theorist at 
the time of the Founding.”995 Calhoun–deeply inspired by Virginia as a locale996–followed 
the argument of Xenophon in his first public speech, delivered a few months after his final 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=352&chapter=53827
&layout=html&Itemid=27. 
990
 Anonymous [Poe], ”Pinakidia,” Southern Literary Messenger 2 (1836e): 580. 
991
 Dew, A Digest, 171. 
992
 There is no critical commentary on Plato’s Symposium, unlike on Xenophon’s. ibid., 170-72. 
To the contrary, the unswerving quality of Socrates’s mind and reasoning in the former are brought 
up: “[Socrates’s speech] however, was the crack speech of the company.” After drinking his two 
companions under the table “Socrates, after having seen them all out, rises with his little Boswell 
(Aristodemus) to pass through the ordinary routine of the day, as if nothing had happened.”  ibid., 
171, emphasis original. Given Dew’s distaste for playfulness, satire and irony despite his 
cosmopolitanism, I interpret this passage to be more didactic than satirical. Plato is mentioned twice 
as often as Aristotle in the work. 
993
 Warner, ”Mass Public and the Mass Subject,” 388. 
994
 Dew, A Digest, 172. 
995
 Thomas L. Pangle, “The Classical Challenge to the American Constitution,” Chicago–Kent 
Law Review 66 (1990), Symposium on Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional Order, 
147. 
996
 Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, 50. 
  
 
 
219 
breakup with Jackson.
997
 That Dew is again adding his weight to SW against which both 
Jefferson and Calhoun were virtually at war
998
 is indicated by his criticism of Xenophon’s 
criticism of democracy–direction WAE Kennedy had satirically flashed (chapter 3)–that 
deserves closer inspection.  
Dew had consistently endorsed the northern reception of neohumanism (chapter 2).
999
 
Dew arrives at its conclusions about Athens against Xenophon’s Sparta. He describes 
Athens as “the most flourishing state of Greece. Her citizens were the most enterprising, 
and accumulated wealth the fastest.” Dew appeals to Herodotus for the fact that the 
“career in wealth [of Athens] commenced immediately after the overthrow of the 
Pisistratidae, [thanks] to the system of equality” so that she could draw “the wealth of 
Greece into her lap.” By contrast, Sparta’s constitution “seems fit only to make soldiers,” 
not even them if Thermopylae is excluded. Athens has the monuments and trophies “to 
prove her grandeur” as “instructress of Greece” as Pericles had put it. It was “the school of 
humanity and fraternity. Foreigners were more mildly treated there than elsewhere. Slaves 
were better treated there than in any other city of Greece, and there was less cruelty in the 
execution of her laws, and her repentance of misdeeds was often candid and cordial.”1000  
Present–day England is a great society for the same reasons: in both ancient Athens 
and England, democratic hegemony produces moral citizenry that is worth more than 
economics. In both, the whole is “a sort of senate of kings” which “inspired importance 
into the meanest” among the citizens.1001  In German rhetoric, Athens had “genius” and 
there “every citizen seemed capable of dedicating his faculties to the most multifarious 
objects with dexterity and grace.” Athenian culture produced “greatness” “in the arts, 
literature [and] statesmanship”–that of Sparta “merely produced sensuality without 
refinement, corruption without greatness.”  
To support these claims, Dew falls back on powerful modern authorities: On the 
character of Greek demus, Dew cites Niebuhr from Thirlwall’s translation. To Legaré, 
who has “seized the true spirit and character of Grecian civilization,” Dew attributes the 
claim that German historians are superior on Greece, because their interpretation is 
grounded in Aristotle, not Xenophon (or Plato). Though the two had “transcendent 
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intellects,” they “wrote in the spirit of a reaction.” After a full and objective analysis they 
lacked, Aristotle emerges as one who had “some faith in the people.” He had a view that 
the best government is “a well–tempered popular constitution, in which the popular 
element is strong and active.” 1002 Dew concludes that since the French Revolution created 
a new public sphere that is more polite, refined and democratic, it is natural to fall back on 
German neohumanist Greece as Heeren, for instance, conceived it: a testing ground for 
political scientific analysis we now can appreciate.  
Applying these insights to the U.S. context, Dew nods to Jackson: the most important 
lesson from Greece is the ability to behold “the great blessings of our federative system, 
which in our state governments secures all the stimulating influence of small independent 
commonwealths, whilst in the federal head we behold just power sufficient to keep the 
peace throughout the system: thereby preventing those family jars and civil wars which 
hastened the downfall of Greece.” Though Dew speaks of “equipoise” and cautions 
against consolidation of power, centralized government is the more important one, and this 
should be the lesson to America from neohumanist Greece. Analogous to Greece, the 
original U.S. as an amalgamation of individual states was much worse than “this great 
union.”1003 
This is a revealing analysis. Dew attaches to Athens attributes from Locke, something 
he had not done in his article regarding property in Athens.
1004
 In addition, Dew goes to 
great lengths to prove his anti–Xenophon case in political theory. However, I seriously 
doubt whether Herodotus could be trusted as a historian. This was Heeren’s position 
(chapter 3) that Dew emulates, but one that was not universal. That Aristotle–the objective 
judge in Dew’s account–discredited Herodotus as a historian1005 would already be enough 
to falsify Dew. But even supposing Herodotus a trustworthy historian, it is strange how 
Dew distorts him to support his own ideology that reflects his Franklinian and SAE 
imperative of ideas as primary. This exacerbates their comparatively alien character in 
Virginia’s history. To speak of Athens as a proto–Lockean city–state seems anachronistic, 
because it applies Locke to all history, a move Locke never granted but northerners were 
less cautious about (chapter 2). Dew claims Herodotus supports such “anti–Spartan” social 
theory. However, Herodotus actually reveals how the Spartans were the ones to conduct 
and, by their two separate armies, apparently chiefly orchestrate the first offensives against 
the Pisistratidae although the two groups had been friends. The motive was not wealth: 
these Spartans “esteemed the things of heaven more highly than the things of men.” The 
second, more successful, Spartan army was assisted only by a portion of Athenians, those 
who “wished for freedom.” After driving the Pisistratidae to a fortress, Spartans would 
have returned back home had not Athenians resorted to blackmail by seizing Pisistratidae 
children as prisoners. “Such then was the mode in which the Athenians got quit of their 
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tyrants.” In Herodotus, the strength of Athens was increased using blackmail after this 
campaign, not Lockean enterprise. In addition, Herodotus makes no explicit comment on 
equality.
1006
 Thus Herodotus fails entirely to agree with Dew’s idealization, but to the 
contrary tells the Athenians became an unthankful and insulting people from a Spartan 
point of view. Herodotus mentions prosperity in connection with tyranny. And while Dew 
claimed the Athens of Herodotus was about equality, actually Herodotus implies equality 
is a philosophy fit for tyranny when Thrasybulus, a tyrant ruler, destroys all the ears of 
corn that top the rest. Further, for example Miltiades, a tyrant, was a distinguished citizen–
general of Athens.
1007
  
Since unlike in the North, neohumanism was far from an obvious truth about Antiquity 
in southern cultural centers (chapters 2, 4), it is striking how strongly Dew advocates it 
and how tenaciously he attacks Sparta and Spartan–minded political theory Jefferson and 
Calhoun preferred. Now it is Sparta that plays the role of the “wrong” kind of aesthetics of 
sensuality, not liberal or refined in a bourgeois neohumanist–cultural sense. This argument 
is all the more interesting because as Hodkinson claims, Xenophon’s Sparta was not so 
much about wealth or militarism as internal social order, self–control, and right moral 
qualities. Instead of wealth or militarism, it is the social dimension of life and promotion 
of freedom in the poleis that matter.
1008
 These concerns chime well with Jefferson in 
general and perhaps southerners in particular. Still, this case is so important to make that 
Dew departs even from Heeren and labels Sparta conservative and oligarchic, Athens 
democratic and progressive!
1009
 This is a notable anachronism and simplification. I cannot 
locate it in Heeren’s output though Dew refers to a mysterious page 296 in (apparently) 
Heeren to support his claim. To the contrary, Heeren points out the position and freedom 
of women in politics was better in Sparta than in Athens, which would already refute 
Dew’s typology.1010  
But the difference in sophistication is even greater compared to Wachsmuth. 
Wachsmuth notes that even concepts such as democracy or aristocracy are perhaps 
unsuitable for Greek constitutional analysis. Even if they were not, there was necessarily 
nothing unnatural, ad hoc or reprehensible about aristocracy for the Greeks. 
“[T]ranquillity and contentment might be preserved amongst them [the people] for 
centuries by the beneficent indulgence of the governing body [of aristocrats], while by 
means of individual concessions, which involved no particular danger to the nobles as a 
class, the aspiring, though not the rebellious demands of the people might be satisfied.” 
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The character of Attic demus showed it had no political ends or purposes that would 
topple the aristocratic rule, because society did not function that way: nobody had a notion 
that the masses should rule. Later and self–interested advocates provide the only such 
allusions. Democracy that was extended too far was responsible for oligarchy. So, one has 
to distinguish between condemnation of the later oligarchy Wachsmuth agrees with, on 
one hand, and centuries–lasting contentment with the earlier aristocracy, on the other. 
Oligarchy was the unnatural separation, because the oligarchs “appear without any fixed 
or substantial character by which their condition of privilege and power could be justified 
and supported, but are confined to the mere relation of numbers, wherein the people 
naturally felt their superiority.” By contrast, the prior aristocracy was “the politically best” 
or άριστοι (aristoi), a timocracy in Plato’s terms. The subsequent oligarchy was much 
inferior. Aristocracy and early democracy were not antithetical and both were equidistant 
from oligarchy. In addition, no natural right, fixed principle or other abstract tendency 
governed such political thinking. Instead, execution varied between each individual and 
was judged by the demus “according to the temper with which power is employed”.1011 I 
argue Wachsmuth’s theoretical framework situates his analysis close to that of the 
Jefferson school of classicist–philological history. Jefferson and Taylor were not strangers 
to such a theory of government of “good” aristocracy.1012 
Even Aristotle in Spartan context is far from Dew’s champion of, or spokesman for, 
democracy. To the contrary, he thinks the ephoroi, i.e., democratic element, is corrupt 
because poor, and more tyrannical than monarchs. Though the people need to form one 
element of a constitution after the Spartan example and help keep the whole together, 
Aristotle laments they have deteriorated the constitution of aristocracy into democracy and 
behave licentiously.
1013
 To be sure, Aristotle contends the sole end of Spartan society is 
war.
1014
 Montesquieu–the Wirt favorite (chapter 2) and an inspiration for Dew as well1015–
                                                 
1011
 Wachsmuth, Historical Antiquities of the Greeks, 1, §36, 270-76, citations on 271-72, 274, 
275, 276. 
1012
 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, October 28, 1813, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
Volume IX, 1807–1815, ed. John Leicester Ford (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1898), 424-30. In his 
critique of Federalism and British emulation of aristocracy that is somehow a natural law–like 
necessity instead of (Aristotelian) moral possibility, Taylor states: “We are ready to acknowledge 
that extraordinary virtue talents and wealth united, will govern, and ought to governs; and yet it is 
denied that this concession is reconcileable with the system of king, lords and commons. If a body of 
men which possesses the virtue, talents and wealth of a nation, ought to govern; it follows, that a 
body of men, which does not possess these attributes, ought not to govern.” John Taylor, An Inquiry 
into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States (Fredericksburg: Green and 
Cady, 1814), 27. Taylor’s book was “widely read in Virginia and the South.” Wingfield, A History of 
Caroline County, Virginia, 197. 
1013
 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), 2.1270b.20-24, 85-86. 
See also Philip Davies, “’Kalos Kagathos’ and Scholarly Perceptions of Spartan Society,” Historia 
62 (2013): 269 and note 49. 
1014
 Aristotle, Politics, 2.1271b.34-35, 88, 7.1324b.9-10, 7.1334a.5, 261, 7.1334b.6, 291-92, 
8.1338b.1-7, 304-5. 
  
 
 
223 
at one point endorsed this and, similar to Dew, ends up praising the British 
constitution.
1016
 However, Aristotle’s account that has been mostly responsible for such a 
view in modern times
1017
 is based solely on Plato’s Laws. Curiously, Dew’s account is 
fully ignorant of this. Given that Plato was a suspicious author in the South and many 
criticized or ignored reason and ideas as metaphysical guides in history, southerners 
probably esteemed Xenophon’s less Platonic account of Sparta more, contrary to Dew. As 
a corollary, there is a significant difference between Dew’s projected idealistic–Christian 
unity and what Hodkinson terms “a deep–rooted ethic of co–operative sociability” 
manifest in Sparta.
1018
 Such sociability had more to do with the senses and sensuality 
alongside hierarchy rather than any abstract dealings. It had to do with uniformity but not 
in the senses of individualism, Idealism or militarism. Hodkinson’s examples include 
respect for the elderly, sociability in food and drink, and sharing of property.
1019
 My 
argument is southern society resembled these Spartan elements in its dynamic, which 
metaphysically extends to their difference with Christianity and Idealism in general and 
northern history in particular. Yet Dew takes a significant, and violent, step away from it. 
Thus, Dew’s views depart more mainstream southern views towards a modern, Yankee 
synthesis. To see Sparta exclusively militaristic fully obscures this social sense. This has 
great relevance for me, because my phenomenological interest is in how the extreme 
Yankee philosophy of modern history became imposed on such an existence.
1020
 
Dew again appeals to distinguished modern scholars to support his thesis. However, 
the quotation he offers as capturing Niebuhr’s view about Athenian populace with the 
disclaimer: “It is perhaps an exaggerated eulogy; but no opinion of that great man and 
cautious investigator [Niebuhr] can be without great weight” is very problematic.1021 
Niebuhr and many of his southern readers were not romantic liberals about history, 
resembling instead the forces critical about the project similar to Nietzsche, Burckhardt, 
even, to an extent, Ranke despite northern and Hegelian distortions by Bancroft and 
Lieber (chapters 2, 3). This is where Dew’s northern allegiances again emerge: he seems 
innocent of, or perhaps just confused about, the fact that Niebuhr was a formidable critic 
of Heeren and a representative of a categorically different research and political paradigm 
in history.
1022
 This confusion illuminates the difference about the philological tradition of 
                                                                                                                                                   
1015
 For example, Dew follows Montesquieu regarding the importance of causal connections and 
causality in history. Many of Dew’s chapters address causes or even strive to link separate 
phenomena causally together. However, though quoting also Gibbon a fair amount, Dew seems 
ignorant of Gibbon’s criticism of Montesquieu’s causal history. See O’Brien, Narratives of 
Enlightenment, 177. 
1016
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Volume I, trans. Thomas Nugent, 4th rev. ed. (London: 
[?], 1766), Book XI, chs. 5-6, 220-37. 
1017
 Hodkinson, ”Was Classical Sparta a Military Society?” 111. 
1018
 ibid., 128. 
1019
 ibid., 129. 
1020
 Davies, “’Kalos Kagathos’ and Scholarly Perceptions of Spartan Society,” 275-77. 
1021
 Dew, A Digest, 208. 
1022
 Blanke et al., “Theory of History in Historical Lectures,” 342. 
  
 
 
224 
history critical southerners embraced but leading northerners ignored or rejected. 
Although Niebuhr was initially received positively in New England as well when he was 
virtually unknown,
1023
 his historical scholarship of critical philology and formal or cool 
textualism was rejected in the North in comparison to the South.
1024
 In a collection of 
studies translated into English in the early–1830s Bancroft was again involved in,1025 
Heeren explicitly attacks ancient history as a study of words or language and points to the 
primacy of things instead. To this argument, he connects a strongly anti–rhetorical stand 
directed at some other writers of history, a quasi–Hegelian value judgment of utilitarian 
liberalism of the institutions as the arena proper and benefactors of history, and a 
neoplatonic trope of knowledge as full light.
1026
 To northern Americans, this was nothing 
new (chapters 2, 3). Attitudes to history were decidedly more modernist and “pagan” in 
the South by comparison. Northern rejection of Niebuhr even amounted to a retreat to a 
“pre–enlightened” and anti–literary paradigm of history as an auxiliary science to 
antiquarianism, institutions and governments.
1027
 As we saw, Minor had also embraced 
antiquarianism. Since antiquarianism was originally a northern
1028
 and VHPS modus 
operandi as local history and often close to romance history in case of gazettes (chapter 3), 
we must be cautious not to reduce southern history to it despite Dew. Interestingly, in the 
North American Review, Niebuhr’s devaluation occurs after his embrace in the South and 
after Bancroft’s Heeren had been enthusiastically received in the journal. As far as 
criticism went, antiquarianism was perhaps history at its most conservative and thus 
antithetical to Niebuhr. Such a position was not what Nietzsche desired either (chapter 
2).
1029
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Dew also appealed to Legaré to support his neohumanist case against Sparta. However, 
as we saw (chapters 2, 3) Legaré certainly did not go to such extremes. As an ironic 
symbolist, he was skeptical or even pessimistic about history as historicism, romance or 
social science. Legaré did not bash Xenophon because of Aristotle. To the contrary–and 
following the Wachsmuth–Jefferson–Calhoun interpretation–Legaré praises Xenophon as 
historian and the Xenophon–Plato duo as political philosophers. Xenophon actually is one 
of his examples in the chiasm involving modern historiography and its metaphysics.
1030
 To 
my knowledge, Legaré nowhere stated anything to support Dew’s interpretation. Thus, as 
with Niebuhr, Dew either purposively distorts intellectual positions, is uninformed about 
their subtleties, or both. What is clear is that the resulting digestive mix is far from 
obvious and should be taken with a grain of salt.  
I would go so far as to assert Dew’s views about history were simply alien to most 
southern historical commentators and critics. Nevertheless, Dew inserted influential views 
about history to the discussion. As I will next explore, Dew’s ignorance of criticism about 
historical language and its metaphysical–political implications would add their weight to 
the onset of criticism–wise less sceptical and more modern views about history that began 
to emerge in Charleston.  
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6. Beginnings of erosion of southern difference about 
history and historiography: discussion in South 
Carolina, 1835–1837, 1842–1844 
6.1 Challenges to the symbolic–critical mode of southern 
historiography 
In this section, my goal is to cover the period from mid– to late–1830s in South Carolina. I 
will look at discussion of history in The Southern Literary Journal and Monthly Magazine 
edited by Daniel K. Whitaker. My argument is, the journal was a battleground. Significant 
figural and philosophic elements of northern views about history permeated it. At the 
same time, the journal also perpetuated the humanistic–modernistic, more critical and 
language–oriented approach that was resistant to modern history and imperialism. Such 
tension is also present in The Partisan, an opening to Simms’s series of historical novels I 
shall finally examine.  
6.1.1 The Southern Literary Journal and Monthly Magazine 
After Legaré’s departure, the Southern Review (chapter 3) had stopped publishing. 
However, just a few years afterwards, in 1835 in Charleston, there had appeared The 
Southern Literary Journal and Monthly Magazine edited by Daniel Kimball Whitaker, a 
journal scholars have not combed a lot so far. Whitaker himself is another very little 
investigated individual in comparison to his influence.
1031
 My argument is, southern 
historical discussion began to converge more with northern views as a result of his work.   
On the one hand, Whitaker represents a major artery of South Carolina cultural opinion 
from 1835 until 1847 when he left the editorship of his second journal the Southern 
Quarterly Review for the Democrat John Milton Clapp of the radically Democrat 
Charleston Mercury.
1032
 What has been often overlooked is the extent of difference 
between Jefferson and the Mercury. Supreme Court Judge William Johnson may serve as 
a representative of the difference. Johnson’s cultural views echoed Tory civic humanism 
antecedent to the Whig rise to power in Britain at the turn of the 18th century that were 
still relevant in the South of the 1830s about history (6.1.1.2).
1033
 Johnson was appointed 
by Jefferson. Apparently, Johnson was close enough to Jefferson to confide in him, firstly, 
about his serious doubts about recent over–stringent slavery legislation in the aftermath of 
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the attempted Vesey slave rebellion of 1822 in South Carolina. Johnson thought such 
legislation counter–productive, “product of fear and hate,”1034 position that ethically 
resembled Thornwell (chapter 4). But Johnson also confided in Jefferson, secondly, about 
the shrill and manic discourse culture in the South Carolina press his criticisms evoked. It 
was founded on “furious Passions and false Policy.”1035 It was the Mercury that replied 
with a torrent of vehement slander and criticism on Johnson as a response in no less than 
seventeen letters in less than two months.
1036
 The chief architect behind the letters was 
lawyer–planter Robert James Turnbull who declared that slavery was not even subject to 
political debate without instigating a war and that Johnson’s critique of law poisoned the 
body politic.
1037
 It is important to discern the different hues of being Democrat between 
Jefferson, the republican Virginia–leaning Calhoun, Turnbull and Jackson to see the the 
internal and functional differences of cultural opinion that also pertained to discourse 
(chapters 2, 3, 5).
1038
  
On the other hand, Whitaker’s background and views greatly resembled the ones found 
in the North. Whitaker was born in Massachusetts, a Unitarian educated at Harvard, and a 
former editor of Christian Philantropist, an abolitionist and anti–Catholic magazine. He 
had moved South in 1823, first to Georgia, then to South Carolina.
1039
 In terms of 
linguistic intellectual background, Whitaker was thereby almost antithetical to Jefferson. 
By 1826 he was doing in Charleston what Channing was doing up North (chapter 3): 
arguing against the Trinitarian position about symbolism in Biblical language. Human 
reason had no quarrel with faith but, on the contrary, helped make faith plain and simple. 
As with northern SAE, language was not to be considered a problematic or poetic entity, 
and reason and religion worked in tandem for utilitarian ends.
1040
 Though history proved 
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the original unity of man and God in the Unitarian sense Christ bridged for Whitaker as 
well, he was unwilling to draw the conclusion of Emerson and Marsh that language is 
problematic. Rather, he thought like Noah Webster (chapter 2) that the move from 
language to reality was proven without a shadow of a doubt.
1041
 In sum, Whitaker’s 
intellectual background was fairly arcane by the time and at odds with mainstream 
southern views.  
Clapp had likewise undergone northern exposure. A Yale graduate, his brother 
Matthew was a northern abolitionist and preacher representative of the frontier 
Evangelical splinter group the Disciples of Christ.
1042
 Since Yale welcomed German 
Idealism in the 1840s, it is conceivable the institution had at least begun to graft it on 
Neoplatonism in history by the early–1830s, a process where Yale scholar Webster’s 
neoplatonic linguistics acted as one linchpin. As a student, Clapp was perhaps subjected to 
idealist discourse that was much more in vogue in the North. At any rate, as an example 
that would point to the grafting, Whitaker became a more strident nationalist in the 1850s 
through Webster’s work.1043 
When he began to publish the Magazine, Whitaker had become more acquainted with 
literary theories of the day through a South Carolina marriage.
1044
 Though an active 
Calhoun supporter,
1045
 Whitaker’s arguments in the first volume fully ignore the problems 
of democracy and mass information Jefferson had had and Calhoun had at least 
acknowledged through Xenophon and Jefferson sympathy (chapter 5): England has been 
responsible for American literature since Americans have had political and enterprising 
affairs to think about first. But the English and others have also made Americans a nation 
of readers and the press “has proved invaluable in leading the mass of the community to 
think and to read.”1046 Given Jackson’s bully tactics in the press at the time, the previous 
Johnson row, and Moss’s claim that Whitaker was actively Democrat by the 1840s,1047 I 
argue Whitaker fashioned a post–Jeffersonian solution to the interplay between language, 
semiotics and history slightly differently from Virginia. Specifically, the difference lies in 
the more northern–colored acceptance of modernity and the use of dialectic tackle it. For 
instance, while the contemporary Simms and especially Poe rebelled against the novel 
modern notion of intermixing the individual and the abstract, haphazard social, Whitaker 
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treats the question far more positively and pragmatically.
1048
 Although the press and whole 
culture of journalism was primarily a New England creature,
1049
 Whitaker assumes its 
importance as a matter of course.  
However, in his argument related to the content of a culture of letters, Whitaker 
exhibits Scott–like skepticism directed at northern romancers (chapter 2). That is, even he 
is not fully ready for rise of society, the multilevel change of being inaugurated by Rome, 
strengthened by Renaissance humanism, and radicalized by the philosophes.
1050
 
Whitaker’s opposition is only different in degree, not in kind. Unlike fellow–Democrat 
Bancroft and New England, Whitaker believes the romance and the novel–in distinction 
from poetry that has spiritual elements and obviously separate from reality–detract from 
public morals and virtue.
1051
 Obviously, these senses of morals and virtue represent an 
older, i.e., humanistic, ideal that modern history and novel undermined and supplanted 
that entailed the change about book and individual authorship the South had trouble with 
(chapter 3). Thereby, Whitaker also departs from the cosmopolitanism of the philosophes 
and great many northerners, the major northern historians, and North–sympathetic 
southerners such as Dew and Lieber, even Jackson regarding democracy as yeomanry 
(chapters 3, 5). By admitting the realm of letters and morality, but refusing the 
Rousseauan implications of them for literature, he is aligned with what Simpson names 
the trope of the English–sympathetic planter as the intellectual, a Virginia figure that 
extends back to 1606 and that was still present in Jefferson (chapter 2).
1052
  
Like Wirt a generation earlier (chapter 2), he denounces the democratic plurality of the 
romance and its quality. Yet puzzlingly, this easiness of content, including history, is 
fortunate. Whitaker is thus more romantic than he would like to admit. Though irony 
never departs him fully–the quality of reading and thinking has decreased while their 
quantities have increased–he insists as a sort of literary equivalent to Crèvecoeur (chapter 
3) that the emergence of American literature will be “a brighter intellectual day than ever 
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yet has blessed the human race”: the Unitarian Neoplatonism lingers but without excessive 
nationalism. Only those who live in America and who “have imbibed the spirit of our 
institutions”–an Emersonian trope–can synchronize their works with national feeling.1053 
Following the Unitarian position, Whitaker demands that American literature be pure, 
devout and moral: that America is founded on God is evident. Ancient Greece is fully 
compatible with this notion in accordance with SAE, northern German enthusiasts and 
Webster (chapter 2).
1054
  
6.1.1.1 Northern influences 
Whitaker’s northern bias shone through in some articles related to history. For examples: 
a) To a reviewer, Simms’s Guy Rivers was too un–Victorian in morals, irony and 
questionable depiction of women. This analysis exhibits a New England topos by tending 
to value character the most in The Yemassee (chapter 3) and criticizing its religious 
satire.
1055
 In other words, Simms’s elaborate critique of American romance gets lost and 
creative playfulness with language is not tolerated.
1056
 b) Contributor James H. Smith 
vastly departed from Legaré’s far more ironic, even pessimistic treatment of Grimké 
(chapter 3).
1057
 c) The argument about confluence between science, Christianity and 
history Dew was disseminating appeared,
1058
as did a view that anticipated Gilmer about 
Christianity as conducive to progressive liberty in culture, politics and character 
development, whiggery close to SAE’s Universalhistorie reception (chapters 3, 5).1059 d) 
French transcendental poet Alphonso Lamartine, who for instance Emerson was impressed 
with and followed, got wide coverage. Lamartine was instrumental in the formation of the 
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bourgeois Second Republic.
1060
 Even an openly transcendentalist article appeared.
1061
 
Interestingly, the frequency of the northern–sympathetic articles concerning history 
increases toward the end of the publication, which leads me to speculate whether the 
ending of the journal had something to do with this trend. 
On a more aesthetically and figurally bourgeois note, combining arguments from 
Simms (chapter 3) and anticipating northerner Fisher (chapter 4)–but lacking in romantic 
and utilitarian liberalism, respectively–artist Charles Fraser insists that history, manifest as 
portrait gallery of signs, preserves memorials of “genius and skill” of ancient work as co–
temporary testimony that is impervious to time. Thus Fraser, like Whitaker elsewhere,
1062
 
has abolished historical skepticism from the unity of art and history. In a fourth, more 
transcendetalist take on this theme, “Idle Man” extols organizations, history as a book, and 
Christianity–a combination not many southerners cared for. The sign of history oozes with 
spirit, and serves as a painting. Accordingly, “[t]here should be in every household a 
family history.” Hearing haphazard anecdotes and tales is not enough. Such a history, 
linearly continuous in time, would be of interest to the community, even to the nation. 
Ironically enough, the page numbers in the article are erroneous just at this point.
1063
 
We are proud of a family name–should we neglect the very material from which it may 
have derived all the pride and character which it may happen to possess? Should we not 
rather seek, in order that the reputation which we claim for it may go unchallenged and 
unquestioned, carefully to put down those particulars of our conduct, in which, mingling 
with public men and public events, we have acquired a claim upon the esteem of the one, 
and a place in the progress of the other. No incident is too humble–no trait too trifling 
which goes to the illustration of the human mind in any of its ramifications; which supplies 
a motive for its action, or which might fill up a blank in public history. In such a book, we 
should remark carefully, and, if possible, day by day, the changes in all the moral aspects 
of the time. We should speak for our actions, and our thoughts upon the actions of others. 
The day has been occupied–let us say how. We have lived–let us record in what manner. 
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Have we been affected by public change?–let us describe its bearing upon us, and its 
general tendency. Have we suffered in domestic vicissitudes–to say why and wherefore, 
may be to erect a beacon and a guide for the children we leave behind us. The most remote 
circumstance which move our thoughts should have their memorial, for who can possibly 
anticipate how close, in a future day, may be their applications to our bosoms and our 
business–though now, they have but little influence upon us, and no connection with our 
visible interests?      
ibid., 109-10 [100-101]. 
While Jefferson had advocated freedom from linear history by the sign (chapter 2) and 
great many southerners, including historically–oriented ones like Dabney, held little faith 
in the book and the printed word about it, Idle Man argues the reverse. Idle Man has 
effectively caught up with Idealism in History, where voice, now reduced to thought, is 
problematic for presence. Thought is stored in the sign that comprises a book. This 
package is to be united with the flow of History in a literal reunion with living future 
generations, especially their hearts. While classical vision pertained to freedom, now the 
sign–become–flesh, “the best gift,” “the noblest heirloom in a family,” is a safeguard of 
presence, didactics and linear temporality, metaphorically a quasi–Bible. “Big” History 
would then pick up this tiny contribution. “[S]imple history” and “cold tradition” that 
apparently pertain to the previous, only haphazardly memorized and told non–discursive 
history, and history according to the ancients respectively–like the “yet colder and more 
speculative” future investigator–fail to have the warm, just authority the sign as presence 
has.
1064
 Thus, combining legal pyrrhonism and romantic thinking, history is a mixture of 
written honest testimony and real presence. Taking cue from British philanthropist, 
antislavery preacher and hymn writer James Montgomery, Idle Man ends with musings 
about departure and reunion. Cosmopolitan travel and the greater (comic) reunion render 
tragic loss real but ultimately secondary, and this Idle Man affirms with a citation from 
Shakespeare’s The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1623).1065 
In another turn to bourgeois Victorianism related to history, a reviewer trusts novelist 
Edward Bulwer–Lytton’s word that his depiction of Italian statesman Cola di Rienzo in 
Rienzi (1835) was more truthful than Gibbon’s treatment. Further, this is fortunate 
considering the American romance history tradition Prescott was also chiding (chapter 3). 
The reviewer also rejects the Middle Ages as uncivilized: they were only relevant as “the 
dawn of the brilliant day that was to follow [that] had already begun to checker, with a 
thousand golden hues, the East.” Mediaeval Rome was corrupt.1066 Although the reviewer 
ends with celebrating democracy in a classical republican sense,
1067
 Whig liberalism and 
romance have conquered the classical world much in the sense of Dew (chapter 5). In 
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other words, Rienzi and ancient Rome are both colored with the hues of Idealism, romance 
and Christianity, and focus is on character. Even Bulwer’s depiction of Rienzi as a fierce 
lover gets swallowed, though with great surprise, even shock in one so patriotic. This 
exhibits the aesthetic confusion between old and new classicism. Indicative of such a 
clash, the reviewer uses both statue and painting metaphors.
1068
 In an additional parallel to 
Dew, Bulwer–despite his promise–strategically obscured and humanized Rienzi with an 
idealist hue in comparison to cosmopolitan history such as Gibbon’s. Unlike the 
Genoveses, I would thus not see Bulwer in a simple continuum with Scott in the South.
1069
 
Instead, I would point out the virtual disappearance of skepticism and outpouring of 
British bourgeois Idealism not all southerners were ready for. Indeed, Bulwer even 
personally criticized Scott for lack of abstract and metaphysical concerns.
1070
 But the spell 
was effective, because even Poe held a mixed opinion.
1071
 
6.1.1.2 Persistences of heterological history, politics and poetics of culture   
Still, alliance with northern sentiment was far from complete. Specifically striking is 
aversion from romantic thinking, on the one hand, and holding onto pyrrhonic attitudes 
with reverence for the ancients, a pagan–skeptic combination epistemologically and 
metaphysically,
1072
 on the other hand. The emphasis on skeptical text criticism about 
history continued between humanism and antiquarianism. The more textual and far more 
skeptical pyrrhonism was anathema to Yankee antiquarianism (chapters 2, 3, 4).
1073
  
“T. C.,” probably the aging skeptic Thomas Cooper, scientist, lawyer, political 
philosopher, close collaborator with Jefferson and his university, and the only major 
utilitarian in the South,
1074
 makes the line between the two fuzzy. In an illuminating 
misreading in the same issue as the Rienzi review, Cooper suggests Niebuhr’s work 
continued the antiquarian findings of historian Louis de Beaufort and antiquarian 
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debate.
1075
 Cooper’s antidemocratic views and simultaneous closeness to Jefferson point 
to the conceptual difference about democracy between Jefferson and Jackson (chapter 
2).
1076
 Tellingly, SAE Rice disliked him.
1077
  
Though disagreeing with the northern rejection of Niebuhr, Cooper is not quite ready 
to join the extremity of the pyrrhonists, perhaps because of the pervading antiquarianism. 
However, he still approaches history in a decisively non–antiquarian manner: 1. he 
explicitly rejects religious history as guide and thus the bona fide tradition of Thomasius 
(chapter 3). He singles out specifically British man of letters Isaac Taylor to blame who 
was strongly anti–pyrrhonic in method.1078 The North American Review, by contrast, was 
recommending Taylor for its readers and offered his works as key texts to historical text 
analysis.
1079
 2. Cooper fully ignores the antiquarian, more tactile history that turned from 
texts to material evidence.
1080
 3. Apart from Niebuhr, he also ignores all German 
authorities, including the anti–literary Heeren the northern paragon, preferring British 
pyrrhonic–legalistic approaches.1081 By exempting ancient authors from such text 
criticism, Cooper has not taken the step into the 19th century.
1082
 Remarkably, Cooper’s 
ignorance of such modes that critique pyrrhonism belongs more to the 17th.
1083
 In sum, 
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Cooper represents a very different orientation to history from the North and organizations 
like VHPS. However, history only came fifth in Cooper’s personal interests judging by his 
library. Philosophy was even far lower:
1084
 he had evidently stopped reading it after the 
Scots. His British sources are rather politicians than historians. He reflects the peculiar and 
complex position about history at Jefferson’s university (chapter 2).  
In his follow–up article, Cooper exposes the utilitarian and scientistic, one could say 
a–romantic, sides to his approach.1085 Indeed, he is the first southerner since Josiah Nott to 
refer to history as a science in my material (chapter 3). Interestingly, like Nott, Cooper 
was familiar with Philadelphia education. Such views were marginal in the South 
compared to humanism and modernist engagements with Romanticism, but not in the 
North.  
Still, Cooper concluded with an emphasis on language thar resulted in a drastic 
difference about what “science” meant in history compared to northerners Bancroft and 
Prescott (chapter 3).  Cooper frankly declares all history that is contextual, or departs from 
universal human nature, fundamentally untrue and suspicious: he considers even 
Herodotus a romancer. By contrast, Herodotus was the enlightened preference who was 
read in France as cosmopolitan natural historian. This reading heralded the collapse of 
Vossius’s exemplar history of the 1620s that had been attached to Universal History 
(chapter 2).
1086
 Contextual history was the German contribution to history (historism and 
historicism). Thereby, Cooper is not ready to move to modern history. Cooper admits 
“[n]ine tenths of all profane history must on this plan be rejected [for its inability to 
withstand the criticism of science],” but the remainder may fulfill the aims of Bolingbroke 
about philosophy teaching by example, in Cooper’s terms, experience lessons, that is, 
exemplary history. Despite his intellectual alliance with Bolingbroke, Cooper has no 
trouble revealing the stand of Whig Robert Walpole that the secret of history is that it is all 
fiction. A skeptical reader can detect it. This is pyrrhonic.
1087
 Thus, his stand on history is 
not really different from historiality before the German renaissance (chapters 2, 4) but 
with perhaps slightly more de–emphasis on Enlightenment. Similarly, Vossius’s “interest 
in historiography was to discover principles, not to describe a development. Theory 
provided criteria by which to judge the ancient practice, and ancient practice gave 
illustrative material to the Ars Historica.”1088  
There is no renovated History, conceived as metaphysics, in Cooper. In dramatic 
contrast, Heeren and, in extreme form, the Yankees, were willing to refer to that History 
as science due to its deductive, scientific nature from statist political science that included 
Prescott’s interpretation of the philosophes as an integral element of SAE (chapter 3). For 
Cooper, history as sign is fundamentally not to be trusted, and that is science for him–a far 
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more Nietzschean estimate. Truthful history must either come from the ancients as 
rhetoric–humanistic examples,1089 or established like a courtroom case for the pyrrhonists. 
True to Whitaker’s roots and the orientation towards the North, a Unitarian rebuttal to 
Cooper appeared later.
1090
 
But differences could go even much further as culture politics in illuminating ways. In 
an article from 1836, a writer formulates a position about history that had many strongly 
anti–neohumanist elements. The writer compares the American relationship to Britain 
with that of Thrace to Athens. The author cautions against neohumanist valorization of 
same language, if this gets overextended into nationalism: ignorance of Greek actually 
secured Thracian freedom. Such schemes ensure the (Roman) arts and liberty. These are 
again humanistic, classical republican aims.
1091
 The argument would have none of 
Herder’s view that language is a force that unites people. Consequently, it evades modern 
history. “At a time when German speakers lived in dozens of different principalities and 
four separate city–states, Herder’s philological inquiries supported a movement dedicated 
to the formation of a unified German nation–state.”1092 By contrast, the writer takes stock 
in such classical authors as Xenophon and Herodotus who have described the Thracian 
society in more detail. Since northerners and northern–minded scholars were very 
enthusiastic about neohumanism at the time, valorization of such a “barbaric” and tribal, 
decisively rural warrior culture and decentralized social existence provides a remarkable 
counterpoint.
1093
 I would thus argue the audience of the argument was South Carolinians, 
not the nation. Similar to the Scots vs. the British (chapter 2), primitive barbarity is a 
liberty with no necessary “civilized” or Christian behavior, morals and decorum attached. 
Alluding to Pope, the writer attacks a recent masked ball held in Washington as very 
suspicious, because it explicitly emulated English corruption and decay. Rome had 
managed to avoid it until too much relish of Athenian influence corrupted her.
1094
 
Reflecting the previous pessimistic and ironic views of Legaré and others (chapter 3), the 
ancients were superior to the moderns in aspects such as manners, sentiment, public virtue, 
literature and the arts. This gets obfuscated by the English and, by implication, bourgeois 
culture the author describes as socially barbaric.
1095
 The writer appeals here to Jean–
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François La Harpe
1096
 who according to Le Coat was semiotically anti–Lockean, anti–
ideological and pro–figural. He was a belated champion of the Ancients against the 
Moderns in the 1790s’ France. Instead of the dominant and analytic knowledge–aesthetics 
dichotomy which, as we have seen, in case of history pertained to social science with 
particular severity in northern United States and decayed history as figuration (chapter 2), 
La Harpe held that language had rhetorical value. It perpetuated the Kantian disdain for 
rhetoric instead of poetry and “essentially marginalized literature by placing it outside the 
central body of concerns, that is, the elaboration of positive, empirically–based 
methodologies in the exact and social sciences.” To La Harpe, rhetoric undermined the 
philosophy behind such ratiocination, because polymath ancients like Aristotle, as setters 
of golden standards, had had no compartmentalization of such genres as history, poetry or 
drama for example. As one result, figure preceded philosophy, not the reverse
1097
 of 
modern history’s credo.  
Interestingly, the reviewer singles out history as a genre that ideology and religion in 
general and, in the English context, poet–biographer Thomas Moore have ruined. Moore 
had acted wrongly as a historian by bringing to the public view embarrassing qualities 
about his subject. Such pestilence extended to America.
1098
 In remarks that resemble 
Machiavelli (chapter 2), the writer states that it is fortunate ancient historians have only 
simple sincerity without metaphysical argumentation or deduction, and that the Spartan 
system never confused politics with morals.
1099
 Again, like in the early–1600s and before 
Rousseau (chapters 2, 3), no modern historian can surpass the ancients.
1100
 
Ironically, there are some illuminating internal inconsistencies. A “spirit” instructed 
and governed both the ancients and “genius” of Bacon and included Michel de Montaigne. 
Thus the author was not fully immune to the reigning idealist fervor and its reductionism 
and unaware of the phenomenological change from Montaigne’s baroque Renaissance to 
Bacon’s Universal History.1101 Indeed, in this temporal vertigo that is similar to Lomax’s 
(chapter 4), “a liberal and rational morality” was to be found in the ancients, and rhetoric’s 
attraction is an attractive fruit of wisdom “enwreathed with flowers of an airy and elegant 
but ever chastened fancy.”1102 The words point to Bacon and Scottish Philosophy and–
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more curiously–English romantic feminine poetics. This again indicates the stronger 
impact of Romanticism in Charleston: it even raises the possibility that the author was a 
woman.
1103
 Another peculiar intertextual pastiche is the mixing of Herodotus with Byron’s 
description of Iris, the messenger of gods.
1104
  
Anticipating Heidegger and Derrida and in line with southern aesthetic of spontaneity 
(chapter 3), the writer is captivated by the phronetic and human aspects of an endless 
work–in–progress among the ancients: even their signatures did not signify finality.1105 
Semiotically, this is a glimpse at the awareness of presence as non–linear continuity in 
time before its bourgeois/capitalist regimentalization as discursive, grid–like space. An 
unfinished signature functions not as something detachable: that would corrupt identity 
and singularity into (immoral) sameness and repeatability.
1106
 Pace Dew, it thus indicates 
the difference about time and ethics in the South. But then, as the temporal vertigo 
continues, to this is linked neohumanist and northern rhetoric about perfection of form and 
a notion that the ancient philosophers were privately far more Christian than Hume or 
Gibbon. Unlike for Gilmer and Dew (chapters 4, 5), their irreligious episteme is not lost 
on the writer. The Greek religion was superior to other pagans in its effects on society, a 
thought the writer gets from philosophe historian Scot John Gillies, Robertson’s successor. 
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Political writer Walter Moyle is quoted to affirm Rome’s religious institution had great 
moral and civic, that is classical republican, ends.
1107
  
Furthermore, interesting here is the disoriented juxtaposition of civic humanism with 
Christianity and idealist continuity in preference to refinement and courtly behavior of 
politeness. As a replacement of one ideology (refined, urban politeness) with another 
(Idealism and Christianity), the former cocktail functionally resembles English cultural–
political discourse in the late–17th and early–18th centuries.1108 Importantly, Christianity 
functions in the writer in a far more subdued sense than in England, more as a resource 
than an end.  
In the British context, there was unease about politeness and refinery vis–á–vis a 
concern with individual manners and morality. Independence, public–mindedness, martial 
ethos, frugality and simplicity were manners that were conducive to liberty as civic 
moralism. Luxury, self–indulgence, privacy, softness, sensuousness, expense and excess 
were antithetical values.
1109
 Moyle, who was sympathetic to civic moralism, celebrated 
Sparta. He combined concern with legislation–founded institutions and laws–the loci of 
liberty in the civic tradition–and an agrarian way of life and poverty as safeguards against 
decay in individual manners. Unchecked, these would decay politics. Similar to the 
southern writer, money and trade would act as jeopardizing forces as the examples of 
Sparta and Rome showed. As materials for history, either the pre–Renaissance Goths–
popular among southern writers (chapter 3) as well–or similarly appropriate phase of 
classical culture would ensure the model will be kept alive. The model came into conflict 
with politeness. In short: “The peoples whose virtue was easiest to establish on civic terms 
were least aptly described as polite.”1110 In the end, Whig Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
third earl of Shaftesbury, a massively influential political writer, eclipsed this divide 
between politeness and manners in the early–18th century.1111 Shaftesbury, like Addison, 
was a part of a transformation of society, now founded on commercial modernity and the 
urban apparatuses of learning and printed sign.
1112
  
My claim is, this conflict we already encountered in sharp terms (chapter 3) still 
lingered in the South, at least in Virginia and South Carolina. Closely parallel concerns 
beset the writer. Though condemning English society, the writer is far from fully 
abandoning it. The enemy, rather, is the new society of commerce as an end result of 
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politeness. John Tyler, whose presidency Poe supported to an extent in 1842,
1113
 had made 
a similar argument a few years earlier in the political arena.
1114
 In America more 
generally, by the 1830s there was a huge gap between a) (bourgeois) politeness further 
cemented by the German renaissance (chapter 2) and b) such old–school liberty and 
humanism whose staunchest proponents in the South were probably Jefferson, Cooper and 
Calhoun. This discrepancy involved history regarding politics and poetics of culture. The 
writer, thus, is exceedingly removed from the wider context of historical discourse in the 
North and Europe, situating intellectually in the 17th century England, but with 
dislocations.  
Similarly, though Whitaker’s opening followed the northern reception of 
Universalhistorie (chapter 3), even he turned on his fellow–Unitarian Channing using 
pseudonym “Sidney” in a series of letters in terms of culture politics. This was an obvious 
rhetorical ploy on Algernon Sidney, the champion of the civic moralist model in England 
Wirt had perhaps used as well (chapter 2) but, as WAE representative, catachretically. 
Among other concerns, Channing’s extension of the Unitarian faith to national politics 
deeply troubled Whitaker.
1115
 In a later article, even a biography of Washington could not 
for him “supply the place of Cicero, Livy, or the Commentaries of Cæsar” as too 
modern.
1116
 
With an appeal to Alexander Pope, the writer rejects the idea of common humanity–
popularized by Rousseau and romantic liberals–that touted comparisons across individuals 
that were valuable in themselves irrespective of rank, metonymic position or status. 
Challenging the Ancients by the Moderns is foolish, an argument Americans have 
regrettably revived, because no–one can dispute or bring down the ancient models. 
Applying this observation to social reality, another critical distinction from anthropology 
and psychology is the writer’s concept of having a good person instead of being a good 
person.
1117
 The French Revolution and decline of Rome had spelled the end for the 
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exemplary individual of Universal History. Universal historians Descartes and Hobbes 
initiated the process of personhood as separate in the early–17th century as well.1118 
Heidegger claims they, bolstered by Edmund Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey among others, 
ignore the ontological status of personhood, what a person is. Though I cannot outline a 
full–scale existential argument about southern society, the text points to the relevance of 
“pre–Cartesian” ontology of the person that complements the semiotic world many 
southerners had (chapter 2). As we saw (chapter 4), at least the powerful Thornwell was, 
like Heidegger, willing to undermine modern philosophy such psychological individuality 
and Universal History rested on. 
For my purposes, the important schematic distinction is one paralleling on–hand vs. 
present–at–hand: A is fundamentally never “inside” or “with” any B in full unity. If 
everything is present–at–hand as category, like “water inside glass” A is of course capable 
of since A cannot evade being–in–the–world, such an existential as A will necessarily 
disappear. A is fundamentally factical in the Latin sense of factum or “has happened,” 
which for Heidegger means “destin–y” as well. Heidegger questions explicitly the 
Cartesian “cogito, ergo sum” principle as summing up the being of personhood. He 
uncouples the deductive unison from the mind to the body, and reverses the Cartesian 
preference for mind, or spirit, on the basis of facticity of A as possible, often communal 
and concrete, actions.  
Heidegger’s relevance is precisely the metaphysically and epistemologically 
problematic obfuscation of A that takes place when addressing the relationship of A to B, 
most commonly as the coupling of southern existence with Christianity and when no 
attention is paid to the comparative lack of philosophy in the South (chapter 2).
1119
 In 
other words, little attention has been paid to the thought of the categories as “mere” modes 
that divert from what to Heidegger is non–discursive fore–having A. As Heidegger poses 
the problem: “What needs to be decided is whether philosophy and history–just as they 
offer themselves to life in their self–interpretations–have grasped Dasein [“Being–there”], 
or whether they are as such not rather possibilities running counter to it?”1120 A is 
fundamentally not about an “independent” or “synthetic” “subject” or “identity” 
encountering an “object” in two senses. a) The relationship between the two is 
simultaneously more dynamic and reverse: the “subject” does not precede or master the 
object, but “object,” such as the world, is what happens, encounters or opens up to–is so to 
speak “greater” than–“the subject” “as an environing world, environs, the round–about.” 
b) “The subject” is not some steady, rationally analyzable or analyzing particular but more 
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a temporal wave with no affixed, calculable or writ–in–stone permanence or teleology in 
temporality outside Ereignis or “own–ness.”1121 I claim a) the analogy with Thrace, b) 
disdain of comparisons, c) understanding of person as a modality of being instead of being 
itself and d) absoluteness of the exemplum are traces of southern A existence. But of 
course, A is not “pure,” but rather contaminated by multiple, including very modern, 
concerns. Lack of faith the writer has for these supposedly “modern” idealistic forms 
about society, culture, history and reality can be characterized modernist.  
6.1.2 Critically metahistorical aspects of Simms’s The Partisan   
For many contributors, history still had no metaphysical and Bancroftian character as a 
totality: the term was applied to literature and the old way as a haphazard series of 
mundane events.
1122
 At times history was used alongside geography in the way of northern 
classicists.
1123
 The reviewer of Simms’s The Partisan (1835) that commenced Simms’s 
series of historical novels about Carolina in the Revolution widely praised the work.
1124
 I 
shall next discuss the book and its reception in slightly more detail as the first in a series 
of such history–literature interplay.  
The novel exhibited Simms’s agreement with Aristotle that events and empirical 
senses counted for more than persons, that is, like in case of many other South Carolinians 
(chapter 3), his emphasis is not on Whig character. In addition, Simms again critiques the 
American romance by de–idealizing the more positive and heroic tropes of American 
history. Particularly striking is Simms’s deconstruction of chivalry in the character 
Frampton, an insane backwoodsman haunting the swamps to brutally avenge his dead 
wife.
1125
  
To the reviewer, Simms was not grim enough: the story should have had a tragic 
instead of its comic ending when an American officer Colonel Walton is rescued from 
Tory execution. The character is fictive, and poetic justice belongs only to fiction, not to 
reality. The reviewer would have preferred Sterne’s style of anguishing frustration at the 
conclusion, but the argument parallels tragic poetics as well, especially Byron’s tactic 
against Schiller to make the situation clearly hopeless without any last–minute climax 
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(chapters 3, 4). And regarding Frampton, such a character “has often existed, even in more 
civilized life.”1126  
Importantly, Simms never takes the steps of Kennedy towards untarnished–more 
northern–American patriotism. Instead, he again uses the more humanistic and classical 
intertwining of virtue and vice. Sidestepping the German foil, the Revolution in Carolina 
is not abstract, idealistic, religious or organicist: it is “a complex of social behavior that 
reveals the differences and the dark and gloomy side of a pluralistic society.”1127 Simms 
resembles Poe, Nietzsche, even Derrida when according to Pearce he argues that too much 
history “may lead to paralysis and collapse on the truly human or ‘life–lived’ level of 
existence.” Simms was aware of the philosophical and aesthetic–semiotic diluting effects 
of modern history for human presence and the body.
1128
 As early as 1830 in The Tri–
Color, his anonymous sympathetic take on the French Revolution and one of the 
pioneering accounts of the event in America,
1129
 Simms had been interested in action that 
was not rational or petty. “[W]hat to a common mind would seem rashness and folly, is 
the result of the highest species of resolution and deliberate manhood. This, indeed, may 
be held that higher species of courage, which draws its influences from the moral and 
animal energies alike.”1130  
The reviewer applauded Simms’s historical fidelity that, Pearce implies, was even 
cooler about history than the cold reading of Scott (chapter 2).
1131
 Simms was never 
hostile to romance, but goes about it cautiously: he only changed the subtitle from “tale” 
to “romance” in 1854. In the later edition, he explicitly criticizes heroic history–the 
northern preference–for preferring individual (and fascist) mythic heroes, to whom “the 
best essentials of society” of communities and individual states across the social fabric 
have only instrumental value. Both the reviewer and Simms agree history cannot be 
reduced to what is in the records or to the sign.
1132
 Simms is not against heroism in the 
novel, but he wants to trace its complex workings as historical myth and resist reducing 
history to the mythic individual, on the one hand, and Montesquieu’s temporally causal 
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neutral backdrop, on the other hand.
1133
 Thus, the problematic of Simms resembles that of 
Nietzsche as cultural criticism of history.  
On the one hand, Kreyling contends Major Singleton represents perfection as “the 
struggle by which an ideally ordered vertical order subordinates diversity and mere 
contingency to the gleaming ideal of a single image” in the novel. He “directs the defense 
of order against a barbarian regime of thieves, rapists, and looters” as transhistorical 
myth’s struggle against ever–widening, ever more contingent history. The Tories are only 
a stand–in enemy: the real enemy is history.1134 The reviewer, in turn, notes Singleton as a 
fine figure, “the high–minded Carolina youth, full of daring courage, with modest 
deportment, warmed by all the natural impulses of affection and love; yet, having them 
under such control as to make them subserve his attachment for liberty and his 
country.”1135 “The best essentials” and avoidance of too much “crass” emotion are 
interesting echoes to Xenophon’s political philosophy (chapter 5). I claim the perfection 
was not a projection of the mind in propagandistic or ideological senses however. Instead, 
I would again refer to Nietzsche and the classical and pre–enlightened elements of history 
(chapter 2). By Nietzsche’s lights, Singleton’s noble history–his example is French 17th 
century critic–soldier Charles de Saint–Évremond–is alien to ignoble history that came 
after Voltaire: curiosity and access felt to and granted for everything. All perfected things 
have “goldenness and coldness.” Nothing can be more offensive to 19th century historical 
consciousness, its aversion from good taste and embrace of curiosity and more 
unrestrained mobility in lieu of perfection. People with ignoble historical consciousness 
yearn for the infinite and the immeasurable–Idealism and religion–most intensely when in 
danger, with no regard for “[p]roportionateness.”1136 Simms decided to award Singleton 
with the rescue of Walton and marriage to his cousin against the protests of her father so 
the heroic transhistorical order represented by Athens and Saint–Évremond might 
continue.
1137
  
But on the other hand, the novel also introduces Captain Porgy, an aristocratic cook to 
the American troops who had transplanted “his plantation pleasures” of the flesh to camp 
life. At times, Porgy is figured as quite literal comparisons to a hog.
1138
 Similar to 
Nietzsche’s argument, Singleton makes no acquaintance with, knowledge of, or mention 
of Porgy in the first volume. Porgy is simply described to him by his subordinate 
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Humphries on the latter’s own initiative as some accompanying “’fat overgrown creature, 
just fit for the camp, though he fights well and is true’”1139 and the issue is left at that. 
Even in the second, Porgy’s first spoken words to him are a one–way street and Singleton 
watches “with mingled emotions of pity and disgust” as Frampton, lacking all proportion 
and manners, feverishly devours a meal Porgy had made that Singleton himself, in another 
scene, did not particularly prefer.
1140
 Porgy next serves Singleton a very brief way as a 
torch–bearer.1141 Their first “dialogue” takes place when Porgy is lying down on the 
ground with a terrapin shell pressed to his heart. The shell is lit by sunrise. Porgy muses it 
makes a beautiful polish and would be fit as “’manly ornament’” “’over humanity’s most 
conspicuous dwelling–place’” that in battle “’would turn off many a bullet from that 
sacred, but too susceptible, region.’”1142 Singleton surprises him like this and fails to 
comprehend Porgy’s romantic–idealist problematic.  The major’s focus is simply and 
solely on proportion.
1143
 In response, Porgy rises “from the earth” respectfully to salute his 
superior gracefully and replies rhetorically that better little shelter than none over this 
most tender part, while agreeing that his body “has gone somewhat beyond proper 
restraints.” “’Take care of what we can, sir, is a wholesome rule, letting what can take care 
of the rest.’” I argue “what can” points simultaneously to God and Singleton. Yet a third 
heterology is introduced by Singleton’s answer when he calls Porgy a philosopher.1144 
Critically, Singleton’s concept of philosophizing never abandons the classical sense as 
amusing post–meal contemplation by way of Aristophanes or Xenophon for (historical) 
Idealism or romance. Thus, the social theory of Singleton is able to withstand Porgy, 
because Porgy’s answer is not a threat to Singleton’s perfection. Though I agree with 
Kreyling Porgy represents history at odds with Singleton, I disagree Porgy’s Rabelaisian 
Messer Gaster character is a figure that careens towards subverting “the official order” in 
a dialectical (historicist) tension.
1145
 Rather, as in cases of Poe, Burckhardt and Nietzsche 
(chapters 2, 3), I argue penchant for Rabelais and what Plank calls “sensism” need not 
include antagonism to noble classical culture, since that would entail unquestioned 
acceptance of modern liberalism, romantic thought and, thus, modern history.
1146
 The 
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Genoveses state Rabelais, an old Charleston favorite in the 18th century, was used even by 
Holmes to satirize German Idealism and the social sciences.
1147
 These strands of thinking, 
though antinomies, are less in conflict with each other than with modern history. In case of 
The Partisan, while the reviewer applauds the historical fidelity in its broad empirical 
sweep, bringing to my mind historian Jules Michelet–a highly esteemed author among 
South Carolina theorists of the 1840s (6.2.2, 6.2.3)–northerners dismissed such southern 
sensism as vulgar and immoral.
1148
 This would further illuminate my argument southern 
classicality and communality (chapter 2) were mutually less conflicting compared to the 
historical theories advocated by Germans and SAE. Singleton has not been eclipsed by the 
German renaissance Porgy and Simms play with. Singleton “enlightens” Porgy, for which 
the latter is deeply grateful, and overrules Porgy’s preoccupation with particular qualities 
of place when announcing the location of their next departure. Kicking a gasping 
terrapin’s head, Porgy finally announces that its “’rascally head’” “’seems to understand 
the subject of our conversation–of mine at least–and opens its jaws every instant, as if it 
hoped some of us would fill them.’” No reaction from Singleton is recorded. Simms notes 
that though friendly and dutiful, Singleton never slipped into familiarity with his 
subordinates, always addressed them standing up, and never let his emotions take over, 
preferring rhetoric.
1149
 
By contrast, in the later edition, Simms has added a brief dialogical, more elaborate 
and wordy interchange between Singleton and his lieutenant concerning Porgy’s character, 
at the end of which Humphries declares: “’You’ll like him, Sir, he is a man; though he is a 
mountain of flesh.’” Singleton answers: “’Very good. I suppose you know him well, and 
now to other matters.’” In addition, Porgy’s fighting prowess is highlighted more in this 
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version.
1150
 Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to this change I can only analyse as 
far as relevant for my concerns about history.
1151
 I claim by the mid–1850s, historical 
sense had changed for Simms and more generally among white southerners towards a 
more democratic and bourgeois social synthesis. As a result, the gulf between noble 
perfection and ignoble, disproportionate creature has grown far smaller. In the later 
version, there is at least a tacit bond stretching from Singleton to Porgy as the new 
insertion of discourse on Porgy and his approval would testify. Further, there is Simms’s 
assurance that Porgy and his motley crew are drawn as portraits from actual life. He 
depicts Porgy as a far more sympathetic character in–focus who had tragically wasted his 
wealth and education.
1152
 Simms offers a psychological framework to “explain” Porgy’s 
behavior in the revised version, a bourgeois tactic.
1153
 Lastly, Singleton only mentions 
Porgy as a philosopher in the first volume of the earlier edition, compared to a more 
prevalent definition of him as a philosopher–in a modern, idealist–romantic sense–early in 
the later edition by Simms himself.
1154
 This would support my argument about updated 
inclusion of Porgy in history’s (historicist) dialectic. I will return to Simms’s 
transformation from irony to romance in history (6.2.2). 
6.2 The lure of modern history and SAE: early historical 
discussion in Southern Quarterly Review  
In this section, my goal is to examine the origins and first few years of the second major 
outlet of southern historical and cultural views in journal Southern Quarterly Review that 
began publication in South Carolina in 1842. I will argue that although the Review had 
contributions from such classicist–linguist historians like Holmes, writers reckoned more 
with European philosophy of history. This led further away from the previous, 
multifarious and fairly unique critique of reason and romantic liberalism. In other words, 
the views were increasingly influenced by northern and German metaphysical theories 
about history, but with some interesting differences. Figures I intend to explore in this 
context in more detail are Holmes and Simms.  
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6.2.1 Bellicose entries and amplified northern–German views  
Whitaker’s second, much better known publication Southern Quarterly Review was 
launched in New Orleans in January, 1842, but moved to Charleston by April, the 
Mercury citing financial reasons. In the study, I can only look at its first years. 
Revealingly, though the plans for the journal were praised by both the Mercury and the 
more moderate Whig Courier–the principal organs in the Johnson row1155–suspicions 
about editorial policies in their initial stages would grow in the latter, but not in the 
former.
1156
 Three relevant themes emerge. 
1. Whitaker, already imbued with Unitarian views about language and history, 
transcended the entire SW–WW dichotomy (chapter 3). He landed on a position that 
weakened the ties of southern history to humanism and philology, and updated the focus 
of historical discussion more on romantic liberalism, roughly a generation after the North 
(chapter 2). Ironically, Whitaker’s arcane Unitarian semiotic was ill–equipped to tackle 
with Idealism in the context of history.
1157
 Outside Lieber, German philosophizing about 
history took off only now in the South, though not in Virginia until mid–to–late–1840s.1158  
2. Whitaker’s discourse strategy was partisan at the beginning, because it refused to 
tolerate political dissent.
1159
 In its contention “for reasons so plain and necessary, that, 
they need not be mentioned” to reject “articles, commencing a political controversy,” 
Whitaker re–enacted the belligerence of the Mercury, more specifically, Turnbull’s stance 
in the Johnson row Whitaker seems to refer to.
1160
 Whitaker has upped the ante from 
Turnbull: for example, he uses the same metaphor of poison in the body Turnbull used 
against Johnson to describe the negative aspects of British thinking and culture and 
northern–biased letters in education.1161 The apparently unconscious irony is that 
Whitaker’s own Unitarian background continues to shine through in his metaphysics, 
epistemology and rhetoric even amidst the bellicose proclamation to get rid of these 
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poisons. For example, he declares about the cautious study of English cultural works, 
provided the poison has been separated from them: “truth is single; truth is a unit; truth is 
powerful, in whatever soil it grows; light elicits light, wherever it springs up, and from 
whatever quarter it dawns over the soul. What is to hinder us from basking in its rays, and 
becoming brighter and better and stronger by the indulgence?”1162 Such neoplatonic 
phantasmagoria obviously emanates from the Unitarians. Whitaker in effect affixes SAE 
metaphysics on republicanism, hardly the position of southerners as a whole as I have 
tried to examine, and exactly counter to Jefferson (chapter 2). Even the Courier saw the 
metonymic operation as false.
1163
 Such radicalism within the South has perhaps not been 
recognized. Since kinship with the Mercury was so close in these openings, it is possible 
there were other reasons to move to Charleston besides pragmatic ones. Though Whitaker 
swung to the other direction in the mid–1840s to keep the Whigs aboard, and even angered 
the Mercury at one point,
1164
 its rhetoric slowly became more strident and more explicitly 
dialectic. 
3. Overlooked up to now to my knowledge is how the religious aspect of idealist–
liberal history, familiar turf in the North thanks to the interaction between 
transcendentalists, historians and SAE (chapters 2, 3), bore on southern theorists of 
history. Dew’s role in combining the two was significant, as was that of VHPS as mainly 
an antiquarian organization of Episcopalians. Now in South Carolina, the relation between 
history and religion became closer. Holmes–among the very few southerners besides Dew 
who monitored the project of Wiseman in England and whom the Catholic faith 
fascinated–became co–editor immediately after the transfer to Charleston.1165 I argue 
Holmes engaged German philosophers of history as well as Michelet, of which more in a 
moment, because he was among the few southerners knowledgeable of the 
interrelationship between post-Kantian Idealism and history. The difference is drastic 
compared to the North, where this had been known for a generation. As with Rienzi 
(6.1.1.1), Idealism was “sold” to southerners only alongside considerable classical 
erudition and philological research Holmes also possessed as a scholar. Further, although 
the journal initially barred access to religious content (“We mean to place this work on the 
most liberal basis, and to express no theological opinions in it . . .”)1166–another richly 
ironic claim given Whitaker’s background–the promise was implicitly compromised from 
the start: not only to German theorists but also Americans like Prescott, Gilmer and Dew 
and northern letters at large, liberality and Christianity were by no means antithetical.  
Still, it was only now, late in 1843, among all the articles that cover history in even 
slightly more detail, that there appeared SAE conception about history by a southerner not 
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exposed to the northern trade of a physician. This pioneer was North Carolina–born 
Baptist minister, journalist and educator William T. Brantly.
1167
  
Christianity meets us in some shape in every region,–is blended with the customs and 
literature of many nations,–is incorporated into the laws and morals, and is a part, a most 
prominent part, of the history of the world. As a fact, or a series of facts, it meets the 
historian in all his researches: as a wonderful phenomenon, it stands before the philosopher 
and demands investigation. The statesman finds it in every attempt he makes to explore the 
secret springs of government and revolution. Before any man can rationally neglect or set 
aside this body of facts, it behoves him to account for its existence. 
Brantly, “Milman’s History of Christianity,” 266. 
An investigation into Brantly’s background may explain these fairly revolutionary views 
about history in the southern context. Brantly’s background was quite anomalous, far 
more in tune with a northern frame of thinking about language and, as a corollary, society 
and history.  
In his youth, Brantly, a student at South Carolina College, had been a very close friend 
to Jonathan Maxcy, its president.
1168
 Maxcy was a hardcore New England Baptist. He 
contributed significantly to the entire Evangelical revival (chapter 2).
1169
 As a follower 
and major disseminator of the views of neoplatonist Jonathan Edwards
1170
 that contributed 
to the founding of the College of New Jersey
1171
 and thus to the Princeton Scottish 
Philosophy reception, Maxcy probably held onto SAE’s Lockean linguistics. The great 
impact of Maxcy on Brantly would certainly illuminate Brantly’s pioneering status as a 
southern advocate of SAE. However, like northerners, Brantly goes further and even 
shows signs of transcendentalist attitudes: the time of the apostles had nothing to do with 
rhetoric or refinement: “Their discourse was most simple, the facts which they stated were 
naked and unadorned.”1172 It is almost as if words did not matter, as Marsh had held 
(chapter 3). In addition, Brantly is drawn to the neoplatonic idea of one common religion 
as the origin of history, and demands simple language from historians.
1173
 He also was an 
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avowed anti–pyrrhonist.1174 Such rhetoric probably derives from Nathaniel William Taylor 
of Yale, another northern primus motor of the awakening, and from his student Horace 
Bushnell, who applied Coleridge to Taylor as a synthesis of Romanticism and 
Transcendentalism.
1175
 
 Brantly was not just one more expositor of history on SAE basis. He was a pioneer of 
“post–Marshian” language theory applied to history in the South. That Brantly spent 
most of his intellectual life in Philadelphia in the 1820s and 1830s and caused internal 
schism even among southern Baptists when he moved to South Carolina in old age
1176
 
indicate his anomalous status. Nevertheless, this was an important southern opening for 
idealist history and SAE history.     
A further step to the idealist direction of history in a way that was reconcilable with the 
Yankees was taken in 1844 when the Review published a book review on the Oxford 
Movement (OM). OM was Catholic–leaning Anglican restoration in England, a project 
dear to Wiseman and known to Dew. This was followed by an article, though with critical 
commentary, by a representative of the movement in 1846.
1177
 OM was related to German 
Idealism and German historians in Wiseman (chapter 5). But in addition, it was related to 
a high church species of Coleridge reception.
1178
 Again Göttingen figures predominantly: 
both Coleridge–who Calvert reports took opium while studying–and Edward Bouverie 
Pusey, a key OM figure, had studied there.
1179
 The might of Göttingen began to ensnare 
southerners more and more about history, because now it spread from the Yankees, 
Harrison and Dew to the southern print discourse proper.  
The book was written anonymously by George Washington Doane, a New Jersey 
Episcopalian. Doane reprised his earlier arguments for the cause on grounds it was not 
popery and wanted to dismiss the claims of Presbyterian reverend Henry Augustus 
Boardman of Philadelphia to the contrary.
1180
 While Doane wanted to firmly reject the 
idea the American Episcopalians have taken a step toward the negative sides of the 
Catholic Church, he also held that the Catholics have good qualities the restoration could 
reveal that Boardman should recognize.
1181
 The reviewer, in turn, contends OM has been 
positively and with great interest welcomed by the Episcopalians on both sides of the 
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Atlantic. The principles of OM “must lead the party and their adherents to Rome.”1182 As a 
further indication of southerners’ position on the threshold of modern cultural 
consciousness, the writer claims that since modernity subjects even religion to 
philosophical discourse, religion has thankfully not only been preserved, it has actually 
more deeply penetrated all spheres of society. This marks a preparatory step of progressive 
movement to a Christian utopia.
1183
 OM offers a chance to restore the Catholic Church to 
the rightful place it had before England separated from it. The highest authority, unity and 
oneness of the purified, pre–Henry Catholic Church is impressive and, echoing Dew, 
champion of the weak and the people. A reunified Catholic Church of oneness would be a 
sociopolitical paradise, with a “larger spirit” and “brighter intelligence” thanks to the 
progress between the 16th and 19th centuries. The only trouble is the unfeasibility of one 
head, and too unrestrained an emulation of Catholicism that would include its vices. The 
unity and thereby conservative authority of the Catholic Church is a nice idea worth 
preserving, but in practice the variations between churches, sects and individuals count for 
more than a single head.
1184
 But OM is correct to sever the Catholic Church from the state: 
religion will proceed to its ultimate triumph regardless of it and its often negative 
impact.
1185
 The idea of unity and spirit manifest in the laudable sides of Catholicism 
extended to cover the whole society along history. But they need to be balanced with more 
American religious liberty. This turns out to be an antinomy without a conclusive answer. 
The author strives to only show the consequences of principles and to keep them internally 
consistent.
1186
  
My point is, pace the foray of Marsh at Hampden–Sidney and Kennedy’s sympathies 
(chapter 3), this was one of the first, if not the first, public application of Coleridge as a 
theosopher in history in the South. Coleridge was “yet conscious also of vast powers of 
thought, and in that consciousness attempt[ed] to transmute the Spirit–forms of sacred 
truth as God gave them, into those thought–forms of his own reason which he could most 
readily apprehend. In consequence of this incessant, yet fruitless endeavour, his theology 
became a theosophy.”1187 For Coleridge and such Oxfordians as John Henry Newman, 
reason was not apart from but a necessary element of religion: they only differed in 
conclusions, since Coleridge shunned the Catholic faith.
1188
 The resulting idea was for 
Coleridge not of the mind, i.e., not forms or generalizations, but rather a conception of a 
thing given knowing its ultimate aim, “a principle in the process of realization through 
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history.”1189 Obviously this is a theologisation of Hegel about history. The only difference 
is the dualistic postulate Hegel did not have in the same form.
1190
 Following Coleridge, the 
reviewer brings up religion’s close relation to philosophy, the dualism of the question, the 
consequences that principles have, the pervasive power of such theosophy across society, 
and (optimistic, idealized) history. Like Wiseman and OM, the reviewer treats 
Coleridgean theosophy as a manifestation of a society–wide crossroads, one end at which 
awaits primordial Catholicism, but without neglecting the other path.
1191
 Like OM, the 
reviewer went beyond Coleridge: Coleridge in On the Constitution of the Church and 
State (1830) never sanctioned Catholics as key actors in the state–deduced religious–
cultural stewardship. Further, in that study, Coleridge never abandoned the state as a 
necessary element in such stewardship.
1192
 If Coleridge has a liberal fringe in his 
conservatism,
1193
 the reviewer has a conservative fringe in his liberalism because of 
reductionism of history to a more perfect Catholicism and simultaneous, Kantian logical 
antinomies about such a liberal state. OM’s revision of Coleridge was welcome, because it 
dispensed with the state as a necessary framework, a great difference to Yankee uses of 
German philosophy of history. This again brings up southern suspicions about it and, 
consequently, modern history. Still, this was a great step towards Idealism about history 
that was to increase due to Holmes (6.2.2). 
6.2.1.1 Dissent 
To be sure, vestiges of older humanist republicanism about history survived. For instance, 
a review of historian J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi echoed the Spartan political 
philosophy and the old guard concerns of Xenophon (chapter 5).
1194
 South Carolina 
philosopher and intellectual William J. Grayson possibly kept this tradition up the 
strongest, to the Civil War. He recommended Bolingbroke the anti–Whig as a philosopher 
about history. Although a friend to Simms,
1195
 Grayson is very distant from the 
solemnities of the idealists concerning such an office. He compares this side of 
Bolingbroke to the trickster Ephraim Jenkinson at the fair in Oliver Goldsmith’s Vicar of 
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Wakefield (1766).
1196
 This was a radical comparison, because it conjoins the humanist 
tradition of history with disregard for Christian didactics about the inhumanity of 
appearance subscribed to by Universal History (chapter 2) and therefore–again–with a 
period around or even before Hobbes. Back then, neither Stoic virtue, at work in those 
subject to Jenkinson’s schemes, nor self–interest dominated.1197 Since even for Hobbes, 
neither appearances nor history could be philosophy, and philosophy could not be 
Christian,
1198
 history for Grayson by default could not be a philosophic, Christian or 
epistemic pursuit especially since Grayson probably agreed with Dew against Hobbes on 
the importance of traditional hierarchy in society (chapter 5). Thus, the secular, 
Renaissance humanist Artes Historicae tradition that preceded exemplary history was not 
entirely gone. 
In addition, anonymous scathing criticism of the reigning bourgeois ethos prevailing 
across America, including its thinking and morals, appeared.
1199
 The writer almost 
certainly had read Poe’s recent criticism of the interrelationship of American letters, 
money, cliques and lack of satire, because the piece featured the reappearance of the term 
humbug Poe had coined.
1200
 The writer and Poe shared similar concerns about liberal–
bourgeois culture.  
Poe had declared the raking satire of America by Baltimore journalist and poet 
Lambert A. Wilmer true and comparable to John Dryden who had heavily satirised 
Shaftesbury. Further, Poe even privately claimed Wilmer’s poem is “the text from which 
to preach a fire–&–fury sermon upon critical independence, and the general literary 
humbuggery of the day,” in other words, the banal culture industry, be the stripe Whig or 
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Democrat. He also echoes Pope and tragic poetics (chapter 4).
1201
 As cultural critic, Poe 
went even further: in his book manuscript on American literature he began to write 
sometime in 1844, he assaults the whole progress theory of history dear to New England 
and strengthened by Bancroft and Prescott. It falsely grounded cultural discrimination of 
the South and the West. Resembling Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Adorno’s Hegel 
interpretation, Poe is aware political statism brings with it increase in (platonic) Idealism 
and conventionalism. Though posing as liberal, as critique it is actually more conservative 
and manifests in cliques “whose separate penchants render it nearly impossible to get at 
the truth.” Like Jefferson, he points out most magazines are controlled by such cliques, 
and he explicitly rejects nationalism, Philadelphia literary circles, transcendentalists 
including the historical romancers and, this time, Kennedy as well.
1202
  
Poe saw no fundamental chasm between history and cultural poetics. This is evident 
from his private remark that southern culture is in the margins of northern dominance and 
neglect and hence a fitting medium of his Marginalia fragments he continued to write and 
publish until his death in 1849.
1203
 Poe disliked the masses and the increase of individual 
sameness in society as “liberal–democratic” metaphysics. Romantic aesthetics and the 
literary industry were only the most pressing sides of this trend. This illuminates his 
disdain for neohumanist and Yankee “originality for its own sake.” Existentially, it 
resembles Heidegger’s critique of “everyone” and its relation to publicity.1204 The Wilmer 
review was a part of this critique. A Pittsburgh magazine had previously rejected portions 
of it. This leads one to speculate whether the Hegel boom there had ties to local 
magazines. In all probability, Poe strongly disliked modern history.
1205
 Despite Poe, 
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Wilmer remains an obscurity in U.S. cultural study. Resembling Poe’s extrapolations, the 
Review writer comes close to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in his pessimism about 
contemporary “liberal” American culture.  My argument is this view about history was, 
nevertheless, on a decline by now on the whole in southern discussion.    
6.2.2 Shadows of German Idealism: Holmes 
Holmes was among the few southerners to have knowledge of the Cincinnati group 
(chapter 4) and he did not like it. Stallo, as Hegel’s and Schelling’s expositor–apparently 
widely read in the North–was not to his taste for its mysticism and complexity. However, I 
would modify O’Brien’s implication that Holmes turned to historism since it was more 
free from metaphysics than Idealism and subservient to Holmes’s materialist 
sympathies.
1206
 Historism is only a variant of Idealism, but there was a great difference 
between Niebuhr and Hegel within it (chapters 2, 3). Holmes, at least partly, missed this as 
I will explain. Holmes dared venture little beyond Niebuhr along the idealist spectrum. 
Even Michelet, modernist in method and poetic awareness
1207
 and esteemed by Holmes 
and Simms, was too speculative, too infected by idealist metaphysics, in his Histoire 
romaine (1839).
1208
 Nevertheless, Holmes continued to wrestle with Idealism and had 
thereby become its captive.  
Holmes declares the historian of the present day “enters into the philosophy of history” 
to paint the signs recorded instead of just narrating facts “interesting, perhaps, but too 
often criminal” or “losing sight of all else” than a few prominent persons.1209 Holmes quite 
programmatically declares rhetoric and philology as doubtful or immoral history and 
Grigsby’s kind of history (chapter 2) outdated. Like Lomax (chapter 4)–the only other 
southern expositor of Romanticism as history to such an extent–Holmes spots the 
discrepancy between relinquishing “the fascinations of society” and cloistered, hard work–
that is, history for its own sake. It still was a marginal phenomenon in the South. Holmes 
expresses his full confidence at the result: “The past appears with graphic fidelity, the 
picture stands forth with life–like reality.” Thus Holmes seems to contend history becomes 
more real and fuller as a result of neoplatonic increase of light and anthropological 
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acquaintance.
1210
 Further, significant is that the object of the article was a work by female 
historian Agnes Strickland, which was quite extraordinary.  
In his next published article, he claims Bulwer’s Rienzi “the best philosophy of history 
that has been written.” Later, his Scott analysis has become colored through Carlyle into a 
warm romance, with Bulwer as Scott’s successor. Interestingly, Holmes is still able to 
explicitly register and examine the metaphysical change from Scott to Bulwer. He 
describes the historical aspects of the change “productive of the happiest results” and, in a 
remarkable confusion, identifies it with mechanist, rather than organicist, explanation of 
interacting processes, which may derive from Prescott’s confusion about philosophy of 
history (chapter 3). Even so, already this article indicates Holmes’s sympathy with OM 
about longing for the purity of the first Catholic faith.
1211
 I argue it was hardly 
coincidental that Holmes inquired his friend Simms about the Anglican Church at the 
period.
1212
 The views also echo Dew (chapter 5).  
But Holmes was not a total convert: even for him, the transition from Montaigne to 
modern philosophy was not complete. Rather, he contends Montaigne’s age is only 
rapidly disappearing, and he and his supporters have no place in modern philosophy–or 
mainly German Idealism–a development he refers to as “new revolution” in progress 
“even now.” But it is a battled development, or a dialectic one. The whole domain of 
intellect is undergoing a revolutionary renovation but still only coming. Like some 
southerners, even Holmes is only now waking up to the discursive condition of man. And 
his description of it either as a shock to be embraced against or bravely encountered shows 
the new theories were not without entrenched unease and disorientation, even skepticism. 
Holmes believes that time would correct the abandoning of the good and its replacement 
by the false. This is a highly interesting reversal of Kant and Schiller. It is more akin to the 
Scots’ ironic progress theory northerners had rejected and echoes Nietzsche (chapters 2, 
3). The world is getting populated by shadows or Idealism and unlike the Germans and 
especially New England, Holmes fretted about it. The overdose of reflection about history 
Simms had registered is also known to him.
1213
  
However, unlike Legaré (chapter 3), Holmes follows Hegel and rejects F. Schlegel’s 
philosophy of history as “lame and barren,” only “nick–named Philosophy of History.” 
The task is to describe “the main stream of the world’s advance.”1214 In other words, he 
prefers historicism to historism. Holmes’s trope of a gigantic river of History, i.e., 
Universalhistorie (chapter 3), is significant and pioneering in southern discussion. It 
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probably derived from Bancroft’s Heeren translation. Heeren used the metaphor to 
describe the importance of tracing the sentimental stream of Homeric poetry to its origin 
and to characterize time as a swallowing stream. Dew took up the first meaning, (again) 
without citing Heeren, and added “higher principle” and a moralistic evaluation about lust. 
Similarly, besides his earlier observation mere writing of history is immoral, Holmes 
trumpeted: “We are fast outliving the reign of sensuality and sloth.”1215 The focus should 
be on the giant stream of History and on an exploration and tracing of “the many tributary 
rivers which flow into it, and diverge from it, pointing out, at the same time, the sources 
whence they descended, and exposing the obstacles which caused the divergences.” 
Rather than a dry causal record of positive growth and development–this seems directed at 
Montesquieu–philosophy of history should be “a philosophical exposition of the mode in 
which each [period] arose, and of the degree in which it was dependent upon those which 
preceded it.” “[O]ne common spirit” “acted and rëacted” within science, arts, letters and 
economy, i.e., culture though the word is unmentioned. These, in turn, were affected by 
both climate and historism. We are now a category away from liberal culture of Roman 
sort (chapter 3, 6.1.1.2). Ironically, Holmes even here insists such a view is not 
metaphysical or deductive as in SAE and “would direct us in the path we ought to pursue” 
by pointing out progress or History as a universal constant in all its windings. Further, as a 
linear line, History would exhort optimism, confidence and enthusiasm among people and 
provide, in its liberal spirit, against both dogmatism and excessive doubt. This also 
resembles Prescott (chapter 3) and Hegel. Holmes valorizes German scholarship in this 
regard.
1216
 Thus, it is striking that Holmes should follow Wiseman’s desiderata about 
philosophy of history so thoroughly. It raises the likelihood Holmes, like Dew, was at least 
open to the cardinal. After all, Holmes’s wife was Roman Catholic. He also had 
connections to William and Mary, was in good terms with Lieber, and took up some of 
Dew’s duties in 1846 thanks to President Tyler’s influence.1217  
Holmes thus provided crucial topoi about history prestigious lawyer and future Justice 
John Archibald Campbell would utilize early in 1843 in his review of historian François 
Guizot.
1218
 Campbell, married to a prestigious New Hampshire family, had probably 
encountered French histories in his studies of French law in Alabama.
1219
 Although 
Campbell took his cue from Holmes, this side of him has been very little researched: 
indeed, Mann states his stance as a pacifist and almost antislavery Democrat has irked and 
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mislead scholars roughly a century.
1220
 This indicates that conceptualizations about 
southern history have been simplistic.  
Historically, Campbell is somewhere between Jefferson and the French liberals. 
Although dismissive of Sparta, Campbell nevertheless supports the Wachsmuth–Jefferson 
view of an uncorrupt aristocracy as the best form of democracy.
1221
 Although Campbell 
reiterates Holmes’s metaphor of a gigantic river and its multiple tributaries, he omits the 
latter’s metaphysical speculation about One Spirit and instead relies heavily on 
Niebuhr.
1222
 This is one more indication southerners could perceive the difference between 
Niebuhr and paradigmatic idealists like Böckh and Heeren far more acutely than 
northerners or Dew. In contrast, even Michelet and Thierry had the Rousseauan postulate 
about an original, a–historical unity.1223 Although for Campbell, there is similarly no 
history without division, he ignores both the metaphysics of the One and social 
implications of disunity save for the oppression by a Spartan oligarchy or “bad” 
aristocracy that obliterated the buffering middle class.
1224
 The usage of the term was rare 
at this time in America
1225
 though the phenomenon of course existed especially in the 
North. Contextually, it refers to uncorrupt aristocracy and thus circumvents the 
Rousseauan problematic idealist discourses and Romanticism depended on. Only a decade 
later Campbell’s–like Simms’s–historical views reflexively enter a more fully liberal 
phase.
1226
    
Despite his initial criticism, Holmes continued to engage philosophy of history in no 
less than two articles on F. Schlegel I shall next explore.
1227
  
In the first, he continues to marvel how often history’s “higher functions” and “more 
important and recondite aims” are missed in historical productions.1228 This is only the 
second time–the pioneer being Lieber (chapter 3)–such phrasing has been applied to 
history in the South in all my investigation of hundreds of sources. Notably it fully repeats 
Lieber’s Hegelian phrasing.  
Holmes acknowledges few southerners have heard about French historians Michelet, 
the Thierrys, Capefigue and their peers about such issues. To almost every reader, they are 
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fully unfamiliar. Self–critically, Holmes abstains from entering this problematic “or we 
might be tempted to introduce the historical inquirer into a new and most attractive field,” 
circumventing to focus on history of literature instead.
1229
 It is possible Holmes had gone 
too far with his previous programmatic pieces for his audience, hence the focus on 
language rather than philosophy. Holmes is acutely sensitive how historical language may 
provide valuable functional and discursive analyses on historiography but he conceives of 
it only as an auxiliary subject to history and its proper field to be literature, which re–
enacts Heeren’s position. Philosophy of history of letters is only a means “to trace back 
the current of that inner and more hidden energy” behind History Holmes continues to 
describe in supernatural, prophetic terms that are now more hyperbolic.  
But unlike the northerners, Holmes is still far more alert about history and its 
functions. In addition, he is apparently the first southern author to slam the Yankee SAE 
explicitly in a philosophical sense for grounding form in scientific truth in history. 
Biographical intertextuality undermines the attempt. Intertextuality within biography, 
when compared to other historist productions, actually forms a branch of philosophy of 
history for Holmes. This is a very advanced suggestion in America, and anticipates 
Ankersmit’s postmodern emphasis on metaphor. Holmes claims any construction of a 
system, be it art, science or history, is impossible trusting mainly on analytic methodology. 
This is an Aristotelian, anti–rationalist position. Holmes backs this up with Sterne. 
Specifically, he uses Sterne’s dismissal of Descartes’s mathematics of music. Sterne’s 
Tristram Shandy was devotedly critical of rationalism throughout. This may be a clue to 
Sterne’s popularity about history in the South, because New England’s philosophy of 
history was Cartesian. But Coleridge is appealed to as well. Synthetic is preferable to the 
reign of the analytic, terms that imply knowledge of Kantian epistemology, as does the 
omnipresence of representation. Such a philosophy of history is still, alas, unknown in 
England and America.
1230
 This interpretation of Kant was far more nuanced than in the 
North and that of Carlyle (chapter 3). Holmes ups the ante of more conventional and 
satirical critique of rationality in southern history–in distinction from the North–by adding 
to it the weight of Coleridge. However, obviously he thereby ignores the drastic 
philosophical differences between that convention and Coleridge for history. Since 
Holmes longs for more philosophy than he found in F. Schlegel, it is feasible he 
subscribes to Coleridge’s theosophy more than Sterne’s satire.1231  
In the second article, Holmes uses a trope that probably was taken from Simms as I 
will explain (6.2.3). While repeating the painting metaphor, the view about linearity of 
time, and the traditionally missed big picture instead of a few individuals, Holmes 
launches a polemic against “disjecta membra,” i.e., fragmentoriness of the past.1232 The 
phrase comes from Horace’s Satire but gets transformed. While for Horace a 
                                                 
1229
 ibid., 474. 
1230
 ibid., 475, 477 and note *, 478, 476, 478. On Sterne and Cartesian mathematics, see for 
example Deborah M. Vlock, “Sterne, Descartes, and Music in Tristram Shandy,” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500–1900 38 (1998), Restoration and Eighteenth Century, 517, 524-25, passim.  
1231
 Holmes, ”History of Literature,” 478. 
1232
 idem., ”Schlegel’s Philosophy of History,” 264. 
  
 
 
261 
dismembered state of poet Ennius’s poetry was no big deal,1233 for Holmes such a 
condition of history is “torn and mutilated,” “a heap” strung “together upon the wires of 
chronological succession, the blanched and mouldering bones, so as to defy all recognition 
of them as organist parts of a once existent body.”1234 Curiously, this brings closely to 
mind SAE Speece’s shell trope (chapter 2) and indicates that for Holmes, organicist 
history had become superimposed on the previous organic concept of the body politic. 
Again, fragmentary history may be amusing and relaxing, satirically and rhetorically 
clever, but far too overrated: lessons achieved through philosophy–a very different 
concept from Bolingbroke now however–and mankind’s progress are lost in that mode. 
Neither is history a simple mirror of human nature–and this is directed to the old–school 
classicists and Scottish philosophers (chapter 2)–nor politics, the northern focus. “[O]ne 
connected scheme” controls every nation upon which in “mystic, but intelligible 
characters, the nature, the direction and the causes of the onward march of humanity” can 
be deciphered.
1235
 Although this position is close to Michelet and very symbolic,
1236
 it gets 
a transcendentalist hue á la Peabody (chapter 5), because of its confidence to grasp the 
real. Holmes has moved from Kant to Peabody epistemologically, a bold move that leaves 
Schlegel and the metaphoric French behind. Accordingly, Holmes declares such a history 
is a science which, again, would be baffling to the Europeans’ sensibilities, but not to the 
transcendentalists.
1237
 Holmes repeats the Hegelian criticism that Schlegel was not 
profound enough.
1238
  
However, interestingly he still diverges from the transcendentalist and SAE position 
metaphysically: God is not at the helm of history, because that is not historist. An 
individual cannot be reduced to the mass, nor are morals and Christianity indicators of 
progress: this is “hallucination,” an interesting proto–Marxian echo. Peoples with 
supposedly good morals cannot beat Greece, Rome or France of the Sun King. So, his 
metaphysics is not totally organicist, because despite sympathies with Michelet, it reverts 
back to the view there is no collective guidance in history outside an individual–
facilitating and haphazard change within a material context. In other words, Holmes, like 
Thornwell and Poe,
1239
 discovers individual difference is irreducible beyond the 
metaphorical stand–in, realisation that goes against the grain of his time in the West and 
resembles historiality (chapter 2).
1240
 As I have argued (chapter 2), the position is a 
precursor to Nietzsche, because it emphasizes becoming, not being, and difference instead 
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of sameness about history. So, Holmes advocates such a stand–in in order to escape 
nihilism and to avoid the analytic and sterile social history or social science history–the 
northern catachretic preference. This raises the possibility of nihilism about history in the 
South, if organicism, i.e., the all-guiding Spirit, gets left out. But like Thornwell, or 
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard,
1241
 Holmes refuses to emphasise history’s ontological 
enervation to draw atheistic conclusions, although he argues philosophically more 
carelessly than Thornwell.
1242
 He downplays his earlier flashed sympathy with OM: 
instead, different aspects, including religious, of human kind should be conjoined to “form 
a perfect whole.”1243 He rejects any Manichean and Gnostic antagonism between atheism 
and religion popular in the North: any dialectic between civilized and barbaric at the 
beginning of history he names “fanciful imaginations.”1244 This indicates southerners did 
not subscribe to the hierarchical–racial progress theory of New England and northern 
classicist–Federalist historians, but paid more attention to the stadialist model (chapter 2).  
Reverting again to the French, this time to historian Augustin Thierry, Holmes insists 
that civilization is a violence and a conquest but something that cannot be forced from 
without or captured as an abstraction. This seems to be a contradiction unless regarded 
from the nature–respecting perspective of John Tyler (6.1.1.2). Civilization is not a goal in 
itself. A little like in Herder–but what Holmes again misreads as mechanist–some peoples 
are “wholly incapable” of it along a temporal continuum, and get exterminated as a 
result.
1245
 But the way to explore this continuum–that is nevertheless categorical unlike in 
Herder, an illuminating contradiction–is not deductive or idealist as in F. Schlegel. Rather, 
it is philological and inductive: Schlegel puts the chart of appearances before the horse, 
and thus his philosophy of history is not even philosophy. Unconscious processes, actions 
and monuments, every kind of phenomenon, are left out if history gets deduced. This 
holds true especially for deductions from mind or abstraction but, revealingly, from the 
sign as well. This is philological by way of Niebuhr and modernist by way of Michelet in 
its remarkable versatility of empirical subject matter. It is also Derridean in its distrust in 
the Platonic sign.  
Holmes’s theory of the individual man in history as something enabled by the modern 
condition of history, its scheme of civilization, and progress of human liberty, shares 
premises with Burckhardt and Poe (chapters 3, 4). But the conclusion is very different: 
modernity as liberalism enables “the independence of the individual man against the 
aggregate masses” and “modern civilization is liberating each individual man from the 
tyranny of his fellows.” Although no inherent champion of the masses, Holmes is 
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optimistic.
1246
 Casting aside the pessimistic symbolic irony of the earlier Charleston critics 
(chapter 3), Holmes ends up valorizing the system as reason’s necessary blueprint. It 
guarantees history’s philosophical and scientific character. It also provides an escape from 
material fatalism of the ancients that Michelet had pointed out.
1247
 Thus, despite his 
intriguing protestations and innovations in method and metaphysics, Holmes only inverts 
the deductive idealism of Schlegel. Thereby, he takes a major step towards Hegel’s 
proactive dialectic that covers all mankind. He connects to this insight a decisive division 
of history when Jews appeared on the scene, to which he finds support in Michelet as well. 
From Jews onward, all “was directly preparatory for the new system,” the period 280–
1300 A.D. containing developing germs. This rhetorically devolves to Heeren and 
Bancroft (chapter 3).
1248
 In sum, the tendency of an increasing number of southerners to 
examine Idealism and even develop it further in quite avantgarde ways, but without 
accepting organicist conclusions “all the way down,” is fairly apparent.  
Also the context of this second article is interesting. To it appeared an implicit rebuttal, 
nominally related to Guizot, by Holmes’s friend, lawyer, statesman and son of a South 
Carolina physician and planter David Flaviel Jamison. Jamison is quite obscure today.
1249
 
Jamison, though Holmes’s mentor about philosophy of history,1250 was decidedly more 
conservative and less discerning about history. Interestingly, Jamison is the fourth instance 
of a physician or physician family (after Rush, Cartwright, and J. Nott), to engage history 
in a discussion that has relevance to my concerns. The result follows, roughly, the same 
path as in the others: emphasis on race,
1251
 Christianity as guarantor of morals and 
civilization, and a scientistic ethos.  
Jamison’s piece was far behind Holmes in sophistication. For example, Jamison 
glosses over history with Carlyle and Whig Christianity, is against Xenophon, believes 
questions of history can be proven true beyond dispute, and is contemptuous of all history 
that is not a production of the mind begun only under the great Christian reformer 
Charlemagne.
1252
 Thus, intriguingly, a physician’s ethos exposed southerners to fairly 
northern and–ironically–intellectually simplified theories about history. Further, like 
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Gilmer, Jamison misses the vast difference between Gibbon and Carlyle on history.
1253
 
Due to a lack of scholarship on Jamison it is difficult to proceed further. It may be no 
accident that Jamison was among the first southern authors in the major journals who 
signed articles with his own name.
1254
 His relationship to discourse may thus have differed 
from his fellow southerners in some profound way.  
Holmes continued with the theme next autumn when he shows a marked preference for 
Campbell over Jamison and has largely switched F. Schlegel for Michelet.
1255
 
Specifically, Holmes relies now far more on Niebuhr especially towards the end of the 
article, as well as philological criticism and research. Like Campbell, he has now modified 
and subdued the flow of history metaphor, meaning with it a genealogical study by way of 
Niebuhr.
1256
 Holmes’s retreat from OM continued: he grounds Catholicism in ancient 
Rome, and repeats this five times: both systems are strictly and totally political institutions 
and both are repressive systems of governance in comparison to his neohumanist 
interpretation of Greece. Catholicism is only a means to examine Roman society.
1257
 
However, Holmes was not rid of OM: at the very end, he declares: “to the Papacy we owe 
the revivification of the world” as a preserver of Christianity and initial stage of 
Protestantism, and “the germ and the model of our modern literature” comes from it.1258  
Similar conflict pervades the tropes: on the one hand, he reintroduces “the same 
uniform spirit” that develops, believes “singular affinity to a spiritual world” as the force 
behind human beauty, character and emotion, and attests cultural artifacts like poetry, 
literature and the arts are “works of the spirit” and “ideal creation[s].”1259 But on the other 
hand, he relies surprisingly lot–and contradictorily–on Montesquieu without question, and 
applies such Fontenelle–Prescott–influenced terms as “machine” to describe the Roman 
citizen, “the engine” to describe the Roman army, “a State engine,”, “one of the 
component parts of a grand political device” to describe Roman religion, while Roman 
mythology is “an anomalous monster of State machinery” “wholly devoid of any 
irradiation, any enthusiasm from above.”1260 This last was perhaps a romantic polemic. 
Roman “sensual and allegorical worship” is portrayed as “disgusting rites” while 
Christianity was “a new and purer religion”, a neoplatonic and Victorian estimate.1261 
Obviously Holmes continues his struggles with Idealism and, like Dew (chapter 5), has 
come to terms with neohumanism, probably as a result of contact with Simms, Dew, or 
both. As we have seen, unlike in the North, this still was a rare attitude in southern 
historical thinkers. But Holmes also steers away from his initial hyperbolic Idealism and 
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his cautious approval of OM towards the more traditionally southern emphasis on “cool” 
philology. However, by next decade, he would only read Catholic texts (chapter 5). 
6.2.3 Shadows of German Idealism: Simms 
Even in 1854, Simms was not ready for a full–scale middle class utilitarian social 
philosophy in his novel Woodcraft. This is symbolically enacted by Porgy’s difficulties to 
adjust to peace–time society increasingly controlled by money, greed and utility.1262 
However, Simms arguably was slowly, perhaps inadvertently, moving to that direction in 
his keen engagements with broader intellectual trends. Simms had a dislike for 
Whitaker.
1263
 This feeling was mutual and the arena was the Whig Courier that was 
slightly biased against Simms’ romantic ventures. The irreconcilable differences about 
language were apparent in Whitaker’s criticism of Simms. This could be expected from 
the drastic semiotic difference between outdated Lockean rationalism and romantic 
metaphoric.
1264
 Although Simms continued his historical pessimism about the frontier in 
Beauchampe (1842), his next tale The Social Principle (1843) was remarkably more 
conservative and Victorian in my view, if still ironic.
1265
 It had more resemblance with 
Kennedy’s Horse–Shoe Robinson (chapter 3) in terms of values.  
In the early–1840s, Simms confronted both northern literary culture and the question 
of history more explicitly. Thus, he also contributed to the weakening of southern 
idiosyncracy about history and letters. After Biele’s death, he lobbied his publishers to 
work with Samuel Hart, Sr., a wealthy Jew who had bought Biele’s “Establishment” in 
1841. As proprietor of “a circulating library and book shop” Charleston ladies were fond 
of, Hart was effectively disseminating book reading in the town.
1266
 But in addition, Hart 
wanted to counter the northern pattern of producing collected volumes dedicated to single 
towns. Boston, New York, Philadephia and Baltimore each already had a town book of 
their own. So, it was internal urban rivalry Hart wanted Charleston to pitch into, and 
Simms became the editor for the endeavor.
1267
 Significantly, even Whitaker joined in to 
respond to the North. However, indicative of the regional differences, despite the cheap 
price, the book that appeared only in 1845 never sold many copies, causing Simms to 
abandon additional volumes.
1268
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Interestingly, Godey’s Magazine ridiculed the book as a feminine effort. The editors 
echoed not only the previous estimate of the Courier about Simms, but also the older 
abolitionist charge, going back at least to Daniel Webster in the 1830s, that slavery 
weakened or femininized southern men. It overlooked the different southern attributes of 
masculinity from those of the North.
1269
 It was an additional instance of refusal to look at 
the South as Other that connected to culture politics of power through the body and text. 
As in case of the Southern Review, South Carolina response was again reactive, but this 
time less different, because now it was dialectical. The project was warfare of letters 
within urban civilization. Thereby, it was decidedly more homogenizing and bordered 
than in the previous cases of the Review and censorship (chapter 3).  
Out of Simms’s preoccupation with history and romantic theory at the time emerged a 
series of lectures he was asked to deliver on history and its uses in Georgia late in 1841. 
He delivered them in March, 1842. They were first published as a series in journals and 
then included in his book Views and Interviews in American Literature, History and 
Fiction (first series) (1845).
1270
 For the remainder of the study, I shall briefly examine 
their first part. Any attention to Simms as a theorist of history had to wait until the late–
1970s.
1271
 Since then, attention has not been great.  
Remarkably, Simms commences from the divided state of mankind and the discursive 
condition of history. Like Holmes and the Scots, he laments such a frame of mind has 
taken place that has destroyed the naïve faith in the ancients.
1272
 As we have seen, this 
endorsement of modern history was still fairly novel in the South. At this time, only 
Lomax had made historical consciousness into a problem in the German manner that went 
beyond Blair (chapters 2, 4). As a result of history’s discursivity, life gets sucked out from 
history into empty forms. Unlike the later work of Holmes and southerners generally–and 
indicative of his preference for the contested German romantic liberals–Simms singles out 
Niebuhr to blame for the tendency and anticipates Holmes’s argument about too dry, too 
form–centered history without organicist life, that is, phenomenality. He even uses the 
same tropes of a skeleton, wires and dry bones.
1273
 The practical dimension of filling–up 
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dry fragments is art, affirmed by beauty, in a historian. Art becomes the greatest historian 
for the masses of mankind. Such didactics of history would result in lifting “heart of the 
multitude” “into gradual excellence and hope!” This was a move away from “conscious 
baseness”: it is potentially better for the general welfare.1274 This is probably the first 
endorsement of the German liberal discursivity of history and philosophy in the South.
1275
 
History is based on and deduced from individual feeling. It is allegory on its material–
not textual–remains. In American context, Simms later specifies that this subject–matter is 
pure, rough–hewn nature one approaches with simplicity, as if a blank slate. This 
prescription echoes Bushnell’s argument about essential American simplicity (6.2.1). 
Further, Simms contends the pure brightness of noon day is good for the American 
historian: “a day perfect from the beginning” with zero invention. This is another 
neoplatonic and transcendentalist trope but previously, only echoed by Gilmer in the 
South in my material (chapter 4). That is why the American archive guarantees truth, and 
why an American publication equals sight and hearing, an argument strongly influenced 
by Emerson (chapter 3). It is “the creative faculty” that makes humans human and the 
aspect that makes human known to human and ensures the possession of the past and its 
transmitting for the future.
1276
  
The sign has acquired its status as ontotheological presence for Simms. This is 
philosophy of history of an idealist kind, rather than singular facts and conjectures. Its 
medium is painting and the imagination,
1277
 a statement Holmes would disagree with later. 
The U.S. would also be dependent on such a history and philosophy of history.
1278
 Despite 
his preference for tangentiality over the sign, Simms is still not advocating antiquarian 
history. Rather, the idealistic construction will be passed along to the future as reality’s 
symbol.
1279
 He is not rejecting the rhetorical quality of (historical) language. However, the 
important aspect in it is inspiration and hope, mental character composed of “just 
principles, generous tendencies and clear, correct standards of taste and duty.” This 
curiosity is composed equally of morality and humanity and offers lessons for character in 
such an idealist sense,
1280
 a notion Holmes would agree with but which is also a New 
England topos (chapter 3). Morality’s source, thus, is put on a temporal line and is entirely 
independent from the empirical realm. This position is still relevant in the 21st century. 
True and complete history is a poetic one.
1281
  
Resembling Dew’s neohumanism, Simms extends the romantic principle into a 
universal, but unlike him, he foils it, as well as romance literature, in nationalism. 
Otherwise, no–one will likely care. But the offices of romance and history are still 
separate in degree. Unlike for Dabney for example (chapter 4), romancing as graces, the 
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heart, pure affections and ennobling virtue belong firmly to home rather than to history. 
Both desire for something they can never attain, but along the continuum of time, some 
other genius may pick up where they individually leave off.
1282
 Scott and Shakespeare are 
allies better than Hume: here Simms evades the ironic and skeptical Scott reading (chapter 
2).
1283
 Romance, deduced from nature, outlasts the sign and the scholar of signs.
1284
 
However, Simms nods to Poe in his rejection of didactic romance and excessive 
contemplation common in northern letters (chapters 2, 3). Freedom should not be 
tempered with in such manner in either history or romance.
1285
 In addition, idealist 
romancing without morality and sense of place is empty, what Cooper has missed in his 
too wanton generalizations.
1286
 Religion is the most pervasive element about national 
feeling and poetic creating, “[a]nd he who speaks from the soul, we need hardly say, 
speaks to the soul.” Simms now contends even Byron followed this metaphysics.1287 And 
poetic freedom is counterbalanced in history by the uniquely American prosaic character 
of the archive and the sign (!) even if Americans cannot fully be separate from England or 
Europe. This lack of separation pertains especially to the rural South. In education, 
Americans should cut loose from the English aristocratic ethos.
1288
  
In my material, this is the first combination of German romantic liberalism and 
nationalism in the South that is in accord with modern history. Simms postulates the 
presence–absence dyad that is remarkably modern and still relevant. But not everyone 
agreed as I have examined. Vestiges of southern ontological awareness of being as 
something irreducible to romance remain in Simms, but they are overturned by the 
unifying forces of religion and feeling. Departing from Pearce who finds resemblances to 
Nietzsche
1289
 and Nakamura who ties Simms to Christian progress reminiscent of SAE
1290
 
I would locate Simms closest to Schiller.
1291
 The dialectic scheme: form vs. life equals 
play and beauty of freedom counterbalanced by necessity, is very close. The importance to 
be moral that is based on art as moral comes from Schiller, as does the optimism about the 
common humanity at the face of individual loss along history’s line. Further, Simms 
hooks up with Schiller in his Fichtean–Hegelian postulate about organicist 
anthropologism. The emphasis on nationalism resembles Schiller, and the idea of 
Aufhebung, simultaneous raising and preserving, comes from him, adopted by Hegel. 
Finally, the emphasis on Bildung that is democratic is a Schillerian concept, though known 
in the North also. Since only Lomax had theorized about Schiller for history at this time in 
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the South in the journals, Simms had probably read her piece. The differences to Schiller 
are a less strict dichotomy into history and poetics, and the transcendentalist elements in 
the argument about history. Simms had joined the admirers of Michelet by 1848
1292
 but in 
this study, I cannot enter more deeply into Simms’s social politics.1293 
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7. Results and discussion 
The purpose of the study was to examine how white southerners in Virginia and South 
Carolina were philosophically different about history to New England at the level of 
historiography in the early 19th century.  
A major result of the study was that especially before the early–1840s, neither Virginia 
nor South Carolina historiography under study actively partook in or completely endorsed 
the New England project about modern history. Consequently, I shall first address what 
the results showed about New England’s take on philosophy, religion, and finally 
aesthetics and ideology about history. I shall then do the same regarding Virginia and 
South Carolina. 
The New England interpretation of modern history called for a history that was rooted 
in natural science. Therefore, it was more social scientific than historical, because it 
operated more formally than contextually, and was more interested in abstract general 
laws (nomothetic history) than empirical particularities and change (idiographic history). 
A peculiar aspect was a desire to discard the traditional European skepticism about history 
and, as a corollary, humanism about it, and to erect a secure and essentially modern 
ground for the U.S. on the result. The primary philosophical characteristic was Descartes’s 
rationalism that believed history was a scientific truth established within individual 
modern mind. It situated within modern Universal History of the 1600s, but in distinction 
from it, like in Descartes, it wanted to reject Universal History’s mode about form or the 
signifier as a mere instrument to the signified. This pure reason could transcend space and 
time and, consequently, rendered both speech and writing about history true. This 
Cartesian insight was then applied to Enlightenment history as social science. Desiratum 
here was to scientifically conquer nature and achieve the goals related to freedom of all 
reasoning individuals. Descartes and Enlightenment progress meant knowledge about 
history needed to be simultaneously eternal, or God–grounded, and scientific. The Second 
Great Awakening bolstered this view. The Evangelicals, championing Locke, imposed 
Locke’s individualistic–psychic empiricism on history. Absence of skepticism about 
history thereby continued. Locke enabled an application of modern enlightened social 
history across space and time, and its grounding in natural history. This created a universal 
standard of reason for peoples regardless of space and time that gave birth to a normative 
race theory within progress. Further, it grounded individuals in the material parameters of 
social science (physiology, economics, climate, anthropology) rather than history. The 
third philosophical layer began to get added in the late–1810s when the Yankees went to 
Germany. Many chose Göttingen, whose representative Heeren was a major linchpin. 
They shared the background in race theories that the appreciation of social science history 
had already amplified in New England. Another point of contact was a strong interest in 
statist history, or to see the nation as the end and the ground of scientific history. At the 
same time, front row U.S. historians George Bancroft and William Prescott also wanted to 
reform social science history. They took Hegel’s German historicism to mean that history 
matters only as a progressive dialectic process of their version of social science history. 
This progress of liberalism and liberal institutions steadily and objectively conquered 
nature and uncivilized savagery. The novelties for them were Other as antithetical fodder 
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for universalized liberal progress, and compatibility of social science history with 
romance. Their German Romanticism was not skeptical about history. Rather, it was a 
resource to strengthen the other layers and solidify history as a nationalist project. In the 
1840s, this version of historicism began to also spread within the northern U.S. in 
institutions, groups and journals. 
Because history was from the beginning grounded in God in New England, it affected 
their philosophy of history. The Cartesian basis called for a synthesis between God and 
true form as history’s ground. The Second Great Awakening was critical in this outcome. 
Extrapolating from the Bible as the truth of society and in line with the reading of Locke, 
it gave birth to a reader who could independently exercise reason to grasp the true idea of 
any text. In addition, individual spiritual feeling entailed that the individual could 
transcend space and time in a Gnostic manner to establish a new order of knowledge 
nearer God. The major pioneers of northern Evangelicalism were philosophical 
neoplatonists who believed in such a feat. True and scientific ideas about the signified and 
a new–neoplatonic and organicist–modern order of the world became simultaneously 
possible. This overlapped with organicist German Romanticism that likewise was indebted 
to neoplatonic mysticism but, critically, in a far more skeptical sense. Rejecting the 
skepticism, but adopting the idealist argument, romance texts of history became 
scientifically true for readers. Thereby, romance strengthened the nationalist, religious and 
scientific grounds of U.S. history, and the new individualist–though gnostically balanced 
by way of pantheism–utopian social order. By the late–1830s when Bancroft’s study came 
out, the transcendentalists such as Emerson actively filtered German Idealism to these 
ends about history. A related ideological trajectory was the active inclusion of the U.S. 
into an international order of civilization through history: appearing at least as early as the 
1780s, but perhaps present already in Franklin, it received a significant boost from 
Germany education from the late–1810s, and from encouraging commentators in Germany 
(Kant, Hegel, Heeren), Britain (Hinton) and France (Crèvecoeur, Tocqueville). 
At first, New England history had little to do with art or poetics. It wanted to abandon 
humanist history as well as skeptical considerations about it for the (social) science–
rationalism–religion triad. In practice, this meant accessing minds and ideas truly across 
time and space, then disseminating these ideas freely for utilitarian ends, to be of use for 
the needs in the individual minds of the new nation. The adoption of Locke by the 
Evangelicals reinforced this trend, because writing history was irrelevant to this system of 
transportation. However, by the late–1810s, new bourgeois interpretations about the 
ancient world, to which the Germans greatly contributed, landed to the U.S. In New 
England by the late–1820s, this neohumanism emphasized imagination under the guidance 
of Calvinist religion as an antidote to the previously rigid space of mind and reason, an 
aim that Heeren’s Universalhistorie perfectly answered to in history. In addition, this 
broadening of space established a felt continuum from antiquity to the present and from 
the Old Testament to the present. It enabled to see the U.S. as a fulfillment of the liberal 
ancient republicanism of Ancient Greece and the Old Testament, but it also called forth 
American morality and American heroes in history who would improve on the ancient 
pagans. The new grafting of feeling on religion reinscribed character in history and 
romance and its essentially moralistic import. Character was no longer an exemplar figure 
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separate from the rest. Rather, the most useful history facilitated character development 
into civilized, bourgeois, urban and useful citizenry in the mind of the independent, 
rational reader. This reinscription extended to the contemporary imperative to be moral 
about poetics and became the chief purpose of history and institutional cultural poetics. 
Rather than investigating history for its own sake, or being studiously skeptical about it, 
history was arranged and mastered to serve this new viewpoint and ordering of the world. 
By contrast, Virginia and South Carolina felt a definite disorientation about modern 
history. Though related to science in some cases, but very rarely reducible to it, history 
was less about social science, and even less about Descartes. In comparison to the New 
England’s attempt to master nature and transcend old European history, southerners took 
an intense interest in both. In comparison to the New England attempt to order space and 
ground it in God, southerners focused on the particular and dynamism: many protested 
against both neoclassical “civilized” ordering in aesthetics and against history’s ordering 
through discourse comprised of mind and God. Many, especially in Virginia, relied more 
on commentary than philosophical discourse about history, a strategy that antedated 
modern history. Even in case of Jefferson, they never swapped the age–old concerns with 
humanism and rhetoric as priorities for universality of mind that would ground the nation. 
Their interest was on individual phenomena as in proper idiographic history and on the 
way the signifier covers the signified. In other words how, if at all, the signifier accesses 
the signified. While in New England, the signifier presented a full coverage of the 
signified that was reified by the layers of natural science ideal, reason, romance and 
religion, in the South, little of this metaphysics was found, especially before the late–
1830s. Not only were southerners following the humanist tradition that had trouble with 
the new arrangement about culture and the book, they were also alert to deep skepticism 
about history, how the signifier fails in time and how it deals with power. They never 
subscribed to Descartes. In history, they were not a culture of mind, but more mind and 
body, in cases even mainly body. They embarked from humanism, pyrrhonic skepticism, 
or enlightened Universal History that had no faith in historical language as true beyond 
rhetorical instrumentality and poesy. Most chose not to adapt so categorically to the 
refashioning of space and time as New England. Some southern philosophers, such as 
Thornwell, even undermined modern individuality itself by contrasting it with the vastly 
popular Aristotle. In sum, few southerners lost sight of what preceded modern history. 
As with Universal History, southerners turned out to be far more discerning than the 
Yankees about the new German thinking. All but Lieber and the later Simms failed to 
enthusiastically embrace historicism that entailed equality of all individuals on a same 
level of slowly progressive dialectic discourse, the novel view that became vastly 
simplified in the North. Rather, at most they agreed with historism: Idealism is important 
about history, but there was no overlapping metaphysical teleology attached. The 
Yankees, in contrast, boldly and as a result of philosophical misunderstandings and figural 
misreadings, streamlined Idealism for nationalist ends. In Virginia, only Lomax, who did 
not live in the state but was born there, embraced the German ideas. Far more commonly, 
idealist history was an ironic, even tragic symbol of dislocation: the vaster its extension 
and scope, the more deadly, the more ludicrous, and the more fictive the result. Lieber was 
the southern pioneer of historicism, and instrumental in bringing it to the attention of 
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Holmes in the early–1840s. Historicism steadily gained in popularity in the 1840s in the 
southern states as a byproduct of Catholic sympathies.  
Since history was not just a social science, and since there was no nationalist 
mysticism about a unified people, as a corollary there was no race theory as a 
metaphysical abstraction, especially not before the impact of Dew in the 1830s. The 
exceptions were the Lockean Whigs and just three individuals, out of roughly a hundred. 
Two, Nott and Jamison, resided in South Carolina. None resided in Virginia. Each either 
underwent, or was familiar with, a physician’s training in Philadelphia. While there, these 
marginal individuals probably were exposed to the Yankee racist application of natural 
history to social science history. The 1830s rocked this state in Virginia: Dew appeared on 
the scene; the Turner rebellion happened; Virginia was annexed to northern–led, Whig–
and–Episcopalian run organizing antiquarian history. The outcome somewhat reified 
history.   
Since history was not grounded in God, far more critical and secular attitudes about it 
flourished, particularly among the alumni of Virginia and among the first South Carolina 
critics. The antiquarian organization of history run by Jefferson’s historical enemy 
Marshall lessened these Virginia voices. The Second Great Awakening included the South 
too of course, but made a miniscule dint on history before Whitaker and especially before 
the mid–1840s. Not only was the philosophical focus of history not on the Cartesian 
science–God dyad, even the Platonic and British neoclassical imitation or discourse did 
not get transplanted into religion, history and the book. The neoplatonic enthusiasm about 
light was less shared. The first exceptions were the Whig Marylanders: in Wirt in a more 
subdued sense, it was mixed to enlightened rhetoric. Kennedy embraced Emerson in his 
historical novel. In the late–1830s, this rhetoric was found among their fellow–Whigs and 
Episcopalian members of VHPS including Dew, and among some authors who published 
their writings in South Carolina. Finally, it became mixed with Idealism in Charleston in 
the early–1840s, about which New England Neoplatonism was making even Gnostic 
claims about reality that commingled with history and science. The new cultural leaders 
such as Dew and Holmes, intrigued by the British Catholic revival, though more warily in 
case of the latter, began to sympathize with a conservative–spiritual world order that made 
German Idealism applicable to it. In addition, Whitaker was a strong neoplatonist. Even 
then, some elements of the older Renaissance and baroque order of Montaigne remained 
about history. In Virginia, it was mainly the Whigs, and particularly Dew, who were 
concerned about including the U.S. to the international order of civilization through 
history: otherwise, far less enthusiasm about it prevailed. Unlike in New England, 
ventures to the international arena through a cosmopolitan order of history were rare: they 
appear only in the late–1830s a few times in Whitaker’s first journal. Instead, in 
Charleston, Simms appreciated the organicist metaphysics of modern history from early 
on that dispensed with cosmopolitan history, and his views gained wider acceptance from 
the 1840s. Thereby, southerners preferred more the European concern with nature that 
organicism and modern history had rather than its erasure, mastery through reason, or its 
subsequent subjecting to sterile imagination, as in New England. However, it was only in 
the 1840s when organicism, and thereby modern history, reaches them more, and 
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haphazardly. But even in this change, history was metaphysically less distinct from 
contemporary Europe of the doubtful romantics. 
Southern history had a lot to do with poetics and rhetoric in a way that for the most 
part was strikingly different from modern history but even less to do with romance. 
Jefferson’s desire to write a freeing history went against the grain of the times, but in its 
libertarian radicalism, his university anticipated or possibly even went beyond Nietzsche 
in its linguistic and heavily classicist expositions of novel bourgeois trends. Even romance 
history was more rejected than endorsed, at least by scholars, but Whitaker’s first journal 
made it creep more into poetics, and the early–1840s saw a real onslaught of romantic 
theory. Still, on the whole, more European doubt and irony than Yankee confidence 
attended historical romancing. The modernist dislocation about history was perhaps most 
explicit in Wirt, Simms, Lomax, and the unfortunately unknown author of the 1835 
Charleston article examined in chapter 6.  
Southern discourse about history was thereby different and even lacking in the sense of 
modern history. It valued presence far more, even oral exchange of story–telling that print 
culture began to weed out in the 1600s. Foreshadowing Derrida, most chose not to enter 
into the new bourgeois trend of a free isolated individual to whom writing was making–
present. In addition, most rejected the new bourgeois trend that romanticized speech in 
preference to writing. Thus, they were not very neohumanist. The only individuals of note 
more captivated by the neohumanist aesthetic were Wirt, Simms, Dew, Lomax, and 
Holmes. Wirt was following the bourgeois novelties keenly that included neohumanism. 
Simms moved from sympathy to implicit rejection of southern peculiarities concerning 
urbanized historical discourse. Dew mixed neohumanism strongly with his complex and 
fairly incoherent political philosophy. It systemically left out the Jeffersonians and, 
mostly, humanist attitudes. In addition, Dew, upping the ante from Wirt, advocated a 
serious update on the southern public sphere towards a more cosmopolitan order. Lomax 
applied neohumanism to history through aesthetics. Holmes, following Dew, colored 
ancient Greece with neohumanism. Most others relied more on older, roughly pre–1750s 
models about the relationship between Antiquity and history that had not stirred much 
since the Renaissance. Even some southern women lacked the novel bourgeois status as 
softeners of public discourse from the home. Instead, they were more dynamic actors, not 
necessarily moral home guardians. At least to some males, this was good where history 
was concerned. Only the Whigs idealized women in connection with history, but no–one 
opposed them either. 
What would account for this perceived difference? The study has suggested that 
southern societies were in tension with central tenets of modernity regarding public 
education and print discourse that New England, in contrast, strongly advocated and 
sought after as a capitalist enterprise. The study agrees with the observation of the 
Genoveses that especially problematic was the middleclass explosion of aesthetic freedom 
of the self, but specifies that it coincided with the changes in philosophy and history after 
Enlightenment and manifested in practical changes about the form as well as content of 
public discourse and its prose genre. Without phenomenological sensitivity, such issues 
that pertain to experience and anatomy of communication and perception are easily 
missed. Though the situation was not categorically different from “the Yankees,” a major 
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bridge being the romance reading of Walter Scott, there were neither as many towns nor 
salons in the South and, as Wirt reported, often the few books in taverns collected dust. 
Certainly, the fact that slavery was still an integral part of society had a role in all this. 
Acceding to the new bourgeois philosophy would have meant equality of all men, 
including women and slaves, from the partial viewpoint of middleclass liberals. Though 
the idea was not completely unfamiliar, it had not yet penetrated southern culture about 
history. This observation would also bear on a different conception of nationalism in the 
South, because the bourgeois revolution required the totality of the nation–state, 
comprised of a united people, as a counterpart to the new, philosophically and 
aesthetically doubled and finite self. By comparison, the emphasis on community and a 
willingness to avoid decisive breaks in temporality from Europeans about history would 
reveal the relevance of an organic community of the body politic in the South that 
shattered elsewhere in the late-1750s, ironically obscured or underplayed by pioneer 
French analysts Crèvecoeur and Tocqueville.  
The study indicates that the U.S. analytic emphasis on materialism, science and social 
history has obscured competing white world–views and approaches into history that, 
nevertheless, can still be unearthed and that should be listened to. This unearthing would 
not have succeeded without a thoroughgoing philosophical criticism of modernity and 
self–criticism. In addition, this unearthing would have failed if I had treated history as an 
organized discipline or topic that has nothing to do with philosophy, poetics or literature.  
This study has brought to light a number of interesting individuals, some of whom are 
very obscure even today, and their attitudes about history and modernity. The old 
caricature descriptions about white southerners as mainly stupid, racist, romancers or even 
fanatically religious should be put to the background when discussing this time period 
represented by them. Even political struggles should be of secondary importance, because 
turning history into a weapon of ideology almost always simplifies its content. Further, by 
that means, modernization or progress can never be questioned. If we take stock in 
modernization and progress, a whole category of ethics that is not based on abstract 
enlightened principles will be forgotten. This ethics has come more strongly to light 
recently when sensitivity about the Other has increased. The study’s decision to include 
European theories after the Second World War has therefore been a most helpful tool. 
Philosophically and poetically, they have made historical reality more complex than often 
supposed. These fields are not self–enclosed territories as traditionally perceived in the 
U.S., but rather present in what history is, what it means and, most importantly, how it is 
used or not used, thought about or not thought about, experienced and not experienced. 
Perhaps the most pressing suggestion for further research that emerged is the character 
of Jane Tayloe Lomax. Her role in ushering in a romantic way to look at history in 
Virginia was decisive: though it would take almost a decade for her ideas to take root 
more in Virginia, after her example there appeared several male authors about history 
particularly in Charleston who were similarly impressed with Romanticism. Lomax’s 
tragic life–she died of tuberculosis in her mid–20s–as well as her habit of travel would be 
an interesting topic. The second theme is a closer look into the relationship between 
Evangelicalism and southerners. This relationship has not been much studied to my 
knowledge in the early decades of the 19th century. On the basis of my research, the 
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southern evangelicals had far more middle class and New England cultural figurations, 
values and attitudes than average southern scholars and southern populace, at least about 
history. In addition, most southern intellects’ far more cautious, in places even atheist, 
attitude to religion would possibly be felt as an illuminating conflict. Since the 
evangelicals culturally and philosophically represented the new modern individuality, their 
differences to the older societal model–one that preceded the Whig rise to dominance in 
Britain in the analogy of chapter 6–would be interesting to examine. At any rate, that such 
”rabble” existed that differed from middle class modernity can be inferred from many 
southern opinions about history: a life of action and pleasures seemed commonplace, so 
often are they evoked, if sometimes in moralist overtones. Of more academic interest 
could be: 1. the early years of the University of Virginia. Several people–alumni, faculty 
or students–had very creative and advanced but at the same time very ancient views about 
history. 2. Dew’s relationship with Nicholas Wiseman, the reform–minded cardinal. The 
exact nature of the relationship remained a matter of speculation in the study but obviously 
they were linked. 3. The character and workings of Daniel Whitaker could use more 
fleshing out because of his key role in contemporary southern cultural discourse. 
The study has aimed at systematic treatment. It has tried to be as open–minded and 
lateral as possible about history and its use. It aimed to resist putting history into scientific 
and philosophical brackets and to explore the effects that science and philosophy have 
exacted on and in history on the figural level and how individuals themselves reinscribe 
history through them. From such reading processes, intellectual, ideological, semiotic and 
aesthetic opinions, their relations and their interpretations have been tentatively deduced 
and located. In terms of reliability, the study should stand scientific repetition. Of course, 
some interpretation is involved on the way, because the study chose not to impose any 
more systematic frame of analysis on its material rather than several loosely deductive 
readings performed on various pieces. By loose I mean that the study is wary of causation, 
offering instead correlations and advanced poetic causal suggestions. The study then 
proceeded to group these only very cautiously together, because the study wanted to resist 
explanatory formalization, or “straightening out” of data, as much as possible. Because 
history has to do with poetics but is not all poetic, this methodological flexibility was 
helpful. In addition, because the object of study did not have the same philosophy as me or 
modernity about history, and because history often overlapped with poetics in the period, 
it was more reliable not to deduce the analysis from such modern basis. I also tried to 
evade the often–repeated analysis on the Old South where it scores poorly in terms of 
modernity without sensitivity to its different dynamics of culture. In terms of validity, this 
study is by far the largest ever taken in terms of texts auditioned and examined with a 
singular interest in history. In the humanities, validity can never match that of the natural 
sciences and today, referentiality is not so obvious as to render it an irrelevant question. 
Nevertheless, the humanities scholar can still make, through hard work, reflection and 
comparison, advanced, if partly poetic, suggestions and conjectures about texts. These 
overlap with reality that is not pure, or without philosophy, language and poesy.  
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